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Introduction 
 
Gothic Discourses is crucially concerned with the effect that cultural theories have 
had so far on contemporary conceptions of Gothic fiction. As a consequence, its 
primary focus is on secondary (i.e. critical) texts. What it traces in those texts are the 
instances of theory influencing the conceptions of both particular Gothic writings and 
the Gothic mode per se. The perspective taken in the dissertation is thus close to that of 
New Historicism; it is structured largely around Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse 
and the production of objects through discourse. From this perspective, Gothic 
criticism, institutionalised as it is, itself functions within a certain discourse, or a set of 
discourses, and as a result it engages in sorting out which statements are true and false, 
which are possible and which not, and who has the right to speak, in a direct reference 
to its own discursive framework.  
The result of such a way of critical operation is construing the Gothic through a 
discursive paradigm that has a high propensity for appropriation and remodelling. In 
order to make those visible in the way Gothic fiction has been conceptualised over the 
last fifty years, we shall perceive the Gothic as a mode whose character is always 
contemporaneous in the sense that its shaped by the immediate historical context, shared 
by the writer and the reader.1 Moreover, we shall understand that context not as simply 
particular historical events, but as a set of discourses, social, political, economic and 
cultural, that were valid at the times when given texts were being written and read.2 As 
it appears, it is only through the consideration of such discourses that the Gothic may be 
appropriately contextualised and illuminated.  
What is understood by cultural theories are a number of broader socio-cultural 
perspectives that have been applied to the analysis of the Gothic since more or less the 
1970s. That was the time when a major methodological shift in the approaches to 
literary criticism took place. The most significant of those is psychoanalysis, which had 
been applied to the Gothic from the early twentieth century, but whose use in the 1970’s 
changed to embrace a more modern way of conducting literary analysis, and was 
                                                           
1
 Robert Miles, Gothic Writing, 1750-1820: A Genealogy (Manchester, New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2002), p. 3. 
2
 Miles, Gothic Writing, p. 4. 
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backed up with historicist-sociological research. Apart from it, other major theories 
applied to the Gothic are identified as Marxism, or neo-Marxism, feminism3 and gender, 
and then we may also speak of postructuralism, new historicism and postcolonialism.4 
Our immediate object of analysis, however, shall be the first three, that is 
psychoanalysis, Marxism and feminism, and that is due to the special status they have 
been ascribed in the Gothic studies, namely, that of the theories which brought the 
Gothic to its contemporary critical prominence. 
The reason for choosing to scrutinise secondary texts, critical readings from the late 
twentieth and the early twenty-first century, controversial as such a decision might 
seem, is the paradoxical status that the Gothic has attained nowadays. The mode has 
been undergoing a continuous and vibrant conceptualisation for about fifty years now. 
We are conscious of the fact that it constitutes a field of an immensely significant 
inquiry into the epochs in which particular texts were written and, perhaps above all, 
into the origins of the Western middle-class culture as we know it. Gothic classics, such 
as Ann Radcliffe or Mary Shelly, are taught as English literature without any objections 
being made, nor even thought of. Still, it appears extremely difficult to find an answer 
to even such a seemingly simple question as: ‘What is the Gothic?’ While various facets 
of what we perceive as constitutive of Gothic fiction are being under ongoing 
discussion, apparently, there has not emerged a set of clearly stated answers regarding 
them, in spite of years and years of research. This fact directs our attention from the text 
– the literary piece – to the critic who undertakes to illuminate it. The question to be 
posed is the following: why does the contemporary Gothic criticism represent, as it 
seems to do, the Gothic mode as a disjunctive mode, ungraspable in its variety and 
hybridity, and still not entirely accountable for, despite a surge of innovative and 
revealing surveys?  
We need to remember that what the critics do while reading and commenting upon a 
text of the past, is construct it in the first place. From a new historicist perspective, this 
is inevitable; yet, it can be especially visible in the case of a mode such as Gothic 
fiction. For the Gothic has always functioned, it seems, through representations. It is, 
thus, immensely difficult to excavate it, and the process itself demands special care and 
caution. On the other hand, the field of Gothic criticism has itself become recently 
                                                           
3
 Miles, Gothic Writing, p. 3. 
4
 Jerrold E. Hogle, “Theorizing the Gothic,” in Teaching the Gothic, ed. Anna Powell and Andrew Smith 
(Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 34. 
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aware of the fact the unconditioned application of theory to the Gothic may result in 
creating a yet further set of representations, instead of illuminating what the Gothic is. 
This is because theories are also historical entities, and reflect their own contemporary 
conditions. As a result, as we consider the contemporary representation of the Gothic as 
disjoined, hybrid, and subversive in its multiplicity, what we may be dealing with is a 
result of projecting the assumptions on which a theory is based on a text which belongs 
to a thoroughly different, and distant, context.5  
As a result, if we wish to illuminate the Gothic well, we must rely not solely on a 
theory, but also on a historicist enquiry.6 What is more, we need to begin with a 
reassessment of the work already done in the field which has been concerned with 
conceptualising the Gothic. There is a particularly sound reason for departing from such 
a vantage point. As it seems, Gothic criticism has largely re-construed the Gothic from 
its adopted perspectives, and especially that of psychoanalysis; consequently, what we 
presently often take to be an inherently Gothic quality may prove to be, in reality, a 
quality upon which a given theory is based, and to which it is thus sensitive.7 The result 
is the emergence of a specific Gothic theory, a representation upon which further 
representations are based, like Baudrillard’s simulacra.8 That is why a reconsideration 
of the contemporary conceptions of the Gothic may prove as illuminating with regard to 
Gothic fiction as a strictly literary analysis of Gothic texts.  
Following such critics as Robert Miles, Chris Baldick and Robert Mighall, we shall 
assume that the above-mentioned major theories, used to account for the Gothic, aim at 
establishing an atemporal truth. Consequently, applied to the Gothic text, they lead to its 
rewriting with attention being paid only to what is of interest to their own framework, 
and to obscuring, or proclaiming irrelevant, the features of the Gothic for which their 
framework cannot account. The result is a peculiar re-construction of the Gothic as an 
object. At the same time, this dissertation itself is founded on a theoretical premise, and 
thus might be seen as prone to carry out a similar process. However, our standpoint is 
not that theory is entirely irrelevant to the study of Gothic fiction, but rather that a 
theoretical analysis must always be qualified with references to the text’s immediate 
                                                           
5
 Miles notices this happens in the case of psychoanalysis, Marxism and feminism. Miles, Gothic Writing, 
p. 10. 
6
 Miles, Gothic Writing, pp. 3-4.  
7
 Miles, Gothic Writing, p. 10. 
8
 See e.g. Jean Baudrillard, “Simulacra and Simulations,” in Selected Writings, ed. Mark Poster (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), pp.166-184. 
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discursive background. In this way, we may be able to avoid imposing the theory’s own 
premises on the Gothic text. Hence, as we shall attempt at ‘deconstructing’ the 
contemporary conceptions of the Gothic, at dissecting the rhetoric applied by the critics, 
and tracing the assumptions about the Gothic they make beforehand, we shall also make 
an effort to provide an insight into the discourses which might have influenced both the 
Gothic and its immediate reception. 
What will undergo a particularly close scrutiny in the chapters to follow is, primarily, 
the assumption of the Gothic’s subversiveness. While the contemporary Gothic 
criticism works to represent the Gothic as ungraspable, it nonetheless seems to 
emphasise that subversion and transgression are its inherent features. Those, in turn, are 
reflected, on the one hand, by the indefinability of the Gothic (as a genre and as a 
mode), which is often explained on account of the Gothic’s ostensibly ‘natural’ refusal 
to abide by formal rules and respect generic boundaries, and, on the other hand, by the 
mode’s early marginalisation, which the critics take to be a sign of the Gothic’s inherent 
marginality, or even liminality. All in all, this dissertation attempts to show that the 
Gothic is not that much indefinable (though defining it demands of us to abandon the 
conventional ways in which we understand definition, and taking another perspective, 
more suitable for such a mode as the Gothic). Rather, its indefinability is a discursive 
function which is meant to allow the critics to define the mode the way they prefer, 
risking neither the emergence of a ‘grand narrative,’ nor exclusion on the basis of such a 
narrative. Also, its aim is to illustrate that the critics confound the assumed 
marginalisation of Gothic fiction with marginality, or the oppositional, abjected, or 
‘waste’ status, which they tend to see as the Gothic’s feature. Neither indefinability nor 
anti-Enlightenment attitude is inherent in Gothic fiction. Both, however, serve the 
critics to construct the Gothic so that it confirms their own standpoints, and thus serves 
their own agendas. 
 
Gothic Representations: Working with Parchments 
 
It should appear that working with the Gothic is like dealing with the subject which 
has been approached from so many angles that only the constant extension of its field (a 
phenomenon observable in the contemporary Gothic criticism, without a doubt) can 
unveil to the critic something new. Yet the benefit of the approach taken in this 
dissertation is that it allows for avoiding the propagation of new Gothic areas as it, 
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simultaneously, makes it possible to uncover interesting white spots on the Gothic map 
known so far. For the fact is that, while it is a terrain that has been trod by many, Gothic 
fiction is not a terrain that has been trod in each and every possible direction. Far from 
that. And this is, above all, because it is not an easy one.  
The situation is highly complex. Certainly, the Gothic is not easy to explore owing to 
its own character. Michel Foucault writes, in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” that 
genealogy “operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents 
that have been scratched over and recopied many times.”9 Certainly, when we think of 
the Gothic, we may have an impression that the same could be said about the Gothic 
critic. It is not an accident that Jerrold E. Hogle describes Gothic fiction as the literature 
of counterfeit, “grounded in fakery.”10 Let us remind ourselves that The Castle of 
Otranto, allegedly the first Gothic novel, became, most probably, the most famous for 
its two prefaces and the hoax they play with. Perhaps Horace Walpole does not use the 
exact word ‘parchment,’ but he speaks of the manuscript, from the bygone era, which 
constitutes a written version of a vernacular account which was, after centuries, 
translated by an English gentleman. In this way, is not his story presented as a confused 
document, recopied many times? And, as the hoax is uncovered and the author admits 
fakery, is not the critic, working on his text, dealing with a yet more confused 
‘parchment,’ scratched over at least twice? Then, as Clara Reeve modifies Walpole’s 
story to adapt it to her own vision of the useful supernatural, we may see that the text is 
scratched over again. Robert Miles is right to observe that Gothic motives and features 
are not simply rehearsed and recopied, but instead “Gothic texts revise one another, here 
opening up ideologically charged issues, there enforcing a closure.”11 As a result, we 
may assume that the Gothic genre is a field which resembles the genealogist’s 
parchment to a large extent. In fact, this extent is so large, that we can hardly perceive 
the Gothic as a genre. It appears much more adequate to view it as a mode. 
This is, however, not the only way in which we may perceive the Gothic as an 
entangled parchment, rewritten many times. Although the term itself was not used until 
the early twentieth century,12 Gothic fiction emerged at the times of Enlightenment, in 
the eighteenth-century Britain, which witnessed the extensive rewriting of history 
                                                           
9
 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 76. 
10
 Jerrold E. Hogle, “The Gothic Ghost of the Counterfeit and the Process of Abjection,” in A Companion 
to the Gothic, ed. David Punter (Malden, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), p. 293. 
11
 Robert Miles, Gothic Writing, p. 3. 
12
 Markman Ellis, The History of Gothic Fiction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), p. 12. 
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according to the Whiggish paradigm.13 Next, this very same period, as observes 
Douglas Lane Patey, was ‘rewritten’ by Romanticism. As he states, in many histories of 
literary criticism, the “evolution [of criticism from the eighteenth century to the 
nineteenth] itself (and thus the eighteenth century from which it began) has been 
construed according to Romanticism’s own account of its nature and origins.”14 To a 
scholar familiar with the field of Gothic studies, the notion that Romanticism ‘dealt 
away’ with the Gothic, pushing it out of the sphere of high art and the proper occupation 
of a learned person (a move later on reaffirmed by Leavisite literary criticism), is not at 
all an unfamiliar one. Dealing with the Gothic, then, may all the more seem to resemble 
uncovering layers of a recopied text on a parchment that is no longer entirely 
decipherable. 
In this way, we have already identified two planes on which the Gothic mode could 
be proven to be marked by white spots. Yet as we move from Gothic fiction itself to the 
way it has been represented by the critics in the past centuries, there emerges yet 
another plane which should appear worthy of looking at. Surely, a particular 
representation of the Gothic (or rather, once we remind ourselves that the Gothic as a 
fixed notion did not exist before the twentieth century, of the popular romance/novel 
internalizing the superstitious, the unreasonable, and the supernatural) is offered for a 
scrutiny by the eighteenth-century critics themselves. We might, as well, search for 
some representations from the period of time between the middle nineteenth and the 
early twentieth century. This option proves especially tempting if we remember that 
once we are told that a certain period did not produce any significant representations,15 
we are also faced with a representation. Realising this fact, in turn, brings to our 
attention yet another fact, namely, that what we are offered by the contemporary 
criticism of Gothic fiction, that is the criticism of the late twentieth and early twenty-
first century, is also a given representation of the Gothic, a given recopied ‘parchment.’ 
The issue of the influence which the adopted methodology has on interpretation is 
not a new one in the field of literary studies. In a way, this dissertation engages with is 
as well. This is because it departs from the scrutiny of the Gothic text and, instead, turns 
                                                           
13
 Chris Baldick and Robert Mighall, “Gothic Criticism,” in A Companion to the Gothic, ed. David Punter 
(Malden, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), pp. 219-220. 
14
 Douglas Lane Patey, “The institution of criticism in the eighteenth century,” in The Cambridge History 
of Literary Criticism, vol. 4: The Eighteenth Century, ed. H.B. Nisbet and Claude Rawson (Cambridge, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 7. 
15
 See, for instance, Jerrold E. Hoggles and Adam Smith’s “Revisiting the Gothic and Theory: An 
Introduction,” Gothic Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2009), p. 3. 
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to the scrutiny of the critical text that construes the Gothic. As it has been stated above, 
the Gothic is a difficult, riven terrain, primarily because it is not available to us in its 
entirety. Dealing with it, we are not granted an immediate insight into the peculiarities 
of its historical context, for we already look at that context through the lens of how the 
following centuries construed it. And even if we were granted such an insight, what we 
would witness would be a highly complex structure, inherent in a period following a 
major cultural, social, and political change. All the more, we should remain cautious 
while dealing with the artefacts of that period – and the Gothic certainly represents such 
an artefact. 
 
Theory: Tracing Discursive Inflections 
 
Adopting the ‘meta’ perspective and turning to the investigation of Gothic criticism 
instead of Gothic literature has major benefits. It may tell us something about the 
deficiencies of the contemporary methodologies applied to the interpretation of Gothic 
fiction, and the inaccuracies that result from the interpretive process. However, above 
all, it may enable us to recover something of the missing part of the parchment (or to 
explore obscure areas), and thus it may help us to better understand the literary 
phenomenon we are dealing with. Therefore, rather than at a scrutiny of given 
interpretations of Gothic literary texts, this dissertation aims at a scrutiny of the 
contemporary conceptions of the Gothic. These, in turn, demand of us investigating into 
how the contemporary cultural theories have been appropriated as the tools of the 
Gothic critic. 
There are particular reasons why cultural theories become our immediate focus. For 
one thing, it has already been pointed out, in the field of Gothic criticism, that the 
application of theory to the study of Gothic fiction may, and often does, result in 
miscomprehension. The examples of arguments that have been made over, 
approximately, the last two decades, coming mainly from such scholars as Robert 
Miles, Chris Baldick and Robert Mighall, or Markman Ellis, make us sensitive to the 
fact that theory will often, and inescapably, enforce its own premises on the text. But, 
for another thing, we also need to remember that the rise of theory had a major impact 
on the development and flourishing of Gothic criticism, and contributed largely to, if 
not actually made possible, the emergence of Gothic studies. This is the way in which it 
is often represented by critics who endeavour to sketch what we could call a history of 
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Gothic criticism, most notably Maggie Kilgour and Fred Botting. And thus, 
unsurprisingly perhaps, theory plays a crucial part in the narrative of the rise of the 
contemporary Gothic criticism.  
This dissertation draws from a number of critics identified nowadays as carrying out 
the new historicist type of inquiry into the Gothic. Of those, we have already 
enumerated Miles, whose application of Michel Foucault’s genealogy in his Gothic 
Writing makes him particularly close to us from the perspective of the adopted 
methodology, and Ellis, who dismisses psychoanalysis as a tool for scrutinising the 
Gothic.16 We shall also refer frequently to E.J. Clery and James Watt. However, the idea 
for this dissertation was inspired above all by Baldick and Mighall’s article “Gothic 
Criticism,” first published in 2000. Baldick and Mighall not only point to the fact that a 
strand of Gothic criticism (which they refer to as ‘Gothic Criticism’) has dehistoricised 
the Gothic and appropriated it to their own needs so that it could serve their own 
political agenda, and reconceptualised it so that political subversion and psychological 
depth have become its major qualities.17 They also emphasise the fact that the Gothic is 
an inherently bourgeois genre,18 not an anti-bourgeois or anti-Enlightenment one, and 
point to the ways in which the perception of Gothic fiction has been, since the early 
twentieth century, based on two crucial misconceptions: of the Gothic’s Romanticist 
alliance and of its confluence with psychoanalysis.19 As they point out,20 and we shall 
see, those misconceptions are still at the root of the contemporary conceptions of the 
Gothic discussed in this dissertation. In fact, they seem to have become inherent in what 
we shall call the theory of the Gothic – a theory of Gothic fiction which becomes a 
methodological tool of scrutiny in itself. It is also worth mentioning that Baldick and 
Mighall recognise the assertion of the bourgeois anxiety reflected in the Gothic to be 
mistaken, in this way undermining another a priori critical assumption about Gothic 
fiction. They also point to the fact that while many of the contemporary studies of the 
Gothic claim to be historicist, they nonetheless turn from history to psychology and 
dehistoricise Gothic fiction as soon as they turn out to rely on the assumption that the 
                                                           
16
 Ellis, The History of Gothic Fiction, p. 13. 
17
 Chris Baldick and Robert Mighall, “Gothic Criticism,” in A Companion to the Gothic, ed. David Punter 
(Malden, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), pp. 209-210.  
18
 Baldick and Mighall, “Gothic Criticism,” p. 226. 
19
 See the discussion on this topic in Bladick and Mighall, “Gothic Criticsm,” pp. 212-213. 
20
 See, for example, their discussion of David Punter. Baldick and Mighall, “Gothic Criticism,” pp. 214-
215. 
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Gothic reflects anxieties.21 This we shall notice as well in the course of our own 
analyses of critical texts.  
It is an interesting fact that Michel Foucault’s remarks on the repressive hypothesis 
seem to parallel Baldick and Mighall’s argument about the Gothic Criticism’s approach 
to the Gothic as presented above. In fact, as the two critics elaborate on the ways in 
which Gothic Criticism reworks the Gothic so that the mode may became a sign of 
subversion in the bourgeois cultural system, we may feel tempted to observe that this 
calls for a comparison with Foucault’s chapter of the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality, “We ‘Other Victorians.’” It is in this chapter that Foucault famously puts 
forth his analysis of the repressive hypothesis. And he makes the following observation 
on sex and its status as established by the prudish Victorians: “If sex is repressed, that 
is, condemned to prohibition, nonexistence, and silence, then the mere fact that one is 
speaking about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression. A person who holds 
forth in such language places himself to a certain extent outside the reach of power; he 
upsets established law; he somehow anticipates the coming freedom. This explains the 
solemnity with which one speaks of sex nowadays.”22 It does not seem a correct 
approach to substitute the Gothic for sex in this quotation, but nonetheless we may 
observe some parallels between the way Foucault speaks of the present-day willingness 
to liberate sex, and the way Baldick and Mighall speak of the critics willingness to deal 
with the Gothic. They state: “the cultural politics of modern critical debate grant to 
vindicators of the marginalised or repressed a special licence to evade questions of 
artistic merit.”23 What is more, as they discuss the figure of the vampire, so appealing to 
the contemporary criticism, they notice: “The ‘liberation’ that the vampire brings is 
principally sexual liberation, the basis of our own modernity and enlightenment.”24 
What they, thus, point to is that the Gothic becomes interesting to the critics for a 
particular ‘political’ reason, and speaking about it is seen as ‘a cause,’ an act of 
liberation. Similarly, speaking about sex becomes a matter of a political cause and 
liberation. In both cases, however, this cause is based on false presumptions. 
It is telling that Gothic criticism, on the one hand, construes its own history, and on 
the other, contests the conceptions of the Gothic as informed by the critic’s own socio-
                                                           
21
 Baldick and Mighall, “Gothic Criticism,” pp. 221-222. 
22
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 
Pantheon Books), p. 6. 
23
 Baldick and Mighall, “Gothic Criticism,” p. 210. 
24
 Baldick and Mighall, “Gothic Criticism,” p. 224. 
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political stance. What this testifies to is the fact that Gothic criticism may be seen as 
characterised by a particular sense of critical self-consciousness: the ability to look back 
upon its own body. Suzanne Rintoul’s review article “Gothic Anxieties: Struggling with 
a Definition” (2005) illustrates well this ability. The article is devoted to the question of 
how critics deal with defining Gothic fiction. It opens, rather tellingly, with a direct 
reference to Maggie Kilgour’s proclamation of her own experience of horror, triggered 
by the growth of Gothic criticism, at the end of the twentieth century. Within the length 
of a paragraph, Rintoul is quick to situate the origin of Kilgour’s horror in the common 
anxiety about the uncertain boundaries of the genre. As the latter sees the ‘swelling’ of 
Gothic criticism as a clearly positive phenomenon, stressing its recognition by the 
academic circle, she cannot be frightened by its poor quality, but rather by its 
“overwhelming quantity,”25 and for a good reason. Rintoul writes: “But what does 
Kilgour find so especially frightening about this growth in Gothic criticism? Is it that 
the Gothic itself narrativizes anxieties? Perhaps a more likely reason is that the anxieties 
thematized in the Gothic are so spectral, so indecipherable and sublimely broad. By 
extension, then, the ‘problem’ of too much Gothic criticism lies in the difficulty of 
defining—of containing—the genre.”26 Thus identified, the problem of ‘the excess’ of 
Gothic criticism is further on summarised in the following way: “just as individual 
narratives compete with each other within the genre to represent fragmentation and 
disjunction, so criticism of the genre follows this same trend to represent the genre itself 
as fragmented and disjointed.”27 In other words, the less straightforward the 
characteristics of the Gothic genre, the greater the dispersion of the ways in which it can 
be approached; the result is the surge of Gothic criticism. Analogously, we should say 
that the greater the surge of criticism, the greater the dispersion of yet further possible 
ways of theorising the mode, and hence – the fewer the possibilities of reaching an 
agreement over a meta-definition. 
The question of definition is one of the major topics discussed in this dissertation. 
The assumption of the Gothic’s openness as a category appears to be particularly 
characteristic of the field of Gothic criticism. However, Rintoul is valuable to us since 
she also passes an immensely intriguing comment on the figure of the critic, presenting 
him or her as an active partaker in the shaping of his or her own object. And, as we shall 
                                                           
25
 Suzanne Rintoul, “Gothic Anxieties: Struggling with a Definition,” Eighteenth-century Fiction, vol. 15, 
no. 4 (2005), p. 701. 
26
 Rintoul, “Gothic Anxieties,” p. 701. 
27
 Rintoul, “Gothic Anxieties,” p. 702. 
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claim, the self-consciousness of the contemporary Gothic critic is one which takes its 
fullest form while it proceeds towards the complete realisation of Botting’s seemingly 
plain and unsurprising statement: that critical engagements with the Gothic are “clearly 
affected by changing critical positions.”28 To have it our way, we could say that the 
Gothic critics show the greatest consciousness of their own field and status as they 
realise that it is the critics themselves who construct their objects of study. This, as we 
shall pose, however, is not always realised by them, which results in misconceiving the 
Gothic and re-writing, re-construing, or re-constructing it in fact, in accordance with the 
assumptions underlying the applied methodology. On the other hand, once fully 
realised, it ought to allow for a detailed analysis of what the Gothic actually is, and how 
it can be best illuminated. 
The considerations of the critical self-consciousness, its manifestations and 
implications for the analysis of how Gothic criticism construes, organises and actively 
re-works its own field are the major focus of Chapter I, “The History of Gothic 
Criticism,” and Chapter I, “Gothic Counter-Histories.” Chapter I is devoted to an 
interrogation of the available representations of the history of Gothic criticism. Such 
representations are offered, sometimes indirectly, in a number of self-reflexive texts – 
articles, chapters, subchapters, very often introductions and prefaces – in which critics 
undertake to account for the development of their field. As we scrutinise them, our basic 
assertion is that we may point to a particular functional paradigm according to which 
the perception of the history of Gothic criticism is often organised. This paradigm, in 
turn, may be linked with the widely assumed subversiveness of the Gothic mode. 
Significantly, change, rather than steady evolution, emerges as an important dynamics 
in the discussed ‘Gothic’ histories, the force propelling, if not enabling, the achievement 
of the contemporary status of both Gothic fiction and its critic. Hence, as the Gothic 
histories considered in Chapter I all seem to depend on a clearly stated moment of 
cutting off from the earlier scholarship, the paradigm which governs them will be 
termed the differentiation paradigm. 
Chapter II, in turn, considers the critical self-consciousness as manifested in the 
course of the on-going debate on the applicability of cultural theories to the Gothic, or, 
in other words, on the available ways of theorising it. What becomes especially visible 
when we turn to this matter is the growing awareness that the choice of a critical 
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approach has its impact on the perception of a work, and that a critical reading of a text 
may prove informed by the adopted methodological perspective to the point of actually 
being re-written by the critic. What the critic sees in a text, in other words, are the traits 
(sometimes projected rather than present) that the adopted methodology is sensitive to, 
and that allow themselves to be summarised and accounted for according to the theory 
which was the basis for devising the methodology. Simultaneously, what falls outside 
the spectrum of theory’s interest vanishes from sight. Elaborating on this type of critical 
self-consciousness shall further on prove vital to our understanding of the contemporary 
conceptions of the Gothic mode. 
Chapter III, “Constructing the Gothic: Gothic Criticism and Discourse,” elaborates 
on the methodological approach that we take while analysing critical texts. The basis for 
our methodology is Michel Foucault’s theory of discourse and his remarks on the 
formation of objects. The usefulness of Foucault to our considerations stems not only 
from the fact that he pinpoints the value that is nowadays ascribed to the liberation from 
repression allegedly enforced by the bourgeoisie. It lies also in the fact that Foucault 
theorises the very period in which the Gothic emerges, and the fact that he stresses, in 
The Archaeology of Knowledge, that objects are always constructs. But above all, 
Foucault theorises discourse, and discourse proves to be a crucial tool for reassessing 
contemporary conceptions of the Gothic.  
A considerable portion of Chapter III is devoted to the consideration of the notion of 
the so called ‘overinterpretation.’ In the course of the discussion, we look at this notion 
from the perspectives offered by such prominent figures as Umberto Eco, Jonathan 
Culler and Richard Rorty (whose exchange of views in the volume Interpretation and 
Overinterpretation of Tanner Lectures in Human Values prove immensely valuable to 
us at that point) in order to establish the perspective on meaning that is to be adopted in 
the dissertation. According to this perspective, we cannot fully account for Gothic 
fiction without acknowledging that part of the ‘meaning’ of the text is always 
conditioned by the specific historical background of the author and the reader. In other 
words, we are not be able to understand the Gothic and the peculiarities of its riven 
terrain without historicising it. However, the way we need to historicise it is not limited, 
as Robert Miles’ Gothic Writing shows, to referring Gothic fictions to particular 
historical events. Instead, we need to refer to its own historical, discursive context. 
It is at this point that Michel Foucault proves particularly useful to us. The way he 
conceptualises discourse, in, above all, his short lecture “The Order of Discourse”, is 
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vital to our understanding of what conditioned the actual significance and signification 
that Gothic fictions might have had for their immediate reading audiences. It is also 
vital for our understanding of what meaning could not be ‘uttered’ by Gothic texts in 
their immediate discursive background, and should be, consequently, ascribed to the 
immediate discursive background of present-day critics. For present-day critics also 
operate within a general critical order of discourse, as Paul A. Bové makes it clear.29 
Interestingly, the two major cultural theories which have been frequently applied to 
Gothic fiction, psychoanalysis and Marxism, are seen by Foucault himself as examples 
of discourses as such.30 As a result, if not properly qualified by the recognition of the 
original discursive background(s) of the Gothic, the conceptions of the mode construed 
by the critics who use cultural theories are inescapably prone to appropriations and re-
constructions resulting from the demands of the adopted discursive framework. 
Chapter IV, “Foucault: The Monster(s) and the Critics” (which playfully establishes 
a link with J.R.R. Tolkien’s early meta-critical lecture of 1936, titled “Beowulf: The 
Monsters and the Critics,” treating on the critical reception of Beowulf31) considers 
examples of the ways in which Foucault’s theory has been applied so far to the scrutiny 
of the Gothic. First, it is concerned with how Miles utilises Foucault’s genealogy in 
Gothic Writing and, simultaneously, comments on the similarities and differences 
between Miles and the approach taken in this dissertation. Then, however, it turns to the 
scrutiny of the ways in which the discourse of Gothic criticism is capable to adjust 
theory so that is appears to confirm preconceived assumptions about the character of 
Gothic fiction. In a sense, then, Chapter IV shows how a theory of the Gothic, 
established by now, influences the critical reading grounded in a cultural theory, 
allowing for the appropriation of the critic’s own tools. To be more precise, it looks at 
certain instances of using Foucault’s texts by Fred Botting and Dale Townshend, and 
analyses them in order to show, in each of the cases, how the application of Foucault’s 
thought is being subtly conditioned by the assumptions about the Gothic made 
beforehand. Those assumption are often traced, in turn, to the impact of psychoanalysis 
on the Gothic studies and the assumption about the Gothic’s anti-Enlightenment drive.  
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In the course of Chapter I, we are able to see that the assumption of the Gothic’s 
subversion underlies the historical narrative within the differentiation paradigm. In the 
final two chapters of the dissertation, we attempt at undermining this assumption 
approaching it from two different angles: that of the Gothic’s assumed indefinability 
(which we have already pointed to above) and that of its seeming anti-middle-class and 
anti-Enlightenment attitude, resulting in its alleged marginalisation.  
Chapter V, “Gothic Definition(s): Shopping for the Gothic,” is devoted to the 
question of the Gothic’s definition. In it, we view the Gothic’s alleged resistance to 
classification, denying of generic boundaries, and formal transgression as a discursive 
function. What links the consideration of the Gothic definition to the question of 
subversion is the matter of liberation. We assert that the assumed indefinability of the 
Gothic stems less from the actual impossibility of finding common axes for the Gothic 
material (these could be, for instance, established in the form of genealogies, as 
suggested by Miles32) than from a fear of a grand narrative33 that might limit the number 
of available paths for the scrutiny of the mode (and, thus, constrain the mode itself as 
well). This fear, as we shall see, is entirely congruent with the history of Gothic 
criticism as construed by the differentiation paradigm. Moreover, what is in fact 
achieved through assuming the Gothic’s indefinability is a creation of a paradoxically 
unified (under the heading ‘Gothic fiction’), vast and potentially unlimited sphere for 
constructing individual definitions that might enjoy an equal status and coexist while 
proving to be mutually exclusive.  
Chapter V analyses a number of such individual definitions. It begins with a critic 
from the period of early Gothic scholarship, J.M.S. Tompkins, and then it contrast her 
definition of the Gothic with that of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, a critic of the borderline 
between the earlier and contemporary criticism, as established by the differentiation 
paradigm’s history of the Gothic criticism. In this way, it attempts to undermine the 
paradigmatic assumption that there was a major liberating rift between the late 
twentieth-century criticism and that of the mid and early century. Next, we move on to 
discuss a number of subsequent critics, beginning with David Punter and ending with 
Anne Williams, in order to show that each time the critic attempts at defining the Gothic 
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(and especially via the application of cultural theories), he or she actually readjusts it to 
the discursive framework adopted. Meanwhile, as the critics work to include more and 
more literary works into the field of the Gothic, the definitions they propose 
increasingly obscure the mode’s possible limits. All in all, we attempt to show that 
while the critics uphold the general assumption that the Gothic cannot be limited for the 
sake of preserving its multifaceted, complex nature from appropriation, they in fact 
work actively to appropriate, limit and reshape it according to their own projected 
needs. 
Finally, Chapter VI, “Gothic Fiction of the Eighteenth Century and the Narrative of 
Marginalisation,” is aimed at reassessing the assumption of the Gothic’s anti-
Enlightenment and anti-bourgeois drive. Its major object of analysis is the commonly 
accepted historical account that the Gothic has been, on the grounds of its representing a 
social threat, a genre marginalised already by the eighteenth-century critics. To this end, 
the chapter draws on mainly two introductory texts by Fred Botting, his preface to the 
collective volume The Gothic and the general introduction to Critical Concepts Series’ 
Gothic, written together with Dale Townshend. Again, similarly to the indefinability of 
the Gothic, its marginalisation is seen as a discursively functional notion. While the 
contemporary critics take liberation of the Gothic to be one of the major bedrocks of 
their own modern success in the academy, the fact is that they themselves often 
establish the value of Gothic fiction as grounded in its status of ‘culture’s waste,’ or 
abject. What the Gothic, thus, is priced for by them is the fact that it reveals what 
culture throws off and represses at the time when the middle-class identity is still in 
formation, or what this culture hails as its opposite, against which it may define itself. In 
this way, the marginalisation of the Gothic becomes the proof for the mode’s inherent 
marginality (characterised by subversion and transgression of what is acceptable), and 
this, in turn, becomes the basis for the mode’s cultural value. Consequently, as we shall 
see, psychoanalysis does account for the contemporary conception of the Gothic to a 
large degree. 
Following in the footsteps of Baldick and Mighall, we approach thus delimited 
conception of the Gothic with the assumption that the mode, quite on the contrary, 
participates in the operation of the positive mechanism of power. To this end, we refer 
to the new historicist accounts of the rise of Gothic fiction of Emma Clery and James 
Watt to show how the Gothic, in fact, actually actively worked to internalise the various 
empowered discourses of the eighteenth-century, including the critical one. Most 
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importantly, however, we attempt at contextualising the eighteenth-century critical 
responses to the Gothic with the aid of Gary Day’s Literary Criticism: A New History.  
In general Day is interested primarily in the criticism of poetry and drama, and not 
the novel/romance form. However, his approach is immensely useful to our 
considerations, primarily because such a focus on the prevailing critical trends outside 
of the new form of the novel directs our attention to the very gaps and fissures in the 
critical discourse which actually make the rise of the Gothic both possible and an 
entirely eighteenth-century affair. In the first place, Day conceptualises the eighteenth-
century criticism as highly influenced by the new idiom of commerce. This, together 
with Clery’s considerations of the ways in which the rise of supernatural fiction was 
triggered by commercialism, allows us to see that whereas the Gothic must have been, 
inescapably, rejected from the perspective of the utilitarian and moral function of the 
novel, of the exemplary historicism, and of neoclassicism, its emergence in the form of 
Walpole’s The Castle of Otranto was fully justified from the perspective of the rising 
economic discourse. This, in turn, as various ways in which the Gothic copies and 
reaffirms the major middle-class trends, customs and beliefs, precludes seeing the mode 
as an anti-bourgeois one. Furthermore, both Day’s considerations of neoclassicism, taste 
and imagination as eighteenth-century means to ground literary value in the face of the 
commercialisation of literature, and Clery’s emphasis laid on the operation of civic 
humanism, may serve to undermine the assumption that the Gothic was an anti-
Enlightenment mode. As we shall see, the Enlightenment period in Britain was a period 
of major discursive shifts and clashes, of which the Gothic is painfully aware, and 
which it reflects to a large degree. Hence, it is ostensibly rooted in the era which 
spawned it, bearing a mark of this era’s inconsistencies, crucial problems, and dramatic 
changes. And it is in testifying to these, as we shall claim, that its actual value appears 
to lie. 
In the course of the considerations and analyses carried out in Gothic Discourse, we 
wish to show that Gothic criticism indeed actively re-works the Gothic. This, in turn, 
takes place through the process of object formation as described by Foucault. Whenever 
the Gothic is approached through a cultural theory, and the approach is not qualified by 
the consideration of the mode’s discursive background, its conception is constructed 
according to the discursive framework from within which the critic works. The result is 
a re-shaping of the Gothic which, indeed, tends to obscure our understanding of the 
mode instead of illuminating what the Gothic actually is. 
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A note about the usage of terms. 
The following dissertation does not assume the Gothic to belong specifically to the 
category of either novel or romance. Hence, the form ‘novel/romance’ was used in the 
Introduction. In the chapters that follow, we use both forms ‘the Gothic novel’ and ‘the 
Gothic romance’ to refer to the Gothic mode. This is for the reason that, as critics often 
observe, ‘novel’ and ‘romance’ were not thoroughly clear-cut notions at the time of the 
rise of Gothic fiction, and even today one may encounter various positions on whether 
Gothic works should be referred to as novels or romances (consider the example of 
Botting and Townshend, who would perceive the Gothic as romance and of Kilgour, 
who titles her study The Rise of the Gothic Novel. In a way, the choice of the particular 
term may also be seen as reflecting the critic’s own agenda). Establishing which is more 
appropriate is beyond the scope of this dissertation, and, in fact runs counter to its logic. 
However, often, choosing to use one of the terms, we follow the particular critic under 
discussion.
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Chapter I 
A History of Gothic Criticism 
 
In the introduction we have already recognised that the turn towards theory in literary 
studies in the late twentieth century is identified as the basis for the emergence of 
Gothic criticism as we know it today. The following chapter discusses the way in which 
a major strand of contemporary Gothic criticism organises its history and the 
relationship between contemporary Gothic criticism and criticism of the past. As a 
result, the chapter presents us with a general paradigm for the representation of Gothic 
criticism’s history, which is called the differentiation paradigm further on. The basis for 
historical representation within this paradigm is the fact that the contemporary criticism 
cuts itself off from earlier scholarship on the basis of its assumed positive approach 
towards the Gothic, more appropriate methodology, and the drive towards liberation. 
Next, the chapter discusses David Punter’s The Literature of Terror as a seminal study 
within the paradigm, and points to the fact that the study does not represent an 
emergence of an entirely new perspective on the Gothic, which could be 
straightforwardly contrasted with the former one. It also analyses a general 
representation of the critical history as all-embracing thanks to the assumption that the 
Gothic is a subversive mode, and, finally, brings about some individual cases of 
departures from this general representation. These considerations will allow us to see 
that the differentiation paradigm is a highly functional paradigm for representing Gothic 
criticism and its past in the field of Gothic studies, for it gives this field a sense of unity 
despite the field’s inherent multifariousness. At the end, however, we shall see that the 
matter of how criticism represents its history, nonetheless, depends on the perspective it 
adopts and on its perceived aims. 
 
1.1. The Differentiation Paradigm 
 
It was already mentioned that a particularly interesting characteristic of Gothic 
criticism is its self-consciousness. This characteristic, the self-consciousness of Gothic 
criticism, may be observed on several different levels of critical activity. It is 
manifested, in the first place, in the way in which Gothic criticism has grown capable 
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and willing to look upon its own body. As we may observe, the Gothic critic has a well-
defined sense of belonging to a certain group which occupies a certain place among 
other strands of literary criticism, and is able to determine the past of this group, and 
make speculations about its future. Such a critical self-consciousness can be detected in 
the plethora of available student companions to the Gothic, treating its history, critical 
approaches, and applicable ways of reading. It is their editors who are obliged in the 
first place to chew over and over again the questions of “What is Gothic?” and “What is 
the significance of Gothic fiction for the contemporary Western culture?” Next, the self-
consciousness of the Gothic critic is also epitomized by the fact that there are available 
books on the methodology of teaching the Gothic, such as Diane Long Hoeveler and 
Tamar Heller’s Approaches to Teaching Gothic Fiction and Anna Powell and Andrew 
Smith’s Teaching the Gothic. This very same self-consciousness becomes evident, too, 
if we consider the wide range of topics elaborated on in Gothic Studies, the academic 
journal devoted to the study of the Gothic. And finally, this very same self-
consciousness proves undeniable as soon as we realize that there has been launched a 
debate over the suitability of the very critical approaches and prerogatives which once 
allowed the Gothic to become recognised as a fully privileged literary mode. 
Critical self-consciousness manifests itself primarily in the ways in which Gothic 
criticism has structured its own history. As a consequence, such sources as Maggie 
Kilgour’s final chapter of The Rise of the Gothic Novel, “The Rise of Gothic Criticism,” 
or Fred Botting’s introduction to his widely known Gothic, both discussed below, 
cannot serve the purpose of our considerations too well. What both of them testify to 
and illustrate is that the Gothic critic, a discrete entity, is a self-conscious critic. Kilgour 
presents us with a brief yet telling account of the twentieth-century history of Gothic 
criticism, simultaneously giving some interesting evaluative comments. Botting, co-
editing the Critical Concepts series on the Gothic (a four-volume collection of Gothic 
criticism, published in 2004) with Dale Townshend, as well as writing on his own, 
contributes greatly to the representation of a certain path of the development of the 
Gothic critic and his or her place in the general field of literary criticism. The overall 
picture he sketches may be seen as reinforced by other critical accounts – or 
undermined, if we consider undertones detectable in them. Andrew Smith, Jerrold E. 
Hogle, Donna Heiland and others also provide us with exemplary histories of Gothic 
criticism, and shall be mentioned in the course of this chapter.  
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Let us now turn to the representation of the history of Gothic criticism offered by the 
abovementioned critics. Both Kilgour’s overview of Gothic criticism in The Rise of 
Gothic Novel and Botting’s introduction to his popular Gothic (1996) locate the 
beginning of the criticism devoted to Gothic fiction in the early twentieth century. The 
key names of early critics that appear in both texts are those of Edith Birkhead, J.M.S. 
Tompkins, Michael Sadleir, Eino Railo, Mario Praz and, finally, Montague Summers. 
For Botting, Davendra P. Varma comes to represent the mid-century critical interest in 
Gothic fiction, and further contributions from the 1960s and 1970s come from G. R. 
Thompson, Robert Hume, David Platzner, Robert Kiely and Masao Miyoshi. To that 
list, Andrew Smith, in his brief introductory sub-chapter in Gothic Literature (2007), of 
the Edinburgh Critical Guides to Literature series, adds Dorothy Scarborough as an 
early critic. What he also adds is a strong emphasis on the significance of the names on 
the list after 1979, which are those of David Punter and Rosemary Jackson, who 
published their studies on Gothic fiction at the dawn of the 1980s. Punter’s work, Smith 
asserts, inaugurates “the modern era of theoretically informed criticism,” as well as 
“[provides] the first rigorous analysis of the Gothic tradition and suggested ways in 
which Gothic texts could be read through a combination of Marxist and 
psychoanalytical perspectives.”1 After Punter, as Smith states, there came “many 
groundbreaking contributions,”2 which helped to shape the major contemporary 
approaches to the Gothic. Botting, having enumerated Punter as well, identifies the 
major of these as the works of Franco Moretti, Ronald Paulson, Ellen Moers, Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick, Jerrold Hogle and Robert Miles, in the order given.3 
Both Botting and Kilgour devote their attention to various stages of the development 
of Gothic criticism, though each of them has a different method. While Botting 
enumerates particular contributions to the study of the Gothic from the 1920s to 1990s, 
Kilgour moves from the early critics to a surrealist, André Breton, and discusses how 
the Gothic had been dominated by readings rooted in psychoanalysis until the 
introduction of Marxist and feminist approaches at the end of the twentieth century,4 
without identifying any further specific names. Smith, over ten years later, organises his 
survey of Gothic criticism in an alternative way. The fact that he jumps, at least at the 
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beginning of his subchapter, from Varma (the 1950s) to Punter (the 1980s), without 
mentioning any other names in between, and pinpoints the precise moment at which the 
contemporary criticism was launched (the year 1980), is telling, as it uncovers a general 
assumption at work. This general assumption emerges in full shape in the following 
statement from Botting’s preface to The Gothic: 
 
[until] recently, with the rapid expansion of critical studies of the 
genre, the value of gothic texts has not been in doubt: judgements 
have concurred, less stridently maybe, with eighteenth-century 
criticism. Though returning in popular forms for over two centuries, 
gothic fiction received little critical examination other than as literary 
curiosities, objects of antiquarian and even arcane scholarly interest. 
Any value discerned was no more than negative value: bad forms, 
styles and stories, like the villains, vices, crimes and monstrosities that 
populated them, at best served as cautionary examples allowing 
readers to distinguish what was aesthetically pleasing and uplifting 
from what was demonstrably unacceptable.5 
 
 
We may observe how a demarcating line is being introduced here between the 
contemporary Gothic criticism and the prior criticism that engaged – infrequently and 
with reserve, we should perhaps add – in the considerations of Gothic fiction.  
The premise that the situation described above, one of critical neglect and dismissal, 
has been reversed, and a new era of Gothic criticism has been launched, underlies the 
position of both Kilgour and Botting. If we depart from this premise, the history of 
Gothic criticism can be divided first of all into two basic phases: that of disparagement, 
neglect and distance, and that of acknowledgement, embrace and incorporation. This 
becomes clear at once as Kilgour describes the attitude of the early critics as, in most 
cases, characterised by “still a somewhat apologetic tone, reflecting a slight 
embarrassment in their own interests in the lurid subject.”6 She writes: “Edith Birkhead, 
for example, ends her study by trivialising her subject as a form that doesn’t ‘reflect real 
life, or reveal character, or display humour’ (which she presumably thinks are things 
worth doing), but is ‘full of sentimentality, and it stirred the emotions of pity and thrill’ 
but only in order finally ‘to produce a thrill.’”7 Botting, similarly, states that the critical 
interest in the Gothic was initially limited to treating it as a peripheral incarnation of the 
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developing novel form.8 As he observes, in early critical works the Gothic is frequently 
discussed in the context of Romanticism and, hence, limited to a darker version of a 
major current: “[b]roader definitions of Romanticism, like those by Eino Railo and 
Mario Praz, include Gothic writings, but as examples of less ideal themes of violence, 
incest, passion and agony: Gothic becomes the dark or negative side to Romanticism.”9 
A slightly different case could be that of Summers, who is referred to by Kilgour as 
propagating the Gothic as a serious art form, thus inverting the established hierarchy of 
literary tastes in a truly Walpolean style.10 However, although his writings, similarly to 
those of Varma in the mid-century, are seen as aimed at recuperating the Gothic,11 they 
are still found to construe Gothic fiction as “the means against which the detritus of the 
modern fictional tradition may be measured,” or to prove “defensively apologetic,” and 
as such join Botting and Townshend’s extended list of critics whose works are 
underpinned by the discourse of disparagement (even if unintended) up till the 1980s.12 
In the abovementioned critical account, the division between the period of 
disparagement and embrace is clearly paralleled by a division between methodological 
stances. Summers constitutes a good example here. Kilgour notes that he discusses the 
Gothic as an escapist form by insisting on its conservative and reactionary rather than 
revolutionary inclinations, the latter ascribed to it by surrealist critics such as Breton. As 
she points out, the chief function of Gothic fiction is, according to Summers, escapist: in 
the Gothic, the dullness of this world is exchanged for something more, and “a longing 
for the past” is satisfied.13 Botting, on the other hand, sees Summers, just as he also sees 
Varma, as finding the Gothic appealing due to its anti-realistic and anti-rationalist 
character, “its quest […] for a realm of mysterious, mystical and holy.”14 The anti-
rationalist and pro-Romantic representation of the Gothic construed in this way 
becomes the basis for Chris Baldick and Robert Mighall’s placing of Summers, Varma 
and Punter in a line of succession.15 As a result, we might view the contemporary 
criticism as indebted to both critics of the previous period. However, if we return to the 
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histories sketched by Kilgour and Botting, we will quickly notice that the early works 
are still presented as ‘other,’ even if their influence is acknowledged in passing. 
According to Kilgour, Summers not only irritates the contemporary critic with his 
pompous tone, but also represents the conservative and reactionary critical stance 
opposed to the one which in fact established the importance of the Gothic. According to 
her, it was surrealism, with its ‘confusion’ of reality and art, its seeing the Gothic as 
revolutionary and subversive, that first opened Gothic fiction to psychoanalytical 
scrutiny, one of the chief theories applied to the Gothic ever after.16 In this way, 
Summers is distanced from contemporary criticism on the grounds of his assumptions.  
A similar distancing takes place with regard to other critics associated with the 
period of disparagement. According to Botting and Townshend, their work is largely 
based on the assumption that  
 
[literary value] is […] measured in terms of enduring human qualities, 
instincts and emotions and thereby displays its foundations in the 
essentialist discourse of liberal humanism. Transcending class, 
history, culture and gender, the genre taps into emotions and instincts 
that have become crystallised as universal, timeless, fundamentally 
human in their depth and darkness. Davendra Varma […] goes so far 
as to assume that all readers of Gothic are male, Anglo-Saxon, and of 
sufficiently bourgeois a social origin as to be afforded the luxury of 
whiling away many precious hours before the comfort of a well-
fuelled heart with nothing more than a Gothic romance in hand […] 
Human nature and instincts are repeatedly invoked to explain the 
appeal of Gothic tales.17 
 
 
By contrast, the readings of the Gothic which mark the rise of the contemporary Gothic 
criticism – readings described as materialist, feminist and poststructuralist – represent a 
turn from essentialism to the socio-political context.18 
The phase of Gothic criticism extending from the 1920s to approximately 1980 is 
thus described as characterised by its overall hesitant attitude towards the Gothic and a 
critical perspective negated by the contemporary literary criticism. The contemporary 
phase, by contrast, acknowledges the worth of the Gothic as much as it recognises its 
own indebtedness to the change in literary criticism as such. As Botting admits, the 
approach taken by Gothic was made possible by the developments and changes that 
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took place in the very theory of literature, culture, and indeed criticism in the second 
half of the twentieth century.19 Donna Heiland quotes Jonathan Culler to identify the 
changes more precisely. Allowing literary texts by previously marginalised groups, such 
as women or people of colour, to enter reading syllabuses; moving away from the 
discipline-based structure of departments; and adopting new tools for reading, borrowed 
from linguistics, psychoanalysis, feminism, Marxism, structuralism and deconstruction 
all constituted an impetus to transform the field of literary criticism into critical theory, 
interested in the first place in how texts generate meanings.20 With these changes taking 
place, the Gothic soon underwent a re-evaluation. Putting the new emphasis not on 
“timeless human condition” but on “distinct and particular socio-political contexts”21 
made it possible to see the Gothic as valuable and worth studying due to “its revelation 
of social conditions.”22 
Apart from its attitude and critical assumptions, the contemporary Gothic criticism 
differentiates itself from the earlier scholarship on yet another ground. Apart from 
approaching the Gothic in a distanced manner and from now abandoned critical 
premises, the earlier phase of Gothic criticism is also assumed to operate within a 
repressive, limiting framework. The origins of that framework are traced back to the 
eighteenth-century early critical engagements with the newly emergent Gothic novel. 
According to Botting, “[b]etween 1970 and 1810 critics were almost univocal in their 
condemnation of what was seen as an unending torrent of popular trashy novels. 
Intensified by fears of radicalism and revolution, the challenge to aesthetic values was 
framed in terms of social transgression: virtue, propriety and domestic order were 
considered to be under threat.”23 Such an outrage at Gothic novels, in turn, had its 
source in the rules dictated by the Enlightenment aesthetics and rationalism.24 Botting 
notes that, at the time of its rise, the Gothic was associated to some degree with a given 
representation of the barbaric, superstitious Gothic past, one ‘produced’ by the 
dominant paradigm to stand for the opposite of the rational, ordered and Enlightened 
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present.25 As a descendant of earlier romances, it was also seen as threatening the 
promoted value model of polite society. From the perspective of the social project 
undertaken by the eighteenth-century criticism – criticism concerned primarily with the 
effect of reading on individuals – which viewed literature as potentially ideological and 
able to reproduce a given set of values on the one hand, but capable of subversion and 
depravation on the other,26 Gothic fiction was an aberration to be dismissed.  
Simultaneously, however, its rebuttal served a productive function, for it allowed to 
promote a certain (useful) type of literature. Botting and Townshend assert that the 
romance and the Gothic “played, albeit through a process of recoil and negative 
reaction, a crucial and productive role in the development of aesthetic criticism and the 
invention and consolidation of the novel form.”27 Having identified Gothic fiction as 
belonging to the category of the romance, they sketch the history of criticism in which 
Gothic romance becomes excluded as it does not ‘fit in,’ or fulfil the conditions 
acclaimed by the critical mainstream. At the same time, they assert, its negative 
representation becomes clearly functional for the dominant critical framework as, 
through becoming the framework’s opposite, the Gothic romance allows the novel to 
define its own distinctive features. As they see it, the eighteenth-century critics, 
favouring the realistic novel, represent the Gothic romance as a threat. If the novel is to 
serve the social function of moral education and prove useful on condition it remains 
didactic, the Gothic romance does exactly the opposite: it paints immorality in much too 
bright colours, or erases the difference between vice and virtue.28 Consequently, it 
‘produces’ the “reader-turned-monster, a subject of inflamed passion or the passive 
receptacle to a dangerous excess held forever in reserve.”29 In this way, the general 
critical frame turns out to be repressive. For example, if Radcliffe’s romances avoid 
sharp criticism, it is because they abide by the rules set for the proper literary creation, 
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rationalizing the supernatural and making heroines learn the lesson of discipline.30 At 
the same time, however, castigating Gothic romances is productive: it helps to encode 
Enlightened, chaste and virtuous readers, capable of internalising the rules for proper 
conduct and morality, as the eighteenth-century critics would envision them.31 
As it follows from Botting and Townshend’s account, if the Enlightenment critics 
approach the Gothic in a repressive manner, constructing and using its representation to 
productively pursue their own ends, then a similar project is undertaken by the first 
generation Romantics. Here, the process of differentiation also takes place by means of 
negative representation and definition. Botting and Townshend state: “[the] diseased 
and corrupting mechanisms of Gothic novel writing and reading are placed at the 
furthest possible remove from Romantic vision, recalling the earlier sense in which the 
novel, through occupying a lower hierarchical position than poetry upon the eighteenth-
century ordering of the aesthetic, defined and constituted itself in terms of its perceived 
differences from the romance form.”32 The paradox, however, is that in doing so 
Romanticism obliterates the common origins it shares with the Gothic, namely the 
interest in nature, imagination and the sublime.33 What takes place through such a 
separation and the resulting denunciation of Gothic romances is the establishment of the 
familiar distinction between high art, represented by (chiefly poetic) forms accessible to 
the elites, and popular forms, which are meant to satisfy the basest demands of mass 
culture.34 In a hierarchy organised in such a way, the Gothic becomes inscribed in the 
category of “a debased and debasing aesthetic mode” of the low, profane, marginal and 
excluded, as opposed to the elevating and ennobling, and these become the major 
foundations on which its perception is to rest.35 Framed in such a way, we are to 
conclude, Gothic fiction is pushed on the literary margin and, after abundant – even 
though frequently negative – initial exchange between the critics and the practitioners, 
finally divorced from serious interest of literary criticism.  
The situation is observed to continue well into the twentieth century. The early- and 
mid-century Gothic criticism, even though it gradually develops a serious interest in the 
Gothic, retains a derogatory tone. Thus, it is still said to operate within the 
marginalising frame, being conscious that what it engages with is nevertheless a 
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marginal form, a curiosity of literature.36 As we read in Botting and Townshend, 
“[early] twentieth-century critics assume the inferiority of the Gothic romance as their 
point of critical and scholarly departure, and thus, even in those studies which self-
consciously attempt a positive reconsideration of the form, unconsciously reiterate a 
discourse in which distinctions between high and low, good and bad, popular and 
literary works abound: almost without exception, Gothic appears to be the 
disenfranchised term in the construction of a system of canonical tastes, categories and 
literary-critical values.”37 What contributes to the persistence of such a frame of 
reference is certainly, we are told, the supremacy of New Criticism.38 It lays stress on an 
organically organised text, in which conflicting symbols work towards building up a 
unity, and defines ‘true’ literature in terms of “dense high art within clear genres 
designed primarily for a coherent aesthetic response.”39 Hence, even its assumptions are 
occasionally used in the defence of Gothic fiction, it is bound to shun the Gothic and its 
transgressed generic boundaries, representations of discourses remaining in permanent 
conflict, irreconcilable tensions between opposite drives, and a verbal style too close to 
pastiche.40 During the domination of New Criticism, and in the face of common attacks 
on popular culture, as Jerrold E. Hogle notes, the historicist studies on the Gothic 
undertaken by critics such as Birkhead, Railo, Tompkins or Summers, as well as later 
on those of Varma and Maurice Levy, “[remain] little more than indicators of a ‘less 
essential’ branch of literary history.”41 Yet even putting this aside, and putting aside the 
undertones of accepted inferiority, if those critics can be seen as nonetheless working 
towards raising the status of the Gothic, their efforts are still seen as determined by a 
constraining frame within the contemporary critical paradigm of differentiation.  
As Botting and Townshend observe, while the eighteenth-century criticism encoded 
the Gothic reader as a reader exposed to moral corruption, early Gothic criticism of the 
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twentieth century perceives him or her as a divided human self, who naturally and 
eternally craves for not only pleasure but also fright. They state: 
 
While the eighteenth-century reader of Gothic was always in danger 
of being consumed and carried away by the monstrous forms of desire 
which the romance was likely to awaken, the Gothic reader produced 
by the formal scholarship of the early twentieth century is strictly 
formulated within the binaric terms of the post-Carthesian 
philosophical tradition. Refusing the passionate, appetitive, corporeal 
excesses of its first readers, the critical heritage of the early twentieth 
century fixes its readerly subjects within certain Carthesian categories, 
pitting consciousness against body, mind against matter, and thereby 
effectively setting certain impermeable barriers in place against the 
abrupt loss of self and sociality which the Gothic romance was 
originally thought to threaten. Here, the reading of a Gothic romance 
is divested of its anchorage in the jouissant desires and passions of the 
body.42 
 
 
The excitement gained from the Gothic is assumed to be purely mental and becomes 
psychologised; at the same time, if the critics refer to bodily instincts or drives, they 
divorce them from “mental, conscious or psychological reading processes so as to 
render their possible passionate, physical effects entirely innocuous and 
inconsequential.”43 As a result, Botting and Townshend point out, the appeal of the 
Gothic is found justified as being grounded in human nature and, simultaneously, 
proves less threatening when it comes to the possibility of the dissolution of the self, the 
major threat that reading Gothic romances used to pose according to the eighteenth-
century critics.44 From the perspective of the early- and mid-twentieth-century criticism, 
Gothic fiction “[offers] a reassuring recuperation of selfhood” by responding to what is 
eternally human.45 Construing the Gothic in such a way works to elevate it from the 
status of debasement; at the same time, however, this still should prove a repressive, or 
at least significantly limiting, act.  
Repression, or limitation takes place through ahistorical projection. Botting and 
Townshend write: “[in] attempting to the redemptive and holistic aspects of Gothic 
fiction, criticism discovers its own fully human image in texts where the idea of modern 
humanity was only and contradictorily in formation. The redemption, moreover, begins 
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the process of critical recuperation which will bring a consistently denigrated popular 
genre within the walls of canon and culture.”46 Undeniably, the early critical attempts at 
recuperating the Gothic do contribute to its reaffirmation. Yet the reaffirmed image they 
propose is significantly re-worked – the quality of the Gothic (which, in general, 
remains in the low culture sphere) lies, according to earlier Gothic critics, in its timeless 
codification of human nature, a nature which is devoid of history and free of the 
concerns of class, gender and culture,47 and, moreover, which is itself a product of a 
particular framework, historically conditioned and retrospectively imposed onto the 
Gothic text. What is more, this early- to mid-twentieth-century representation of the 
Gothic remains unavailable to a type of critical investigation that could establish the 
importance of the mode and its cultural function in terms of what is actually effaced by 
the redemptive-holistic approach. As Kilgour recounts, it had to take the fall of 
‘shackling’ New Criticism, together with its ‘imprisoning’ concept of the autonomous 
verbal structure, for the Gothic critic to become “free to see the gothic, as it clearly must 
be seen, in its broader social as well as literary context.”48 And it is the broad socio-
cultural contextualisation of the Gothic that may finally confirm the actual worth of the 
Gothic. 
In the accounts such as those of Kilgour or Botting, the early phase of Gothic 
criticism becomes represented as functioning within a disparaging critical frame. This 
frame pushes the Gothic into the sphere of low culture and popular entertainment as 
opposed to high art, and reproduces critical assumptions which significantly limit the 
perception of its object. This latter characteristic is significantly elaborated on in Anne 
Williams’ introduction to Art of Darkness: A Poetics of Gothic, where the mechanism 
of ‘repression,’ enforced by the general critical paradigm of the mid-twentieth century, 
receives a considerable dose of attention.  
Discussing Williams adds significant points to our argument carried out so far. In her 
work, she attempts at reconsidering the prevailing perception of the Gothic as prosaic, 
subordinate to Romanticism and chiefly ‘female’ by discussing the ‘stories’ about 
Gothic fiction told by critics, and begins forcibly by stating that the “[twentieth-century] 
keepers of the House of Fiction [represented by F.R. Leavis in the first place] have 
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always treated Gothic as a skeleton in the closet.”49 In her account, the Gothic has no 
legitimate place in the literary studies as envisioned by earlier scholarship. The realism-
centred critics shun the Gothic as unworthy of deeper insight since it fails to follow the 
set of standards for the novel, and readily recognise Gothic fiction as long extinct as this 
proves the novel to be a superior – that is lasting – form.50 If they acknowledges that the 
Gothic is still alive, on the other hand, they relegate it either into the realm of popular 
fiction, or into the area of ‘romance,’ governed by a different set of values.51 Yet in this 
area, equated by Williams with Romanticism, there is even less room for the Gothic – 
the Romanticism-centred critic views the Gothic text as “the black sheep of the family, 
an illegitimate cousin who haunts the margins of ‘literature,’ pandering cheap and 
distressingly profitable thrills.”52 As Williams asserts, “[f]rom the high Romantic 
ground, disreputable Gothic appears shocking and subversive, delighting in the 
forbidden and trafficking in the unspeakable.”53 As a result, the resemblances between 
the two are “politely ignored,” students of Romanticism being told that the Gothic is not 
a domain of the poetic but that of prose fiction.54 This might appear a vicious circle, yet 
what it achieves is the comfortable exclusion of Gothic fiction from both fields, and its 
taking a liminal – or rather marginal position with regard to them.  
The attempts at banning the Gothic from the Romanticist backyard take more forms 
in time. Soon, they begin to comprise not only the codification of Gothic fiction as 
prosaic and subordinate, but also the projection of the drawbacks later on ascribed to 
Romanticism by Modernist critics. To return to Williams argument, although the early 
twentieth-century critics link Romanticism with the Gothic (for example Railo in his 
The Haunted Castle: A Study of the Elements of English Romanticism), they do not find 
followers in the mid-century because, at that time, Romanticism-centred criticism tries 
to counter the Modernist attack on the perceived Romantic ‘femininity,’ and reworks its 
own image in terms of masculinity, characterised by ‘Imagination,’ dismissing Gothic 
fiction as a product of ‘feminine fancy’ with yet greater force.55 Thus, the black sheep, 
as we could extend the metaphor, is made to be blamed for the ill-perception of the 
whole family. Williams concludes: “although ‘Gothic’ might reasonably claim kin with 
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both the novel and Romanticism, its claims have usually been denied almost before the 
fact. To preserve the realistic novel as the High Prose Fiction tradition, critics have 
regarded the Gothic as long dead, or else (if alive) as irrational ‘feminine’ popular 
romance. According to the Romanticist, this dim, shapeless fiction lacks the unifying 
clarity of the Romantic Imagination as articulated by several great poets in their greatest 
poetry.”56 Such a representation of the earlier scholarship is perhaps a most telling 
example of how the contemporary critical paradigm construes the limiting framework 
imposed on the Gothic before the paradigm’s own rise. 
The skeleton in the closet and the black sheep of the family both entail repression in 
its purest sense. We repress our skeletal ‘dirty’ family secrets as much as we do not 
speak a word of our infamous relatives since both could spoil our own self-image. At 
the same time, they enable us to delimit this very image so that it takes a favourable – 
and favoured – shape. Williams parallels Botting and Townshend in stating that, for the 
early to mid-twentieth century critics, the Gothic is the ‘other’ against which 
“‘Realism,’ ‘Romantic poetry,’ and ‘Serious Literature’” define themselves, projecting 
that which disturbs their own integrity outward.57 She also puts a strong emphasis on the 
‘falling down’ of ‘older’ distinctions58 which makes it possible to re-define the Gothic, 
dangerous though it may seem since each act of defining carries a potential risk of 
drawing a line again.59 What is thus stressed is ‘the fall of the old order,’ which 
similarly emerges in Botting’s and Kilgour’s accounts. As the story goes, the present 
perspective on the Gothic has been made possible only owing to extensive changes in 
criticism itself, those changes allowing the critics to free themselves from the 
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constraints imposed by the received notions of realism or Romanticism as much as of 
high culture, the essentialist notions referred to by liberal humanism, or the New 
Critical autonomous verbal structure.  
The freedom of the Gothic critic, be it to probe new ways of interrogation or to 
establish the importance of the Gothic in socio-political terms, or to question the 
prevalent norms, becomes one more, if not the major one, of the features inherent in the 
contemporary Gothic criticism. Botting passes a particularly telling comment in this 
regard: “If Gothic fictions and films were affected by the tide of sexual, political and 
social liberations of the late twentieth century, both curiously challenging normative 
and repressive mores, criticism, similarly, has not remained immune. Indeed, in a period 
of questioning, of crisis even, cultural and critical institutions have contested strict 
regimes of literary evaluation and canonisation and opened themselves to different ways 
of understanding and approaching texts and their contexts.”60 A similar stance manifests 
itself in Kilgour’s account: 
 
From its beginning the gothic has suggested the limits of causality and 
modern systems for understanding relations, and offered itself as a 
form of ‘cultural self-analysis.’ Like other previously marginalised 
forms, it is therefore being used today to critique established norms: 
the canon, gender roles, and the traditional ideals of western 
individualism which took form during the seventeenth an eighteenth 
centuries. The gothic exposes the limits of modern rational ideals of 
both human and textual autonomy, coherence, self-control, and 
Lockean notions of personhood. A form whose monstrous corporate 
identity transgresses traditional generic categories seems appropriate 
for new attempts at boundary negotiations.61 
 
 
What follows is that the Gothic clearly has a ‘liberating’ potential and may be 
particularly useful to the ‘liberated’ critic. Not only is it a form that, once marginalised, 
has been reassessed and valorised in positive terms owing to changes in criticism and 
overall culture. Since it exposes the impact of social context on literature, and in 
general, the impact of politics, or history, or sexuality on art,62 bringing to the fore what 
is at stake ‘here and now,’ it may be used by the critic to trigger further changes. This is 
because it provides source texts that may be read as putting into question the notions of 
the establishment, fixed values, literary canons, marginalised and mainstream figures, 
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the binary opposition between popular and high art, and even our inherited 
understanding of literature as recording eternal truths. 
Contemporary Gothic criticism, then, as this history shows, has been made possible 
by the reorientation of literary values and the notion of literature itself. The path to its 
development was opened by questioning and contesting, or perhaps, as proposes 
Kilgour, by “our own increasing distrust of the enlightened myths that we have 
suspiciously inherited.”63 Or, somewhat paradoxically, by precisely our own new 
Enlightenment, which freed us from “the ‘dark ages’ of Leavisite ‘New Criticism.’”64 
The liberation of the Gothic was paralleled by its acknowledgement by and inclusion 
into the institutionalised mainstream. As Catherine Spooner asserts in the May 2007 
issue of Gothic Studies, a journal published continuously for over a decade now, 
nowadays, “Gothic in popular culture is a burgeoning area of research.”65 And in Anna 
Powell and Andrew Smith’s introduction to Teaching the Gothic, we read that “[from] 
its former marginality to the literary canon as prescribed by English Studies, Gothic has 
become a fully-fledged and popular topic with its own undergraduate units and 
postgraduate degree courses, scholarly associations and journals.”66 Nowadays, the 
Gothic is relishing its right to be studied and included into the curriculum. The history 
of Gothic criticism as outlined here is thus one of success – of a route from 
disparagement to acknowledgement, the margin to the mainstream, repression to 
freedom. What is more, it asserts that the Gothic played its role in the re-evaluation and 
re-definition of our own understanding of literature. Understandably, such a history is 
not one of continuous progress, but rather of a rupture, or many ruptures, ‘changing 
critical positions’ that led to the final revelation of the value of Gothic fiction for 
Western culture. 
We could conclude that the contemporary critics thus put considerable emphasis on 
their difference from their predecessors, and that the difference becomes the major 
characteristic around which the concept of the contemporary Gothic criticism is build. 
As a result, we may term the general paradigm that governs the representation of the 
history of Gothic criticism as delimited above ‘the differentiation paradigm.’ We might 
observe that the manner in which it operates resembles somewhat disturbingly the 
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procedure of the negative definition applied by the realist- and Romanticist-centred 
criticism. Still, we cannot deny that it simultaneously appears to prove highly workable 
for the contemporary criticism.  
 
1.2. The Borderline 
 
In the context of the differentiation paradigm, governing the history of Gothic 
criticism as outlined above, it becomes clear why The Literature of Terror is given the 
seminal status by numerous critics who venture to account for the major developments 
in the field. Punter’s study relishes the status of a ground-breaking work for a good 
reason. If Botting states that its approach is “Freudian, though heavily tempered by 
Marxist criticism,”67 then he in fact acknowledges its cutting-edge quality – dealing 
away with the essentialist notions of the previous stage of criticism. By locating the 
source of Gothic dread in the bourgeois fear, inherent to and shaped by the particular 
moment of social instability, Punter’s study counters the essentialist assumptions of the 
earlier Gothic scholarship. In Punter’s own words, “Gothic emerged at a particular 
historical moment and has a particular historical development.”68 In this study, the 
transvaluation of literature becomes clearly visible, enabling an apparently unbiased and 
thorough investigation into the Gothic. In fact, Punter’s investigation takes as its 
starting point the assumption that “an art-form or a genre derives its overall vitality, the 
ground on which specific excellence can be achieved, from its attempt to come to grips 
with and to probe matters of concern to the society in which that art-form or genre 
exists.”69 Also, his study establishes the value of the Gothic mode considering it in 
terms of “a process of cultural self-analysis.”70 In this, it manifests an attitude embraced 
by the contemporary Gothic criticism. 
We could, however, observe – as do Baldick and Mighall – that a link could 
nevertheless be established between Punter’s approach and that of early critics. 
Presenting the Gothic as anti-Enlightenment and anti-Augustan, that is as a clearly 
Romantic enterprise, is the case in point. But as Baldick and Mighall also state, aligning 
the Gothic with Romanticism belongs to “the traditionally defensive traditions of Gothic 
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Criticism,” which work to provide the Gothic with “some testimony of its high romantic 
credentials,” and which we, thus, ought to link with the period of disparagement.71 It is 
worth noting that both critics view the Gothic as characterised by the “vital elements of 
modern rationality, Protestant scepticism and enlightened Whiggery”72 rather than as 
poetic and revolutionary. However, whether their own conception of the Gothic is more 
justified than the one which inscribes the Gothic within “a romantic or proto-romantic 
‘revolt’ or reaction against […] the shallow materialism of the Augustan age,”73 is, at 
least at this point, less significant to our considerations than the fact that Punter indeed 
works towards lifting the Gothic from the position of the margin, as if it were necessary 
before any serious study of Gothic fiction could be conducted. It is not, however, 
unambiguous whether this is a sign of continuity or of a rift. 
What is worth consideration in this respect is Punter’s chapter on the origins of the 
Gothic novel, and especially the way he re-draws Gothic literary alliances. Let us begin 
by taking Railo as a representative of early critics who linked the Gothic with 
Romanticism. Interestingly, as Railo introduces the reader to his aforementioned The 
Haunted Castle, the major reason he gives for studying Walpole’s Otranto and its 
offspring, ‘horror romanticism,’ seems to be the fact that the “small and unassuming 
booklet” is mentioned in the majority of English literature handbooks.74 Punter’s work 
manifests a clearly different attitude, one in which providing reasons becomes a well-
though-out and carefully planned activity, and is visibly given priority at the onset of 
the study. The allegiances Punter stresses work visibly to reconfigure the assumed 
relations between the Gothic and the popular. This is done, in the first place, not simply 
by aligning the Gothic with Romanticism, but rather by linking it with the learned and 
the middle-class, and construing it as a literature of the bourgeoisie. Having pointed to 
the financial and educational limitations of the potential eighteenth-century reading 
audience, Punter arrives at two major conclusions. Firstly, he calculates that, according 
to sales figures of the time, it was impossible for the Gothic to reach masses of any 
kind, and therefore “Gothic fiction should not be characterised as a popular literature in 
the sense in which we would now recognise.”75 Secondly, he continues, Gothic novels 
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were written in a too elaborate and learned style to pass as popular entertainment, 
proper for lower classes.76 As he sums up, 
 
Walpole and Radcliffe write within a complex web of classical and 
Shakesperean allusions. Lewis writes an admittedly dramatic but very 
complicated prose. Mary Shelley’s work is packed with elaborate and 
erudite social argument. Radcliffe, admittedly, received the then 
colossal sums of £500 for Udolpho and £600 for the Italian; but it 
could not have come, directly or indirectly, from the lower classes. 
Indeed, the evidence seems to point quite clearly to the hypothesis 
that, despite the differences between the realistic novel and the Gothic, 
and despite the attacks mounted on Gothic fiction by various arbiters 
of middle-class taste, the readership for the two genres must have been 
pretty much the same.77 
 
 
All of this clearly works to draw a line between Gothic fiction and the popular as we 
understand it today. In this way, it also works to underscore vital elements of the 
negative representation of the Gothic, its commonly accepted perception as ‘popular.’ 
It is not until this has been done that the relations between Gothic fiction and low 
entertainment are reconfigured in terms of establishing links to higher forms. In this 
area, the Gothic is seen as allied with phenomena ranging from Richardson’s novels to 
sentimentalism to graveyard poetry in the first place. By establishing a complex net of 
forms, concepts and currents that gave birth to the Gothic, all sharing an averse attitude 
towards Enlightenment, rationalism and the Augustans, Punter shifts the mode from the 
position of a sub-category to the very mainstream of eighteenth-century literature. He 
states: 
 
[the] background against which the emergence of Gothic fiction needs 
to be seen […] is a complex one, in which intellectual, technical and 
commercial developments all play a part. It is a background which 
includes the appearance and early growth of the novel form itself; the 
attendant emphasis on realism, and the complicated relationship which 
that bears to rationalist philosophy; Augustan cultural thinking and the 
view of human psychology it entails; the emergence of an emphasis 
on extreme emotionality which produces sentimental fiction; rival 
views of the relevance to contemporary writing of immediate and 
distant history; and the developments in poetic practice and theory in 
the mid-eighteenth century. Under such circumstances, it is not 
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surprising that the elements of Gothic fiction first began to emerge, in 
a hesitant way, within the mainstream of the realist novel itself.78 
 
 
In this way, Gothic fiction is, however, not only incorporated into the body of what has 
been already widely recognised as mainstream literature. Stressing the anti-
Enlightenment or counter-Augustan features of recognised forms serves here to disclose 
“the contradictions in taste of the eighteenth-century bourgeoisie,” or the gap “between 
‘official culture’ and actual taste.”79 This, in turn, justifies the bourgeois taste for the 
Gothic, and simultaneously brings to one’s attention the fact that the Gothic might be 
seen as not necessarily that marginal. The same function can be ascribed to Punter’s 
later considerations of Gothic influences on major poets (from Blake, through the first 
generation of Romantics represented by Coleridge, to the second generation including 
Shelley, Byron and Keats) and the influences they, in turn, had on the development of 
the Gothic. As Punter states, “[one] of the features of Gothic fiction which distinguishes 
it historically from many other forms of ‘sensational’ writing is the power which it 
exerted over this group of undeniably major writers; this is both part of its validation as 
a focus of critical interest, and also a major source of its continuing historical vitality.”80 
The interest of ‘serious’ writers – canonical poets – in the Gothic becomes another 
argument in favour of its ‘high art’ credentials.  
Paradoxically, such a transvaluation of the Gothic may be seen as emphasising both 
continuity and rupture. Romanticising the Gothic seems to be a gesture towards the 
discourse of high art – and so seems estranging the Gothic from the popular culture as 
we know it. While this indicates breaking up with the older critical discourse, it also 
indicates that this discourse still exercises power over what we think should be studied. 
The twenty-first-century criticism needs no such reconfigurations; on the contrary, as 
Spooner’s aforementioned text states, dismissing the Gothic’s affiliation with popular 
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discourses by academia has been a negative tendency and has already received some 
corrective.81  
Punter’s efforts, however, transfigure the Gothic by representing it as ‘not’ the 
popular but what had been unnecessarily removed from the respectable literary canon. 
This could be viewed as a sign of hesitation over legitimizing the Gothic as a serious 
subject, hesitation which results in the assumption that the Gothic needs to be 
reconstituted as high art to be treated with sufficient respect. If that were the case, we 
would be dealing with continuity with regard to the earlier phase of criticism. At the 
same time, however, such a transfiguration could be viewed also as a sign of certainty, 
an attempt at reclaiming the status of the Gothic, pushed to the literary margin after the 
categories of high and low art emerged, and unjustly kept there during their reign. In 
that case, we would be dealing with a rupture and establishing the parameters of Gothic 
criticism anew. Or, taking yet another perspective, it could indicate a difference 
between the contemporary, twenty-first century academia, which takes free interest in 
popular forms, and the scholarly context of Punter’s work, which he embarks on in the 
late 1970s, when other works on the Gothic are still frequently informed by the 
assumptions of New Criticism, and a new critical discourse, that of theory, is in the 
process of taking shape. In this case, we are dealing both with continuity and with 
rupture, with a change of critical discourse in which different frames still persist and 
coexist, mesh, clash and interact, and which turns to new perspectives, introduces new 
priorities while still appropriating the old givens for its own purposes.  
Punter’s analysis of the origins of Gothic fiction makes us alert to the fact that both 
continuity and rejection are not clear-cut notions. His analysis seems to redeem the 
mode within the old critical framework. At the same time, his study shifts the interest 
from organic unity to psychological content, from innate human fears to historically 
conditioned social anxieties, from literary value to cultural theory, revealing a new and 
different discourse at work. It is at this point that ‘changing critical positions’ emerge to 
sight as determining the approach to the Gothic, not through a sudden and thorough 
breakthrough, but by shifts and rifts in the previous order which allow for a 
reconceptualization of both the object under scrutiny and the order itself. And this 
should, in turn, make us somewhat suspicious towards the history of Gothic criticism 
according to the differentiation paradigm.  
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1.3. The General Representation of History 
 
A peculiar characteristic of the contemporary Gothic criticism is that it is markedly 
conscious of discrepancies and rifts occurring in a seemingly unified field it represents, 
where one might be tempted to proclaim continuity. This statement, of course, demands 
an explanation. Let us assume that the ‘natural’ state of affairs in the ‘old’ critical 
discourse was to draw a line which would introduce order, unity and continuity through 
stabilising definitions. In that case, by comparison, the contemporary criticism should 
seem thoroughly conscious of the fact that it is inescapably marked with gaps, ruptures, 
and unstable limits. These manifest themselves not only in the assumed difference 
between the earlier and the contemporary scholarship, but above all in the way the 
today’s criticism has been shaped. If we assume that the shift which enabled a new 
perspective on the Gothic entailed moving away from the organic text, the autonomous 
verbal structure or essentialism, and moving towards cultural theories, then the sheer 
variety of possible methodologies based on them should grant versatility, and often lead 
to irreconcilable, mutually exclusive conclusions. Having stated this, the question is 
whether there can be indeed one unified representation of Gothic criticism and its 
history, or perhaps various strands of Gothic criticism, informed by different theories, 
will define their field and its development in essentially divergent ways.  
The versatility of the contemporary Gothic criticism is nowadays a widely 
recognised fact. However, while surveying contemporary critical accounts, one may still 
have the impression that the boundary between ‘the past’ and ‘the present’ of Gothic 
criticism (imprecise and highly generalising though these categories may be) marks the 
beginning of a new unified – in the sense that it shares certain underlying assumptions, 
common roots – critical discourse, with Punter as the founding father. Strikingly, this is 
the way in which we could read especially an outline such as Smith’s, where we move 
immediately from Varma to Punter, as if there were no other theoretically informed 
works with a focus on socio-historical context worthy of a mention in between, and 
where the line demarcating the beginning of the contemporary criticism is drawn in a 
very explicit and straightforward way. 
Despite the fact that the versatility of Gothic criticism is frequently acknowledged in 
the field, Smith’s brief outline of the major contributors to the study of Gothic fiction 
presents the contemporary Gothic criticism as originating in Punter’s psychoanalytical-
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Marxist approach, and generally following the paths made available only after The 
Literature of Terror. Let us quote again the passage as a whole: 
 
However, the modern era of theoretically informed criticism was 
inaugurated by David Punter’s The Literature of Terror, published in 
1980, which provided the first rigorous analysis of the Gothic tradition 
and suggested ways in which Gothic texts could be read through a 
combination of Marxist and psychoanalytical perspectives. The 
following year Rosemary Jackson’s Fantasy: the Literature of 
Subversion (1981) was published, in which she examined the Gothic 
through Freud’s concept of the uncanny [...]. Since then there have 
been many groundbreaking contributions from scholars working in 
Britain, mainland Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia, 
indeed often in those very countries where the Gothic took root. Such 
studies have helped to shape approaches to the Gothic, and in order to 
acknowledge this I will briefly outline a range of possible critical 
approaches [...]: the psychoanalytical, historicist, feminist, and 
colonial and postcolonial perspectives.82 
 
 
What emerges here is clearly a diversity of approaches, but these are qualified in an 
interesting way. Adding that, one year after Literature of Terror, Jackson ‘examined the 
Gothic through Freud’s concept of the uncanny’ reinforces the role of the 
psychoanalytical paradigm, and mentioning no other names but the two makes them 
stand out as a clear-cut borderline. This, in a sense, allows to treat later developments in 
somewhat general terms. True, they are immediately named and discussed, each 
separately, but a ‘unifying’ common source – the making available of a new critical 
attitude, the new understanding of a ‘rigorous analysis’ of a literary text – seems to 
prevail over the disparate directions taken by them. The contemporary Gothic criticism 
is rich, open to multiple perspectives, but still some sense of identity and unity is 
reinforced. 
The general tone of Smith’s brief outline of critical history could be easily justified. 
All in all, his subchapter provides an insight into different approaches and, since it is 
targeted at students in the first place, it ought to aim at conciseness and clarity above all. 
Hence, logically, it could resort to naming only the key figures and facts. But these 
figures and facts create a clearly defined picture of Gothic criticism and its 
development, and what becomes alluringly striking about this account is how it could be 
read in the context of other accounts of Gothic criticism. Although it does not state it in 
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any explicit way, this account eventually emphasises the line of succession mentioned 
above, namely that of Summers – Varma – Punter, as it proceeds from presenting two 
studies by Summers to The Gothic Flame by Varma and to Literature of Terror. As it 
was already stated, a line of succession is drawn by Baldick and Mighall when it comes 
to establishing the Gothic’s anti-Augustanism, or anti-Enlightenment attitude, and thus 
its links to Romanticism in order to provide the ‘high Romantic credentials.’ The anti-
Enlightenment twist is one of the key elements of the early Gothic as described in 
Smith’s own book.83 More significantly, however, marking the shift from the previous 
approaches to the contemporary ones with the names of Punter and Jackson may signal 
yet another way of appropriating this twist by the contemporary critical discourse. The 
choice of Jackson as the other leading ‘Gothic’ critic – though her major interest is 
fantasy in a broader sense – appears to be especially telling in this regard.  
However, before we clarify in what way the anti-Enlightenment impulse becomes 
reinscribed in Smith’s account as a result of coupling Punter and Jackson, there is 
another essential issue that must be referred to. A person familiar with the feminist 
readings of Gothic fiction could immediately ask: Why Jackson rather than Moers? In a 
way, Ellen Moers’ 1976 Literary Women, in which the authoress coins the term ‘Female 
Gothic,’ could be seen as more significant for the development of the contemporary 
Gothic criticism than Jackson’s study. As Botting writes, the feminist approach has “set 
the tone” of the contemporary Gothic criticism in a degree equal to Marxism or 
psychoanalysis.84 But though Moers’ chapter “Female Gothic” emerged four years 
before The Literature of Terror, it is mentioned in Gothic a-chronologically, after 
Punter, and after Paulson, who investigated into the connection between the Gothic and 
revolution, and published his Representations of Revolution in 1983. Punter himself, in 
his preface to the 1980 edition of The Literature of Terror, clarifies he has infrequently 
referred to particular works investigating the relation between the Gothic and the 
woman for the reason that “this material is as yet largely unavailable to the student or 
general reader,” though he also adds that he provided references in his bibliography.85  
There is something in this statement that rings a bell. Williams recounts at one point 
in her Art of Darkness that – just as the Gothic – feminist scholarship itself initially used 
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to function on the margin of the academic establishment.86 Kate Ferguson Ellis begins 
her account of feminist criticism of the Gothic in “Can You Forgive Her? The Gothic 
Heroine and Her Critics” by pointing to exactly this fact. As she writes, initially, the 
feminist theorisation of the Gothic as, above all, women’s fiction, written by and for 
women while male authors were striving to “wrest the form from the female hands in 
which they saw it too firmly grasped,” was losing to David Hume’s 1969 view of the 
Gothic as oscillating around “‘a complex villain-hero,’” and themes of unresolved 
moral ambiguity.87 She comments: “Certainly a genre that privileges moral ambiguity 
would fare well among critics in ways that the heroine-centered Gothic, whose 
‘trappings’ invariably include the happy ending required by its marriage plot, cannot so 
readily achieve.”88 Nowadays, we should assume that both feminism and feminist 
readings of the Gothic are granted their place in the academy and Gothic studies, and 
the gender- and queer-oriented perspectives are fruitfully applied to Gothic fiction and 
film. Yet then, all the more, it may appear somewhat suspicious that Moers’ ‘Female 
Gothic’ should be substituted by Jackson’s psychoanalytical reading in a history of the 
Gothic which seems to adopt a general – which also means the broadest – perspective. 
Such a substitution points to a more complex psychoanalytical perspective as a basis 
for recognising the beginning of a new stage in the history of Gothic criticism. Yet this 
may appears surprising. If we agree with Hogle that psychoanalysis is the theory which 
“first rescued the Gothic from mere popularity and made it a means to understand 
Western thinking and culture more deeply,”89 and assume it is for this reason that it is 
given attention before feminism in the histories of Gothic criticism, we should still 
expect early feminist critics to be mentioned before or simultaneously with Punter, at 
least for the sake of chronology and comparison. If we approach the issue from a totally 
different angle and observe that both psychoanalysis and feminism have been recently 
much contested,90 we will also find little reason why one is being privileged over the 
other. However, if we bear in mind what is said by Williams and Ferguson on the initial 
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position of the feminist approach among other approaches to the Gothic and relate it to 
what Punter states with respect to his approach, some questions may arise.  
In his preface, Punter defines what was his incentive to write the book. This 
incentive stemmed partly from his interests, and partly from his dissatisfaction with the 
adequacy of the approaches that were at the time applied to the Gothic. As he states, 
while, in turn he would wish the Gothic to be approached through Marxism and 
sociology, these approaches were generally reserved for reading the realist fiction.91 
Without consulting the historical context, at least at this stage, we might infer from the 
above statement that, while the feminist readings of the 1970s remain closer to the 
margin than to the mainstream, Punter’s seminal study claims to incorporate the 
approach which has already gained some esteem in the mainstream (for it has been used 
to scrutinise the realist material), and, hence, adopts an already empowered discourse. 
And this leaves us with a number of questions. Does this make his approach more 
‘acceptable’? If so, and if it is his study whose status is that of a ‘borderline’ from 
which the modern era of Gothic criticism takes its beginning, does this mean that the 
contemporary critical discourse on the Gothic is still the ‘old’ mainstream critical 
discourse? Or perhaps a new mainstream one? 
These questions demand a careful investigation – and placing them in the context as 
well – as answers may be more complex than it might appear. However, in the first 
place, it seems what is at stake here is not simply an attempt at exclusion or 
diminishment of one particular strand of Gothic criticism. For example, we should take 
into account the fact that Smith, whose text we are focusing on, is vitally engaged in 
and with feminist criticism himself,92 and so, in fact, deliberate exclusion does not 
appear to be the case. We should also observe that placing Moers anachronistically after 
Punter in fact inscribes her into the modern era of Gothic criticism in a history in which 
Punter’s work constitutes a borderline. If, in such a historical representation, she were 
mentioned before him, she could become automatically pushed into the earlier period of 
criticism, or treated as a marker of a stage of passing from one standpoint to another. 
And that would be exclusion. In a concise outline of the history of Gothic criticism such 
as Smith’s, this would not be acceptable. At the same time, however, the paradigm 
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which informs Smith’s account demands the Punter-Jackson dyad, not a Punter-Moers 
one, and its introduction has a significant result for the ramification of the whole field. 
Jackson is introduced by Smith, as it seems, due to her application of the Freudian 
concept of the uncanny. Yet what should be said about her work, in the first place, is 
that she considers the literary fantastic primarily as a subversive mode which unveils 
“the basis upon which cultural order rests, for it opens up, for a brief moment, on to […] 
that which is outside dominant value systems.”93 The assumption of the Gothic’s anti-
Enlightenment attitude inscribes itself well within this definition, this time not as a basis 
for establishing a Romantic affiliation, but as a feature confirming what has become 
irreversibly connected with many of the contemporary conceptions of Gothic fiction. 
Namely, the premise of the mode’s inherent interest in subversion. When it comes to 
Jackson’s considerations of the Gothic as a form which laid the foundation for the 
development of fantasy, Jackson does not see Gothic fiction as overtly transgressive. 
She states that it “conducts a dialogue within itself, as it acts out and defeats subversive 
drives,”94 and thus poses a problem when it comes to speaking of political subversion. 
Still, she states: 
 
The tradition of Gothic fiction, traced here from Frankenstein to 
Dracula, in many ways reinforces a bourgeois ideology. Many of its 
best known texts reveal a strong degree of social and class prejudice 
and it goes without saying, perhaps, that they are heavily 
misogynistic. Yet the drive of their narratives is towards a ‘fantastic’ 
realm, an imaginary area, preceding the ‘sexed’ identity of the subject 
and so introducing repressed female energies and absent unities. 
Especially in the vampire myth, the attempt to negate cultural order by 
reversing the Oedipal stage constitutes a violent countercultural thrust 
which then provokes further establishment of repression to defeat, or 
castrate, such a thrust. The centre of the fantastic text tries to break 
with repression, yet is inevitably constrained by its surrounding frame. 
Such contradictions emerge in graphic form in the many Gothic and 
fantastic episodes which break into nineteenth-century novels, 
erupting into the calm surface and bland face of their realism with 
disturbing reminders of things excluded and expelled.95 
 
 
Seen from such a perspective, the Gothic nonetheless does release the disruptive forces. 
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Mentioned next to Punter, Jackson becomes a mother-like figure to the contemporary 
criticism of the Gothic, one which displaces the perhaps more legitimate mother – the 
feminist critic, discussed by Smith only several pages later, after psychoanalytical and 
new historicist approaches to the Gothic have been considered. Hence, the 
contemporary Gothic criticism is constructed as both originating in a 
psychoanalytical/theoretical but contextualised studies, and as discussing the Gothic 
from the venture point of its hidden psychological content and subversion, be it anti-
Enlightenment, anti-Augustan, or any other ‘anti’ drive. And, as a matter of fact, in this 
way the critic’s consciousness of belonging to a distinct group, one characterised by 
acknowledgement, a more relevant methodological approach and liberation can be 
maintained without pointing to differences between particular contemporary 
approaches, and remains valid with regard to the whole field. The feminist approach, 
obviously, inscribes itself within the paradigm given by Jackson, treating the Gothic as 
an example of, to quote Ferguson, “popular literature [that] can be a site of resistance to 
ideological positions as well as a means of propagating them.”96  
We could account for creating such a picture of Gothic criticism in terms of a 
generalising move. This move could then be aimed at obliterating the differences 
between particular strands of the today’s criticism, and at creating a fixed frame to 
embrace the directions taken by nowadays’ scholarship. But the coordinates of Gothic 
criticism defined in the way discussed above are in fact all-embracing enough to safely 
cover a whole vast field characterised by divergences, discrepancies, contrasting 
assumptions and mutually exclusive conclusions without (at least in theory) leaving any 
strand of criticism out.  
The drive not to leave out may be seen as typical of the contemporary Gothic 
criticism, a trait to which we shall return on various occasions. Leaving out – excluding, 
omitting or dismissing – becomes a supreme crime in the world which, to put it in 
Kilgour’s words, through its postmodern distrust of causality, becomes “a gothic world, 
made up of effects without agents, creations without creators, ideological constructs that 
have taken on lives of their own.”97 As Kilgour puts it, the contemporary criticism 
perceives literary texts as constructs that are often remade in the critic’s own image; 
simultaneously, it remains fully aware of reality being inescapably made up of 
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constructs, and of the fact that there is no absolute truth to uncover.98 In such a reality, 
freedom from ‘illusions’ – or, we should perhaps say, meta-narratives – may be 
achieved through reading, embraced by criticism “which institutionalises the (originally 
anti-institutional) Protestant tradition of self-scrutiny, turning it into a larger 
psychoanalysis of cultural motives and impulses.”99 Reading Gothic fiction allows us to 
scrutinize our present as much as origins, and hence allows us to break away from the 
past, granting us at least some control over it. Of course, there exists a danger that the 
critic may become another Victor Frankenstein, devising his or her own Gothic monster 
from bits and pieces of a narrative previously ripped apart, in an act of gaining authority 
over the text.100 We may infer that such a type of authority could redirect criticism back 
to its repressive past, provided it would denounce other possible approaches to, and 
interpretations of, the text for the sake of maintaining ‘power.’ Hence, all the more 
sensible may it appear to adopt the most general possible perspective, one to which 
different critics may subscribe while deciding on the methodology of their own choice. 
What is more, as Kilgour’s text implies – in the times of the postmodern ‘culture of 
recycling’ no other perspective appears to be possible; all in all, it turns out that all the 
approaches are inescapably ‘Frankensteinian.’101 
Being ‘all-inclusive’ is, however, a double-edged (or even multi-edged) weapon. By 
being potentially all-embracing, the contemporary field of Gothic criticism prevents 
constraints, or authoritative attempts at imposing fixed distinctions such as those which 
limited the possibilities of critics interested in Gothic fiction during the dominance of 
New Criticism. Still, we could observe that if the realist-centred critic imposed a fixed 
boundary between the novel and the Gothic romance, or the Romanticist-centred critic 
between the Gothic and Romanticism, both with a result of diminishing – or discarding 
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– the significance of the mode, defining the mode, for example, in terms of only 
women’s fiction results in discarding a part of it as well. Such is Williams’ criticism of 
early feminist critics: in construing their critical narrative of the Gothic, they create only 
another mythos, that of “the madwoman in the attic,” according to which ‘otherness’ 
exposed in Gothic fiction is to be defined exclusively in terms of femininity.102 This 
mythos imposes limits in that it excludes what it cannot contain – the ‘Male Gothic.’ A 
similar criticism is aimed at the Walpolean myth of origin, which presents The Castle of 
Otranto as the prototype of the Gothic tale and Walpole as the sole founder of the mode. 
In this way, the Gothic can be established as unique and worthy of studying for its own 
sake.103 As Williams states, “[this] critical tradition proposes Gothic as a Surrealist or 
revolutionary nihilist, an eerily prescient prophet of psychoanalysis, deconstruction, and 
the miseries of the modern world,” but simultaneously it becomes a patriarchal creation 
story, one which effaces the mother and confines Gothic fiction tradition within the 
frames of a prose genre which survived for only half a century.104 These two critical 
Gothic stories share, together with the realist and the Romanticist ones, the drive to 
draw the line, reflected by the social establishment in which boundaries guarantee order, 
separating what is ‘proper’ from what constitutes subversion.’105 It took the falling 
down of these boundaries to assume a new perspective on the Gothic, one that would 
not appropriate its object along the pre-established lines in a repressive manner. 
Williams’ classification of Gothic criticism suggests a taxonomy which complies 
with the differentiation paradigm, as we already indicated several pages ago. The 
skeleton in the closet, the black sheep – these are myths that correspond to the stage of 
disparagement. But the madwoman in the attic and the myth of creation in fact 
complicate such a correspondence as much as they subscribe to it. If we focus on 
remarks passed on feminist criticism, in Botting as in Smith, Moers is contemporary 
rather than belonging to the previous period. In Williams, whose study inscribes itself 
into the feminist strand of literary criticism, what we see is, however, distancing: the 
madwoman, even though embracing the Gothic ‘feminine otherness,’ nevertheless 
appropriates, limits and excludes, as much as the discourses which clearly belong to the 
(apparently) bygone era. This is an interesting discrepancy, one which could possibly 
point to different backgrounds – or discourses – from which the two versions of the 
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critical history – general and female – emerge. Apart from that, this also shows that the 
line between the past of the Gothic criticism and its present is a provisional one, and 
that the contemporary modern rigorous analysis grows out of the past to a greater 
degree than, perhaps, it is being admitted. 
The inclusive representation of the contemporary Gothic criticism constructed by 
accounts targeted at a broader audience is, however, able to accommodate such 
divergences as well. And these are numerous, emerging to sight as soon as we look at 
the histories drawn by those strands of Gothic criticism which are informed by different 
theories and dedicate themselves to highlight, in their variety, what a generalising move 
of the previous (repressive) discourse would sweep away – the issues related to the 
notions of gender, race, class, sexuality, diaspora, etc. Thus, an attempt to avoid 
exclusion, we could conclude, may be the reason for Botting’s grouping together – 
subsequently to having mentioned Punter’s combining of psychoanalysis with Marxism 
– critics such as Palmer and Moers, and, further, Sedgwick, Hogle and Miles, all three 
of whom he sees as exemplifying post-structuralist criticism engaging into an 
interrogation of issues emphasised by feminism and Marxism. And hence, quite 
possibly, Smith’s lack of naming them, or rather his mentioning of them under one 
common denominator of numerous important contributions – which, we are to 
understand, follow the spirit of Punter and Jackson. 
 
1.4. Divergent Representations of History 
 
The general representation of Gothic criticism as embracing its subject, adopting new 
socio-cultural methods of scrutiny and liberating itself from its previously limited and 
marginalised place in the hierarchy of literary criticism can be found reflected by less 
general accounts of its history, even if these do not reproduce the set of names proposed 
above. For example, the account of feminist Gothic criticism offered by Diana Wallace 
and Andrew Smith in The Female Gothic: New Directions, a quite recent collection, 
reproduces the shift in criticism, situating the turn to socio-political contextualisation in 
the 1990s, which are also identified as the decade in which Female Gothic became a 
mainstream branch of literary inquiry.106 In so doing, Wallace and Smith’s account 
partakes in the general history as represented above, or at least parallels it in 
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incorporating the same changes which are emphasised by the general representation. 
But apart from that(and bearing in mind that the dates are different), unsurprisingly, it 
focuses strictly on the contributions to and within the area of Female Gothic criticism 
and its development, starting from the 1970s. Punter and Jackson are not mentioned 
here and the line of descent is traced from Moers without introducing sharper 
distinctions between the earlier and the contemporary critics, though the reader’s 
attention is drawn to the late twentieth-century re-evaluation of the core concepts of 
Female Gothic in terms of the correlation between the text and the sex of the author, 
possible alternatives to universalising psychoanalytical readings, and the question of 
subversiveness of the mode.107 Contemporary reconsiderations of earlier presumptions 
become emphasised more strongly in Postfeminist Gothic: Critical Interventions in 
Contemporary Culture, edited by Benjamin A. Brabon and Stéphanie Genz. Here, the 
1990s are presented as the decade in which the introduction of post-structuralist theory 
into the feminist inquiry triggered a debate over the striking simplicity and overall 
usefulness of the category of Female Gothic, its essentialist assumption that the sex of 
the author can be equated with the gender manifested in the text, and its “acceptance of 
‘gender as the bedrock of explanation.’”108 
A somewhat similar case is that of a history of Gothic criticism written from the 
perspective of gender studies. Heiland’s “Coda: Criticism of the Gothic,” the final 
chapter of Gothic and Gender: An Introduction, seemingly sketches a pardigmatic 
journey taken by the Gothic critic from the margin of literary establishment to the very 
mainstream, accompanied by essential general changes in the field of criticism and 
literature. The changes which enabled a new approach to the Gothic, as it was already 
mentioned in this chapter, are situated by her in the 1970s, the decade identified as one 
in which previously neglected minorities began to make their way into the academic 
curricula. Similarly to the histories discussed above, this one represents the early- and 
mid-twentieth-century criticism as either perpetuating the discourse which saw the 
Gothic as unacceptable in various ways, or forced to struggle with it.109 Furthermore, 
moving away from essentialist readings is emphasised while commenting on the 
developments in Female Gothic in 1990s, especially Diane Long Hoeveller’s 
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considerations of Gothic fictions as aimed at teaching ‘proper femininity.’110 As in the 
accounts by Wallace and Smith or Brabon and Genz, the major parameters of the 
general historical representation are reflected by the account.  
But a crucial difference emerges to sight immediately if we consider the way Heiland 
formulates her aims. She states: “[transforming criticism into theory] has been reflected 
in the single sub-field of gothic criticism, as critics have brought to bear on this 
literature, which itself consistently challenges established norms, everything that late 
twentieth-century literary theory had to offer. My purpose here is not to account for all 
of that criticism, but to outline the major forms that it has taken and provide a guide 
through some of the work that has been done.”111 This difference is the fact that Heiland 
adopts – or at least claims to adopt – a general perspective rather than one focused the 
strand of contemporary Gothic criticism devoted to gender studies. What a reader 
should expect from a text following such a formulation is a general survey. And indeed, 
the account offers a broad perspective on major currents and directions, both within 
Female Gothic and gender-oriented criticism and outside of them. However, the 
presumption governing the field of Gothic criticism in this history is somewhat different 
from that governing the general historical paradigm outlined above.  
On the one hand, Heiland’s account is in compliance with that paradigm, for it also 
rests on evoking a moment of differentiation. On the other, however, it is not, for it 
represents the borderline from another perspective, giving the field of Gothic criticism a 
different organising framework. Heiland states that “[while] gothic writing began to 
attract serious critical attention as early as the 1920s, it was not until the 1970s – when 
the very meaning of literary study was changing dramatically, and when feminist 
criticism in particular was reshaping the literary canon – that gothic took center 
stage.”112 As it follows from the accounts discussed above, such as those of Botting and 
Townshend, or Smith, feminism did play a vital role in reshaping the attitude towards 
the Gothic, but here this role becomes a decisive and major force behind the 
introduction of the Gothic into the canon. Furthermore, the distinction between the 
critics perpetuating the discourse of disparagement and those eschewing it is drawn on a 
different basis. For example, what becomes the reason for being fascinated and at the 
same time repelled by Gothic fiction in the works of Birkhead and Railo is not its 
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overall lack of ‘value’ as recognised by New Criticism, Romanticism or realism, but the 
complex attitude towards gender formation displayed by the Gothic text.113 Heiland 
reads the two early critics as proposing a gendered history of the Gothic, one which tells 
a story “of male fertility and female nurture,”114 and hence, to a certain extent, as 
striving to contain what could be seen as inappropriate or unacceptable in Gothic 
novels, a task which would continue to be undertaken by the critics up till the 1970s.115 
Once classified as disturbing the ‘right’ gender identity, the Gothic again finds itself 
pushed onto the margin of proper culture, and the attempts at recuperating it through 
containing it constitute attempts at appropriating, making acceptable at the cost of 
explaining away that which does not fulfil the overall critical, or even social, 
expectations.  
As it was already stated, on the one hand, this proves much in tune with the 
contemporary general representation of the history of the Gothic and its criticism. 
However, on the other hand, the general paradigm is here rewritten in strictly defined 
and delimited terms, informed to a large extent by an underlying assumption about the 
constitutive structure of Gothic fiction. In such a history, Punter has a lesser part to play 
than Moers or Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar whose book’s title, The Madwoman 
in the Attic (1979), has come to function as a fixed phrase in Gothic studies. Having 
stated that “[the] emergence of feminist literary scholarship in the 1970s changed the 
criticism of gothic completely,”116 Heiland continues, giving an account of Female, 
Gothic-centred criticism, which resists the conventional views of gender, and then 
moving to the studies of critics such as Kilgour, Williams, Miles and Markman Ellis, 
which adopt in reality various perspectives but are evoked as, nevertheless, engaging 
with ‘male’ and ‘female’ Gothics and thus elaborating on the relations between genre 
and gender. Next, she reviews related approaches to the Gothic which take as their 
starting point the assumption that the mode is occupied first and foremost with 
subjectivity shaping and identity construction, to finally arrive at the “range of research 
that has emerged in gender studies, gay and lesbian studies, the history of sexuality, and 
queer theory.”117 In so doing, she writes a history of critical progress and evolution, 
where links are more important than rifts for they serve to uncover the underlying 
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structure of the Gothic mode, defined in terms of gender: a specification which, in the 
more general accounts, is replaced by the more general assumption of literature 
disclosing socio-political context. Other perspectives on the Gothic are also given some 
space: Punter is mentioned as a leading figure of criticism focusing on the mode’s 
engagement with the problems of class, nation and race, a question related to that of 
“subjectivity, gender and sexuality,” and a yet another strand of criticism, related as 
well, is codified as exploring Gothic aesthetics and reception.118 
In many ways this is an exhaustive account, one bringing together a whole array of 
names and contributions that have shaped the contemporary field of Gothic criticism. It 
also seems to aim at a general, inclusive perspective as it proposes three possible angles 
from which the Gothic might be approached, grouping, as Botting does, diverse authors 
under possibly general and broad headings. But between all of them some kind of 
relationship is established with reference to what remains represented as the core of the 
Gothic and, consequently, Gothic criticism: the female-feminist-gender paradigm. It 
would probably be a gross exaggeration to claim that this particular history might be 
consciously exclusive – but it may be interesting to note that while Heiland goes as far 
as to evoke Gayatri Spivak’s essay on Jane Eyre and Frankenstein, she mentions 
neither Botting, nor Mighall, a recognisable new historicist figure in the field,119 whose 
article written in collaboration with Baldick, already mentioned in this text, has 
nonetheless received serious critical response.120 Nor does she mention Hogle.121 The 
suggestion we could make here, to repeat, is not that these authors have been excluded 
on purpose. However, it might prove worthwhile to investigate the extent to which the 
critics who are mentioned by Heiland contribute, in one way or another, to the general 
paradigm of Gothic criticism she devises, and whether they reinforce it just as Jackson, 
once made a key Gothic critic from 1980s, reinforces the paradigm found in Smith’s 
account. 
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On the basis of the above considerations, we may arrive at an interesting conclusion. 
It appears that the representations of the history of Gothic criticism not only vary when 
we move from the general plane to the level of (essential) details, but also that they may 
vary in accordance with the assumptions informing a given strand of criticism that 
undertakes to write a history. In a similar way, representations should vary according to 
various agendas, or aims that the critics set for themselves. To give a rather simple 
example of how a particular agenda may influence a representation of the crucial 
moments in the development of Gothic criticism, we may quote Clive Bloom’s brief 
mention of the early twentieth-century critics whom he sees as carrying out “the serious 
study of horror and ghost fiction,” and as scholars ready to “divine the essential nature 
of [the horror genre’s] craft and symbolism.”122 In his account, early criticism becomes 
represented as a necessary stage which enabled “sustained critical analysis,” even if its 
focus was rather on cataloguing than analysing.123 Bloom’s account is aimed at 
recovering the definition of Gothic horror from analytical texts by practitioners, 
beginning with Lovecraft, rather than commenting on the history of Gothic criticism, 
but the manner in which he ascribes early Gothic criticism a role in enabling this 
definition to take shape – approaching the genre seriously – in fact reworks the 
representation of criticism as presented above. What becomes displaced in this account 
is the very difference which seems to define the representation of the contemporary 
criticism – it is Birkhead, Railo and Summers who cross the boundary of disparagement 
inherent in early horror writers and mark the beginning of serious inquiry. Here, since 
there is little attention given to contemporary criticism and the focus is instead on 
writers, the early stage of the development of the Gothic critic may be easily construed 
according to a yet different reference frame, one which does not incorporate the changes 
in critical theory that took place in the second half of the twentieth century. 
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Gothic Counter-Histories 
 
So far, we have based our considerations on the assertion that the contemporary 
Gothic criticism manifests a special sense of critical self-consciousness. On the one 
hand, this consciousness refers to being conscious of the place the Gothic critics occupy 
in the field of critical theory nowadays, and the changes that had to take place for them 
to become acknowledged by the critical mainstream. This consciousness is revealed 
especially when it comes to defining the recent history of criticism through the 
difference from the earlier stages of Gothic scholarship: through adopting a different 
approach that reflects, as much as it is enabled by, the turn to social context in general 
literary criticism; through moving the Gothic from the margin to the mainstream; and 
through remaining free from the constraints imposed by the previous prevalent critical 
discourse. On the other hand, this special consciousness emerges when we consider the 
general character of the paradigm established to characterise the contemporary 
criticism, one which seems to embrace various divergent representations of critical 
history, but at the same time proves to be reworked by particular critics according to 
their own presumptions about the mode. The contemporary Gothic critic avoids naming 
the prevailing approach, conscious that this would threaten with exclusion, liberation 
from which has been the basis for moving Gothic fiction from the margin straight into 
the mainstream. But at the same time, he or she nevertheless does choose – between 
generalising or specifying, both the general and specific paradigm being informed by 
some underlying assumptions. 
As we have already noticed, the critics’ choices seem to be, in fact, informed by their 
own adopted perspectives and by their own projected aims. In the following chapter we 
will consider a number of counter-histories of the Gothic, offered to us by William 
Hughes, Chris Baldick, Robert Mighall, and Robert Miles, as well as take into 
consideration the voices coming from the new historicist strand of Gothic criticism, in 
order to highlight this fact. Counter-histories such as those mentioned above represent 
the fullest form of critical consciousness as defined by us. This is because they 
recognise the fact that criticism itself actively reworks its own field, and attempt at 
contesting elements of the Gothic history as represented by the differentiation paradigm. 
As a result, what they emphasise is that, especially as it turns to theory for interpretive 
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tools, and away from historical discursive background of the mode, Gothic criticism 
turns out to structure conceptions of the Gothic which do not illuminate the mode as 
such, but rather serve to reinforce the very perspectives and aims of the critics. 
 
2.1. Contesting the ‘Myth’ of the Margin 
 
The fact that Gothic critics tend to take different approaches to the Gothic, choosing 
what best suits their needs, but at the same time avoid evaluation and exclusion is a 
curious and a problematic one. As Rintoul writes in her review, the critic’s attention 
should be directed towards a significant gap in the field of Gothic criticism, namely the 
question of the impact of contemporary Gothic criticism on the definition of the 
Gothic.1 By the same token, we could ask what is the extent to which Gothic critics 
shape their own past as a consequence of the approaches they take towards it. But 
taking different approaches is not all. As the brief example of Bloom above has shown, 
as soon as the aim of the critical survey into the past changes, an historical account may 
change as well, up to the point of being structured according to another paradigm. Just 
as Gothic criticism is well aware that our past defines who we are, so it is well aware 
that representations of the past are informed by different agendas. These agendas haunt 
the Gothic pasts – but they also seem to haunt the critics. A trace of this haunting can be 
detected in Rintoul’s article, which in fact highlights how Gothic critics seem to be 
frustrated with their inability to define their object but, in reality, themselves constitute 
the source of this frustration. The critical self-consciousness as exemplified so far 
entails seeing freedom from limitations as a basis for complete and fruitful scrutiny, and 
hence, we may conclude, the critics find themselves bound to acknowledge the diversity 
of possible approaches. This ought to be the case especially with the general paradigm 
for representing critical history. As a result, the only possible cure for the frustration 
caused by the fragmented and disjointed representation of the Gothic is to learn to 
accept it for the sake of the diversity (and hence freedom) it secures.  
At the same time, however, just as the contemporary critics do favour representing 
their field in a particular way (subscribing to the general representation or modifying it 
from their own perspective), they still define the Gothic in their own manner, enjoying 
the freedom they have. Inescapably, in this way, they also contribute to further 
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fragmentation.2 One result is what Rintoul mentions at a certain point, and what is 
generally noticeable if one surveys contemporary critical texts, namely the assumption 
that the difficulty with fixing rules upon the mode somehow parallels the mode’s 
inherent emphasis on contesting limits.3 As if the inherent subversion of the content was 
one aspect of the mode’s subversiveness, the other manifesting itself in the mode’s 
refusal to be fixed, which ought to make it a supreme subverter. We shall claim that 
such a representation of the Gothic is, in fact, often characteristic of the type of Gothic 
criticism which embraces the critical history as represented in accordance with the 
critical paradigm discussed above.4 And, without a doubt, such a representation must be 
seen as highly functional. 
More direct traces of agendas haunting Gothic criticism emerge to sight when we 
consider critical accounts which openly dismiss both the paradigm of liberation from 
the critical discourse of the past and the narratives of moving from the margin to the 
mainstream of critical establishment. For example, surveying the criticism of Gothic 
fiction from the year of the publication of Otranto to the dawn of the twenty-first 
century, William Hughes begins by thus summarising and commenting on the very 
representation of the history of Gothic criticism we have discussed so far: 
 
To chart the development of Gothic criticism, it might be argued, is to 
follow the progress of a genre from literary curiosity to distinctive and 
systematic cultural movement. A genre that forms the subject of a 
discrete and expanding body of criticism must surely, the argument 
runs, have gained acceptance within the Academy, and the right in 
consequence to police a canon or canons as well as affirm a body of 
generic conventions. To have attained such a worthy position, 
inevitably, implicates the genre in a mythical past-time when such a 
body of criticism could not have been contemplated, a less-
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enlightened age where Gothic was, if not precultural, then at least 
subcultural. This is a wonderful myth, and it is one which no doubt 
does much to reassure the critic at the dawn of the twenty-first century 
that he or she has escaped the strictures of a still-discernible Leavisite 
heritage. By accepting the Gothic, in teaching as well as in research, 
the modern Academy distances itself from an intolerant and elitist 
past, variously eighteenth-century, Victorian, or Leavisite. It 
proclaims a liberation of texts from obscurity and censorship, and in 
so doing sustains an edifice of the enlightened present. The Gothic, 
reassuringly, has been rescued from prejudice, has become something 
that the critics and authors commonly regarded as great, authoritative, 
or canonical, may now talk about openly with no embarrassment, save 
that of having to admit that their forebears were less enlightened.5 
 
 
Williams sees the realist, Romanticist, feminist (at least until 1995) and creationist 
representations of Gothic fiction as critical myths; Hughes views in the same way the 
progress of Gothic criticism as described according to the paradigm which we have 
characterised earlier in this chapter.  
This paradigm is interestingly contested in his account. Gothic criticism is extended 
to incorporate nineteenth- and eighteenth-century belletrist responses (the first example 
of a critical engagement with the Gothic being Walpole’s first-edition preface to 
Otranto) and the beginning of the twentieth century is identified with the rise of Gothic 
criticism modified by the adjective “academic.”6 Such a change of strategic reference 
points allows for re(-)constructing the Gothic as never fully rejected, marginal or 
silenced by criticism, and debunks the “subcultural origins”7 proclaimed by academic 
Gothic criticism. As Hughes points out, “Gothic as a genre has never been beneath the 
notice of the most elitist of critics—as, indeed, it has never been outside of the creative 
                                                           
5
 William Hughes, “Gothic criticism: A Survey, 1974 – 2004,” in Teaching the Gothic, ed. Anna Powell 
and Andrew Smith (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 10. Emphasis mine. One 
may find it particularly interesting to read this description – and, subsequently, follow Hughes’ line of 
argument up till his closing considerations of the Gothic canon – against the following description of the 
development of Gothic studies provided by Hogle in the article which follows Hughes’ in the very same 
collective volume: “The teaching of the Gothic today is the product of a reactivated psychoanalysis, a 
post1950s feminism which has expanded into ‘gender studies’, a resurgent Marxism, a genuinely ‘new 
historicism’ combining cultural anthropology with Derridean ‘deconstruction’, and several forms of 
‘cultural studies’ that have come to include ‘postcolonial’ theory and criticism, among other strands. All 
of these together, challenging the standards set by New Criticism and high/low culture distinctions, have 
brought the Gothic forward as a major cultural force by the very nature of their assumptions and thereby 
drawn some Gothic ‘classics’ (The Mysteries of Udolpho [1794], Frankenstein [1818], Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde [1886]) to the centre of what a liberal arts education must encompass if a college student is be truly 
‘literate’ about what Western culture includes.” Hogle, “Theorizing the Gothic,” p. 34. 
6
 Hughes, “Gothic criticism,” pp. 11, 17. 
7
 Hughes, “Gothic Criticism,” p. 10. 
 62 
 
achievement of the most canonical of authors.”8 Dismissed for its improbability but 
praised for craft by the eighteenth-century critics, elaborated on both through literary 
reviews and the formal essay, which condemned as much as explicated it, and produced 
by the learned members of the elites, the Gothic has always, one way or another, raised 
critical interest and this interest legitimised it historically.9  
From this perspective, Gothic fiction proves inseparable from both authorial and 
critical mainstream at its dawn. And if it vanishes from the public eye in most of the 
nineteenth-century, this is, as Hughes maintains, because the public’s (authors’ and 
readers’) interest shifts to the issues pivotal to the materialistic age, away from the 
Gothic trappings of history and supernaturalism. Though he points to a handful of 
writers like Walter Scott, Charles Lamb or May Shelley who remain engaged in the 
Gothic theory and aesthetics, Hughes writes: “no Gothic novel generated a level of 
social fascination equivalent to the products of [the] topical issues of the day, and so the 
genre remained a mode of fiction first and foremost rather than an arena in which to 
mobilize stridently the discords and fear of culture.”10 The situation changed only with 
the rise of decadence at the fin de siécle, bringing along a Gothic revival.11 In that sense, 
the Gothic did become subcultural at a given time, receiving little critical interest, 
perhaps except for the burlesque satirising of its worn-out conventions. Those 
conventions were, nevertheless, still exploited by writers (consider e.g. the ghost story), 
and reviews appeared in journals.12 
Of course, Hughes’ is not the only critic that takes the final decades of the 
eighteenth-century as a starting point for the history of serious critical engagement with 
the Gothic. To give one example, in their introduction to the tenth anniversary issue of 
Gothic Studies, Hogle and Smith draw a parallel between the present day and the Gothic 
heyday with respect to the blooming exchange between Gothic novel and theory. Then, 
as now, the Gothic was undergoing vigorous theorising, as much as it fed on theory. 
However, this burgeoning exchange in the eighteenth century, as they relate, ended with 
the rise of high Romanticism and its disparagement of the Gothic, resulting in the 
disappearance of Gothic fiction from “the theory and criticism by ‘men of letters.’”13 
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Wordsworth and Coleridge are identified here as those whose attacks on the Gothic 
resulted in banning it from the sphere of criticism, and New Criticism phase as 
particularly strict in guarding the ban until it’s supremacy had been overthrown, and the 
Gothic underwent “the process of restoring it and its many variations to cultural 
importance in the academy.”14 This account, unlike Hughes,’ incorporates the extended 
history of Gothic criticism into the critical frame of ‘liberating’ the Gothic and its 
silenced cultural significance, and of re-acknowledging it after it had been debased.15 
By contrast, Hughes asserts we cannot speak of a gradual acknowledgement of 
Gothic fiction.16 In the paradigm which he draws, the Gothic has always been 
acknowledged, even if the critics raged at it, and even if at times the attention of the 
public was directed towards other literary phenomena and issues raised in writing. 
Similarly, it has always been exploited, to a greater or lesser degree, as a mode, even if 
at times there was little contribution to its theory, and the authors who took recourse to 
Gothic motives for profit did not treat it as a ‘serious’ genre. It was not forced 
underground due to its threatening subversions, or so that another form could use it to 
form a negative definition. Neither was it reclaimed from the margin with the change in 
critical theory that directed criticism towards discussing the text as a socio-political 
phenomenon. And it was not liberated by theory from constraints imposed by earlier 
critical discourse. This earlier discourse did not silence or underestimate the Gothic; 
rather, it focused primarily on other things, things to which it gave utmost importance. 
Within the framework proposed by Hughes, as we may conclude, the Gothic simply 
became relevant again with a new cultural turn – so much for changing critical 
positions. This time, the turn moved it not from the margin into the mainstream, but 
from the non-academic sphere into academia, with eighteenth-century belletrist literary 
reviews turning into articles in academic journals, post-conference volumes, and 
introductions by contemporary editors of Gothic writings, in all of which the belletrist 
spirit, in fact, survives.17 
One interesting, though seemingly minor, difference between these two accounts is 
the critics’ manifested understanding of the place of both Gothic fiction and criticism in 
the eighteenth century. For Hogle and Smith, the men of letters become equated, in a 
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sense, with the contemporary academy. Equating the two appears a logical move if we 
are to speak of bringing the Gothic back into the critical – i.e. nowadays’ academic – 
mainstream. Falling outside the ‘academy’ equals falling outside the respectable, being 
rejected and becoming marginal. For Hughes, however, the belletrist tradition in which 
the Gothic first burgeoned is primarily non-academic. What this detail reveals is the 
centralising of academic discourse that is taking place in the paradigm embracing the 
postulates of acknowledgement, focus on social context, and liberation. In this 
paradigm, admission into the academy is the basis for recognition.  
While stating this may be seen as stating the obvious, the implications it may bear 
are not that straightforward. Both accounts pay attention to the interaction between the 
Gothic and theory. Hughes’ one, however, does not see the scarcity of theory on the 
Gothic as a sign of its exclusion – but rather as a consequence of the broader attention 
being temporarily directed elsewhere. We could thus draw the following conclusion: 
whenever the Gothic becomes closer to the prevailing cultural currents, more easily 
lending itself to be used for particular purposes (e.g. to become an embodiment of 
decadence or of rebellion against essentialist notions) we are dealing with a revival. 
This point of view is strikingly free from the dialectics of marginalisation and 
subversion. What is more, it allows us to suggest that, while the considerable part of the 
contemporary Gothic criticism dismisses the notion of literary value as dependent on 
‘high art’ credentials, it nevertheless remains haunted by some sort of them. Academia – 
the house of research into High Art – needs to embrace the Gothic if the Gothic is to be 
validated, acknowledged and valued. Although it apparently revolts against the 
distinction between ‘serious’ and ‘popular’ literature, the contemporary Gothic criticism 
nevertheless acts under this distinction’s influence.  
The difference between the two paradigms can be perhaps best observed when it 
comes to the borderline between the past and the present, drawn by the differentiation 
paradigm. For Hughes, early twentieth-century Gothic critics were, “inevitably, 
influenced by the belletrist and antiquarian traditions in which their authors were well 
versed,” and consequently focused on the generic survey.18 Their embarrassment with 
the subject of their study is not brought to the foreground here: the Gothic becomes their 
subject in the first place due to its persistence.19 This persistence, we could continue, 
becomes a reason per se for academic study – a reason, in fact, good enough to write 
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extensive volumes. As such, the Gothic becomes introduced into and validated by 
academia even without being seen from the perspective of the changes that took place in 
the 1970s and 1980s. What is more, it becomes mostly validated as a legitimate genre 
with fixed conventions and discernible features, even if at times it comes close to be 
incorporated into Romanticism.20 The approach of the critics and their attempts at 
linking the Gothic with Romanticism could be seen, consequently, not as disclosing 
active marginalisation or neglect, or prejudice against the Gothic, but rather as resulting 
from the general character of the period which saw more interesting and pivotal topics 
elsewhere. 
Similarly, the turn to the modern phase of study into the Gothic is not presented in 
Hughes’ account as characterised by liberation from the trap of the margin. He writes: 
“Though the influence of other early twentieth-century critics such as Montague 
Summers cannot be discounted, nor indeed the synthesis of earlier works provided 
within Devendra Varma’s The Gothic Flame (1957) be discounted, it is nevertheless 
important to establish a point at which the generic survey becomes a thoroughly modern 
and systematic critical medium.”21 Thus, Punter is introduced to fix a point at which the 
study of the Gothic becomes a fully modern and systematic enterprise – and not at as a 
persona who paved the way for a new path of analysis, one that had been kept made 
unavailable to the Gothic by earlier mainstream criticism: 
 
Discernibly a product of the liberal preoccupations and rising theories 
of the 1960s and 1970s, The Literature of Terror combines 
psychoanalytic thought with social consciousness in order to establish 
the genre as a serious attempt “to come to grips with and to probe 
matters of concern” to contemporary society. Its rejection of the 
assumption that Gothic is nothing more than escapism is subtle, and 
the book’s theoretical context is less intrusive than, for example, 
Rosemary Jackson’s psychoanalytical adaptation of Todorov’s 
theories in her Fantasy, published twelve months later. The Literature 
of Terror is, also, the text which extended Gothic from its customary 
end-point in the nineteenth-century fin de siècle to more recent 
publications, many of which might not have otherwise been classified 
as generically Gothic. This extension includes possibly the first 
serious considerations of Walter de la Mare and Algernon Blackwood; 
a significant reading of the horror film; and the acknowledgement of a 
vibrant and contemporary Gothic tradition in the works of, among 
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others, Oates, Pynchon, Ballard, Coover, and Carter through what 
Punter terms “Modern perceptions of the barbaric.” This latter 
definition, together with his original coda in pursuit of a feasible 
theory of the Gothic, underlines the systematic approach which 
distinguishes this survey from those of twenty-three, if not forty to 
fifty years earlier.22 
 
 
Punter’s study fulfils the conditions set forth for the contemporary critical study 
thoroughly. At the same time, however, though his approach is distinct from the older 
approaches (as it clearly must be, provided it is the product of its own age), it does not 
allow these conditions to suddenly break through from a critical closet, but rather marks 
a point at which they have emerged in full shape, one critical discourse (or one set of 
discourses) being substituted by another. 
What is interesting about Hughes’ succinct history of Gothic criticism is the way he 
reworks the representation of the past, complicating, in fact, the possibilities of drawing 
the line between the past and the present. To be able to free oneself from the past one 
must assume some degree of continuity between now and then – otherwise, the rift will 
not be possible. However, as soon as we start thinking about different periods of Gothic 
criticism as conditioned by different discourses prevailing at different times, it becomes 
difficult to assess any of them on the same basis as we assess our own. Punter’s study 
does constitute a transition point – and his considerations are, in general, guided by the 
modern critical frame, a frame which values liberation and inclusion. Prior discourses 
concentrate on other issues, as Hughes’ appears to stress. And if it is so, should we 
perceive the neglect of Gothic fiction and its socio-cultural relevance as a conscious 
attempt at silencing, doing away with, or excluding for the sake of retaining power? Or 
perhaps such a perception of the previous stages of criticism is somewhat anachronistic? 
What is also compelling in Hughes’ account is the ease with which he speaks of 
achievements and definitions – and points to influences. It was Punter’s work that 
introduced the Gothic critics of 1990s to the genre. Then, it was Botting’s paperback 
Gothic, concise and accessible both due to the way it had been written and its price, that 
influenced undergraduate students in the 1990s, popularising the now widely accepted 
definition of the Gothic as a writing of excess, transgression and diffusion. Though 
Hughes admits there are “as many potential definitions of the Gothic as there are critics 
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to assert them,”23 he nevertheless singles out Mighall’s definition of the Gothic as a 
mode preoccupied with attitudes towards the past and its legacies, and not as a genre. 
Moreover, he also draws a link between the contemporary Gothic criticism and perhaps 
what could be least expected – the tradition of generic surveys, stating: “The scholarly 
monograph, and its fragmented counterpart, the critical article or book chapter, are in 
effect synecdoches of the broader drive of Gothic criticism, namely the construction of 
lineage and antecedent, temporal or otherwise, as an aid to generic identity, expansion, 
or definition.”24 Next, as he identifies the concepts which constitute the basis on which 
much of the contemporary criticism rests, Hughes enumerates Moers’ the Female 
Gothic – both a style of writing and a mode of criticism – in the first place. As he states, 
“[t]his concept, which embraces both female authorship and the characteristic plots of a 
fictional tradition influenced by female psychological and political issues, is central to 
both generic definitions of the Gothic, to the wider problems of canon formation and 
resistance to the restraints of canon, as well as to broader women’s issues beyond 
literary criticism.”25 He also devotes some attention to the critical works concentrating 
on anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic themes in Gothic Fiction,26 aesthetic questions, typical 
Gothic elements such as the double or the ghost, national schools and, finally, published 
bibliographies and masterlists. And, concluding his account, he emphasizes a 
phenomenon which, in spite of the used disclaimer, hints at a somewhat perverse 
subversion of the premises of non-exclusion, on which the differentiation paradigm 
seems to rest: 
 
As academic teaching in the Gothic becomes more widespread, so the 
pressure to direct formal publishing to areas of mass appeal becomes 
more acute. The Gothic is too rapidly becoming, for example, Ann 
Radcliffe, Bram Stoker, and Anne Rice, rather than Clara Reeve, 
Algernon Blackwood, and Poppy Z. Brite. This is not to say that these 
other writers are excluded—scholarly revivals of the unreprinted 
works of Horace Walpole, Charlotte Dacre, and L. T. C. Rolt, for 
example, have been welcome—but it is becoming perceptibly more 
difficult to publish outside of the familiar (and already critically well 
supported) Gothic paths beloved of undergraduate students. 27 
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The danger which Hughes traces, in the process of perhaps a quite involuntary limiting 
of the Gothic canon, seems to be real. What is more, the fact that he acknowledges the 
role of the prevalent ‘student tastes’ is striking, as one can, by association with the 
proliferation of Gothic novels at the dusk of the eighteenth century, sense the politics of 
marketplace behind what is being published of and on the Gothic nowadays. 
 
2.2 Subversion and Theory’s Dehistoricising of the Gothic 
 
Hughes’ account of the history of Gothic fiction clearly follows a different paradigm 
than the one outlined earlier in this chapter, and, clearly, stepping outside of the 
differentiation frame allows him to make several significant points. Still, his stance is 
not the only one that is distanced from the prevailing critical trends. A brief and 
provocative article, criticizing the history of Gothic liberation complacent with what we 
have identified as the differentiation paradigm, was published in 2000 and co-authored 
by the aforementioned Baldick and Mighall.28 While Hughes’ history aspires to a more 
general status – though it must be said that its venture point is also a counter-
perspective, its underlying assumption being that of the inherent centrality of the Gothic 
and the mode’s never ceasing presence in critical thought – Baldick and Mighall wish to 
focus on “some critical problems and strategies that are typical of the Gothic Criticism 
of the last seventy years.”29 Thus, they present a counter-history which focuses more on 
the recent critical period. 
Baldick and Mighall contest much of the assumptions on which the contemporary 
criticism operates. Their major objection is that the critics have abandoned historicist 
scrutiny in favour of methodologies and approaches which displace the Gothic from its 
historical context. Such a displacement, in turn, allows the critics to enjoy the liberty of 
re-making Gothic fiction – literally – so that it may be seen as characteristic of 
“psychological ‘depth’” and “political ‘subversion.’”30 Consequently, the assumption 
that the Gothic is subversive – one which is visibly inherent in the contemporary Gothic 
criticism and conditioned by the character of our own times – seems to be at the root of 
what becomes condemned in the course of the article. For Baldick and Mighall, the 
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contemporary criticism perceives – and codifies – subversion in a clearly distinct 
manner, namely as positioned against Victorian repression and realist oligarchy, and 
then projects so codified subversion on the Gothic text, viewing it as consequently 
repressed and marginalised. There is a clear agenda behind such a projection. As 
Baldick and Mighall assume, “the cultural politics of modern critical debate grant to 
vindicators of the marginalized or repressed a special license to evade questions of 
artistic merit.”31 Thus, according to their representation of the recent critical history, the 
contemporary Gothic criticism, having liberated itself from the limitations imposed by 
earlier discourses, chooses to construe the Gothic as its anachronistic counterpart, a 
progressive character much ahead of its own times, trapped in the past of the strict 
bourgeois code and persecution; as a disturbing “undomesticable Other,” “the favourite 
wicked uncle of counter-cultural rebellion.”32 As a result, the history they sketch 
becomes a history of miscomprehension and appropriation. 
Baldick and Mighall’s account begins with a statement which seems to correspond 
with the differentiation paradigm. The authors restate the common assumption that the 
early twentieth-century Gothic criticism worked “under a curse” of disparagement and 
on the “modest” assumption that the Gothic was a curiosity.33 This phase of Gothic 
criticism is here termed “shamefaced antiquarianism,”34 and comprises the phase which 
was, according to Hughes, that of generic survey. Hughes assumes Baldick and Mighall 
represent this critical phase as “the culturally naïve,”35 though it appears that the strand 
of criticism until the 1930s is the one with which the two critics actually sympathize. 
Even if the claims to the right of recognition made by the early critics were modest and 
shameful, they still constituted a good enough ground on which the study of “sources, 
influences, biographical contexts and generic features”36 could be conducted. Of course, 
we could debate whether conducting such studies is not, actually, culturally naïve, but 
still we need to remember about the position from which we depart. As Hughes stresses, 
early critical studies function within a different critical frame – and as Baldick and 
Mighall overtly state, it is historical survey that should constitute the basis for analysing 
Gothic fiction. Their one-paragraph-long description of the early critical works and 
authors emphasizes exactly the historical slant of the early works – the stress is visibly 
                                                           
31
 Baldick and Mighall, “Gothic Criticism,” p. 210. 
32
 Baldick and Mighall, “Gothic Criticism,” p. 210. 
33
 Baldick and Mighall, “Gothic Criticism,” p. 209. 
34
 Baldick and Mighall, “Gothic Criticism,” p. 209. 
35
 Hughes, “Gothic Criticism,” p. 17. 
36
 Baldick and Mighall, “Gothic Criticism,” p. 209. 
 70 
 
put on considering context, drawing intertextual connections and doing ‘solid’ research 
(and not the apologetic tone), the qualities of early Gothic scholars which are, as the two 
authors figuratively put it, “brushed aside” by later critics.37 
The appropriation begins with the displacement of the value of historical research 
and with removing the Gothic from the context of bourgeois fiction into that of high 
Romantic poetry. The result is a reorientation of the main field of the Gothic into that of 
“‘poetic’ revival of medieval sentiment or romance.”38 One of the outcomes, apart from 
inscribing the Gothic into the sphere of high art, is positioning it not within the 
dimension of bourgeois tastes – the positioning which, as the two authors notice and we 
have observed, is carried out by Punter, but later on abandoned in favour of all sorts of 
poetic allegiances – but within the aforementioned sphere of counter-cultural rebellion. 
Hence, ultimately, the Gothic will become endowed with the quality of cultural 
transgression.  
The displacement is carried out by Breton and Summers, though they depart from the 
opposite venture points. Breton, as was already mentioned during the discussion of 
Kilgour in the previous chapter, opens the Gothic to the psychoanalytic scrutiny, 
viewing it as resorting to dream and fantasy, the regions outside of the reign of reason. 
In his interpretation, the supernatural in the Gothic becomes the haunting presence of 
the feudal past, one against which the Gothic actively rebels.39 This particular 
assumption about the uneasiness of the past could be found compliant with Baldick and 
Mighall’s own perception of the Gothic. However, it becomes distorted as the later 
Gothic criticism combines Gothic rebellion with what it takes after Summers, namely 
his assumption that Gothic fiction reflects “nostalgic resistance to bourgeois modernity 
and enlightenment.”40 Interestingly, while the origin of this assumption is shown to lie 
in the mistaken premise that English Romanticism was reactionary rather than 
revolutionary41 – and, according to Summers, the Gothic is overtly Romantic – the 
contemporary criticism seems to ‘tacitly’ turn a blind eye to the fact. The nostalgic 
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orientation of the Gothic towards the lost medieval past and against the uncertain 
present, first posed by Summers, is then upheld by Varma, and through a line of further 
successors traced up to the very work of Kilgour on which we have already drawn. On 
the contrary, Baldick and Mighall would see the Gothic as scarcely looking up to the 
past. According to them, Gothic fictions “represent the past not as paradisal but as 
‘nasty’ in its ‘possessive’ curtailing of individual liberties; and they gratefully endorse 
Protestant bourgeois values as ‘kinder’ than those of feudal barons”42 – an assumption 
in tune with much of the contemporary criticism of, for instance, Radcliffe’s novels. 
Displacing the Gothic’s attitude towards the past, resulting from tying it with 
Romantic-poetic mode contributes to the representation of the Gothic as subversive by 
nature. Removed from the bourgeois background, the Gothic becomes the antagonist of 
the rationalist, Protestant, enlightened society. Its emphasis on conjuring decaying 
abbeys and castles, together with the use of the supernatural, so much condemned by 
the contemporary propagators of reason, somehow takes priority over its inherent 
bourgeois prerogatives. As these are obliterated, the Gothic is reorganized as 
transgressing boundaries. Hence, the Gothic becomes defined through negation – as 
non-realist, anti-Enlightenment fiction resorting to the realm of the fantastic and 
dreams. Such a perception of Gothic fiction, in Baldick and Mighall’s view, contributes 
first and foremost to generic confusion and dehistoricising.43 
Let us digress for a moment at this point. Though he is quite explicit about the 
psychological coordinates of the Gothic which he assumes in his study,44 Robert Miles 
points to the dehistoricizing of the mode as well. His Gothic Writing 1750-1820: A 
Genealogy, which appeared in two editions, first in the 1993, and then almost ten years 
later, in 2002, was initially written in the 1980s (the decade when, as Miles states, there 
was still very little academic interest in the Gothic), and was meant to expand on 
Punter’s argument. Similarly to Kilgour, Miles sees the upsurge of Gothic criticism in 
the following decade as overwhelming, refers to it as a “flood,” poses the question 
whether this flood should be seen as a proof of a new fashion, or rather as a birth of a 
serious academic discipline, and immediately chooses the latter.45 His stance, if 
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considered in reference to the differentiation paradigm, is thus an interesting one. And 
this is not only because in the preface to his second edition he overtly positions his work 
with regard to the developments in the study of the Gothic after the genre became 
central to critical interest. 
In his study, Miles passes an intriguing comment on the aforementioned central 
position of the Gothic and Gothic criticism. He states: “My present sense of the field is 
that it is situated both at the margins and at the centre of ‘English’: at the margins, 
because the study of the Gothic is not primarily occupied with the best that has ever 
been thought and written, with those aesthetic concerns which constituted the 
canonisation on which traditional English studies were based; but at the centre, because 
it involves itself with those wider questions about the work of culture that have inspired 
much of what is innovatory in English.”46 One the one hand, what is interesting here is 
the retaining of the ‘older’ distinctions within the field of criticism as still operative – 
high art and aesthetic questions equal the centre, ‘bad’ literature equals the margin. In a 
way, such a perception of the academic field, stated in 2002, might be thought 
‘anachronistic’ in itself with regard to the contemporary pronouncements of change in 
the critical discourse. Of course, on the other hand we have the statement that the 
cultural relevance of the Gothic places it at the centre of interest. But, in fact, Miles 
acknowledges that one might claim that the margin and the centre are two concepts 
irrelevant to the contemporary English as they depend on the perspectives adopted, and 
these are numerous, contributing to the field’s constant state of flux.47 This is a striking 
observation if we think of how much is said about the Gothic’s journey from the margin 
to the mainstream. Still, as he postulates, whatever the case might be, it is “innovative” 
methodologies that enable the critic to cope with the Gothic’s cultural significance, as 
contrasted with those traditional ones.48  
As a result, what we have here is an interesting position, one which emphasises 
change, but at the same time does not announce the end of the older discourse, or its 
irrelevance, or the repression it used to exercise. Quite on the contrary – what seems to 
be stated is that the Gothic is not high art, and its relevance for the study of high art is 
marginal. It becomes central only when we turn to the study of cultural phenomena, and 
of its impact on the development of literature; and it is central only from a well-defined 
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perspective. The two discourses, the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ as represented here, are neither 
mutually exclusive, nor incapable of coexistence. In fact, what becomes emphasised in 
this account is, as in Hughes’ one, the coexistence of two different strands of criticism. 
Miles’ brief sketch of the contemporary criticism concentrates on the developments 
in the sub-field staked out by his own study. Significantly, his review in fact considers 
the authors whom he might view as his successors, at least in a sense.49 The brief 
remarks he passes on the overall field of Gothic criticism are, however, valuable as they 
somehow imply the way he perceives the relationships between the ‘new’ 
methodologies applied to the Gothic. Feminist criticism, represented by Hoeveler, 
Williams and Clery, is here visibly acknowledged as contributing a significant influence 
on the contemporary study of Gothic fiction. Psychoanalytical readings, concentrating 
on “Freudian paradigm of the unconscious, and ‘the uncanny,’” though presented as 
“previously […] so influential,”50 are, by contrast, mentioned as eschewed by more 
historicist-oriented studies, which are the keen of Gothic Writing. Among these, Miles 
enumerates: E.J. Clery’s The Rise of Supernatural Fiction, which adopts “a cultural 
materialist approach;” James Watt’s Contesting the Gothic, which concentrates on the 
genre’s internal generic and cultural heterogeneity; Mighall’s The Geography of 
Victorian Gothic Fiction, relating the Gothic with the parallel discourses of medicine 
and anthropology; Michael Garner’s reconsidering of the relationship between Gothic 
fiction and Romanticism; Cannon Schmitt’s discussion of the Gothic and nationalism; 
and Jacqueline Howard’s elaboration on the Gothic and the carnivalesque. He 
summarizes the perspective taken by all of them in the following way: “What these 
studies have in common is a desire to catch the Gothic’s contemporary inflections, thus 
placing Gothic works in their cultural and historical context.”51 In other words, what all 
of them share, is the historicist, or perhaps we should say new historicist, perspective. 
The gap addressed by the Gothic, one referring to the subject in formation, or re-
formation perhaps, and connected with the rise of modernity via rifts and ruptures, is, 
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according to Miles, best “teased out” by a theory.52 The choice of the theory is, 
however, not a straightforward one since the “dialectics” of the Gothic are multiple, and 
hence what often takes place – as in Punter’s study – is a consensus between different 
approaches.53 Still, Miles insists the consensus of theories is not enough: 
 
Gothic writing needs to be regarded as a series of contemporaneously 
understood forms, devices, codes, figurations, for the expression of 
the ‘fragmented subject.’ It should be understood as literary ‘speech’ 
in its own right, and not the symptom, the signification, of something 
else ‘out there,’ or ‘in here.’ The Gothic does represent a disjunctive 
subject, but these representations are in competition with each other 
and form a mode of debate. Gothic formulae are not simply recycled, 
as in the service of a neurotic, dimply understood drive; rather, Gothic 
texts revise one another, here opening up ideologically charged issues, 
there enforcing a closure.54 
 
 
Theory itself is unable to give an ultimate answer to the question about the gap in the 
subject – provided, of course, any such answer is attainable.55 On the contrary, it can 
find itself guilty of transplanting a text which bears witness to the past into the modern 
context, “dehistoricizing the Gothic through retrospective reading,” and “encountering, 
not evidence of late eighteenth-century gap, only ghosts of twentieth-century ones.” 56 
Hence, historicizing the Gothic proves the condition sine qua non if theory is to take us 
anywhere. 
Digressing towards Miles while discussing the account of Baldick and Mighall 
should enable us to contextualise their perspective. With Gothic Writing, it becomes 
visible that the strand of Gothic criticism oriented towards historical scrutiny persists, 
though, naturally, not without crucial changes both in assumptions and adopted tools. It 
also becomes visible that the criticism of the practice of using theory without a recourse 
to history can be encountered throughout critical writings. Most frequently, however, it 
can be encountered in those accounts which provide historical evidence that some of the 
achievements of theoretically-oriented studies need, in the best case, reconsideration, 
and in the worst case – serious revision. As it also follows from Miles, though less 
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directly than from Baldick and Mighall, historicising the Gothic may, at least to a 
certain extent, clarify generic inconsistencies which have become the basis for the 
claims of ‘non-definability.’ Both accounts see a danger in theoretical readings. 
However, while Miles considers theory as compatible with the historicist approach and 
nonetheless vital to the study of Gothic fiction, Bladick and Mighall focus on what 
theory actually disfigures as soon as it divorces itself from the imperative to account for 
history. What is more, their account comments on the differentiation paradigm in a 
telling way, pointing to the possible manner in which the paradigm itself can be seen as 
a function of the contemporary critical discourse.  
Baldick and Mighall, similarly to Williams, are quite explicit when it comes to 
identifying ‘agendas.’ A vivid example is the fact they connect Summer’s Catholicism 
with the means he uses to explain away the anti-Catholicism of the Gothic mode, which 
used to be treated as an obvious element of the Gothic by the early historicists.57 The 
assumption of the mode’s psychological orientation, or even its “Freudian agenda,” 
introduced by Breton, allows in turn for such an appropriation to pass unnoticed while it 
diminishes the importance of the historical context for the understanding of the mode. 
What is more, ultimately, it allows to analyse the relicts of the feudal past, present in 
Gothic texts, as explaining our own present rather that inherent in representations 
common in the eighteenth century.58 What thus becomes obscured is not only the 
historical context, but also the impact this context might have had on the original 
meaning of the text. And this meaning, according to Baldick and Mighall, should be 
established with reference to the fact that Gothic fiction “delights in depicting the 
delusions and iniquities of a (mythical) social order and celebrating its defeat by modern 
[Protestant] progressive values.”59 For both authors, the Gothic is Whiggish, bourgeois, 
and internalising “the clash between ‘modernity’ and ‘antiquity.’”60 It is, thus, hardly 
anti-Enlightenment. 
We might observe that such an understanding of the Gothic inescapably ‘subverts’ 
much of what the contemporary theory-oriented criticism has to say about it. If it were 
to be widely accepted, in the first place, it would force the critics to qualify their 
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assumptions about the Gothic’s perceived subversion, its rebellion against the 
Enlightened, Augustan, or in fact bourgeois reality. Or, to put it in simple terms, it 
would undermine the critics’ assumption that the Gothic offers some sort of progressive 
revisions of the past as, while it does offer revisions, these are not the ones the 
contemporary liberated critics could identify with. The Gothic as defined by Baldick 
and Mighall hails the emergence of the very ‘repressive’ cultural system of which the 
contemporary critics liberate themselves with so much pride. However, being deprived 
of proper historical context, it becomes the critic’s peer, its monsters turned into heroes, 
its heroes into monsters.61 
Baldick and Mighall ostensibly insist that a strand of contemporary Gothic criticism 
appropriates the Gothic for its own benefit, against the historical evidence. Seeing 
Dracula as a liberator as much as the Gothic mode as the wicked-uncle of rebels, and 
oneself as a rescuer of “the persecuted maiden Gothica from the ogre”62 – the ogre of 
the Leavisite criticism, we should presume – appears, in the light of their perception of 
the Gothic, highly functional for the differentiation paradigm. According to such a 
narrative, not only have the critics liberated themselves; they have also liberated a 
forgotten – or perhaps silenced – genre of fiction which was suppressed in the previous 
period but is now free to be celebrated. Naturally, not all of the contemporary criticism, 
as the authors stress, can be viewed in this way, and if some authors can, then their 
inclinations are very often not entirely mistaken. This is for instance the case of 
Punter,63 who, to give one example, actually qualifies the claims of Gothic’s subversion. 
Still, the contemporary history of Gothic criticism as sketched by Baldick and Mighall 
is actually one founded on much miscomprehension, resulting from the attempts at 
accomplishing a well-defined agenda. 
Hughes’ subsequent and more general history recognises Bladick and Mighall’s one 
as “a significant landmark in the genre’s introspection.”64 Still, his overall reception 
remains sceptical. What is noteworthy, he perceives the distinction between the earlier 
and more modern phase of criticism as artificial – a perfectly just remark if we take into 
consideration his own vantage point, which is not to stake rifts that allow the Gothic to 
become central. But then, apart from criticising the co-authors’ superficial treatment of 
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the early twentieth-century criticism – which, as we have already noticed, seems to 
result from his taking the implications of the phrase “shamefaced” somewhat at face 
value – he also states with regard to their approach that it: 
 
is as prejudiced as the “modern” phase of criticism which [it itself] 
disparage[s] as being implicated in a left-leaning and allegedly 
libertarian critique of Victorian repression. In a sense, [Baldick and 
Mighall] too have Gothicized the past, not with repression necessarily, 
but certainly with a dismissal based upon perceived primitivism and 
dilettante irrelevance. Gazing upon their division of two phases of 
Gothic criticism, the culturally naïve and the politically implicated, 
they find nothing to please them—at least until the act of criticism 
turns inward upon itself to critique the critical text and its theoretical 
basis over and above its alleged focus upon specific textual or generic 
issues.65 
 
 
Whether the approach is prejudiced or not could constitute a moot point. Certainly, 
Bladick and Mighall are firm about their rejection of the particular perception of Gothic 
fiction and – too – of a particular type of methodology which, according to them, if not 
qualified by history, results in miscomprehension. Much of their article in fact 
recapitulates Mighall’s earlier criticism of the application of psychoanalysis to the 
Gothic, which, in some cases, he sees as using Freud to explain what actually explains 
Freud.66 The coordinates of the Gothic they promote are perhaps as limiting – with 
regard to the scope of both texts which could be seen as Gothic and paths of 
investigation which could be chosen as legitimate – as their argument is fierce in tone. 
Still, it does not appear justified to state that they find nothing to please them as they 
call out for a well-defined type of criticism and, above all, their act of turning inwards 
upon criticism cannot be perceived as of secondary importance with regard to what is at 
stake in studying Gothic fiction. Baldick and Mighall’s account has generated 
significant critical response, and how central their argument is to studying Gothic 
fiction can be seen for instance on the example of David Punter and Elisabeth Bronfen’s 
article published in the aforementioned collection, The Gothic, edited by Botting. We 
might conclude with their statement: “One premise which is assumed is that it is no 
longer adequate – if it ever was – to consider Gothic solely under the rubric of the 
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counter-cultural or subversive; Gothic is now canonical in many different ways, but it 
could be argued that this renders the urgency of examining the ethical implications of 
our readings of the Gothic all the greater.”67 
 
2.3. Gothic Criticism and Psychoanalysis 
 
The history of Gothic criticism as constructed by the differentiation paradigm is a 
history of success based on rifts. However, the accounts such as Hughes’ and Baldick 
and Mighall’s provide a valuable set of counter-perspectives, and point to possible 
points of rift and appropriation within the very contemporary critical discourse 
operating within that paradigm. Hughes approaches the notion of the Gothic journey 
from the margin into the mainstream critically and reinscribes the directions Gothic 
criticism took in the past without considering them with reference to a repression-
liberation relationship. Baldick and Mighall highlight some underlying assumptions on 
which the contemporary Gohic criticism often operates, and point to significant 
displacements which bear upon the constitution of a vast field of study. Interestingly, 
just as Miles notices that the historicist surveys often turn their back on psychoanalysis 
– and psychoanalytical scrutiny seems in fact to underlie the success of the Gothic in the 
differentiation paradigm – so the voices contesting the underlying assumptions of the 
differentiation paradigm come most often from historicist critics. This is, however, not 
to state that there ought to be a rift between the historicist- and theory-oriented Gothic 
criticism. We have already seen in Miles that the corrective drive would rather be to 
unite, or perhaps re-unite, the two in such a way that we are able to pay more attention 
to our own projected goals and received prejudices as, inescapably, cultural theories are 
culturally conditioned tools. 
The historicist (or rather ‘new historicist’) type of analysis interestingly identifies the 
potential (or actual) weak points of the theory-based interpretation where, we could say, 
the differentiation paradigm sees the moments of progress (or beneficial departure from 
the earlier assumptions and assessment of the Gothic), which enable the critic to 
reposition the Gothic as a phenomenon of central importance to culture. In the first 
place, what it contests is psychoanalysis, the basis for methodological scrutiny that first 
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made Gothic fiction something more than just ‘bad fiction,’ that is fiction which failed 
to follow the canons of the best that has ever been written. It appears, then, that out of 
the array of theoretical approaches that Gothic criticism has adapted for the scrutiny of 
the Gothic, it is psychoanalysis that deserves our special attention. 
A significant perspective on psychoanalysis is offered by Mighall. Valued by Hughes 
for its introduction of the concept of the Gothic as a mode,68 his A Geography of 
Victorian Fiction, first published in 1999, elaborates in detail on the author’s stance that 
psychoanalysis should be reassessed as an unproblematic mode of reading Gothic 
fiction. In fact, as Mighall states, psychoanalytical or psychological approaches 
preclude historical or ‘geographical’ considerations: “Discussions of just where and 
when a text is set are not prominent in this critical tradition.”69 Importantly, as 
considered by Mighall, Gothic fiction does not turn out to be inconsequential to the 
development of the modern subjectivity. He writes: “The Gothic dwells in the historical 
past, or identifies ‘pastness’ in the present, to reinforce a distance between the 
enlightened now and the repressive and misguided then.”70 Thus, its representations of 
the past ought to be seen as central to the formation of the bourgeois subject, a fact 
which is established without any aid of psychological scrutiny. What is more, Mighall 
claims, psychology-oriented critical readings are Gothic in their own right, as they 
“[enact] version of ‘historical’ attitudes and mechanisms which are central to Gothic 
representation, compelled to duplicate what [they fail] to understand.”71 They key idea 
here is that, according to Mighall, psychoanalysis stems from the same discourses that 
manifest themselves in Gothic fiction. As a result, while attempting at ‘explaining’ the 
Gothic, psychoanalysis traces in the text the clues pointing to what once determined its 
own rise. 
An example might be necessary at this point to clarify Mighall’s position. To give 
one, the Gothic’s reliance on history makes it prone to invite psychoanalytical readings, 
simply because psychoanalysis itself relies on a history model in which the past equals 
infantile drives, the repressed which returns in the present to haunt us.72 To give 
another, Lambroso’s theory informs psychoanalysis as much as it also informs Stoker’s 
Dracula. That is, among other reasons, why it appears that Dracula invites Freud so 
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readily. Mighall writes: “Following Lambroso (the named source for his ideas) in 
stressing a biogenetic correspondence between ontogenistic stagnation (fixation in 
Freudian terms) and the count’s archaism, Van Helsing twins the vampire’s 
‘criminality’ with his ‘child brain.’ Critics who pick up on this and transform atavistic 
‘child-brain’ into ‘infantile fixation’ merely rehearse the historical modifications that 
this idea was undergoing in the hands of Freud at about this time. These critics’ 
comments restore the lost historical thread which binds the two ideas.”73 It does not, 
however, properly account for the text’s own conclusions, to which psychoanalytical 
‘infantile fixation’ is still an idea of the future.  
Similar conclusions, voiced perhaps in a less vehement manner, come also from 
other Gothic critics who dedicate themselves to a historicist scrutiny. To give just a 
brief example, in Ann Radcliffe: The Great Enchantress, Miles engages into a dialog 
with psychoanalysis and Elisabeth Bronfen’s analysis of ‘the figure of the missing 
mother,’ typical to Female Gothic plots. As he notices, the questions raised by Freud’s 
essay “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” and Lacan’s account of the mirror stage 
“interweave with the Female Gothic on several levels,” the typical female plot 
manifesting certain curious analogies with the two theories.74 Yet, as he stresses: “[i]n 
digressing at length on psychoanalysis I do not mean to suggest that psychoanalysis 
explains Radcliffe, or even (as some argue) vice versa. It is rather that the Gothic and 
psychoanalysis invite a dialogue with each other, in which their voices, similar but 
different, ramify into something else, for good historical reasons.”75 What he begins 
with, namely pointing out that the Gothic and psychoanalysis as narratives are coeval,76 
may be seen as paralleling Mighall’s account of how they are shaped by the same 
discourses. One of the moments when this becomes especially visible is when Miles 
uses Philippe Ariès’ The Hour of Our Death77 to briefly contextualise psychoanalysis. 
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The conclusion he reaches on “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” is that “when Freud 
comes to analyse the ‘death’ instinct his language turns Gothic”:  
 
Given that the essay was written in the shadow of Sophie Freud’s 
death, the suggestion arises that Freud’s ‘speculations’ are a displaced 
attempt to cope with death; that without either a paradigm that would 
explain it, or social customs to ‘naturalise’ it, Freud takes refuge in a 
narrative capable of ‘containing’ mortality. The narrative form that 
comes most readily to hand is the Gothic, with its dimly understood 
agencies, its images of division and entrapment, of deep, inner, self-
betrayal. And the reason Gothic comes to hand is that, historically, it 
is the first literary form to come into being as a response to modern 
ways of dying.78 
 
 
This vividly illustrates the ways in which psychoanalysis and the Gothic may interact, 
the latter assimilating the former. 
To take a slightly different direction, the divergence between the outcomes of a 
psychoanalytical reading and the historically justified conclusions of the Gothic text, 
though not considered at great length, is pointed to by another scholar, Markman Ellis. 
As he proclaims at the onset of his considerations, he avoids referring to 
psychoanalytical register as it was not available to the authors he discusses. He writes: 
“As the term ‘psychoanalysis’ was first coined by Freud in 1896, first in French, then 
German, and only later in English – it could be concluded that the gothic inhabits a 
world of representation categorically pre-Freudian.”79 Furthermore, just as he sees solid 
reasons why psychoanalysis should find Gothic fiction attractive, so he enumerates 
reasons to remain cautious. As Mighall and Miles, he emphasises that psychoanalysis 
drew extensively from Gothic repertoire, some of its “key terms of value” being 
actually “predicated on, determined by, or theorised in the discourse of gothic fiction”; 
still, as the aforementioned critics do, he also points out that the Gothic and 
psychoanalysis each took their own, divergent route, and stresses that using the latter to 
explain the previous results in effacing the original conclusions that a Gothic text might 
offer.80 
A vital conclusion arises out of these considerations with regard to the differentiation 
paradigm. This conclusion is that perhaps the elevation of the Gothic from the margin – 
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of course, having assumed that the Gothic had previously functioned unambiguously at 
the margin – took place at the cost of displacing what the Gothic actually offers us. This 
is a striking conclusion, but not an impossible one. Similar displacements, lying at the 
foundation of the conception of the Gothic that the differentiation paradigm has 
constructed, may, quite possibly, be found if we look at a basic, it should seem, aspect 
of this very conception. This aspect is the mode’s assumed subversion. Subversion, as 
we have seen, is the key concept in the differentiation paradigm, one which unites the 
variety of approaches under a common label of the liberated study of a liberated 
genre/mode. As we have noticed, there appear more or less confident voices that Gothic 
fiction could be properly seen as conservative rather than subversive in some 
particularly modern, or even postmodern, sense. However, we must remember that what 
is conservatism to one system, may appear subversion to another.  
Much is said – and has already been quoted, especially from Botting – on the 
presumed (multiple) ways in which the Gothic subverted what was expected of 
literature, and then became marginalised as a result. But the critical outrage triggered by 
the growing popularity of Gothic fiction is only one level on which we can discuss 
Gothic transgression. If we decide to follow Baldick and Mighall’s way of reasoning, 
we can see that subversion may be discussed on two further levels. One of them is the 
subversion of the feudal past, mentioned by Breton, and highly functional for the 
Whiggish political and social paradigm. The other one is the Romantic subversion of 
the Enlightened present propagated by Summers and upheld by later critics. Of these 
two, the previous is considered by the two critics as ‘actual,’ the latter as a 
methodological mistake resulting from displacement. However, as they observe, the 
previous becomes obscured by psychologising ruminations which establish yet another 
level of subversion: of the reasonable by the unconscious, which immediately makes 
Gothic transgressions psychological and a-temporal. Hence, we may speak of one 
instance of the displacement of the text ‘original subversion.’  
Jackson, who introduces the notion of the subversive powers of fantasy in the 1980s, 
speaks of a yet different kind of subversion. Her considerations of what is given voice 
in the fantastic text, against the silence imposed by the dominant order, reorient the 
notion of subversion towards the domain of the play of power in the contemporary post-
Foucauldian sense. But Jackson is quite explicit while stating that the Gothic is not 
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easily seen as subversive in this sense – and so is Punter.81 The way in which a feminist 
critic would perceive Gothic fiction as subversive is a yet different story. And finally, 
while commenting on the conclusions of Gothic Writing, and the tension between the 
Gothic aesthetic – defined as “the discursive construction of an idealised Gothickness”82 
preceding Gothic fiction – and the way it is realised in Gothic writing, Miles states that 
his “point was not that Gothic writing was ‘subversive,’ in the usual meaning of that 
phrase, but that the accustomed vectors of power that obtained in discursive acts 
occurring on the same ‘ontological plane’ outside the text, frequently exhibited 
symptoms of reversal within it.”83 
A voice against assuming subversion (a multilayered concept, as it seems) to be the 
constitutive feature of the Gothic in all its incarnations comes, apart from Baldick and 
Mighall, also James Watt (1999). Watt contests Gothic subversions on two major 
planes. First of all, he points to the emergence of what he calls the Loyalist Gothic, a 
strand of Gothic fiction verging on historical romance, which originated in the writing 
of Clara Reeve and flourished at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. He states: “From around the time of the British defeat in America, 
[…] the category of Gothic was widely redefined so as to denote a proud heritage of 
military victory. In the context of this increasingly powerful loyalist discourse, I argue 
that the majority of works after Otranto which called themselves ‘Gothic,’ along with 
numerous other ‘historical’ romances, served an unambiguous moral and patriotic 
agenda.”84 Second of all, according to Watt, a conservative perspective is in fact 
characteristic of the majority of Gothic novels of that time. As he states, what could be 
found disturbing at the time, was the context of production and reception rather than the 
content of the novels themselves: “Works that described themselves as translations or 
imitations of German fiction were seen to be increasingly suspect as the 1790s 
progressed, since anything ‘German’ was guilty by association with the deluded 
revolutionary idealism attributed to the Illuminati, or to writers such as Schiller and 
Kotzebue. The escapist fiction published by commercial presses, such as William 
Lane’s Minerva, was widely censured, in addition, because of the way that it was seen 
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to feed the demand of an undisciplined yet ever-expanding reading public.”85 Hence, 
also, he considers Lewis’ The Monk, the novel which relishes the status of an exemplar 
of Gothic transgressiveness as, first and foremost, atypical to Gothic fictions of the 
time, 86 and the novels which followed, like those of Dacre, Hogg, Maturin and the 
Shelleys, written in a similar vein, as constituting only one strand of the Gothic seen as 
a genre, and hence unable to provide a substantial evidence that Gothic fiction in 
general should be viewed as characterized by subversion.87 
When it comes to Watt’s stance on the context of production and reception as a 
source of Gothic subversion, a somewhat similar claim is made by Emma Clery. For 
example, read against the contemporary context of Revolution and revolutionary 
conspiracy, The Monk, as she views it, acquired the potential to subvert social order first 
of all in the eyes of the contemporary critics. Discussing Thomas Matthias virulent 
response to Lewis’ novel, Clery writes: “The controversy gave the book a vertiginous 
slant; the subversion of morality and social institutions, which was its subject, was now 
publicly announced to be its end; [...] The confused overlappings of the content of The 
Monk, its reception and alleged effects, and rumours of actual political plots created an 
indeterminacy over allegiances and identities which in turn favoured an indiscriminate 
paranoia.”88 Though handing the theme of subversion in Gothic fiction in a different 
way, as she works on drawing multiple links between the rise of Gothic fiction – or the 
supernatural in fiction – and the context of its rise, which is the rise of consumerism, 
Clery also comes to announce a need to reconsider the subversive status ascribed to the 
Gothic: “Claims that the fantastic per se represented or continues to represent a 
literature of subversion need to be reconsidered in view of [the] definable post-1800 
relations of production and consumption in Britain. Radical potential is not inherent in a 
uniform content, a set of themes, or a formal structure; it concerns above all the event of 
the work, the determinate entry of a work into circulation and the systematic boundaries 
of the dialogue between reader and text.”89 
All of the abovementioned voices, which we have grouped under the common 
heading of “Counter-Histories,” undermine the basic elements of the contemporary 
representation of Gothic fiction as devised by the differentiation paradigm. It is said that 
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the Gothic has travelled from the margin of culture into the mainstream – but at the 
same time, we must account for the fact that, in a very particular sense, the Gothic has 
always been a quite central phenomenon. It is said that theory, or, to be more precise, 
psychoanalytical theory ‘recovered’ Gothic fictions from the academic limbo – but 
some of the new historicist accounts of the Gothic view it as actually doing more harm 
than good. The contemporary critical discourse recognises the subversive character of 
Gothic fiction – but, again, in a manner which, some would suggest, is not qualified 
enough. And all in all, the very broadness of the notion of the Gothic and of the range of 
the approaches applicable to it assumed by the differentiation paradigm seems 
somewhat suspicious due to the way in which it impinges on both the conception of the 
Gothic and the history of criticism. What we need, perhaps, in such a case, is, indeed, a 
qualification. And this qualification, as it seems, ought to be carried out, following some 
of the suggestions already presented in this chapter, on the basis of the contextualisation 
of both Gothic fiction and its major coordinates as posed by the differentiation 
paradigm.  
  86
Chapter III 
Constructing the Gothic: 
Gothic Criticism and Discourse 
 
Chapter I and Chapter II of this dissertation have discussed a current representation 
of the history of Gothic criticism and illuminate the ways in which this representation is 
contested by the critics themselves, respectively. This chapter elaborates on the basis for 
a possible contextualisation of the contemporary conceptions of Gothic fiction. 
Contextualising those conceptions, however, cannot be carried out without trying to 
account for the emergence of the differentiation paradigm first: without understanding 
why the field of Gothic studies represents itself by means of cutting off from the past. 
Consequently, what must be carried out before we proceed to devising a methodological 
approach towards the critical representation of the Gothic is a theorisation, and also in a 
sense contextualisation, of the differentiation paradigm itself.  
Such a theorisation shall be carried out by means of comparing the situation in the 
field of Gothic studies to a situation in which a new interpretation becomes acceptable, 
discussed in Stanley Fish’s Is There a Text in This Class? The relevance of Fish to our 
considerations stems from the fact that his work embodies the very changes Gothic 
criticism appears to embrace. As a result, we shall see that although Gothic criticism 
claims to originate in the shift of the general approach to literary studies, it nonetheless 
perpetuates the type of practice inherent in the earlier stages of criticism. This, in turn, 
seems to result from an attempt at self-validation within the domain of literary studies. 
And the consequence of such a validation is structuring the conception of Gothic fiction 
around what might turn out to represent a functional ‘ruse.’ 
Having discussed the differentiation paradigm, the chapter turns towards considering 
the question of overinterpretation. In fact, one might wonder whether the subject of 
these considerations is actually the long-lasting debate on the matter of ‘the meaning’ 
that is the property of a text (mentioning the author’s intention might appear too passé, 
which is of course meaningful in itself). This is not exactly so. A juxtaposition of 
Umberto Eco’s, Richard Rorty’s and Jonathan Culler’s stances on overinterpretation 
will serve to clarify the position taken in the dissertation. The aim it pursues, like 
Culler’s ‘overstanding’ interpretations, is to scrutinise how the contemporary 
conceptions of the Gothic fiction work, and why. At the same time, following Eco to a 
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certain degree, it stresses the need to contextualise a text in the process of interpretation. 
This is because both the production and the reading of any text, a Gothic one too, are 
conditioned by cultural factors, inherent in given times. As a result, the meaning we are 
interested in is the ‘historical’ meaning – the context of the production and immediate 
reception of the Gothic. Nonetheless, we do not wish to entirely reject theory as a 
methodological tool, but rather to emphasise the fact that theory must be qualified with 
historicist considerations if it is not meant to ‘use’ a text for its own purposes, instead of 
interpreting it. 
A significant assertion which underlies our perception of criticism is that it 
represents an activity in which one inescapably constructs, one way or another, one’s 
object. However, it is typical of the contemporary Gothic criticism to disregard this fact 
and seem to act on the presumption that it uncovers ‘the truth’ about the Gothic. This is 
a potentially dangerous practice, given that the Gothic is often ascribed a socio-political 
resonance. Yet, at the same time, the socio-political significance that Gothic fiction is 
valued for nowadays is exactly the reason for assuming such a position. If the Gothic is 
significant for it tells us something about our culture, then its conception cannot be 
widely recognised as a construct. At the same time, however, this conception may 
indeed turn out to be based on a ruse. The way in which we may be able to verify 
whether such a ruse has indeed become central to the representation of the Gothic 
nowadays is by checking the conception of the Gothic against the historical context of 
its production. By this historical context, however, we do not mean particular historical 
events that the Gothic may reflect, or allude to, but rather the discursive context, as 
available to us, which influences the production and original reception of Gothic fiction. 
It is by addressing such a context that we are able to identify some interpretations as 
informed by the contemporary theoretical perspectives. 
And this takes us to Foucault, whose thoughts on discourse and the formation of 
objects constitute the basis for our own methodological approach. Foucault’s theory of 
discourse is useful to us primarily because its allows us to see theory-oriented Gothic 
criticism as a discursive field, which constructs its objects and validates statements 
about them according to its own adopted framework. As a result, this field is prone to 
‘rewrite’ the Gothic; to construct it anew and in agreement with its own discursive 
paradigm. As we shall see, Foucault himself perceives psychoanalysis and Marxism, 
two of the prominent theories mentioned by the contemporary Gothic critics, as 
discourses. What is more, although the differentiation paradigm assumes that Gothic 
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criticism cut itself off from earlier institutionalised and constraining scholarship, 
Foucault’s thought allow us to notice that Gothic criticism, institutionalised as it is, 
itself exercises control over what is being said in the field. And, finally, Foucault’s 
remarks also allow us to undermine the conceptualisation of the scrutiny of the Gothic 
as a process of discovering the ‘true’ origin of one’s own cultural identity. 
 
3.1. Theorising Gothic Criticism 
 
In a certain way, what we deal with appears to be a paradox. How can we say, 
nowadays, that one reading of a text is the right one, and another is not? How can we 
say that one definition of the Gothic is the correct or complete definition and others are 
incomplete or mistaken? And above all, how are we supposed to forbid anyone to state 
that a genre – or a mode – escapes definition but is by nature subversive and marginal? 
In a certain way, it is ‘true’ that we cannot. 
We have analysed the differentiation paradigm and the way the contemporary Gothic 
criticism establishes its difference from the early scholarship, discarding earlier 
approaches. We may picture the situation in the field as parallel to Stanley Fish’s 
assumptions concerning the question of what makes an interpretation acceptable. Fish 
generally claims to agree with the statement that “we are right to rule out at least some 
readings,” simultaneously admitting what seems to be an impasse at the first glance – 
“on the one hand there would seem to be no basis for labeling an interpretation 
unacceptable, but on the other we do it all the time.”1 However, the foundation of his 
analysis of critical activity is the assumption that the text is a function of interpretation, 
a creation – a product or a construct – of interpretive communities. Its meaning is their 
property, and thus a reading can and will be ruled out on the basis of what is 
institutionally accepted at a given time as “a thing that is done” and what is rejected as 
“not done.”2 In other words, as soon as a given strategy of interpretation gains 
institutional recognition, it is established as acceptable. 
Bearing this in mind, we may notice that Gothic literature (or the mode that 
encompasses much more than literature) has been ostensibly classified as ‘done’ and 
‘not done’ since its very rise, as the differentiation paradigm holds. This classification 
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 Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, 
Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 342. 
2
 Fish, Is there a Text in This Class? p. 343. 
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has only recently assumed the form of discussing whether a given interpretation is to be 
seen as ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ Previously, it concerned the very question of the existence of 
a type of literature such as the Gothic. Gothic fiction was profusely ‘done’ at the end of 
the eighteenth century, both by the writers and the critics. By the latter, it was discussed 
as rather ‘not (to be) done’ than ‘done.’ Then, as it seems, it was definitely ‘not done’ 
by the critics for quite a while. And then, at the beginning of the twentieth century, it 
was again classified as ‘done’ (written and read) though in the light of a general 
agreement that it is ‘not really to be done.’ And, now, it is ‘done’ (literally and 
figuratively) again, profusely, but the contemporary ways in which it is done by the 
critics are more ‘done’ than those others of the past. But this is not the only parallel. 
The situation of Gothic criticism parallels the one described by Fish with regard to 
the question of interpretation also with respect to his remarks on how a given ‘new-
born’ interpretive strategy establishes itself as valid. By the way, these we might find 
surprising if we look at them from the perspective of the differentiation paradigm. Fish 
writes: “A new interpretive strategy always makes its way in some relationship of 
opposition to the old, which has often marked out a negative space (of things that aren’t 
done) from which it can emerge into respectability.”3 Chiefly, the very same thing can 
be said of the Gothic criticism of the second half of the twentieth century. But Fish has 
more to say: “Rhetorically the new position announces itself as a break from the old, but 
in fact it is radically dependent on the old, because it is only in the context of some 
differential relationship that it can be perceived as new or, for that matter, perceived at 
all.”4 At this point, we may notice that the profundity of the contemporary Gothic 
criticism appears to have something to do with the fact that Gothic literature was so 
neglected and mistreated in the past, as maintains a large part of its criticism. In a way, 
the paradigmatic history of Gothic criticism as presented in chapter one may be seen as 
analogous with Fish’s outline of the relationship between the new and the old position: 
 
This means that the space in which a critic works has been marked out 
for him by his predecessors, even though he is obliged by the 
conventions of the institution to dislodge them. It is only by their 
prevenience or repossession that there is something for him to say; 
that is, it is only because something has already been said that he can 
now say something different. This dependency, the reverse of the 
anxiety of influence, is reflected in the unwritten requirement that an 
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interpretation present itself as remedying a deficiency in the 
interpretations that have come before it. […] The lack an 
interpretation supplies must be related to the criteria by which the 
literary community recognizes and evaluates the objects of its 
professional attention.5 
 
 
To sum up: Gothic fiction used to be considered as an inconsequential subgenre of the 
novel, a curiosity without much literary merit (by the previously institutionalised 
criticism – realism, Romanticism, New Criticism, etc.); now, it is considered as crucial 
to the understanding of the history of the middle class, modern literature and culture, 
and our own very contemporary psyche. What was not said about it, as much as what 
was said, becomes the basis for what is said about it now, and a justification for 
speaking at the same time. The area of deficiency is – understandably – vast, and 
interpretations find themselves supplying multiple lacks, all of which seem to be related 
to the appropriate criteria. 
If we look at the case of the Gothic from the perspective of the differentiation 
paradigm, the space of the critic as delineated by his or her predecessors is that of 
recovering one’s space. This is no accident for it is in this way that the paradigmatic 
history of Gothic criticism has been structured. And this is what makes the case of the 
Gothic particularly interesting as well. If Fish discusses the conflicting interpretations of 
Blake’s tiger as either good or evil, or good and evil, or neither good nor evil, and 
shows how a given ‘new’ interpretation depends on previously delineated spaces, then 
in the case of the Gothic we can observe the same relationship, but in terms of the 
contradiction ‘unworthy’ and ‘worthy,’ and also ‘forbidden’ and ‘liberated,’ ‘almost 
non-existent’ and ‘vibrantly lively.’ On the level of scholarship centred on literary merit 
and universal human values, serious Gothic criticism is Fish’s Eskimo interpretation 
(meaning an interpretation which is not to be) of “A Rose for Emily” given institutional 
credit. At the same time, on a different level, it does not transcend the limits established 
by what it wishes to discard. It is finally ‘being done.’ 
Stanley Fish has not been chosen for this analysis merely for the reason of those 
above-discussed similarities. His Is There a Text in This Class? was published the same 
year as Punter’s The Literature of Terror and is considered to be a testimony to the dusk 
of New Criticism, while given accounts of Gothic criticism celebrate this dusk as the 
dawn of their own freed field. Something of the attitude manifested, among others, by 
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Fish, or its offshoot, in one or another form, can be perhaps felt ten years later in 
Kilgour’s short chapter on Gothic criticism as she states that “[i]nterpretation gives us 
an illusion of control, especially as it has itself become increasingly idealised as a more 
authentically heroic and creative act than writing, a means of an ideal communal 
construction of the text that offers an alternative to the rampant possessive 
individualism of artistic creation.”6 Indeed, Fish’s assumption that “there is no core of 
agreement in the text, there is a core of agreement (although one subject to change) 
concerning the ways of producing the text,”7 ways which are disseminated by and a 
property of interpretive communities, corresponds well to what Alexandra Warwick 
writes on how, it should seem, studying the Gothic ought to be ‘done’ nowadays (but is 
not):  
 
It seems to me that the dominance of Gothic as a critical category is an 
effect of the aftershock of deconstruction, of the move to an 
apparently anti-scientific criticism that circulates around the problem 
of subject/object relations. Critical schools of the first half of the 
twentieth century such as Formalism, New Criticism and 
Structuralism constituted themselves as sciences. […] The shift into 
Post-Structuralism comes when structural linguistics poses the 
question of whether structure belongs to the object or to the subject. 
This is the anti-scientific moment that disrupts the objectivity of 
scientific analysis, and this is followed by three decades of a similar 
anti-scientific orientation in criticism, in which the act of criticism 
tries, if anything, to highlight the ways in which it constructs and 
constitutes its object even as it apparently interprets it. The problem 
for Gothic studies, or the reason for the remorseless expansion of the 
field, is that the subject/object confusion still remains. Gothic 
criticism pretends that Gothic is inherent in its object and thus the 
relation between criticism and literature returns to being one of 
transparency and objectivity in which the texts themselves are coerced 
into becoming allegories of Gothic critical practice.8 
 
 
Warwick’s concern is that the Gothic as a critical category has expanded to the point of 
too diverse (and striking) texts ending up being labelled as Gothic fiction. We could 
even say the Gothic has become an interpretive strategy in its own right (‘I recognise 
this text as Gothic and therefore this is what it says: […]’). Simultaneously, the critics 
fail to notice that they are not discovering but producing meanings.  
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Analysing the differentiation paradigm along Fish’s considerations of the role of the 
criterion of acceptability is illuminating with regard to the above-presented situation in 
the field. It allows us to highlight what sort of space is given to the Gothic critic in this 
paradigm. The passage is not only from one acceptable interpretive strategy to another; 
it is also from unacceptability of interpretation as such to its full credit. All in all, 
though beginning to rise to its prominence at the times of the publication of Fish’s book 
(and in the times following the spread of deconstruction) the contemporary Gothic 
criticism – to Warwick’s disappointment, as it seems – not surprisingly falls into the 
same mechanisms of operation as the criticism(s) that preceded it. Although Kilgour 
asserts that the Gothic critic is aware there is no ‘truth behind the veil,’ no ‘real point’ to 
the text that should be discovered in it, to put it in Fish’s terms, Gothic criticism (e.g. in 
its application of psychoanalysis in its various forms) still acts as if it was trying to 
devise this a-temporal, true point that has been overlooked by its predecessors, though, 
it seems, primarily on a different level (that of cultural significance). In such a case, 
resorting to the consciousness of the fact that there is no truth, only interpretation, may 
be considered as a means of self-defence, a justification for the diversity of 
interpretations, but proves rather superficial, especially with regard to the major 
arguments of the differentiation paradigm concerning the justification of Gothic 
criticism as such. ‘Doing’ Gothic has to be established as culturally significant (and thus 
striving to discover some sort of truth) if it is to be valued as ‘done,’ and not on the 
basis of the fact that this is what has ‘somehow happened’ to be presently allowed by 
academia. If it did not establish itself as revealing with regard to e.g. culture, it would 
remain a ‘mere curiosity.’ We shall return to this issue further on. 
To allow ourselves a digression, the parallel between the differentiation paradigm 
and Fish’s considerations may bring to one’s mind another parallel, this time with 
Michel Foucault’s treatment of the ‘repressive hypothesis.’ In his celebrated volume I of 
The History of Sexuality (1976), Foucault sketches what seems to be a commonly 
observable fact – but turns out to be a pre-established functional assumption serving the 
politics of its own times – namely, that the society of the second half of the twentieth 
century is in the shackles of old bourgeois prudery and has to take efforts to liberate its 
sexuality. Foucault thus describes the common discourse: 
 
If sex is repressed, that is, condemned to prohibition, nonexistence, 
and silence, then the mere fact that one is speaking about it has the 
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appearance of a deliberate transgression. A person who holds forth in 
such language places himself to a certain extent outside the reach of 
power; he upsets established law; he somehow anticipates the coming 
freedom. This explains the solemnity with which one speaks of sex 
nowadays. [Speaking of sex] we are conscious of defying established 
power, our tone of voice shows that we know we are being subversive, 
and we ardently conjure away the present and appeal to the future, 
whose day will be hastened by the contribution we believe we are 
making.9 
 
 
Again, we are dealing with what seems to be a definite cutting off from the old, though, 
as it is easy to imagine, the new discourse of “deliberate transgression” operates in the 
space marked by the previous discourse of repression. As Foucault shows, contrary to 
what is believed, the bourgeoisie invented sexuality and multiplied discourses on sex 
rather than silenced them. But as he states, at the time when his famous book is written, 
asserting the hypothesis is, we could say after Fish, commonly ‘done’: 
 
The affirmation of a sexuality that has never been more rigorously 
subjugated than during the age of the hypocritical, bustling, and 
responsible bourgeoisie is coupled with the grandiloquence of a 
discourse purporting to reveal the truth about sex, modify its economy 
within reality, subvert the law that governs it, and change its future. 
[…] To say that sex is not repressed, or rather that the relationship 
between sex and power is not characterized by repression, is to risk 
falling into a sterile paradox. It not only runs counter to a well-
accepted argument, it goes against the whole economy and all the 
discursive ‘interests’ that underlie this argument.10 
 
 
Foucault refrains from claiming that sex has never been repressed – that its prohibition 
has been “a ruse.”11 But then he points to the fact that the repressive hypothesis has to 
be “[put back] within a general economy of discourses on sex in modern societies since 
the seventeenth century”12; that it constitutes a part of a larger system rather than a 
constitutive element for the modern history of sex.13 We could say the way sex is seen 
nowadays depends on contemporary society, knowledge, power and the relations 
between them; this does not give us, however, the whole picture. What escapes us is 
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another set of relations between now and then – the questions: ‘Why is it seen in such a 
way?’ and ‘How has it come to be seen in such a way?’ Analogously, we could ask why 
Blake’s tiger should be seen as no longer bad but good, and if it is announced that The 
Tyger has nothing to do with the categories of good and evil but with, say, time and 
space, what has prompted the change?  
We could observe that the discourse of the repressive hypothesis has something in 
common with the interpretive strategy as defined by Fish. To put it in Foucauldian 
terms, we could say that the interpretive strategy itself belongs to and reflects a given 
discourse. Both cut themselves off from the previous discourse system but emerge into 
existence only in relation to it. However, the discourse of the repressive hypothesis is 
one which, after all, makes a ruse its central point – the prohibition of sex is not the 
historical basis for the writing of the modern history of sex; still, it has to become one if 
the discourse of the repressive hypothesis, itself a part of a larger power-knowledge 
system, is to be operative. Also, the ruse will not emerge to our sight if we do not 
consider a larger system of relations, one which extends beyond oppositions. 
It is a matter of fact that the contemporary conceptions of Gothic fiction assume its 
marginality and subversity while being careful not to define it in a totalising way. We 
can agree or not, advocate the conceptions or prove them to be mistaken, but we cannot 
disprove their functionality – and necessity at this particular moment in time. The 
questions is, however, what makes them functional and necessary? How did subversion 
and marginality, visible in the very construction of the differentiation paradigm, come 
to be the central elements of the representation of Gothic fiction? And why? 
The above considerations respond to one of the issues raised at the beginning of this 
chapter. In a way, we cannot disclaim the contemporary conceptions of the Gothic: they 
arise for certain reasons, and for certain reasons they could not be different from what 
they are. This, however, does not mean that we should accept them at face value and 
move on without giving them a serious thought. Let us now turn to another issue, the 
question of ‘meaning’ and ‘overinterpretation’ – in spite of the fact that mentioning Fish 
a moment ago could be seen as obliging us to exclude this path of consideration already 
at the outset. 
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3.2. The Gothic and the Question of Overinterpretation 
 
Overinterpretation is not a matter that has been infrequently tackled by literary 
scholars. Umberto Eco’s Interpretation and overinterpretation, a volume of the Tanner 
Lectures from 1990, discusses it explicitly, providing us with various, and significantly 
varying, perspectives on this subject. Eco’s stance of a semiotician is clearly opposed to 
that of reader-oriented criticism, which can be best seen in his assumption that the aim 
of critical interpretation is to “discover […] something of [the text’s] nature.”14 
Accordingly, as he asserts, it is possible to point to criteria for assessing interpretation,15 
and, thus, it is also possible to reach an agreement about, at least, the meanings that are 
discouraged by a given text.16 The criteria he gives oscillate around the concept of 
intentio operis, the intention of the text. Eco’s understanding of intentio operis is as 
follows: 
 
The text’s intention is not displayed by the textual surface. […] One 
has to decide to ‘see’ it. Thus it is possible to speak of the text’s 
intention only as the result of a conjecture on the part of the reader. 
[…] Since the intention of the text is basically to produce a model 
reader able to make conjectures about it, the initiative of the model 
reader consists in figuring out a model author that is not the empirical 
one and that, in the end, coincides with the intention of the text. Thus, 
more than a parameter to use in order to validate the interpretation, the 
text is an object that the interpretation builds up in the course of the 
circular effort of validating itself on the basis of what it makes up as 
its result. I am not ashamed to admit that I am so defining the old and 
still valid ‘hermeneutic circle.’17 
 
 
He further qualifies his stance by stating that “[t]o recognize the intentio operis is to 
recognize a semiotic strategy” (which may refer, for instance, to stylistic conventions), 
and that to prove the guess about the intention of the text one has to “check it upon the 
text as a coherent whole.”18 These are not all available criteria in fact as, in the course of 
his lectures, Eco also refers to the “criterion of textual economy,”19 of resorting to the 
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most economical ways of interpretation that find their confirmation in the cultural and 
linguistic context of the text in question as much as prove effective for the text as a 
whole. What he opposes, as stressed in his “Intentio Lectoris: The State of the Art,” is 
the practice of ‘using texts’: of treating texts as one’s venture point for “[getting] 
something else,” under the risk of misinterpretation from the semantic viewpoint.20 
Eco’s arguments are confronted with criticism and polemics, gathered in the very 
same volume and coming from Richard Rorty and Jonathan Culler. Rorty, speaking 
from the position of pragmatism, wishes to dismiss Eco’s distinction between 
interpretation and use21 insisting that all interpretation be use, and finds mistaken the 
assumption that a text may somehow ‘control’ its reader. Culler, “a prominent 
expounder and to some extent defender of several of the new approaches which are 
collectively labelled (not always helpfully) ‘theory,’” as Stefan Collini calls him,22 
disagrees with both Eco and Rorty on several different issues. However, above all, 
viewing the search for knowledge on the functioning of literature as the basic and vital 
occupation of literary studies, he disagrees with Eco when it comes to an instance of 
overinterpretation in whose case the critic is engaged more in the question of how the 
text works than in what it asks its model reader.  
For Rorty, determining the meaning that the text in itself generates is pointless, just 
as the assumption that a given text has its own internal coherence against which an 
interpretation can be checked. He views interpretation in terms of responding to stimuli 
provided by an object by means of making assertions. These assertions, as he poses, 
“are always at the mercy of being changed by fresh stimuli, but they are never capable 
of being checked against those stimuli, much less against the internal coherence of 
something outside the encyclopedia. […] You cannot check a sentence against an 
object, although an object can cause you to stop asserting a sentence. You can only 
check a sentence against other sentences, sentences to which it is connected by various 
labyrinthine inferential relationships.”23 We could perhaps paraphrase this statement as 
follows: if a thing is constituted in language in such or such a way, what is said about it 
and shown as coherent cannot be checked against the thing’s own coherence. If a 
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representation happens to propose something else than the previously accepted 
representation, than it may be compared with the previous representation and found 
irrelevant, or it may be shown to be incoherent or insufficient in itself and thus 
disproved, but not with regard to the object itself. Thus, Rorty opposes “the idea that the 
text can tell you something about what it wants,” and insists that it can only provide 
stimuli which confirm, to a greater or lesser degree, the way a reader is “inclined” to 
perceive it beforehand.24 One’s interpretation may prove convincing or not – but it 
always remains a use, always responds to a predetermined need. 
For Culler, on the other hand, focusing on discovering the text’s intention 
exclusively seems to be dull, or unproductive. As he states, an intellectual activity such 
as interpretation is to be valued primarily for being ‘extreme.’25 This is because the 
critic has a much greater chance to notice things that might be otherwise unnoticed by 
making strong claims.26 Culler values overinterpretation, or overstanding – as he 
proposes to name it after Wayne Booth – when it investigates into “what the text does 
and how” instead of into what the text itself has to say.27 This type of overinterpretation, 
which is hardly concerned with the text’s meaning but pursues a different project (even 
though, as Culler suggests, it often calls itself, somewhat confusingly, interpretation28), 
is most productive for it uncovers the mechanisms by which literature functions. It 
investigates into “how [a text] relates to other texts and to other practices; what it 
conceals or represses; what it advances or is complicitous with. [Not what it] has in 
mind but what it forgets, not what it says but what it takes for granted.”29 Taking up 
such a perspective, we could say that to interpret the text merely in order to discover the 
meanings it ‘wants’ us to discover is not only dull but also dangerous – as is rejecting 
the importance of the mechanisms of how texts function. That is why Culler ascribes 
value to deconstruction, perceiving it as a significant critical tool due to its “continuing 
engagement with the hierarchical oppositions which structure Western thought, and the 
recognition that the belief one has overcome them once and for all is likely to be a facile 
delusion.”30 Overstanding, as he defines it, is exactly what enables the critic to expose 
such delusions.  
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These three stances, of Eco, Rorty and Culler, represent three extreme positions, 
three ways of approaching the text. It is not our aim here to decide which of these 
positions is ‘right’ – provided it is possible to approach them from such an angle at all. 
We have already stated that our goal is not to deny one’s right to the present 
conceptions of the Gothic, but we are nevertheless going to look at them critically in 
order to see how they were structured and, possibly, with what outcome. Since we 
assume that the conception of the mode based on its subversiveness and marginality is 
functional, we already see it as representing a use – but this use is not to be debunked. 
Instead, it may be approached in terms of Culler’s distinction between analysing the text 
for the questions it poses and asking questions about how the text works and what 
effects it produces. Literary criticism ‘does’ the latter, often, as Culler notices, without 
distinguishing between it and the former, in fact Gothic criticism being no exception. 
Our task is this as well, though on a different level: namely, to ask questions about how 
a given critical representation ‘works,’ where it originates and what its goals can 
possibly be.  
Still, the concept of the text’s ‘meaning’ must be addressed in the course of our 
considerations. As can be seen from the critical debates between particular scholars in 
the field of Gothic studies – especially in the case of Baldick and Mighall’s article, it 
should seem – much of the contemporary scholarship in the field is accused of doing 
precisely what Eco stigmatises: overinterpreting texts in the sense of going too far; and 
using them for whatever purpose one may have at the cost of misreading. Such a stance 
clearly opposes the pragmatist one. On the other hand, there immediately appears a 
question about criteria. Are those proposed by Eco sufficient – or useful, indeed? Is it 
enough to check a conjecture against what we assume to be the work’s coherence? 
Taking into consideration Baldick and Mighall’s own conception of Gothic fiction, we 
could infer that at least some sort of qualification is necessary. 
Let us consider one of the examples provided by Eco in “Intentio Lectoris,” that of 
Derrida’s and Marie Bonaparte’s reading of E. A. Poe’s “The Purloined Letter,” which 
is also referred to by Rorty. As Eco notices, in Derrida’s case what is meant to undergo 
an analysis is “the unconscious of the text,” rather than that of the author, whereas 
Bonaparte, in her combining of the motives she finds present in Poe’s texts and facts 
from his life, wants to get the author on the couch. 31 Thus, while Derrida’s 
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interpretation does not violate the intention operis and “shows how a text can produce 
[a] second-level meaning,”32 Bonaparte, to use Rorty’s wording, “spoil[s] her own 
treatment of Poe.”33 We could say that whereas Derrida remains ‘inside’ the text, 
Bonaparte needs to use the text to attain something external to it. The problem is, 
however, more complicated.  
We may remark, in tune with Markman Ellis’ stance on the relationships between the 
Gothic and psychoanalysis, that Poe could not have been familiar with Freud’s writings. 
To paraphrase, we may accept that a psychoanalytical reading remains ‘faithful’ to the 
intentio operis of any text, even if it is used to discern certain patterns that seem to have 
textual confirmation, only if we assume that psychoanalysis reveals some sort of eternal 
truth about how a human psyche works. However, the contemporary Gothic critics who 
approach the mode from the new historicist perspective would rather show, like 
Mighall, that psychoanalysis and the Gothic have common roots, and that makes them 
similar but does not make the former a tool to explain the latter, for both are ways of 
accounting for certain phenomena.34 From such a perspective, having applied 
psychoanalysis to a reading of a text we end up doing precisely what Rorty writes about 
– namely, producing the text’s coherence by linking textual clues, visible to us only by 
the power of a prior assumption of what clues we want to see, into a coherent and 
convincing whole35 (or, better still, linking into a whole some clues by means of 
discarding some others which cannot be accounted for by the logic we have adopted). 
But the structure used to account for all the points is as external to the text as 
Bonaparte’s interest in Poe’s mental state. Otherwise, it seems, by introducing a 
dialectics which gained prominence for the first time several decades after Poe wrote 
“The Purloined Letter,” we put into action something similar to the ‘Hermetic’ principle 
post hoc, ergo ante hoc, in which case “a consequence is assumed and interpreted as the 
cause of its own cause.”36 The situation could be different only if, by chance, 
psychoanalysis was somehow confirmed to constitute the underlying logic of the text. 
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But how are we to confirm such a thing? This may be an irresolvable question, but 
let us nevertheless delve into it. Rorty rightly notices that “the boundary between one 
text and another is not so clear.”37 On the other hand, Eco, also rightly, states that one 
“can certainly use Wordsworth’s text for parody, for showing how a text can be read in 
relation to different cultural frameworks, or for strictly personal ends […] but if I want 
to interpret Wordsworth’s text I must respect his cultural and linguistic background.”38 
As he also rightly states, the process of interpretation includes, among others, “the 
cultural encyclopedia comprehending a given language and the series of the previous 
interpretations of the same text.”39 In this, as in his reference to the criterion of 
communal control,40 we could assume he comes somewhat (perhaps incidentally and 
obviously from a completely different venture point) close to Culler’s postulate that 
what is interesting in overinterpretation is the way in which it can unveil how a text 
functions (in a given culture). Surely, texts work in communities, and it is the 
communal consensus that points to the ‘acceptable’ ways of their working. In other 
words, Eco’s model reader could be viewed as a communal reader, a reader who ‘knows 
what to expect’ of a text, or recognises which of the communal objects of interest have 
been realised in it. This, in turn, takes us in two directions. On the one hand, towards 
Fish’s interpretive communities, and, on the other, towards Culler’s assumption that it is 
less interesting to answer the text’s questions than to delve into how a given text 
functions, what it omits to say, and what it takes for granted – for this will tell us 
something about its culture. It is this culture at a given moment, this set of principles 
governing the production of texts in a given community, in its temporal dimension, that 
elicits particular conjectures on the side of the reader through the text; which becomes 
inscribed onto the text. If we pay no attention to this fact, we shall fail to answer the 
question how a text works – instead, we will manifest how we want it to work. 
The temporal dimension is a vital element here. ‘Always historicize!’ is the great 
motto of Fredric Jameson’s The Political Unconscious, first published 1981. It 
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represents a countermeasure against what Jameson sees as a trend prevalent in criticism, 
namely “the tendency of much contemporary theory to rewrite selected texts from the 
past in terms of its own aesthetic and, in particular, in terms of a modernist (or more 
properly post-modernist) conception of language.”41 Nearly twenty years later, we can 
see a similar type of claim being made with regard to Gothic criticism by Baldick and 
Mighall, and the concern about the de-historicising of, in this case, Gothic fiction 
remains valid. Hence Robert Miles’ fear that a theory, rooted in the twentieth-century 
concerns, may project those concerns on the texts of the past, deciphering them 
according to the contemporary social code.42 Hence, also, Robert Mighall’s analysis of 
how the Dracula of Bram Stoker makes friends with the twentieth-century critic in 
his/her reading of the original text.43 To conclude, it may be risky to assume that to use 
psychoanalysis as an explanatory tool with regard to Ann Rice makes more sense than 
with regard to Ann Radcliffe – but then there is a certain justified basis for doing the 
former, which seems to be at least the ubiquity of the psychoanalytical discourse in the 
twentieth-century culture. 
The meaning we have established thus as interesting to us is in some sense an 
‘historical’ meaning, one generated by the context of the text which influences the text’s 
production as much as its reading. Of course, one could object that such a meaning is in 
fact as difficult to determine as any intrinsic nature that a text may possess. As Culler 
notices with regard to deconstruction, it “stresses that meaning is context bound – a 
function of relations within or between texts – but that context itself is boundless: there 
will always be new contextual possibilities that can be adduced, so that the one thing we 
cannot do is to set limits.”44 Specifically with regard to Gothic fiction, Andrew Smith 
remarks: 
 
Reading the Gothic historically enables us to see how writers respond 
to earlier Gothic texts; it also enables us to relate such texts to the 
historical contexts within which they were produced. […] However, 
the danger in this is that such texts can merely be seen as doing history 
by other means […] In addition, how we understand history is not an 
objective process as it is inevitably influenced by selectivity and 
because the past is always mediated for us through accounts […] of 
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historical events. History also means different things to different 
critics – how a Marxist, a cultural materialist, a new historicist, or a 
feminist interprets history is dependent upon the significance accorded 
to specific events.45 
 
 
Again, Jameson could serve us as an illustration here. The Political Unconscious sees 
interpretation as far from the process of dealing with a text that is immediately available 
‘as it is.’ On the contrary, the process of interpretation is one of apprehension “through 
sedimented layers of previous interpretations, or—if the text is brand-new—through the 
sedimented reading habits and categories developed by those inherited interpretive 
traditions,”46 and the response is the imperative to historicise. Still, it cannot be 
overlooked that Jameson relies on a very well specified version of history – a Marxist 
one. And if Marxism perceives history in terms of class struggle, it is inescapably bound 
to emphasise certain facts and exclude others in accordance with its own paradigm. 
Let us approach the issue from a Gothic angle. Reading a text against a given 
historical context, such as the French Revolution, will provide us with a particular 
interpretation. This interpretation, however, may prove as mistaken as reading it 
through the lens of a theory rooted in twentieth-century cultural concerns. For that 
reason, Smith, for instance, asserts that while reading the Gothic historically “due 
acknowledgement is made of the literary histories which [the texts that are being read] 
also drew upon and which played a role in shaping a Gothic aesthetic.”47 We could see 
this as a particular version of a recourse to the text’s internal coherence, to taking into 
account ‘all’ the aspects of the text while making – and then checking – a conjecture, 
though, of course, it could also be said that we should remain cautious while ‘choosing’ 
the literary histories that ‘shaped the Gothic aesthetic.’ 
Clearly, history does pose problems. Nevertheless, we need to remember that both 
Jameson and some of the Gothic critics point to history as an alternative to 
dehistoricising through theory while it is theory that dominates Gothic studies 
nowadays. Reading critical texts in the field of the Gothic feels almost like reading 
Culler’s list of “series of competing ‘approaches’ […] such as structuralism, 
deconstruction, feminism, psychoanalysis, Marxism, and new historicism.”48 Resistant 
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as it is to historicising itself, for whatever reasons there may be,49 theory nevertheless 
risks rewriting the text in terms of interpreting it from the perspective of its own aims as 
well. But it does not seem the right way out of the predicament here to argue in favour 
of one of them; rather, as assumes Robert Miles, history can help us verify theory.50 To 
put it in other words, perhaps it is not possible to identify one right context for the text, 
one that would explain it thoroughly and rightly. Nevertheless, referring a theoretical 
reading to certain contexts, both of the text and of the reader, may serve as a means of 
checking a conjecture, for it may show that certain ‘meanings’ are brought into the text 
from the historical outside. 
It is that sort of enquiry that underlies our considerations, though the general 
framework of the object of investigation, namely, the contemporary critical conception 
– or representation – of Gothic fiction, is somewhat larger than the text itself. The 
question that remains is the one about the rationale for conducting such an analysis. 
What can be gained by ‘verifying’ the elements of the way Gothic fiction is structured 
nowadays by the critics against some sort of historical context – apart from what was 
already offered by such accounts as Markman Ellis’ The History of Gothic Fiction or 
Emma Clery’s The Rise of Supernatural Fiction? Once again referring to Warwick’s 
article, we shall argue that the answer lies precisely in Gothic critics’ persistence in 
searching for the ‘real’ Gothic and refusing to accept the Gothic as their own construct. 
 
3.3. The Gothic as a Construct 
 
Warwick identifies the cause of the incontrollable spread of the Gothic, seen as a 
critical category, in “the subject/object relation problem.”51 Clearly, this problem can be 
rephrased in terms of the critical debate presented above: the question is whether there 
is any internal structure or element of the text that makes it Gothic, or any Gothic 
‘meaning,’ or perhaps reading a text as a Gothic text is thoroughly arbitrary, dependent 
on a given fashion or preferred institutionalised critical practice. 
According to Warwick, the consensus reached by Gothic critics when it comes to 
defining the Gothic is that the Gothic represents a mode or a loose tradition with a 
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capacity for constant change and reinvention.52 Yet, as she states, there are instances of 
criticism approaching the Gothic as if it were a genre, cataloguing its formal features, 
and ‘mechanically’ classifying texts as Gothic as soon as they appear to include those 
features – which, in her opinion, is a most harmful practice.53 This is because, seen in 
this way, the Gothic as a critical category turns out to be practically unlimited, for 
Gothic ‘clues’ may be potentially found in most improbable places. Then, the problem 
becomes potentially more complicated when we reach a higher level: that of the ‘Gothic 
meaning’ which can be seen as politically or socially charged. We might be dealing here 
with a pattern of the following kind: if this text represents an example of the Gothic, and 
the Gothic is characterised not only by its formal features, stock characters and themes, 
but also by its social or political role or reverberation, then this text also has to have the 
same socio-political status or – conversely – the socio-political status of this text has to 
be Gothic. This, in turn, opens a promisingly vast field for the free practice of useful, a-
historical misreading. 
As we have noticed above, within the differentiation paradigm, Gothic criticism 
emerges as a culturally significant activity, one which has the privilege of 
acknowledgement. And that is the reason why it cannot define itself as projecting the 
structure on the object. If Gothic criticism accepted its status as owning the structure, it 
would have minimal space to claim that Gothic fiction has – and always had – a 
significant and influential socio-cultural role. In the previous chapter we have observed 
that whereas David Punter in 1980 still validates Gothic fiction by providing it with 
high-art poetic credentials, later critics move toward establishing its value in terms of 
socio-political impact and usefulness. One extremely useful example is Jerrold E. 
Hogle’s article “The Gothic Ghost of the Counterfeit and the Progress of Abjection.” 
Hogle relies on the conceptualisation of the cultural function of the Gothic, distilled, as 
he states, by the “most sophisticated recent critics,” as that of providing a space for 
abjecting (in Kristeva’s understanding) contradictions (otherness, anxieties, fears) of the 
Western middle-class psyche in the process of forming a unified identity.54 Thus, the 
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Gothic is seen as providing a testimony to the ways the Western middle-class identity 
has been shaped, and reading a Gothic text is perceived in terms of the “Protestant 
tradition of self-scrutiny”55 or, to put it differently, of digging in the garbage of culture 
to learn about it through what it disposes of.56 Yet, simultaneously, it can be neither 
presented nor perceived as a mere construct but has to be given some ‘substance.’ Seen 
as a subjective structure projected on the object, the Gothic would seem to have little 
explanatory force with regard to the subject who conducts a ‘self-scrutiny’ of his or her 
origin. Hence the reason for the subject/object confusion mentioned by Warwick. And 
hence, also, the reason for our interest in what could be seen as the contemporary 
misconceptions of the Gothic. 
Scrutinizing the contemporary conceptions of Gothic fiction instead of merely 
accepting them as predominant at present should serve to broaden our understanding of 
both the Gothic as such and the present condition of its criticism. As soon as we treat 
the reading of the Gothic as capable of explaining anything to us, our past or our psyche 
or our present society, it becomes a socio-politically marked reading. In a way, this is 
no surprise if the basis for the adopted methodology is theory. As defined by Culler, 
theory is “what changes people’s views, makes them think differently about their 
objects of study and their activities of studying them,” its most significant practical 
effect being “the disputing of ‘common sense.’”57 In this sense, 
 
[t]heory is often a pugnacious critique of common-sense notions, and 
further, an attempt to show that what we take for granted as ‘common 
sense’ is in fact a historical construction, a particular theory that has 
come to seem so natural to us that we don’t even see it as a theory. As 
a critique of common sense and exploration of alternative conceptions, 
theory involves a questioning of the most basic premises or 
assumptions of literary study, the unsettling of anything that might 
have been taken for granted: What is meaning? What is an author? 
What is it to read? What is the ‘I’ or subject who writes, reads, or 
acts? How do texts relate to the circumstances in which they are 
produced?58 
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Theory is highly speculative, analytical and reflexive with regard to fixed notions – and 
subversive in its un-fixing of them. As a result, we cannot omit to notice that applying it 
to the reading of texts in order to ‘explain’ their function in e.g. the shaping of the 
subject – indirectly, or pretty much directly, also the subject who reads – we not only 
act in the socio-political domain but also act so as to produce a change, both in views 
and in thinking; we act with subversion on our minds. Thus, we end up encoding the 
particular vision – or version – of ourselves, our past, our society, our culture and a set 
of historical relations, as well as our possible future. As a result, however, the discourse 
on the Gothic reveals certain similarities to the Foucauldian repressive hypothesis: both 
reconstruct a certain history. The question is, however, whether the Gothic, just as the 
repressive version of the history of sex, is made functional at the cost of making ‘a ruse’ 
its central point. And this question may be answered precisely by means of verifying the 
contemporary conceptions of the Gothic against a historical background. 
 
3.4. Contextualising the Gothic 
 
We have initially sketched the method of our scrutiny as consisting in checking the 
contemporary critical representations of the Gothic against the context of the text’s 
production. This, however, is still a rather vaguely described methodology and requires 
clarification. In the first place, we need to specify what is meant by the ‘historical 
context.’  
The obvious and simplest denotation of historical context would be the events of the 
past against which we can situate a text – one example good enough would be the 
aforementioned French Revolution as an illuminating background for Lewis’ The Monk. 
In the light of the contemporary historicist approach, however, ‘reading’ a text 
exclusively ‘through’ an assumption that it is, one way or another, meant to reflect a 
certain historical event is not satisfactory when it comes to conceptualising The Monk or 
generally Gothic fiction (or any fiction, indeed). By the way, it is such an approach that 
seems to risk re-writing a text by means of doing history. 
Treating Lewis’ novel as an example, we can observe how the contemporary Gothic 
critics in the historicist circle move towards another, more satisfactory level of analysis. 
Before we discuss it, let us however turn to the oft quoted, ground-breaking 1981 article 
by Ronald Paulson, “Gothic Fiction and the French Revolution”. Paulson’s assumption, 
underlying his treatment of a number of key Gothic novels, is that Gothic fiction used to 
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serve as a metaphor of the Revolution,59 and is supported with de Sade’s famous 
opinion of 1800. Though Paulson distances himself from the position that the Gothic as 
such serves revolutionary propaganda, he states quite confidently: “I do not think that 
there is any doubt that the popularity of Gothic fiction in the 1790s and well into the 
nineteenth century was due in part to the widespread anxieties and fears in Europe 
aroused by the turmoil in France finding a kind of sublimation or catharsis in tales of 
darkness, confusion, blood and horror.”60 Relying on this assumption allows him to 
identify Lewis’ monk Ambrosio as a revolutionary, an individual breaking free form 
repression (inflicted by an aristocratic family and the clergy); the scene of the 
destruction of St. Claire’s convent by an angry mob as inspired by the actual course of 
Revolution; and Radcliffe’s Emily as threatened by “the sexually threatening soldiers of 
Montoni […] (in this sense related to Burke’s mob that threatens Marie Antoinette).”61 
In such a reading of the mode, its incarnation popular in the turbulent 1790s is 
established as either representing a “plot” that was already there and became adapted to 
reflect on the Revolution, or originated in the terrors of the Revolution itself and was 
“borrowed” to reflect on matters either related or unrelated to it.62 According to 
Paulson, the Gothic not only has a potential for Revolutionary associations in itself: its 
castles-as-prisons are there by the time the turmoil in France brakes out, and have the 
potential to become the “frame of mind that made the Fall of the Bastille an automatic 
image of revolution for French as well as English writers” but this very frame itself also 
becomes “sophisticated” by the Revolution.63 Resemblances, or perhaps 
interconnections between Gothic and ‘revolutionary’ fictions are further traced in the 
mode’s elaboration of ‘tyrant-victim’ relationship; juxtaposition of tyrannical fathers 
obsessed with the preservation of property and banditti, the latter of whom Paulson 
deciphers as alluding to the rioting crowd; and the Gothic’s taste for mysteries and 
plots.64 
Organising – or structuring – the Gothic of 1790s in such a way produces a workable 
grid which can be extended over the Gothic material of that time and later. Identifying 
the use of terms parallel to those of Burke’s reflections on the Revolution in Radcliffe’s 
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description of Emily St. Aubert further adds to the argument (probably as much as the 
readers’ awareness that Lewis was an eye witness to the Revolution) on the basis of 
which Paulson is capable of stating that “Radcliffe produces a fiction about a spectator 
of revolutionary activity who can be confused by her experience […]” while “Lewis’ 
Monk reproduces the exhilarating but ultimately depressing experience of the 
revolutionary himself.”65 Similarly, through evoking the possible ways in which the 
Revolution could have an impact on Mary Shelley, both through her own experiences 
and the experiences of her parents, he is capable of reading Frankenstein as “to some 
extent a retrospect on the whole process [of revolution] through Waterloo, with the 
Enlightenment-created monster leaving behind it wake of terror and destruction across 
France and Europe, partly because it has been disowned and misunderstood and partly 
because it was created unnaturally by reason rather than love in the instinctive 
relationships of the Burkean family.”66 Many of Paulson’s observations are correct and 
intriguing. However, what becomes the basis for more contemporary considerations of 
the French Revolution theme, especially in the case of The Monk, seems to be the filling 
of gaps in the grid proposed by him. 
With regard to historical reading, it appears impossible to read a Gothic text with a 
single reference point, as it is at the junction of multiple traceable influences that the 
fullest picture seems to emerge. Paulson’s consideration on the influence of the French 
Revolution on a strand of Gothic fiction becomes compensated in, for example, such 
accounts as the aforementioned Markman Ellis’ The History of Gothic Fiction, James 
Watt’s Contesting The Gothic and Emma Clery’s The Rise of Supernatural Fiction, 
each account in its own way drawing our attention away from the direct influence of 
omnipresent terror across the British Channel, stressed by de Sade, and towards issues 
pertinent at home. To return to Monk as our example, Paulson focuses on the theme of 
the rebel and the angry mob – both sympathetic and outrageous for rebelling against the 
ancient regime and a decayed version of Catholicism but, at the same time, heading 
towards their own destruction due to the excess of violence and the lack of moral 
restraint. The above-mentioned authors, by contrast, analyse the book in a way in which 
the influence of Revolution, though visible and meaningful, is placed in a larger context 
of Lewis’ mockery of the Radcliffean novel and the discourse of sensibility, his 
instrumental use of Revolutionary and pornographic language, the overall 
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understanding of conspiracy at that time and, as it seems, the personal striving to earn 
the label of enfant terrible of the day. Simultaneously, none of the authors seems to 
state so confidently as Paulson does that the Revolution is to be seen as constituting 
some sort of a common axis for the subject matter or manner of representation in the 
Gothic of the 1790s. 
Placing the revolutionary theme in Monk in the context of the prevailing 
contemporary discourses has a notable effect on the understanding of its significance for 
the text. Addressing the critical stance on the issue of why Monk was condemned by its 
contemporaries appears essential at this point since it is through the study of what 
prompted the eighteenth-century critics to castigate Lewis that Paulson’s grid becomes 
‘filled’ with illuminating contents. Paulson remarks that Lewis’ portrayal of the 
Revolution is distanced from its typical propaganda texts in France,67 and does not 
mention the outburst of Monk’s criticism. In turn, the later critics stress that the novel 
was “loyalist” with regard to its portrayal of the Revolution but its reception turned out 
to be filtered through the fears predominating in the official critical discourse: in the 
critical readings at the time, exemplified by the vehement attack by Matthias, “the 
subversion of morality and social institutions, which was its object, was now publicly 
announced to be its end; the fate of Ambrosio […] seemed to foreshadow the 
discomfiture of M. G. Lewis.”68  
The fact that Lewis becomes castigated for spreading subversion which he, in fact, 
presents from the loyalist perspective in his novel is interesting. For Clery, the 
controversy around Lewis seems to be a side effect of the fear of revolution finding its 
reflection in the conspiracy panic, conspiracy being seen at that time as a possible 
trigger to the outbreak of the French Terror, and then also from the fear of books and 
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uncontrolled reading as propagating conspiracies69 and illicit content. As she states, 
with their properly Gothic penchant for mystery, Gothic tales “[i]n their content […] 
allegorise their own effects,”70 as a result of which they can be read as serving what 
they should demystify, which is exactly the case with Monk. According to Clery, “[t]he 
confused overlappings of the content of The Monk, its reception and alleged effects, and 
rumours of actual political plots created an indeterminacy over allegiances and identities 
which in turn favoured an indiscriminate paranoia.”71 What is interesting in the above is 
the fact that Clery links the ‘confused’ effect of mystery and conspiracy in Lewis with a 
similar perception of German Sturm and Drang movement and the form of 
Schauerromane in the late 1790s, especially Schiller’s The Ghost-Seer.72 Earlier, she 
notes that the German literature, imported with enthusiasm at the beginning of the 
decade, was soon seen by some as a threat capable of “[perverting] British minds and 
morals” as a result of associating it with the situation at the continent and spreading 
rumours of the “German-based” (Illuminati) world-wide plot, an example of which 
could be easily seen by the contemporaries in Lewis’ Monk, a book whose author was 
not only versed in German novels but also openly admitted “borrowings”73 from Sturm 
and Drang key works.74 
Paulson also mentions conspiracy as inherent in the contemporary representations of 
revolution.75 However, the obvious influence of German supernatural/conspiracy fiction 
on Lewis, brought about by both Clery76 and Watt,77 constitutes and important 
supplement to the revolution grid and allows to approach Monk from a different angle. 
Adopting this angle allows us to perceive the novel not simply in terms of reflecting 
upon revolution, or the Revolution, but in terms of its toying with the standard British 
romance form at that time – to which, at least initially, German novels were a refreshing 
alternative. Watt states: “[i]f Lewis dealt in German materials because of the regard for 
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boldness or daring which he shared with the translators and imitators […] he also had 
recourse to German sources, it seems, as a means of ‘supplementing’ the contemporary 
romance and making a name for himself by his defiance of the legitimizing conventions 
[…] which were observed by writers such as Wordsworth and Scott,” his “method” of 
composing Monk being “assimilative and wilfully heterogeneous.”78 This takes us to a 
quite different level of the text’s functioning and, indeed, brings us closer to the homely 
affairs. 
The fact that Lewis’ works enter into a polemic with the form of romance and 
version of female sensibility popularised by Radcliffe is further emphasised by Watt 
and elaborated on in greater detail by Ellis. As Watt stresses, it was typical of Lewis to 
adopt an antagonistic position towards the discourse of sentimentality, often embraced 
by women writers.79 Quoting Jacqueline Howard, he moves on to comment on Lewis’ 
writing as aimed at achieving the status of a ‘masculine,’ brilliant author, whose 
characteristic would be unconventionality, eccentricity, risk-taking and the readiness to 
shock the readers. 80 What this further adds to the reading of Monk, seemingly aside the 
revolution theme, is the novel’s constituting of itself as “a ‘homosocial’ work, written 
for a leisured male audience,”81 and relishing Shamela-like, misogynist commentary on 
feminine virtue.82 Importantly, Monk was initially credited by the critics for it literary 
merit, even though its libertine potential did not pass as unnoticed.83  
When it comes to the outrage at the content of Monk, Watt notes it reached its peak 
only after Lewis, an MP at that time, publicly admitted his authorship in July 1796, and 
was stirred by the general anxiety connected with the emergence of the mass market and 
popular novel-writing.84 This is not necessarily an argument contrary to that of Clery; in 
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a way, it inscribes well into her account of the critical reaction to popular fiction 
distributed by the circulating libraries. Watt perceives controversy as one of the goals 
the book was meant to achieve, reading it in the context of Lewis’ later attitude towards 
the reception of his works, characterised by “[maintaining] the upstart reputation he had 
gained with The Monk [i.e. of an enfant terrible], baiting critics and reviewers by 
knowingly appealing to popular demand.”85 This also adds to the revolution-grid 
established by Paulson, again taking us closer to home. But then, on the other hand, it 
cannot be stated that Monk does not make use of the revolutionary theme, especially as 
Lewis was by experience capable of evoking the Revolution and the Terror itself in a 
vivid way.86 As Ellis states, the novel gained a remarkably uncommon attention of 
criticism,87 which seems well in tune with Watt’s assumption that what prompted the 
critics was Lewis’ high political status, and with Clery’s analysis of the fear of 
revolutionary attitudes spread by supernatural fiction. What Ellis also states is that the 
novel was consciously inviting criticism through “deliberate obfuscation [of its stance]” 
and “confusion of […] ideological commentary, which [illuminated] British opinion on 
the revolution up to 1794 [but] was itself readable as a political intervention during its 
critical reception in 1797.”88 However, the aim of the confusion, as it follows from his 
considerations, again lies in something else than a reaction to the Revolution as such. 
As it was stated above, Ellis focuses to a large extent on reading Monk in its relation 
to the Radcliffean novel. As he suggests, reading the novel as a satire on Radcliffe’s 
internalising of the rule that literature ought to spread moral teachings could be of 
benefit to the critics.89 While he mentions what was also stated by Watt, namely that 
Monk puts into question the construction of the feminine virtue and uses misogynist 
representations, he also makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the use 
Monk makes of the Revolution through its overt use of “a libertine descriptive language 
in moments of sexual encounter,”90 at times disturbed with the application of 
revolutionary symbols. The discourse of libertinism “an historically enduring literary 
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and philosophic discourse on sexuality,” was characterised by its masculine character 
and allegiances with misogyny; it treated sex as “good and natural,” and postulated to 
analyse sexual behaviours in “rational and empirical” terms.91 Ellis traces the use of the 
libertine language and representation of sexual behaviour in Monk, at the same time 
pointing to possible moments at which the language of libertinism becomes conflated 
with the language of liberty.92 Such a use of the libertine language serves its own 
purpose: thanks to it, Ellis states, Lewis satirises The Mysteries of Udolpho, attempting 
“to expose the folly and hypocrisy of its ostensibly demure sexual agenda.”93 As a 
result, whereas Lewis’ portrayal of the destruction of St. Claire’s convent may differ 
substantially from French representations of revolutionaries combating the evil 
perpetrated by clergy, his language and manner of representation still manifest a link 
with those of French libertine anti-Catholic pornography, recognised in Britain in the 
1970s as “closely allied with revolutionary radicalism, and as such, a dangerous species 
of sedition.”94 Similarly, his depiction of the devil’s plot invites associations with the 
Revolution, even though, as Ellis observes, “The Monk is not simply a romance of the 
Terror [but] instead, multiple zones of overlap are located and explored.”95 It is because 
of such associations with the Revolution that Lewis’ novel is found threatening (or at 
least highly contemptible) paired with the political position of Lewis, and if we follow 
this train of thought, we perhaps could even risk a hypothesis that it does so up to the 
point at which Paulson takes Ambrosio to be a revolutionary himself.96 
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The insights of the contemporary criticism as presented above do ‘fill’ many of the 
gaps in Paulson’s grid. In fact, we might notice that it is those gaps that actually make 
possible a straightforward reading of Lewis’ novel as reflecting upon Revolution, and 
filling them actually complicates Paulson’s basic assumptions. This suggests that 
perhaps a similar conclusion could be, upon consideration, reached also with regard to 
other novels he analyses. While he seems to be quite right when it comes to stating that 
the Gothic might have used the Revolution, its language and discourse of Terror to 
achieve its own objectives, it appears much less obvious when and to what extent the 
Gothic mode itself was actually used to reflect on the Revolution as such. This is for the 
reason that, when present, such a reflection would be possibly mixed with themes 
pertaining to homely affairs and would become fully meaningful only in reference to 
other discourses employed by the Gothic text. 
What each of the aforementioned contemporary critics does, in fact, is relating, in a 
certain way, an existing assumption – a conjunction – to the available discourses of the 
times in question. In the case of Monk, what comes in handy is, among others, the 
discourse of sensibility as popularised by Radcliffean novels, the critical discourse and 
its representation of unlicensed reading, and the political discourses circulating around 
the Revolution itself. It is this kind of historical background that we will strive to evoke 
in our consideration of the present-day critical conceptions of the Gothic. In a similar 
vein, it is possible to check the basic conjectures of the contemporary Gothic criticism 
and the differentiation paradigm (like the one of the Gothic’s inherent subversion, 
which evokes as evidence e.g. the eighteenth-century critical debasement of the mode), 
against the discourses prevalent in the criticism of the times when Gothic novels were 
actually written. Doing this, however, demands a double-sided analysis. On the one 
hand, what is necessary is the evoking of the past discourses in order to illuminate 
certain assumptions of the contemporary criticism. On the other hand, we also need to 
evoke the present discourses that may prompt the contemporary critics, dedicated to 
theoretical analysis, to reach particular conclusions. 
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3.5. The Theory of Discourse and the Formation of Objects 
 
It is discourse, then, rather than the historical event, around which our analysis is to 
be organised. It goes without saying that historical facts are, indeed, represented through 
discourses, as can be seen in the case of the discussion of the French Revolution’s 
impact on Gothic fiction. And, as the example of Monk shows, it is the discursive 
representation that has an impact both on the content of the work and on its reception. 
However, as we have already remarked, discursive representations constitute a context 
for production and immediate reception of a text in the past as well as for its re-
production in the present. As a result, what is necessary is some sort of theory of 
discourse that would allow us to address and analyse both types of critical discourses on 
equal terms. Simultaneously, such a theory must let us pay a considerable attention to 
the ways in which both past and present discourses re-present their objects according to 
their own framework and for their own aims. Not surprisingly, approached in this way, 
the differentiation paradigm itself emerges as a kind of ‘discursive formation.’  
Such a theory of discourse is offered by Michel Foucault. Foucault has already been 
mentioned in this chapter – almost at the very beginning of it – mainly due to his notion 
of the repressive hypothesis. In fact, his thought has already been evoked to help us 
formulate the essential problem of this work, namely the suspicion towards the 
differentiation paradigm and its critical tenets. In a way, such a topic invites his theory, 
which curiously happens to be reflected in the field itself, even if only by means of a 
mere digression. Namely, in a footnote to his remarks on the way Baldick and Mighall 
approach the matter of critical misconception of the mode, William Hughes states “that 
Baldick and Mighall’s argument owes much, it may be argued, to Foucault’s “We 
‘Other Victorians,’” the opening chapter of the volume one of The History of 
Sexuality.”97 This is, of course, only a side-note; nonetheless, Foucault’s thoughts on 
discourse indeed prove illuminating with regard to the subject matter of this work. 
Of Foucault’s works which deal with the question of discourse, in one way or 
another, Madness and Civilization (1961) and volume one of The History of Sexuality 
appear to be the most famous ones. Paul A. Bové enumerates two further sources which 
explicitly address the notion of discourse, namely Foucault’s lecture “The Order of 
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Discourse” (1870) and The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969).98 Other scholars could 
perhaps mention the essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1971) as well, though in 
fact all Foucault’s early work is concerned with this topic to a larger or lesser degree. 
All of the aforementioned works deliver a wealth of insight into the matter of discourse, 
even though it must be stressed that Foucault’s views changed over years and while new 
paths were being pursued, others were dismissed or underwent considerable 
reformulation. The extended analysis of discourse belongs to Foucault’s earlier phase of 
studies, with especially the method of The Archaeology of Knowledge bearing much 
semblance to structuralist theory. This method is ultimately abandoned in later writings 
in favour of genealogy, as Foucault turns to issues other than discourse as such.99 Still, 
as Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow claim, “[a]s a technique, archaeology serves 
genealogy. As a method of isolating discourse objects, it serves to distance and 
defamiliarize the serious discourse of human sciences. This, in turn, enables Foucault to 
raise the genealogical questions: How are these discourses used? What role do they play 
in society?”100 A set of similar questions pertaining to critical discourse emerges from 
the considerations following the remaining part of this work: How has the Gothic come 
to be codified as subversive or marginal, or indefinable? Why is it so vital to codify it in 
this way? What role does it have?  
As it was already said, the advantage of Foucault’s theory is that it enables one to 
identify literary criticism as discourse. What could perhaps be mentioned in this context 
is his treatment of the way discourse emerges as a unified entity, at least when it comes 
to taking his stance as a venture point. At this point, The Archaeology of Knowledge 
proves, however, a somewhat less immediately useful source, for it seeks to establish 
the rules which enable the unity of discourse as autonomous and ahistorical, in a 
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structuralist-like fashion. Dreyfus and Rabinow contrast this attitude with the position 
taken by Thomas Kuhn in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), namely his 
introduction of the notion of “paradigm” – “a specific exemplar of successful work” – 
around which scientific communities are organised.101 In his later works, Foucault also 
moves from the level of discourse theory and the search for rules to that of discursive 
practice, as well as pays more attention to the factors influencing this practice and its 
social significance. A number of useful observations can be drawn already from his 
“The Order of Discourse,” the lecture introducing his concept of genealogy. 
Foucault begins sketching out the concept of discourse by enumerating the ways in 
which it is restricted, and it is this perspective, rather than that of some sort of 
autonomous rules of discourse, which organises his discussion of the notion. What he 
addresses in the first place is the external means of exclusion, those which emerge 
whenever “power and desire” are put at stake,102 namely prohibition, the opposition 
between reason and madness, and that between true and false.103 Of these, he analyses 
in more detail the final one, focusing on “the will to truth” as a historical division which 
governs “the will to know,” and states:  
 
starting from the great Platonic division, the will to truth had its own 
history, which is not that of constraining truths: the history of the 
range of objects to be studied, of the functions and positions of the 
knowing subject, of the material, technical, and instrumental 
investments of knowledge. 
This will to truth, like the other systems of exclusion, rests on an 
institutional support: it is both reinforced and renewed by whole strata 
of practices, such as pedagogy […]; and the system of books, 
publishing, libraries; learned societies in the past and laboratories 
now. But it is also renewed, no doubt more profoundly, by the way in 
which knowledge is put to work, valorised, distributed, and in a sense 
attributed, in a society. […] I believe that this will to truth […] tends 
to exert a sort of pressure and something like a power of constraint (I 
am still speaking of our own society) on other discourses. I am 
thinking of the way in which for centuries Western literature sought to 
ground itself on the natural, the ‘vraisemblable,’ on sincerity, on 
science as well – in short, on ‘true’ discourse. […]104 
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What is true is acceptable. What is not acceptable, becomes excluded on the basis of 
being false. Hence, the potential of discourse is significantly restricted, and its ability to 
generate statements curbed. At the same time, the will to truth remains unnoticed within 
the discourse itself.105 Truth appears to be ‘natural,’ and hence transparent. 
What Foucault opposes to the external procedures of control are internal ones, which 
become the “principles of classification, of ordering, of distribution,” and serve to 
master “event and chance.”106 These are the commentary, the author-function and the 
organisation of disciplines. The author, according to Foucault, serves the “grouping of 
discourses, conceived as the unity and origin of their meanings, and the focus of their 
coherence.”107 In other words, it serves to bring together statements, or works, and 
delimit what a given unified discourse, or oeuvre, may be seen as saying. Commentary, 
to move on, is a function of “discourses which, over and above their formulation, are 
said indefinitely, remain said, and are to be said again,” though, at the same time, they 
may prove unstable and subject to change.108 They represent a kind of “major 
narratives,” based on primary texts (among which he identifies also literary texts, such 
as Odyssey), and their existence precludes the utopia of a pristinely new discourse.109 
What characterises commentary is the relation between primary and secondary texts, 
one which entails “(endless) construction of new discourses” based on re-actualising the 
primary text, on discovering in it always fresh and promising meanings on the one hand 
and, on the other, constant repetition of identity, of what was already in that text, 
articulation of what was already “silently articulated ‘beyond’” in it.110 As Foucault 
states, “[b]y a paradox which it always displaces but never escapes, the commentary 
must say for the first time what had, nonetheless, already been said, and must tirelessly 
repeat what had, however, never been said.”111 In this way, the commentary dismisses 
the possibility of chance statements, “it allows us to say something other than the text 
itself, but on condition that it is this text itself which is said, and in a sense 
completed.”112 Finally, organisation of disciplines, the final means of exclusion, is 
                                                           
105
 Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” p. 56. 
106
 Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” p. 56. 
107
 Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” p. 58. The function of the name of the author is discussed by 
Foucault in detail in his influential earlier lecture, given in 1969, “What Is an Author?” See Michel 
Foucault, “What Is an Author?” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Book, 
1984). 
108
 Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” p. 57. 
109
 Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” pp. 56-57. 
110
 Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” pp. 57-58. 
111
 Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” p. 58. 
112
 Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” p. 58. 
  119
based on delimited range of objects, methods and propositions that we recognise to be 
true, “a play of rules and definitions, of techniques and instruments,” as much as “the 
requisites for the construction of new statements.”113 Disciplines are also characterised 
by the coexistence of ‘errors’ and ‘truths,’ both of them having their “positive 
functions,” and the fact that a proposition which is to be considered as true or false must 
first fulfil the criterion of referring to a given set of objects, as well as use well-defined 
“conceptual or technical instruments,” and refer to a given “theoretical horizon;” in 
other words, it must be “in the true” if it is to be considered as belonging to a discipline 
at all.114 
Both external and internal principles of control of discourse are seen as “principles of 
constraint” and are yet further contrasted with the principles of control that apply to 
individuals holding a given discourse, i.e. “the speaking subjects.”115 Similarly to a 
statement, which in a way needs to be pre-qualified to enter a discipline as a 
proposition, a subject also needs to be qualified to enter a discursive order, with certain 
orders being more open than others.116 Exchange and communication between speaking 
subjects are governed by ritual, a system of restrictions which predefines “the particular 
properties and the stipulated roles of the speaking subjects”117; societies of discourse, 
which guarantee that discourses circulate only in predetermined, limited spaces, and 
ensure some degree of the secrecy of knowledge and non-interchangeable relations 
between the members118; and doctrines, which, on the one hand, require subjects to 
form a particular type of statements and, on the other hand, tie a given discourse with a 
certain group of individuals who stand out against other groups.119 Foucault also pays 
attention to education as a means of appropriating discourse by societies through the 
regulation of its distribution.120 
The usefulness of Foucault’s insights on discourse when it comes to speaking about 
literary criticism in general is highlighted, for example, by Bové. Bové discusses the 
Foucauldian notion of discourse focusing, in the first place, on the New Critical 
understanding and use of the very notion (here, understood as a term providing one with 
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“a way of identifying and separating genre”121). As he does so, he also delineates the 
manner in which a given (though in this case specifically New Critical) discourse (in 
more contemporary sense) of literary criticism may function. ‘Discourse,’ he states,  
 
used in this New Critical sense […] helped to constitute and organise 
an entire field of knowledge about language; it helped discipline the 
judgement, and thereby the response, of students and teachers; and in 
so doing, it revealed its links to forms of power—such as teaching—
that have effects upon the actions of others. And in the case of New 
Criticism, we can, if we choose, easily choose this pattern, in which an 
intellectually specialized language of a professional discipline is 
constellated and made functional; we can see it extended both into a 
broader coherence with other discourses constituting other fields and 
into the processes which institutionalize discourses. When their 
discourse about language and criticism became institutionalized, it 
effectively produced the language of professional literary criticism 
and, accordingly, helped make up an academic discipline by giving it 
some of the characteristics of other intellectual fields already 
professionally organized. As a result, criticism joined in the general 
disciplinary project of producing and regulating the movement of 
knowledge, the forms of language, and the training of minds and 
bodies.122 
 
 
What one may immediately associate with the above description is, indeed, the 
eighteenth-century critical discourse, itself informed by other discourses prevailing at 
that time, aimed at policing the adherence to the politics of chastity, didacticism and 
taste – or, as we could see in the case of Monk by Lewis, the propriety of political 
judgement or literature standards, up to the point of castigating what exceeded the 
acceptable norm. This very description, however, is applicable also to the differentiation 
paradigm discussed in previous chapters. 
Elaborating on his example of New Criticism, Bové quite accurately outlines the 
discursive character of institutionalised literary criticism. He pays attention to features 
such as, first of all, “functional and regulative” character of utility of the critical 
discourse, which, as he states “hierarchizes not only poetry and prose but, implicitly, 
identity and difference, authority and subservience, taste and vulgarity, and continuity 
and discontinuity as well—that is, we might say, it shares in the operation of the 
generalized discourse of our society that constitutes its most basic categories of 
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understanding and thought.”123 Furthermore, he points to the extension and propagation 
of the very discourse by the critic, who also becomes seen as a function, and to the 
discourse’s apparent natural and self-evident status, achieved as a result of the fact that 
the critical discourse draws attention away from itself and towards “the need ‘to get the 
job done,’” that is to carry out, in the obviously right way, a critical analysis of a text.124 
As he views it, “[b]y obliging all to answer the ‘same’ questions […] discourse 
homogenizes critical practice and declares ‘invalid’ whatever does not or cannot operate 
on its political and intellectual terrain,” and thus, it maintains unnoticed power and 
control by means of not so much repression as positive production.125 Although Gothic 
criticism ostensibly distances itself from the ways of New Criticism, we have already 
shown that it actually cannot successfully establish itself as a major rupture. As we have 
noted, a new strategy always functions within the space delimited by the earlier strategy 
from which it wishes to distance itself. As a result, as soon as it is institutionalised, 
Gothic criticism turns out to function in a discursive framework. 
The fact that Gothic criticism represents a discursive field may be quickly observed 
if we turn to analysing Gothic criticism and bear in mind the way Foucault describes the 
notion of discourse. To follow the order outlined in our summary of the theory of 
discourse as presented in “The Order of Discourse,” let us begin with the will to truth. 
What strikes one at this point is the fact that Gothic criticism in fact ‘invented’ the 
Gothic as we know it today. Or, to be more precise, the Gothic was invented by the 
early twentieth-century Gothic scholarship. This scholarship was perhaps not that much 
Gothic in the present-day sense, but, for one reason or another, searched for a way in 
which it could group together a number of literary phenomena, somehow related to that 
of the novel, and, in order to do so, came up with what today seems to be a 
systematising frame. Only gradually, with the shift of critical discourses, did the Gothic, 
seen as a genre, with a fixed range of objects (the canon of texts), become a 
recognisable and well-determined area of knowledge (even if its boundaries seem to be 
obscure), with a “range […] of the functions and positions of the knowing subject.”126 
This knowing subject is the Gothic critic who, as we shall see, perceives himself/herself 
as, for instance, a postmodern broken subject carrying out the act of self-scrutiny with 
the aim of understanding one’s own history, like one’s own conscience, so significant in 
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the contemporary Western culture. No doubt the will to truth governing the will to 
knowledge of the Gothic is nowadays institutionally supported, and we define the 
investment in the Gothic as an investment in a better understanding our culture, society 
and ourselves, in “material, technical, and instrumental” terms. We are also dealing with 
a “whole strata of practices” serving the dissemination of knowledge, with texts for 
scholars on how to study the Gothic, tutors on how to teach it, and students on how to 
understand it. It is also not insignificant that the ‘old’ approaches to the Gothic are 
dismissed as ‘no longer relevant’ in certain cases (like the “laundry list” approach 
consisting in listing the conventions of Gothic literature127), though, of course, not in all. 
All this, finally, appears simply commonsensical. 
We may notice the reflection of internal procedures of rarefaction in the discourse of 
the contemporary Gothic criticism as well. What appears to fulfil the author-function 
emerges as quite evident if we consider the way Gothic criticism has established the 
Radcliffe’s school of terror and Lewis’ school of horror, to give one example. To give 
another, we may consider the way in which Walpole is still commonly singled out as 
the founding figure of Gothic literature, his second preface to the castle of Otranto 
persistently identified as ‘the gothic manifesto’ – not only by those singled out by 
Williams as holding the legend of the Gothic Father. The very issue of the formation of 
the Gothic canon, of choosing the texts on the basis of which the concept of the Gothic 
is to be formed, and later on disseminated and applied in the consideration of texts to be 
included into the domain of Gothic studies could, in fact, be discussed in terms of 
author-function with a considerable dose of success. Roughly the same can be said with 
regard to the question of commentary – the question of constant rereading of the same 
canonical texts in order to make them speak up. Furthermore, as we could see in the 
previous chapter, we could perceive Gothic criticism and the differentiation paradigm as 
reflecting what could be compared to the organisation of disciplines. To give just one 
example at this point, we have already seen how the Gothic is structured around a 
‘positive’ error, its alleged poetic character, which makes it the predecessor of the 
romantic formulae. And again, we could look at the differentiation paradigm’s effort to 
differentiate itself from the previous scholarship and see who is “in the true.” 
Interestingly, it is also true that Gothic criticism rarely speaks of who is ‘in the wrong’ 
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when it comes to assessing its own contemporaries. This, however, as we tried to show 
in the previous chapters, is also a functional, ‘positive’ feature in the Foucauldian sense.  
Interestingly, it is also a ‘positive’ feature that the domain of Gothic criticism seems 
to be just as open as it perceives one of its aims to consist in the ‘opening’ of the 
individual’s psyche by the opening of a text of the past to scrutiny. Strangely enough, 
the ‘secret’ of the Gothic, like a repressed thought or memory, has to be brought to light 
– even, or especially, if we follow the logic of psychoanalysis, where we do not expect 
it to reside – and, what is more, made public for it constitutes the repressed content of 
everybody’s very own psyche. If we assume the psychological reception of the Gothic to 
be ‘the closest to truth,’ and we remember that psychology makes quite ‘material, 
technical and instrumental’ claims with regard to extra-literary reality, we need to bear 
in mind that it is as if everybody were invited to speak, and thus to attain and 
disseminate knowledge; to become members of the discursive community and, 
inevitably, its agents. This, however, also positively regulates the critical discourse. 
It is possible, then, to situate the present-day Gothic criticism as a discourse. 
Moreover, we are able to do it in a way which allows us to account for certain 
regularities (as much as discontinuities) and practices (of reorganisation, redefinition, 
re-construction, re-representation), and which enables us to take up a more systematic 
analysis. In the course of this analysis, are able to pay attention to certain facts which 
usually pass as unnoticed, or are indeed noticed but not always discussed to a 
satisfactory degree. We have already pointed out that what influenced the rise of Gothic 
fiction was multiple discourses of the day, sometimes intertwined, sometimes openly 
hostile, reflected both in writings under scrutiny and critiques. All of these discourses 
shaped the field of eighteenth-century reaction to the surge of ostensibly un-reasonable 
texts, as much as they shaped the general criticism of the day and the text production. 
As could be noticed at this point, we have just (and again) suggested that although 
criticism can be seen as a discourse in itself, it is also formed and influenced by higher 
levels of discourse, not necessarily concerned with literature as such, but still capable of 
accounting for literature as a part of their domain and ascribing to it a function. This 
could be said of sentimentalism as much as civic humanism or the general social and 
political discourse pervading British society after the Restoration, with its reorientation 
from the modes of representation centred on feudal values to those of the newly 
prominent middle class of the city. The same can be said of the contemporary criticism, 
too – with its recourse to theory as the key to unlocking the text’s message. 
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It is interesting that two of the theories underlying the contemporary discussions on 
the Gothic as traced back to the seminal study by Punter, psychoanalysis and Marxism, 
are spoken of by Foucault as discourses in their own right. According to Foucault, both 
Marx and Freud represent what he calls “founders of discursivity,” types of authors who 
make possible “not only a certain number of analogies, but also (and equally important) 
a certain number of differences.”128 As Foucault speaks of Freud and Marx, he states: 
“[t]hey have created a possibility for something other than their discourse, yet 
something belonging to what they founded. To say that Freud founded psychoanalysis 
[…] means that Freud made possible a certain number of divergences—with respect to 
his own texts, concepts, and hypotheses—that all arise from the psychoanalytic 
discourse itself.”129 Both psychoanalysis and Marxism delimit a certain space of inquiry 
which in practice “defines a proposition’s theoretical validity in relation to the work of 
the founders”130; furthermore, re-reading the primary texts – the texts of Freud and 
Marx – may modify the discourse, but in itself takes place only within its limits.131 
Applied to the reading of literary texts these discourses expand, open up to a new 
possible application.132 However, we should add that they also inescapably re-construct 
the texts they are applied to in accordance with the pre-established theoretically valid 
statements. What they are be able to tell us, in other words, cannot transgress their own 
limits. Interestingly, the founders of discursivity are contrasted with literary authors 
(and paradoxically, the example of a literary author given by Foucault is Radcliffe), an 
opposition to which we are going to return in the next chapter. 
Illuminating with regard to the subject matter of our analysis is also a number of 
other elements of Foucault’s thoughts on discourse and its practices, some of them 
already evoked in this chapter. In the first place, as has already been signalled, what 
corresponds to the situation in the field of Gothic criticism is the theme of discontinuity 
as a venture point for analysis. It is indeed in Madness and Civilization that Foucault 
raises the questions of discourse as paired with power, discontinuity of representation 
(or cultural change) as (continuously) linked with power demands of the day and 
opposed to uninterrupted progress in science, and the importance of the institution and 
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its representative.133 Bearing in mind Fish’s postulates of critical practice being always 
adjusted to the demands of the present-day institution (which seems to successfully 
dismiss any claims to ‘truth’ inherent in the text under scrutiny as much as it does away 
with the notion of continuous progress), we could already see that similar questions 
emerge in the scrutiny of the differentiation paradigm, with its emphasis on ‘freeing 
itself from the shackles’ of earlier scholarship, from the predecessors’ institutionalised 
resistance to certain modes of scrutiny.  
Drawing from Foucault’s works, we may now expand our insight. In one of his 
interviews, Foucault comments on his early analyses and especially the theme of 
discontinuity: 
 
My problem was […] to pose the question, “How is it that at certain 
moments and in certain orders of knowledge, there are these sudden 
take-offs, these hastenings of evolution, these transformations which 
fail to correspond to the calm, continuist image that is normally 
accredited?” But the important thing here is not that such changes can 
be rapid and extensive, or rather it is that this extent and rapidity are 
only the sign of something else: a modification in the rules of 
formation of statements which are accepted as scientifically true. Thus 
it is not a change of content (refutation of old errors, recovery of old 
truths), nor is it a change of theoretical form (renewal of paradigm, 
modification of systematic ensembles): It is a question of what 
governs statements, and the way in which they govern each other so as 
to constitute a set of propositions which are scientifically acceptable, 
and hence capable of being verified or falsified by scientific 
procedures. In short, there is a problem of the regime, the politics of 
the scientific statement.134 
 
 
The differentiation paradigm, to a certain extent in a conscious manner, posits itself as a 
discontinuity, an abrupt “take-off,” but as we have seen, the differentiation process is 
not that sudden and free from being grounded in the previous critical discourses as it 
may seem. The new critical discourse on the Gothic begins pretty much in the midst of 
the old discourse of the primacy of the poetic mode and, even today, rests on the 
assumptions formed in the mould of the previous representation of literature, despite the 
fact that it represents itself as a rupture. It is a fact that the aim of the paradigm is to 
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differentiate itself – to cut itself from the previous approaches. However, the 
dependency of the contemporary scholarship on its predecessors, both in terms of the 
rhetoric of establishing one’s own status and the actual direction taken by the 
contemporary criticism, stressed by Fish, is obvious, both on the level of some of the 
critical tenets and the more general one of establishing the ‘worth’ of the Gothic. Hence, 
we could conclude that, in tune with Foucault’s proposition, the change in critical 
discourse, in spite of the rhetoric used by the very discourse, is not the question of a 
“theoretical form.” 
Furthermore, if we refer to Foucault’s statement quoted above, it becomes more 
visible that, in a curious way, the differentiation paradigm establishes itself as progress 
in spite of (or perhaps in tune of) the rhetoric of stressing discrepancies. It represents its 
way of ‘reading’ as liberated from institutionalized limitations which hamper progress 
(even if progress remains unnamed) in proving the Gothic to be a worthy and 
illuminating socio-cultural product. Moving away from the imposed and restrictive 
model is, in this sense, a critical progress towards a better form of analysis; at the level 
of the representation produced by the differentiation paradigm, it is a move towards “a 
change of content.” What may escape one’s notice, however, is the fact that the 
‘oppositional’ reading modes soon gain the status of the institution and the critics attain 
the demeanour similar to that of a clinical expert, entitled to exercise correction and 
prescribing the unblemished way of conduct. In this way, we are dealing both with 
concealed discontinuity – the progress is no progress but an adjustment to the new 
authoritative position, external to the critical discourse – and the continuity of power 
being exercised. “Extent and rapidity” turn out to be “the sign of something else,” a 
“modification” in the acceptable way of speaking and reading, triggered by external 
factors. Importantly, Foucault’s (genealogical) perspective, though in a way similar to 
that of Fish, allows us to push the analysis much further in the sense propagated by 
Culler, beyond the critical discourse itself, so that the question why the differentiation 
paradigm emerged and has operated successfully by representing the Gothic as it does 
in the socio-cultural context could be addressed effectively. 
There is another way in which Foucault’s complex remarks on levels of discontinuity 
(visible and unseen, represented and concealed) may beneficially bear on our 
considerations of Gothic criticism. His remarks allow us to approach from a given angle 
the strand of criticism devoted to researching the Gothic as a material enabling a 
reconstruction (a regaining) of the way in which the contemporary subject has been 
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shaped; as a way of discovering one’s own origin. We have already stressed that taking 
such a stance makes the Gothic meaningful with regard to contemporary culture and 
justifies the volume of critical attention. At the same time, however, if we look at such 
an approach to the Gothic, we can notice that its result is the obfuscation of a certain 
area of self-scrutiny.  
Let us return to Kilgour as our example yet again. It has already been mentioned that 
what may be sensed in her account of the contemporary Gothic criticism is the loss of 
the power of interpretation to unveil the ‘truth.’ What such a loss entails, is also, 
unavoidably, the loss of sense of ‘meaning’ inherent in the text and the loss of 
‘progress’ in the reading practices of the institution. What is, however, interesting in 
Kilgour is the fact that, although she seems to recognise “that not only is art a fraud, but 
life is, as reality is not real but a series of artificial Baconic idols,”135 she simultaneously 
sees interpretation as nevertheless a cure. Asserting the position of power and re-making 
the text in one’s own image (using it in Rorty’s understanding) is a possibility which 
she does not seem to welcome with much enthusiasm, as the value of Gothic for our 
own times seems to lie for her precisely in its “demonization of creation and 
authority.”136 She states that “[f]rom the beginning the gothic has suggested the limits of 
causality and modern systems for understanding relations, and offered itself as a form of 
‘cultural self-analysis,’” but immediately inverts its power by pinpointing it as “an 
ancestor for our current obsessive self-criticism and self-scrutiny of past and present 
motives,” an object of institutionalised “Protestant tradition of self-scrutiny [turned] into 
a larger psychoanalysis of cultural motives and impulses. [Of] reading […] as a way of 
gaining power and so breaking away from the past.”137 We could paraphrase this by 
saying that Kilgour sees Gothic criticism as a way of discovering the history of the 
postmodern subject, of carrying out a psychotherapeutic analysis of ‘what has brought 
me to the place I am right now and how can I cope with it.’  
At this point, Foucault’s thought proves illuminating as, according to him (and 
Nietzsche, whom he recapituales), history should be by no means seen as the discovery 
of the origin. Genealogy, as he states, “opposes itself to the search for ‘origins’”138; 
hence, the genealogist “refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to 
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history, he finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ behind things: not a 
timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their 
essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”139 The postmodern 
Gothic critic is highly suspicious of metaphysics, but still nourishes a hope that a text of 
the past might wield the key to understanding the present, and thus seems to seek an 
underlying continuity in spite of his or her contempt for the notion of progress (by 
seeing how my culture has abjected what it feared onto the Gothic in the process of 
structuring identity, I can see how I came into being). This, however, is a ruse, at least 
from the Foucauldian perspective.  
To state this is not to dismiss the possibility that the study of Gothic fiction could 
show how discourses have changed, shifted and substituted one another until the present 
day. In fact, this could possibly bring some interesting results. Rather, our aim is to 
point to the vast region of data that actually could grant one understanding but becomes 
obscured by turning to the past for answers. “[T]he origin,” states Foucault, “makes 
possible a field of knowledge whose function is to recover it, but always in a false 
recognition due to the excesses of its own speech. The origin lies at a place of inevitable 
loss, the point where the truth of things corresponded to a truthful discourse, the site of 
a fleeting articulation that discourse has obscured and finally lost.”140 As he views it, 
and this is a vital point, “[g]enealogy […] operates on a field of entangled and confused 
parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times”141 – 
and, practically, the Gothic critic interested in the texts from the past centuries does 
roughly the same. Searching for the key unlocking the present in the past, one turns a 
blind eye to the keys offered by the present itself. Or, to put it in different words, the 
origin that could be perhaps recovered in the Gothic text is the text’s own origin in the 
tangled discourses which gave it birth (as we have seen on the example of Monk), pretty 
much different from those which assign to the critic the task of searching for origins at 
the present moment. Seen from this perspective, the critic’s own discourse will 
inevitably impose itself on the field of knowledge that is to be recovered with “the 
excesses of its own speech,” turning the Gothic text it works on into a parchment that 
has been “scratched over and recopied many times.” This is, however, not just a matter 
of the status quo, things as they simply are, as reader-response or pragmatist criticism 
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might be seen to imply, but a matter of turning one’s attention away from the discourse 
in which one operates in such a way as to establish a functional origin. 
In “Nietzsche, History, Genealogy,” Foucault states after Nietzsche that “the pursuit 
of the origin […] is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest 
possibilities, and their carefully protected identities; [it] assumes the existence of 
immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession. This search 
is directed to ‘that which was already there.’”142 Our immediate task is to focus on the 
critical conceptions of the Gothic as constructed by theory, and it must be stressed that 
by viewing criticism in terms of discourse we also automatically view it as constructing 
its object in a given way, and not recovering something “which was already there.” 
Establishing the Gothic, or its conception, in terms of the object of discourse should 
prove of use to us, not because this could show that there is no such thing as the Gothic, 
but because it could make us alert to the ways in which discourses actually create (or 
recreate) their own objects for their own purposes. In fact, to state that the Gothic was 
‘born’ in discourse, does not appear to be a mistake. As it seems, what is nowadays 
taken to be Gothic literature has always been a mode of writing particularly sensitive to 
the variety of discourses prevalent in the politico-social context of the day. And the very 
fact that we are presently dealing with the very notion of Gothic fiction, non-existent 
before the twentieth century, is in itself meaningful. 
The notion of the object of discourse, as much as its attempted theory, is elaborated 
on in detail in The Archaeology of Knowledge, a book which might be seen as, to a 
certain extent, representing a failed project. Nonetheless, as was already stated above, it 
still allowed Foucault to grasp valuable notions, and, approached from a certain 
perspective, proves of immense use to our considerations. In the first place, as Warwick 
notices, what is problematic about Gothic criticism is the fact that critics sometimes do 
strive to establish some sort of truth inherent in the object of their study, as if there was 
something ingeniously ‘Gothic’ in Gothic literature that could be teased out. Foucault, 
in turn, draws our attention to the fact that the object under scrutiny in itself is not a 
coherent whole against which statements on its nature can be checked, but rather 
emerges through these statements:  
 
the unity of the object ‘madness’ does not enable one to individualize 
a group of statements, and to establish between them a relation that is 
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both constant and describable. There are two reasons for this. It would 
certainly be a mistake to try to discover what could have been said of 
madness at a particular time by interrogating the being of madness 
itself, its secret content, its silent, self-enclosed truth; mental illness 
was constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, 
divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its developments, 
indicated its various correlations, judged it, and possibly gave it 
speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to be taken as 
its own. Moreover, this group of statements is far from referring to a 
single object, formed once and for all, and to preserving it indefinitely 
as its horizon of inexhaustible ideality; the object presented as their 
correlative by medical statements of the seventeenth or eighteenth 
century is not identical with the object that emerges in legal sentences 
or police action; similarly, all the objects of psychopathological 
discourses were modified from Pinel or Esquirol to Bleuler: it is not 
the same illnesses that are at issue in each of these cases; we are not 
dealing with the same madmen.143 
 
 
Foucault’s major concern here is the matter of classification of statements as belonging 
to one group, or discourse. Without engaging in a detailed consideration of his 
assumptions, however, we can still see that, according to him, it is discourse that 
produces its object – the abstract concept of madness, in this case. What enables the 
unity of a discourse, according to Foucault, “would be the interplay of the rules that 
make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time: objects that are 
shaped by measures of discrimination and repression, objects that are differentiated in 
daily practice, in law, in religious casuistry, in medical diagnosis [etc].”144 Again 
without delving into the character of these rules at great length, what proves useful to us 
is the fact that the perceived ‘nature’ of objects lies outside of them, and in fact, as 
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occupying a place “at the limit of discourse,” “[determining] the group of relations that discourse must 
establish in order to speak of this or that object,” and “[characterizing] not the language (langue) used by 
discourse, nor the circumstances in which it is deployed, but discourse itself as a practice”: “a group of 
rules that are immanent in a practice, and define it in its specificity” (pp. 51-52). Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
though asserting this strand of Foucault’s thought to be “one of the most important but least discussed 
claims in the Archaeology,” notice the difficulties posed by it as well as Foucault’s diminishment of the 
role of “nondiscursive” factors, presented in fact as in a way ‘subordinate’ to discursive relations. 
According to them, “only when Foucault gives up his semi-structuralist claim that discourse has some 
sort of priority which enables it to ‘use’ nondiscursive relations can he discover the legitimate domain of 
the functioning of discursive practices, and give an account of the unique way discourse is both dependent 
upon and yet feeds back and influences the nondiscursive practices it ‘serves.’” Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
Michel Foucault, pp. 63-64, 67. 
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Foucault’s later studies will manifest, outside of a given discourse on them as such. In 
The Archaeology of Knowledge, he states: 
 
The conditions necessary for the appearance of an object of discourse, 
the historical conditions required if one is to ‘say anything’ about it, 
and if several people are to say different things about it, the conditions 
necessary if it is to exist in relation to other objects, if it is to establish 
with them relations of resemblance, proximity, distance, difference, 
transformation […] are many and imposing. Which means that one 
cannot speak of anything at any time; […] the object does not await in 
limbo the order that will free it and enable it to become embodied in a 
visible and prolix objectivity; it does not pre-exist itself, held back by 
some obstacle at the first edges of light. It exists under the positive 
conditions of a complex group of relations.145 
 
 
These relations, according to him, “are established between institutions, economic and 
social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of 
classification, modes of characterization” and, above, all, thus prove to be external to 
the object itself: “They do not define its internal constitution, but what enables it to 
appear, to juxtapose itself with other objects, to situate itself in relation to them, to 
define its difference, its irreducibility, and even perhaps its heterogeneity, in short, to be 
placed in a field of exteriority.”146 The object of study, then, emerges as a construct. 
Furthermore, as Foucault makes clear, neither it, nor its domain is constant.147 This is 
very useful to us since, if we are to trace the ways in which criticism re-shapes and re-
presents what it calls the Gothic via theory, simultaneously constructing it, we need, in a 
Foucauldian-like fashion, to put aside the notion that there is some sort of ‘Gothic 
meaning,’ which manifests itself in a given body of texts, to be discovered, and 
“dispense with ‘things.’”148 Otherwise, we might get caught in yet another version of 
Gothic definition and only reorganize the field in accordance to it. 
From these considerations there emerges a general method applied in this work to the 
scrutiny of the contemporary theory-based conceptions of Gothic literature. The aim of 
the following analysis is to show how these conceptions are structured in ways 
functional from the point of view of the applied methodological tools, themselves 
reminiscent of certain discourses, and how, as a result, they re-structure the original 
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discursive object which is the Gothic. What such an analysis demands is a rediscovery 
of a set of (broken) connections between the contemporary and the past (historical) 
conceptions of Gothic texts, and the vantage point is the contemporary assumptions of 
the aforementioned the Gothic’s indefinability, marginality and subversion, which seem 
central to the conception structured collectively by different areas of the differentiation 
paradigm. As a result, we shall be dealing with two sets of discourses: those which 
shape the critical conceptions of Gothic literature nowadays, and those which could 
have shaped the production and reception of certain texts, later singled out from the 
body of eighteenth and nineteenth-century fictions as belonging to one genre, or mode.  
With such a methodology adopted, what appears necessary is a recourse to works 
covering the original discursive influences in Gothic fiction. As a result, all sorts of 
new-historical critical studies of the Gothic should prove most useful. However, we also 
need to address on equal terms the available historical studies on literary criticism, and 
especially its shape in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. That is because many 
of the contemporary major critical texts refer to the critics of those times – as they do to 
authors – in order to support their stances. Such a ‘reading’ of the present-day 
conceptions of the Gothic, against the standpoint from which they are uttered and the 
discourses of the past, may prove a useful method of pinpointing ‘the moments of 
rupture,’ or of distortions and shifts, at which the theory-based methodology re-creates 
the original text while passing over the connections which might not account for the 
interpretation it produces, but rather point to a different one. Occasionally, especially 
during the analysis of the contemporary status of Gothic definition, we may also find it 
necessary to evoke the discarded early Gothic criticism of the previous century, 
especially in its historical form. In a way, thus, our analysis is meant to constitute a kind 
of genealogical scrutiny. 
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Chapter IV 
Foucault: The Monster(s) and the Critics 
 
The major thesis set out for this dissertation is that theory applied to the reading of 
the Gothic text has often exerted a considerable impact on the results of the reading, 
thereby projecting certain pre-established assumptions on conclusions. This situation is 
to bear upon the contemporary conceptions of Gothic fiction, which appear to be based 
on the shared assumptions of certain typically Gothic features (though no longer ‘the 
Gothic repertoire’). The major of those assumptions is the mode’s inherent predilection 
for subversion of norms. We are going to have a look at two ways in which this 
perceived subversion is often seen to manifest itself: the critical confusion regarding the 
definition of the Gothic, and the mode’s marginalisation. In the previous chapters we 
undertook, first, a brief sketch of the paradigm which, to some extent, seems to govern 
the positions taken by the contemporary Gothic criticism (a sketch of a history), and a 
delineation of some counter-responses (counter-histories) which entice us to delve into 
the subject of the contemporary conceptions of the Gothic. Then, we presented our 
methodology. This chapter, in turn, has a slightly different function. In a way, it might 
appear to be digressive with regard to what preceded it, but it also appears to be 
indispensable if the analysis we are approaching is to be seen as feasible, and its tool as 
indeed useful. 
Michel Foucault’s thought represents by no means a prime point of reference when it 
comes to Gothic studies. Still, it has not been an infrequent practice of Gothic criticism 
so far to use Foucault for the purpose of analysing the Gothic text, or various levels of 
its functioning in culture. This is a fact even if we agree that, for several years, French 
post-structuralism has been avoided by the critics as if it were a Gothic monster itself.1 
Monstrous or not (and of course monstrosity could probably be accounted for as a 
reason by itself), Foucault has been found relevant to Gothic studies – and, as the 
critical material proves, in several ways. We shall account for some of those in this 
chapter. 
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What is more, we also need to consider that Foucault’s name is in itself a staple of 
cultural theory in the sense we use it here. As a result, it seems impossible to accept it 
without hesitation, just as it is impossible to accept without hesitation the assumption 
that history is a simple alternative to theory. Since Foucault has not been avoided at any 
cost by Gothic criticism, it appears worthwhile to distinguish between the way his 
remarks on discourse, repressive hypothesis, genealogy and the like are employed in 
this dissertation, and the ways in which his thought has been used by the very criticism 
we are scrutinising. 
 
4.1. At the Gothic-Theory Confluence: Reversing Relations 
 
What Gothic critics find compelling in Foucault is not only his analysis of sexuality, 
though of course the introductory volume to The History of Sexuality finds its place in 
the range of applicable theoretical resources. Foucault’s thought appears to prove itself 
especially useful to the critics for the reason that he theorises the very moment in the 
history of Western society at which Gothic fiction is born, and this seems to allow for 
contextualising as much as conceptualising the mode. In both cases, the mode emerges 
as partaking in and reflecting the significant changes that took place at the dusk of 
aristocratic world and the dawn of the bourgeoisie, industrialisation and modernity 
itself. In this chapter, we shall examine chosen cases of critical applications of Foucault, 
not in the least to show that Foucault can ‘unlock’ the Gothic, but to confirm what has 
already been said at the beginning of this chapter and in the previous ones, namely, that 
the discourse in which the critic operates exerts a significant influence on what it makes 
its object. 
This is one thing. Another thing refers to what seems to be an issue in Gothic studies. 
The considerations which follow were not initially meant to constitute a lengthy and 
significant portion of the argument – rather, they were envisioned as a brief and 
somewhat symbolic overview of some ways in which Foucault and his various writings 
have been applied to the critical readings of Gothic fiction. But, all in all, they testified 
to something striking (though perhaps trivial if one thinks about it), namely the fact that 
it is not only theory that bears upon a conception, but it also can be a conception (well-
established and raised to the prominence of theory itself) that bears upon a theory, in 
which case the tool and the product strangely shift their positions.  
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Something alike has already been noticed by criticism. For example, in A Companion 
to the Gothic, David Punter remarks that “in the 1990s in particular, we have found 
ourselves at a peculiar confluence between the major motifs of the Gothic and a set of 
ways of thinking increasingly current in contemporary criticism and theory,”2 and 
moves on to enumerate where parallels can be found: in the use of phantoms and crypts, 
spectres and the uncanny, above all, by Derrida and psychoanalysis. Both Derrida’s 
poststructuralism and psychoanalysis might seem to us the staple-marks of two vast 
areas, theory and psychology, which played (as the differentiation paradigm holds) their 
great role in the process of uplifting the mode form the state of debasement. As Punter 
notices, at present, the very same theoretical tools “give us a potentially powerful grasp 
of new ways of understanding the Gothic,” while they simultaneously prove to be 
“increasingly haunted”3 – just like the Gothic, we might be expected to add – by their 
understanding of knowledge, theory and practice, and history as not safe and obvious 
notions but constructs of complicated and unstable nature.4 He limits his conclusions, 
however, to advising caution when it comes to judging the phenomenon’s implications, 
so that the critics do not fall into the trap of losing critical distance.5  
Indeed, there clearly seems to be a confluence between the Gothic and theory today. 
However, we could ask ourselves the question about the extent to which it actually takes 
place. A direct exchange of themes, or ‘ghosts,’ between the Gothic and theory appears 
debatable. Similarly, it does not appear correct to state that theory gives voice to 
something that was already present in the Gothic, but could not be stated explicitly by it. 
Both theory and the Gothic are historical ‘entities,’ both acquire their specific meanings 
in context. Perhaps, as it is the case of psychoanalysis, particular theories and the Gothic 
may share common roots. However, from the perspective which has already been 
adopted here, we could hardly look at them as haunted by the same ghost. 
Psychoanalysis has been already tackled in the course of the chapter I and we could see 
that historicist-oriented critics would rather take a stance that the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and the Gothic is a complex and, indeed, historical one, which makes it 
impossible to ‘translate’ one strictly into the terms and notions of the other.  
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Similarly, the relationship between the Gothic and Derrida is not a straightforward 
one. In her article “Feeling Gothicky?” Alexandra Warwick hints at the merging of the 
Gothic with the method applied to its study, but she does so in a way which may be seen 
as illuminating with regard to Punter for she goes one step further. Namely, she points 
out that, nowadays, “Gothic becomes deconstruction” through critical misconception 
and misuse of Derrida’s Spectres of Marx.6 What she has in mind is a situation in which 
the Gothic itself is used as a tool for deconstructing. To illustrate her point, Warwick 
evokes the example of Julian Wolfrey, who would view Victorian fiction as haunted by 
the Gothic. Here, Victorian texts are read by the Gothic critic, in the quasi-Derridean 
fashion, as containing ‘Gothic’ traces that undermine their governing logic. At the same 
time, the overall analysis heads towards showing that these texts are therefore Gothic in 
themselves, which is against deconstruction’s logic, and, in general, turn out to be a 
paradox. If the Gothic is the dominant logic, then it represents what should be in doubt. 
According to Warwick, somewhat strikingly, the critic wishing to follow Derrida in this 
way simply takes the presence of traces as such, spectres of meaning, to be suggestive 
of the Gothic, which makes the Gothic worthless both as a tool for deconstruction and 
as a field of study. Approached from such a perspective, all traces are Gothic and all 
texts are Gothic, and hence the Gothic is dominant, ubiquitous and can be anything.7 As 
she puts it, found and announced potentially everywhere, “Gothic is being used to 
explain itself.”8  
Curiously enough, a similar conclusion might be seen as potentially applicable to 
Punter’s statement that the Gothic and contemporary theory seem to come at a 
confluence. First, perhaps we ought to remark that Punter may be seen as verging on 
inviting the same sort of misconception of Spectres of Marx as the critical movement 
discussed by Warwick at the point when he states that Derrida uses the same rhetoric of 
evoking spectres as the Gothic.9 Both the Gothic and Derrida may be using the same 
rhetoric – but then, if we are not to lose our critical distance, we cannot take the 
implications of this confluence too far. If we choose to see theory as paralleling, or even 
‘the same as,’ the Gothic, on many planes, thereby levelling confluence with conflation, 
we cannot use it as a tool anymore. Then, the Gothic would clearly be used to explain 
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itself: there would seem to be little sense in pointing to “peculiar” similarities between 
the two except as a warning, unless we want to cross the line and see the Gothic as 
simply ‘inexplicable’ by means of theory, or, turning tables, itself having an explanatory 
force with regard to it. Or to our culture, which came up with it. And while Punter 
issues his warning, he seems to substantiate it with yet more uncertainties, and poses yet 
more questions, which complies with the unstable picture of the mode, instead of 
clarifying. 
Punter, to an extent, codifies the Gothic as a mode which demonstrates to us the 
instability of history.10 Such a codification rings a bell, for it is much in tune with 
Kilgour’s assumption that the Gothic shows us the artifice of reality – and much before 
the rise of postructuralist and postmodernist thought. However, if that is the case, what 
is actually meant to be illuminating with regard to what? If we do not state explicitly 
that both the Gothic and theory signal, though in different ways, a change, but this 
change is in each case historical and peculiar to its own times, logically – or 
chronologically – it should seem that the Gothic is illuminating with regard to theory. 
This, however, is a very strange conclusion, and a highly suspicious one, for it does 
actually make the Gothic the basis on which the contemporary Western culture rests, 
and in a totalising way. As a result, we end up in a Gothic world without an alternative. 
And this is a dead end, even if some would be perfectly happy with such a resolution.  
However, if we introduce Foucault’s notion of discourse into these considerations, 
we are capable of showing that such a codification of the Gothic indeed organises our 
reality around a simple ruse. This ruse is an achronological, ahistorical perception of the 
phenomena we are tackling. It seems perfectly justified to state that the Gothic “consists 
of a series of texts which are always dependent on other texts, texts which they are not, 
texts which are ceaselessly invoked while no less ceaselessly misread, models of 
méconnaissance in the form of lost manuscripts, of misheard messages in cyberspace, in 
the attempt to validate that which cannot be validated, the self-sufficiency, the 
autonomy of a textuality that is already ruined beyond repair.”11 But this does not mean 
that the Gothic is a kind of supressed pre-theory which speaks of mutability in a pre-
postructuralist or pre-postmodern way. It is a phenomenon which demonstrates certain 
facts about how texts are created. Still, it operates under discourses which trigger it and 
give it its often distorted, irregular and illogical shape. Contemporary theory may try to 
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account for such phenomena, but the phenomena themselves are silent about the theory 
– they speak only of the discourses which used to own them. The Gothic is often a 
gratifying object for postrstucturalist and postmodern thinking (and as we know both 
Derrida and Foucault discuss Gothic texts) but it is not on a par with them. Just as 
Derridean spectres are not on a par with those of Gothic literature, for the simple reason 
that Gothic literature does not have a monopoly on ghosts.  
One assumption of this work which perhaps has not been voiced forcefully enough in 
the previous chapter is that Gothic criticism is in itself a discourse. We have elaborated 
on Foucault’s perception of the notion and pointed to the ways in which the 
differentiation paradigm acts out the procedures of the rarefaction of discourse. 
However, what may still appear somewhat confusing is the fact that we simultaneously 
speak of different discourses which manifest themselves in the critical practices within 
the differentiation paradigm, psychoanalysis, Marxism, feminism, gender, etc, even 
pointing to how they account for differences within the paradigmantic history of 
differentiation. The presence and operation of these discourses do not seem to raise 
doubts; but if this is the case, how can we still perceive the differentiation paradigm as a 
discourse in itself? 
In fact, it does not appear quite impossible. We may, for example, consider 
Foucault’s stance that “[d]iscourses must be treated as discontinuous practices, which 
cross each other, are sometimes juxtaposed with one another, but can just as well 
exclude or be unaware of each other.”12 There is, as he puts it, no “great unsaid” or 
“unthought” that would underlie all of them,13 but still they can come together and 
depart, and form different orders. Taking into consideration the fact that theory’s 
general focus is to question, which was mentioned in the previous chapter, it does not 
seem to run counter to Foucault’s assumptions that different theories, once applied, may 
delimit a space which will constitute a discursive formation in itself. What we have 
already mentioned above, namely the fact that it may be observed how the object 
formed in discourse renegotiates theory which was once used to structure this object, is 
indicative of precisely this: the discursive status of the contemporary Gothic criticism as 
such. 
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For the purpose of demonstrating the above-said we may now turn to the 
consideration of particular texts. We shall begin with addressing an example of the 
ways in which Foucault is addressed by the critics. Next, we shall move on to showing 
how the discourse of Gothic criticism itself seems to attempt at objectifying the theory it 
adopts. Foucault is referred to openly by various critics at various stages of their 
research and for various purposes, from Rosemary Jackson to Diane Long Hoeveler and 
beyond, but one particularly interesting case from the perspective of this work is the 
aforementioned book by Robert Miles, Gothic Writing, 1750-1820: A Genealogy. We 
shall review its assumptions in order to position our own study with regard to other 
studies of the Gothic relying on Foucault. When it comes to scrutinising the ways in 
which the discourse of criticism ‘invades’ the boundaries of theory, we will make use of 
the essay by Fred Botting published in Punter’s A Companion to the Gothic, “In Gothic 
Darkly: Heterotopia, History, Culture.” The point of passage from one strand of the 
argument to the other will be a discussion of a somewhat ‘unfulfilled’ contextualisation 
of Gothic fiction with the use of Foucault in Fred Botting and Dave Townshend’s 
introduction to the second volume of Critical Concepts series’ Gothic, which results in 
establishing a particular conception of both the mode and the modern. 
 
4.2. “Crossed by Discourse”: Robert Miles, Gothic Writing and Genealogy 
 
Robert Miles’ Gothic Writing was already briefly introduced in Chapter II for the 
sake of its overall argument, with some attention being paid to the fact that the book 
aimed at taking up some paths opened up by Punter’s seminal study. Embarked on in 
1980s, first published in 1994 and then republished in 2002, the work, if we situate it in 
its proper place within the chronology of approaches to the Gothic, proves to be a 
significant one, especially due to the perspective it adopts on the earlier theory-based 
studies, and the manner in which it attempts to ‘push’ their reasoning further, beyond 
the limits imposed by theory. In a sense, it is illuminating with regard to its own 
moment in the history of Gothic criticism, as much as Punter’s seminal study is 
illuminating with regard to the turn of the 1970s and 1980s. The fact that Miles 
responds to Punter’s suggestions, but already in the 1990s stresses the danger of what 
we could perhaps see as overestimating theory, is obviously crucial. There are other 
studies that use Foucault’s ideas in a systematic way, like Hoeveler’s Gothic Feminism 
(1998), which to some extent utilises Foucault in a similar way to Miles, but Gothic 
  140
Writing seems to be the first one that would employ them on such a scale, engaging in a 
genealogy of both discourses and texts. What needs to be stressed is the fact that 
Foucault’s thought becomes the foundation for the analysis here, and not only for 
contextualising the Gothic. This focus on Foucauldian analysis is what primarily makes 
the work similar to our own study. However, what also must be emphasised is the fact 
that while Gothic Writing proves in many ways immensely useful to us, it also seems to 
incorporate a dialectic, or perhaps a rhetoric, inviting assumptions from which we wish 
to distance ourselves. 
What triggers Miles’ work is his observation that both Punter’s The Literature of 
Terror and his 1987 review of Elisabeth Napier’s The Failure of Gothic advance an 
indirect, tentative claim that the Gothic speaks of a gap in the subject.14 Miles attempts 
at “teasing it out,”15 but although he clearly stresses that the findings of the critics who 
preceded him are valuable and allow for an advance in Gothic studies, he is not fully 
content with the theoretical approaches they rely on. As he notices, though the 
contemporary studies cut themselves off from the simplicity of early psychoanalytical 
and Marxist readings, testifying, either purposefully or by virtue of their own versatility, 
to the versatility and complexity of Gothic dialectics (to the fact that Gothic writing is 
not a uniform genre which has some sort of deep structure to be discovered) theory, 
when applied to the Gothic, may still reach a dead end by dehistoricising its object of 
study.16 According to Miles, theories are sensitive to gaps in the subject for they are 
founded on such gaps – but what they consequently recognise in the material they are 
applied to is their own reflection. What he finds to be a remedy is taking a “literary-
historical” route that would be “theoretically sensitive,”17 and that is why he turns to 
Foucault. 
Foucauldian genealogy has a number of advantages, which are of a twofold nature. 
To quote Miles, “it provides theoretical accommodation for the diverse discourses […] 
to be found within a literary complex such as the Gothic; and […] it [divests] itself of 
both the evolutionary and the causal assumptions of conventional histories.”18 But apart 
from that, Foucault proves relevant also because he speaks of what is very close to 
Gothic criticism. Miles notices that Punter reads the late eighteenth century as 
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historically important due to the fact that it witnesses the modern subject in the process 
of its formation, thus echoing “the traditional view of Romanticism as an 
epiphenomenon of the modern”19 (which should not surprise us). He also notices that 
Foucault offers a similar periodization of the times as those in which “a series of 
archival ruptures constitutes the modern,”20 and is to be seen as all the more relevant 
since the tide of criticism after Punter feeds off the potential opened by such a historical 
paradigm.21 Thus, Foucault is found to be relevant to the contextualising – or rather 
historicising – of the Gothic.  
This is carried out on two planes. In the first place, Miles approaches the Gothic 
material with the help of Madness and Civilization, backing it up with Tzvetan 
Todorov’s The Fantastic. Especially, he pays attention to the themes of madness and 
Gothic forms as gradually emptied of their original meaning, of the birth of history as a 
straight, meaningless line, and of nostalgia for the past. Seen in this light, the rise of the 
Gothic in the late eighteenth century is enabled by the growing detachment of the word 
from the thing which it is meant to signify.22 The Gothic discourse, connected with 
Gothic revival and indeed reviving Gothic iconography as already deprived of the 
original, feudal signification, is here presented as re-creating the past for the sake of the 
present, and in ways which disclose its contemporaneous interests. Miles moves on to 
pinpointing these interests with the use of volume one of The History of Sexuality and 
Lawrence Stone’s The Family, Sex and Marriage, and does so through the application 
of Foucault’s notions of the deployment of alliance and sexuality in order to historicize 
the Gothic’s obsession with feudal fathers and disobedient offspring.  
Obviously enough, Miles introduces Foucault’s theory as a way of avoiding the 
pitfalls of dehistoricizing. According to him, the Gothic is a mode which “constitutes 
significant textual evidence for the writing of the history of the subject,”23 and finds 
itself involved in the process, but at the same time does not represent a unified stance or 
smooth line of development but rather “a mode of debate,” in which “Gothic texts 
revise one another, here opening up ideologically charged issues, there enforcing a 
closure.”24 As a result, he views Foucault’s genealogy as an immensely useful, non-
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teleological, “theoretically sensitive model of literary history,”25 and for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it emphasises the intertextual quality of the Gothic, contrary to theories 
which tend to pass over it.26 Next, though not less importantly, it also directs our 
attention to the complex status of the Gothic as a writing, crossing genres, and an 
aesthetic, pre-existing and co-existing with the writing, not always without a tension.27 
And finally, above all, genealogy also enables one to see the dialogue between Gothic 
texts as “energized by the power implicit in discourse.”28 As Miles states, his task is to 
look at how Gothic writing discloses inflections towards contemporary discourses, these 
being “axiomatically historical” in the sense that they mirror “the vicissitudes, not of 
events, but of discourse, discourse moreover occurring in the highly mediated form of 
literary expression.”29 Such a formulation of objectives is almost identical with the one 
we have assumed in the previous chapter.  
Last but not least, Foucault is also found immensely useful for the reason that his 
theory is centred on the subject. What proves especially valuable to Miles in this regard 
is the conception of the subject as “a radical cultural entity,”30 immersed in history and 
always represented from the perspective of discourse. What is more, while Foucault’s 
theory is not organised around a particular gap in the subject, it adopts a non-
evolutionary model of history in which looking at shifts and changes is inevitable. 
Therefore, it remains sensitive to ‘gaps’ (and Miles recognises that ‘gap’ is no longer a 
useful word in its usual meaning for, within Foucault’s theory, there is no self as a unity 
that could experience a gap, or a fracture, but only shifts and changes of the self as a 
“site of conflict”) without imposing on them a particular, well-specified understanding, 
which allows one to situate the Gothic in a historical context instead of automatically 
projecting on it the conclusions to be reached.31 Perhaps it is also worth mentioning at 
this point that The History of Sexuality proves especially useful when it comes to 
theorising the gap in the self, since, as Miles assumes, the now problematic areas 
constituted as a result of the emergence and proliferation of the discourses on sex – 
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modesty, mania, reverie, hysteria – “form discursive presences within the Gothic; they 
at once implicate ‘sexuality’ and instabilities within the self.”32 
Gothic Writing traces a number of competing discourses encountered in the Gothic, 
the basic two being that of the Gothic aesthetic and the hygienic self, both utilised 
variously in Gothic writing. Not surprisingly, these turn out to “have as their foci issues 
of national origin, the sublime, genius, vision, reverie, a congeries tied together by a 
pedagogic concern for the self and its integrity,”33 all of which Miles recognises as the 
sites where power and knowledge intersect. He does, however, also point to a difficulty 
connected with identifying the discursive when it comes to literature, one which in a 
way also touches the sphere of our own analysis.  
This difficulty lies in the character of literature as such. As Miles himself states in 
the preface to the second edition of the book, his work is “discourse-centred,” which 
makes it at the same time unique and odd.34 Both its uniqueness and oddness in fact 
refer to what is a problem stemming from the question of whether imaginative literature 
can be seen as discursive. On the one hand, it seems it can, at least in a way, for it may 
employ discursive models employed widely elsewhere in culture, and these can be 
received by the reader in an act of reading which, for instance if it were that of a 
nineteenth-century woman reading a treatise on hysteria, would be clearly discursive.35 
Still, in the case of literature, it is difficult to determine “the flow of power” inherent in 
a discursive act.36 Miles acknowledges that his work struggles with this problem, 
pointing to possible discursive inflections but at the same time being careful about the 
way they are realised in the literary text, and concludes that, all in all, “[t]he final 
version of Gothic writing that emerged from the book was that it was a multigeneric 
occasion whereby the discursive construction of the human subject was imaginatively 
disassembled, re-assembled, and generally re-figured.”37  
There is a perceptible difference between Gothic Writing and our study as far as this 
issue is concerned. Miles is, obviously, interested in the flow of power connected with 
the discourses utilised by the Gothic text. So are we – but to a different extent. We can 
see from the above quotation that Miles focuses on charting how Gothic writing utilises 
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contemporaneous discourses, either incorporating power relations they serve or 
reversing them. Our task is also to point to various discourses in which Gothic fiction 
finds itself involved, but our aim is not that much a given genealogy of the Gothic as the 
recovering of what theory has swept out of sight, doing precisely what Miles wished to 
avoid – dehistoricizing the mode. Works such as Gothic Writing will be of great use to 
us, but our task is not primarily to undertake a similar sorting out of power/knowledge 
relations – though this should prove useful as well, especially that we are going to talk 
about the perceived subversion of the Gothic. What we wish to tackle in the first place 
is how the theoretical re-construction of the Gothic may be seen as a dehistoricizing act 
of rewriting, functional within the differentiation paradigm and serving the interests of 
the modern critic. But then, since we also assume that the Gothic text is “crossed with 
discourse” – a phrase that Miles’ uses as referring to a situation in which “a textual 
segment partakes both of the purely discursive, and the discursive within the frame of 
fiction”38 – our study will also partake in the problem of viewing literature as 
discursive. Nonetheless, for our own aims, what is of major importance is that, 
undeniably, literature hosts discursive presences, no matter how it charts them, and 
these cannot be obliterated if we are to understand it. 
The same is repeated by Miles, alongside a number of other useful observations. But 
it may also be noticed that the way he speaks of his own method and the way he wishes 
to utilise it sometimes verges on inviting the differentiation paradigm – or, to put it 
differently, sometimes seemingly finds itself at a confluence with it. We could begin 
with what may puzzle us as we are reading the introduction to Gothic Writing, being 
already familiar with Foucault’s theory of discourse, and especially his understanding of 
traditional history and his method of analysis, genealogy. Miles’ own understanding of 
the notion is, as can be deduced from a number of citations, based on “Nietzsche, 
History, Genealogy,” and then also The History of Sexuality. However, while Foucault, 
similarly to Nietzsche, insists there is no progress and evolution, no history in the 
word’s traditional sense, Miles perceives Gothic writing as illustrating Foucauldian 
geneaology, but Gothic aesthetic as incorporating the ‘conventional’ one, in which 
evolution – tracing back the origin of national values – becomes emphasised.39 At the 
first sight, the idea that Gothic writing ‘illustrates’ Foucault’s method of detecting 
cultural rifts and erased fragments of ‘texts,’ or aesthetic ‘incorporates’ traditional 
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history must inescapably come as striking, and it takes reading on, into the following 
chapters, to sort this seemingly bizarre assumption out. As Miles explains, he views the 
analysis of Gothic aesthetic as one in which “the critic’s concern becomes, not the 
chasing down of a cultural provenance of a form, but an account of what made an 
excellence possible.”40 This he views, perhaps unnecessarily, as a methodological 
contradiction, but instead of resolving it, he “[intends] to use it as a constructive tension, 
one that highlights, in another form, […] to what extent […] the complex and riven self 
of Gothic writing [bears] witness to historical forces outside of the form, and to what 
extent [it is] self-created.”41 And then, he moves on to elaborating on the ways in which 
the Gothic as such represents discourse. 
Miles’ resolution to retain the contrast between two genealogies, in its own way, 
makes perfect sense, especially if we consider the fact that he indeed views the Gothic 
aesthetic as a discourse in its own right. Discourses do give the histories they produce 
the shape of evolutionary, teleological stories of progress, and the ‘traditional’ 
genealogy of discourse should enable one to highlight how Gothic writing utilises it in 
its own, versatile way. But we need to be careful before we embrace the assumption that 
the Gothic in general can be viewed as a discursive formation. 
This, especially from the perspective taken by this study, would be, in the best case, 
troublesome. What indeed re-emerges here is the question of literature as a discursive 
phenomenon, but not that much with regard to how it charts the flow of power (e.g. in 
accordance with the external discourse or not), but rather whether we can actually 
perceive a literary mode such as the Gothic as a discourse in its own right. We could 
consult Foucault with regard to this crux. In the course of “What Is an Author?” 
Foucault gives a partial answer to this question, even though it is not Gothic writing that 
he wishes to examine above all. According to him, Ann Radcliffe is a founder of a 
certain type of novel, but is not a ‘mother’ to a discourse. He states: 
 
Ann Radcliffe’s texts opened the way for a certain number of 
resemblances and analogies which have their model or principle in her 
work. The latter contains characteristic signs, figures, relationships, 
and structures which could be reused by others. In other words, to say 
that Ann Radcliffe founded the Gothic horror novel means that in the 
nineteenth-century Gothic novel one will find, as in Ann Radcliffe’s 
works, the theme of the heroine caught in the trap of her own 
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innocence, the hidden castle, the character of the black, cursed hero 
devoted to making the world expiate the evil done to him, and all the 
rest of it.42 
 
 
What distinguishes the founders of discursivity, such as Freud or Marx, from literary 
authors is, in turn, the fact that they give birth to a formation which provides an 
opportunity for, and limitations to, differences as much as similarities. By the same 
token, neither is Walpole a ‘father’; he may have spawned a certain type, or mode, of 
representation, or commentary on reality, but as soon as Clara Reeve reworks it for her 
own purposes, we can see the two oeuvres do not ‘utter’ a common discourse, nor do 
they represent it – they rather seem to be ‘responsive’ to different external (discursive) 
stimuli. Or rather, they may respond to similar stimuli, but utilise them in their own, 
discrete ways. 
What is at stake here is Miles’ own conception of the Gothic as comprising two 
distinctive but related notions, the Gothic aesthetic and Gothic writing. For Miles, the 
previous influences and exists simultaneously with the latter. As such, it predates 
Gothic writing, emerging at the time of the Age of Sensibility, and is to large extent 
brought about by antiquarianism and the emphasis it put on the idealisation of Gothic 
times as the origin of Englishness.43 If we look at it in this way, we may imagine the 
reason for Miles’ speaking of a ‘conventional’ genealogy that it incorporates. Foucault 
clearly dismisses evolution, but the Gothic aesthetic is a discourse which rests on 
nostalgia for the irretrievable past and the original national spirit; which “reveals its 
discursivity through its claims to know the past, thus urging the normative values of its 
ideals while insisting on the imperative of disowning the accompanying 
umbrageousness.”44 From Miles’ perspective, the Gothic aesthetic is not that much an 
aesthetic sensu stricto as it is an ideological concept, and, as such, a discursive site: “As 
a reinvention of Englishness, the Gothic aesthetic assumes the status of a discourse, a 
site of power/knowledge revealing, not an evolution of maturing aesthetic views, but the 
‘hazardous play of dominations.’”45 Unsurprisingly, this very same discourse may be 
used to serve power as much as to oppose it, and this fundamentally Foucauldian 
assumption becomes the basis for drawing a link between the Gothic aesthetic and 
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Gothic writing, which feeds off the aesthetic. According to Miles, “in its pedagogic and 
prescriptive aspects the Gothic aesthetic offers the representation of an idealized, 
culturally compromised, self, exaggerated and repudiated, explored and denied, by 
Gothic writing.”46 As a result, it is not only the Gothic aesthetic that turns out to be 
discursive; “Gothic writing is a discourse in the sense of a language ranging over,”47 
which departs from the basis provided by the Gothic aesthetic. Hence, it can be seen as 
an “occasion” for re-figuring of the discursive construction of the self. Hence, also, the 
reason for stressing the tension between the aesthetic and the writing in terms of 
genealogy they ‘embody.’ If the Gothic aesthetic ideologically prescribes a given 
version of the self, Gothic writing re-works it, and thus may self-create what does not 
necessarily find reflection in the discourse external to the text. In a given metaphorical 
sense, aesthetic could be thus seen as utilising traditional history, whereas writing – as 
representing genealogy for it tears a representation apart to create it anew. 
Thus Miles ascribes to the Gothic an additional dimension of discursivity. There is, 
however, as we have already mentioned, a problem which stems from such a 
conceptualisation. The argument that the Gothic aesthetic bears a mark of discourse 
appears to be sound enough, and particularly useful for our own purposes. But the same 
assumption made with regard to Gothic writing poses a problem, even if we bear in 
mind Miles’ understanding of its discursivity. This problem manifests itself particularly 
well if we consider such statements as: “[w]here the novel opposes social registers with 
ideological inflections, Gothic writing opposes discursive practices,”48 or Gothic writing 
is “a code for the representation, and the working out, of anxieties regarding the self’s 
nature.”49 Whereas Miles insists the Gothic needs to be viewed as diverse, carnivalesque 
and dialogic, and complies with the contemporary theory that it cannot be considered in 
terms of some sort of deep structure, the above passages nevertheless might be read as 
disclosing a drive towards finding a unifying axis for Gothic writing. And this results in 
an interesting tension within his own dialectic. 
Similarly to the theory-oriented approaches of the late twentieth century, Miles 
strives to avoid grand narratives of literary history.50 On the one hand, he admits this 
was his pre-conception about the Gothic, but on the other, his analysis also shows that 
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Gothic writing is “axiomatically historical,” and, therefore, changes over time. This is a 
direct result of the adopted methodology. But the temptation to read his considerations 
as showing how the Gothic itself turns out to be a discursive formation concentrated on 
the transgressive representation of the self, a site of unified practices, if not by means of 
an underlying assumption than at least through the achieved effects, is nonetheless 
invited. In the case of the aforementioned passages, what plays a crucial role is the very 
register used. Hence, perhaps, the reason why the second edition’s preface explains that 
it was not the author’s intention to assert that the Gothic was subversive, but rather that 
“the accustomed vectors of power that obtained in discursive acts occurring on the same 
‘ontological plane’ outside the text, frequently exhibited symptoms of reversal within 
it.”51 Then, Miles also qualifies the assumption of Gothic writing’s disclosure of 
opposing discursive practices as he states that he analyses texts which range from those 
that only display the presence of a discourse to those that use it to actively rework it; 
texts in which discourse (in power, we should perhaps add) can be both reinforced and 
questioned.52 This clarifies his standpoint, showing it to be in accordance with 
Foucault’s rule of the polyvalence of discourse. Still, the line which should separate this 
account of the Gothic from a grand narrative may sometimes vanish out of sight if we 
lose the angle dictated by a strict adherence to the tenets of the methodology adopted. 
We may contend that even if the Gothic constantly revises the socially and politically 
preferred representation of the self, this is exactly because it is discourse-sensitive, and 
not a discourse in itself. Viewing it as a site where empowered discourses are utilised 
for the sake of reversal need not be wrong; it may simply be not enough. Walpole would 
revise the empowered aesthetic discourse for a different reason than Mary 
Wollstonecraft. Thus, it appears true that the Gothic would provide a particularly useful 
space for such revisions; however, it also appears that the reasons could be pinpointed 
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on the level of discourse play itself, rather than devised on the basis of some sort of 
common paradigm.  
What might prove of interest at this point is the fact that Miles insists on viewing the 
Gothic as a code, even though ‘code’ might not, again, seem the best possible lexical 
choice, for it signals a common framework of reference. Yet interestingly enough, Miles 
defines the system this code uses as that of “literary devices that make certain 
articulations possible.”53 What he wishes to undertake with regard to Gothic writing is, 
explicitly, its genealogy, entailing, on the one hand, the genealogy of discourses which 
shaped “the expression of subjectivity”54 available to the Gothic, and which 
contextualise it, but, on the other, the genealogy of intertextual relations between 
particular texts. It is the latter which he views as occupied with the Gothic code. One of 
the comments he passes about the character of this code is, for example: “It is a tenet of 
modern psychoanalytic theory that anxiety may be discharged through utterance. 
Irrespective of therapeutic effect, the Gothic provided a codified expression for 
fashionable anxieties regarding the self, anxieties to an extent shaped, if not produced, 
by mental paradigm itself.”55 What could prove of interest at this point is perhaps a 
simple connotation that the Gothic code as a set of literary devices might have: the 
aforementioned ‘laundry list’ of the Gothic themes and characters, devices and figures. 
In a sense, these are pretty often as much ‘literary devices’ as empty symbols, inherited, 
through antiquarianism, from the properly Gothic repertoire of chivalric romance. And, 
as such – as Miles does make us aware – they are discursively fillable. 
Assuming Gothic fiction to represent discourse would be a fatal step, one which 
would ultimately result in producing a grand narrative particularly fit for our own times. 
This is what we need to bear in mind. Interestingly, what Gothic Writing appears to 
partake in, at least on the level of register – strange generalisations, uncannily 
reminding us of the paradigm which favoured grand narratives – is, however, a sort of 
tension between two successive paradigms with the old one somehow intruding into the 
domain of the new one. Still, the work’s argument is illuminating with regard to how 
the Gothic should be conceptualised, and how it should not if we wish to avoid losing 
its crucial historical inflections out of sight. Let us now address two more cases of 
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critical texts, in which, as we shall see, the undertones of the differentiation paradigm 
are traceable, if not immediately recognized.  
 
4.3. Gothic Modernity: Filtering Theory Through the Gothic  
 
To give another example illustrating how Foucault may be applied both to 
contextualising and conceptualising Gothic fiction we can turn now to Botting and 
Townshend. It is with the use of Foucault’s deliberations that the critics, in their three 
initial paragraphs of the introduction to the second volume of Gothic, establish the 
Gothic as “a peculiarly modern genre,” one registering “a shift from classicism to 
modernity, embodying a new sense of literature.”56 What becomes the basis for such an 
encoding of the Gothic as a genre is Foucault’s three works: The Order of Things, 
“Language to Infinity” (1977) and “The Eye of Power” (1980). A closer look at these 
and the context they provide for the Gothic ought to turn out to be worth the effort. Let 
us start with “Language to Infinity,” which seems to constitute the axis of the critics’ 
brief conceptualisation of the Gothic as a modern genre.  
It is in “Language to Infinity” that Foucault refers to Sade and what he calls “the 
tales of terror”57 of the late eighteenth century to stake out the moment of change almost 
coinciding with literature taking the shape that we know today.58 This modern literature, 
in the words of Botting and Townshend, “emerges […] in a self-reflexive and abyssal 
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relation to language and death.”59 The relation of which they speak, if we now turn to 
Foucault, might have existed since the times epitomised by Homer, when speech was 
first used to talk about and against death, opening a space for writing to emerge: “a 
virtual space where speech discover[ed] the endless resourcefulness of its own image 
and where, it [could] represent itself as already existing behind itself, already active 
beyond itself, to infinity.”60 Speaking about death, the moment at which language ‘dies’ 
as well, language, as Foucault puts it, “turns back upon itself”61 and engages in an 
unlimited play of mirrors to create its own ‘immortal’ image. A work speaking about 
death is a stilled and complete one, to be spoken about infinitely, both to warn against 
death and to promise immortality – it becomes a mirror of the Infinite, the Infinite being 
external to language.62 In its talking about death – about misfortunes sent by gods – 
language speaks so that death remains unfulfilled and averted, distanced through words 
that make it ‘still.’63 And in so doing, it creates its own self-representation, becomes 
doubled: “language […] tells of itself, discovers the story of the story and the possibility 
that this interpenetration might never end.”64 Quite like Scheherazade, who, one night, 
tells the story of her own striving to postpone her death by telling stories. 
As Botting and Townshend recount, it is, however, the self-conscious staging of ‘the 
murmur of death’ in the language’s play of mirrors that allows modern literature to 
emerge.65 To turn to Foucault’s exact deliberations, what indicates the change in 
relations between language and death in the eighteenth century is the fact that in the 
case of both Sade’s works and the tales of terror (and in the face of secularisation and 
the disappearance of the Infinite outside the text) “languages […] are constantly drawn 
out of themselves, by the overwhelming, the unspeakable, by thrills, stupefaction, 
ecstasy, dumbness [etc.] and […] are calculated with the greatest economy and 
precision to produce effects [to the point of achieving the greatest possible 
transparency] [and thus] very strangely represent themselves in a slow, meticulous, and 
infinitely extended ceremony.”66 Consequently, the case of the tales of terror is as 
follows: their language’s prime function, as it might seem, becomes communication – 
transmitting the event of terror but simultaneously erasing its own presence. As a result, 
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there seems to be no space open in the language for its possible endless self-
representation: in a tale of terror, language does not represent itself, seemingly not 
engaging in a play of mirrors that would grant it infinity.67 It is only in the tales’ own 
parody that their language becomes manifested. Foucault states: 
 
It is as if two twin and complementary languages were born at 
once from the same source: one existing entirely in its naivety, 
the other within parody; one existing solely for the reader’s 
eyes, the other moving from the reader’s simple-minded 
fascination to the easy tricks of the writer. But in actuality, these 
two languages are more than simply contemporaneous; they lie 
within each other, share the same dwelling, constantly 
intertwine, forming a single verbal web and, as it were, a forked 
language that turns against itself from within, destroying itself in 
its own body, poisonous in its very density.68 
 
 
This doubling, however, grants no immortality. We could say that satire annihilates the 
language of the tales of terror; but in so doing, it also inescapably annihilates its very 
own language. In this sense, paradoxically, its birth is simultaneously its death. 
Yet the language of the tale of terror is doomed to die anyway. Instead of pursuing 
infinity, or immortality, it is “push[ed] to its own limits,”69 to use Botting and 
Townshend’s words, which is a mark of its very modernity. To return to Foucault, on 
the one hand, language is triggered by its “ornamental superabundance,” the necessity 
of describing all details overtly and at once.70 On the other hand, it is triggered by its 
obligation to produce the moment of terror, which is the moment when it gains full 
power over the reader, but also when it becomes immediately impotent, as terror cannot 
be stilled. It can only be produced ad infinitum, in a series of successive episodes 
(chapters, volumes, etc.).71 Both ornamental superabundance and the evoking of terror 
make language going, infinitely drawing from itself only to prolong its existence, but at 
the same time display the murmur of death in it: its reaching of its own limits, its 
impossibility of becoming complete in an immortalising way. In the case of terror, 
completion is death. 
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These remarks may be found useful for conceptualising a phenomenon such as the 
Gothic. Let us now, somewhat anachronistically, turn to The Order of Things. In The 
Order Of Things, published 1970, and especially in the final subchapter of “Labour, 
Life, Language,” Foucault treats modern literature as a means of substitution, or 
compensation, for “the demotion of language,”72 for making language an object of 
knowledge instead of a form of knowing.73 As he states, in the nineteenth century, it is 
through, or rather in, literature that language becomes liberated from grammar; it 
regains independence by constantly drawing upon itself: 
 
Literature is the contestation of philology (of which it is nevertheless 
the twin figure): it leads language back from grammar to the naked 
power of speech, and there it encounters the untamed, imperious being 
of words. From the Romantic revolt against a discourse frozen in its 
own ritual pomp, to the Mallarméan discovery of the word in its 
impotent power, it becomes clear what the function of literature was, 
in the nineteenth century, in relation to the modern mode of being of 
language. Against the background of this essential interaction, the rest 
is merely effect: literature becomes progressively more differentiated 
from the discourse of ideas, and encloses itself within a radical 
intransitivity; it becomes detached from all the values that were able 
to keep it in general circulation during the Classical age (taste, 
pleasure, naturalness, truth), and creates within its own space 
everything that will ensure a ludic denial of them (the scandalous, the 
ugly, the impossible); it breaks with the whole definition of genres as 
forms adapted to an order of representations, and becomes merely a 
manifestation of a language which has no other law than that of 
affirming […] its own precipitous existence; and so there is nothing 
for it to do but to curve back in a perpetual return upon itself, as if its 
discourse could have no other content than the expression of its own 
form […].74 
 
 
This constant drawing upon itself, in denial of established rules, may be seen as 
corresponding with the situation of the tales of terror as described in “Language to 
Infinity,” in which language forms a closed circuit, reaching its own limit and turning 
back inwards to continue ad infinitum in a series of yet further thrills and terrors. As a 
result, it seems that contrasting the essay and the subchapter could definitely prove 
thought-provoking. Not to mention the fact that the statements concerning literature’s 
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‘radical intransitivity,’ detachment from Classical values, ‘ludic denial’ and breaking 
with the definition of the genre might prove more than compelling, to some on the level 
of immediate association, and to some others as opening a path for a deeper analysis.75 
However, they are not found compelling by Botting and Townshend. On the contrary, 
the two critics seem to use Foucault in an interesting way, which signals not only their 
interest in the French philosopher as enabling us to contextualise the Gothic, but also 
the fact that their analysis is based on some preformed assumptions about Gothic fiction 
which impinge on Foucault’s remarks themselves. 
Botting and Townshend see the usefulness of The Order of Things for the 
conceptualisation of the Gothic in something else, and it may seems they are quite right. 
In their third paragraph they view the Gothic’s exploitation of feudal settings as 
disclosing a newly shaped sense of history, one which becomes another marker of the 
beginning of modernity in Foucault’s study.76 As they notice, while they were fictions 
persistently reviving the Gothic past, Gothic novels were strikingly modern, always 
immersed in their eighteenth-century present. In this way, the Gothic is conceptualised 
as distinctively modern from yet another angle – what is modern about it is not only the 
way its language discloses the murmur of death, but also its sense of history. And it 
seems to be conceptualised properly. 
However, if we return to the initial paragraph of Botting and Townshend’s text, we 
shall see that their approach to the Gothic still betrays assumptions about the Gothic 
made in advance. In the first paragraph, for instance, the critics seem to evoke The 
Order of Things in order to depart in a quite different direction, using it to emphasise 
certain elements of the Gothic as construed by the contemporary theory. This is done in 
an interesting way, and with possibly curious results worthy of our attention.  
Referring to the modern sense of history is a means to conceptualise the Gothic as 
modern literature. It is a gesture towards establishing it as definitely deserving the 
attention it is given – without any need to locate it within high art plane. But drawing 
from The Order of Things in order to link the rise of modern literature with the rise of 
the unconscious, which the critics do, takes us at a different discursive level. As Botting 
and Townshend state, “[i]n The Order of Things the division separating the transparency 
of the scientific language from literature’s doubling begins a process in which the 
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unconscious appears.”77 In Foucault’s own words, also quoted by them: in the 
nineteenth century “[language] had to be either made transparent to the forms of 
knowledge, or thrust down into the contents of the unconscious.”78 It is difficult not to 
notice that ‘the unconscious’ in the context of Gothic fiction unmistakably points to 
Freud, but the implications here seem to be more intricate.  
Referring to Foucault’s exact train of thought should again prove useful. The 
transparency of scientific language, according to Foucault, is connected with the first of 
the three compensations for language demotion, namely the fact that language remained 
the necessary medium for the expression of scientific knowledge. As a result, the ideal 
state of affairs was to make it neutral and passive to the point of becoming “nature’s 
faithful portrait” – “the exact reflection, the perfect double, the unmisted mirror of a 
non-verbal knowledge.”79 As to the emergence of the unconscious, it can be explained 
in the following way. The second compensation for language demotion, as Foucault 
writes, is the value given to the study of language.80 He states:  
 
Having become a dense and consistent historical reality, language 
forms the locus of tradition, of the unspoken habits of thought, of what 
lies hidden in a people’s mind; it accumulates an ineluctable memory 
which does not even know itself as memory. Expressing their thoughts 
in words of which they are not the masters […] men believe that their 
speech is their servant and do not realize that they are submitting 
themselves to its demands. The grammatical arrangements of a 
language are the a priori of what can be expressed in it.81 
 
 
Hence, the importance of the formalisation of language – and hence the rise of the 
notion of the unconscious. We read:  
 
The critical elevation of language, which was a compensation for its 
subsidence within the object, implied that it had been brought nearer 
both to an act of knowing, pure of all words, and to the unconscious 
element in our discourse. It had to be either made transparent to the 
forms of knowledge, or thrust down into the contents of the 
unconscious. This certainly explains the nineteenth century’s double 
advance, on the one hand towards formalism in thought and on the 
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other towards the discovery of the unconscious – towards Russell and 
Freud.82 
 
 
In other words, the language is either neutralised when it comes to the forms and rules 
imposed in advance upon what can be said, or traced back to those forms or rules, 
buried, as we may assume, in the unconscious past of human kind. However, it must be 
stressed that such an unconscious is not yet the Freudian one. 
As a result, the usefulness of emphasising the unconscious element in language while 
elaborating on the Gothic appears to lie in analogy, though not immediately a 
psychoanalytical one. The unconscious is considered as one of the prominent themes of 
Gothic fiction, being the term’s immediate connotation. Indeed, if modern literature is 
to be seen as representing a sort of reaction to the changing perception and treatment of 
language – as the philology’s twin, to use Foucault’s metaphor – then it must somehow 
reflect upon the changes taking place in what it operates in relation to. And one of these 
changes is the development of the notion of the unconscious as underlying the 
production of language. Hence, we could assume, the unconscious transpiring through 
the Gothic fabric.  
However, Botting and Townshend, as they speak of the unconscious, have a different 
understanding of it in mind. Although they seem to employ Foucault’s periodization as 
an explanatory tool, rhetorically, in a curious way, they also remain at the level of 
analogy, but a ‘Gothic’ one. In their introductory paragraph, the unconscious, emerging 
through the change of the perception of language, is the Gothic’s inherent business. 
True, it can be linked with the rise of modern literature, but in the first place, it is 
inherently Gothic. It is not even the case that the unconscious is related to 
psychoanalysis, which first identified it in the mode. The unconscious becomes an 
integral feature of Gothic fiction.  
And what is more, this special language which is modern literature plays with 
mirrors, doubles itself, or engenders monstrous forms.83 Mirrors, doubles, monsters – 
all of these are in themselves considered to be Gothic properties. And all of them, 
rooted, as it were, in Foucault’s application of metaphors to describe certain processes, 
are emphasised in the opening paragraph of Botting and Townshend’s introduction for 
the purpose of linking the Gothic with the dawn of modernity, but in a paradoxically 
                                                           
82
 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 326. 
83
 Botting and Townshend, Introduction to Gothic, vol. 2, p. 1. Emphasis mine. 
  157
‘Gothic’ way. As we read at the end of the critics’ initial paragraph, “Foucault’s 
references to death, doubling, mirrors and monstrosity, all abiding figures from tales of 
terror, make the emergence of modern literature a thoroughly Gothic affair.”84 There is 
a rhetorical device at work here, one which is meant to be an apt and catchy metaphor – 
which it certainly is – but, at the same time, one which reveals to what extent certain 
assumptions about the Gothic are taken as givens. It is not Foucault’s considerations of 
the emergence of modern literature here that explain the Gothic – it is the Gothic that 
seems to explain modern literature. Once, psychoanalysis contributed to establishing the 
Gothic as characterised by the unconscious and the double. Now, the Gothic critic take 
both to be inherently Gothic in the first place, and link modernity to Gothic fiction 
because of metaphors used by a philosopher. It is as if Foucault’s though was filtered 
through a particular conception of the Gothic: its elements not used in order to 
illuminate the mode, but chosen on the basis of their likeness to what has already been 
established as characterising Gothic fiction. 
We could assume that catchy metaphors are the privilege of introductory paragraphs. 
The second paragraph apparently turns to more exact references to Foucault. Firstly, the 
critics assert, in tune with Foucault, that the Gothic engenders the moment of shift out 
of which arises the modern sense of literature, evoking Foucault’s statement that the 
tales of terror are drawn out of themselves, aimed at effect, the language reaching its 
own limits.85 Then, they refer to “The Eye of Power” to further establish the modernity 
of Gothic fiction. They write: “A distinctive topography appears: mirrors and surfaces, 
with their range of effects and affects, are counterposed with mysterious doubles and 
terrifying death. The new topography, recognisable in the play of surfaces and depths 
that are literary and, subsequently, psychological, have architectural correlates: the 
fortress or castle, defiantly exposed to external elements, finds its power and darkness 
internalised in the panoptical complexities of the labyrinthine spaces beneath its 
sovereign ramparts.”86 Let us now pick up this trait. 
Dark fortresses and castles, mysterious vaults and terrifying secrets are the requisites 
which, in Gothic novels, designate the feudal era. In this era, as we read in Foucault, the 
prison was a space of darkness and restriction, the source of disease of the body and 
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moral corruption.87 The eighteenth century, with its interest in science and medicine, 
turns toward visibility and access – the panopticon, in which vice and crime are 
eradicated through immediate exposure to whoever watches. The rebellion against the 
monarchy also finds itself internalising the rule of visibility. Foucault thus elaborates on 
the topic:  
 
A fear haunted the latter half of the eighteenth century: the fear of 
darkened spaces, of the pall of gloom which prevents the full visibility 
of things, men and truths. It sought to break up the patches of darkness 
that blocked the light, eliminate the shadowy areas of society, 
demolish the unlit chambers where arbitrary political acts, 
monarchical caprice, religious superstitions, tyrannical and priestly 
plots, epidemics and the illusions of ignorance were fomented. The 
chateaux, lazarets, bastilles and convents inspired even in the pre-
Revolutionary period a suspicion and hatred exacerbated by a certain 
political overdetermination. The new political and moral order could 
not be established until these places were eradicated.88 
 
 
According to him, the literary illustration of the process takes place in the Gothic novel, 
and especially in the works of Ann Radcliffe, in which dark feudal spaces are infested 
with all sorts of aristocratic and aristocratically-related parasites. The feudal 
topography, anachronistically depicted, becomes the foil for visibility.89 Juxtaposed 
with lightness, it serves to enhance the new order: “In the Panopticon, there is used a 
form close to that of the castle—a keep surrounded by walls—to paradoxically create a 
space of exact legibility.”90 As Jean-Pierre Barrou, one of Foucault’s interviewers, 
notices, “[it’s] also the areas of darkness in man that the century of Enlightenment 
wants to make disappear.”91 It seems it is in these terms that the new order of visibility 
can be translated onto the psychological dimension – it is meant to be instilled in those 
subjected to gaze, starting from a child and finishing with a criminal. By analogy, 
spatial rearrangements of the times are one manifestation of a multi-layered process, 
taking place as much within the subject’s psyche; in the period of transition, this should 
prove unavoidable.  
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Yet Botting and Townshend again seem to read Foucault in a different way. In fact, 
their way of handling the issue appears to be predetermined by an assumption about the 
Gothic. Mirrors, surfaces, depths – these are concepts marginally related to the main 
train of thought in “The Eye of Power.” The fortress and the castle are described therein 
as manifestations of distrust and repugnance felt towards the previously dominant 
system, based on hierarchy and ultimate power wielded by the God-appointed King, 
rather than as representations of psyche’s regions. Still, surfaces and depths – effects 
and affects – sound more psychological, not to say psychoanalytical, and hence more 
‘Gothic’ if we take the contemporary conception of the mode into consideration. It is a 
fact that Foucault is here referred to as illuminating the conception, but there remains an 
impression that another explanation of ‘the new topography’ could be proposed, for it is 
at hand. 
This moment of linking Foucault’s rumination on panopticon with psychological 
dimension of the Gothic as accepted nowadays is a point at which an underlying 
assumption reveals itself at work. And this assumption works to adjust theory as much 
as to utilise it for the benefit of the existing conception of the mode. The same could be 
said about the introductory paragraph. Catchy or not, the metaphor posing the Gothic as 
some sort of an underlying logic of modernity is striking. Granted, Gothic fiction 
manifests an abundance of motifs and figures that prove to be marks of modernity – but 
does this make the rise of modernity a Gothic affair? Or should it remain the other way 
round? Above all, it seems a pity that a body of Foucault’s potentially illuminating work 
is filtered, and evoked to some extent only for the sake of a metaphor – one that remains 
in tune with the prevailing assumptions. 
 
4.4. The Gothic Heterotopia: Gothic Criticism as Discourse 
 
Foucault’s periodization of the eighteenth century and his ruminations on the birth of 
modernity testify to his attractiveness at least to some of Gothic critics. His works allow 
for contextualising the Gothic as much as for theorising it. We have briefly looked at 
the instance of the former; let us now turn to the latter. To give another example of how 
Foucault has been applied to the study of Gothic fiction, one which represents less an 
attempt at conceptualising it in context than at theorising its certain features, Fred 
Botting, in his essay “In Gothic Darkly: Heterotopia, History, Culture” applies 
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Foucault’s conceptions of utopia and heterotopia as sites to account for the meaning and 
effects of the Gothic’s interest in the Gothic past.  
Let us again begin with Foucault and his own argument. In “Of Other Spaces,” first 
published in 1984, though constituting the basis for a lecture delivered in 1967,92 the 
philosopher introduces a distinction between two types of ‘sites,’ sites understood as the 
modern incarnations of the concept of space, utopias and heterotopias. Utopias are 
defined here as “fundamentally unreal places,” which represent real societies either in 
their perfected or inverted form.93 Heterotopias, by contrast, are “effectively enacted 
utopia[s],” real spaces within existing societies in which “all the other real sites that can 
be found in culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted.”94 In other 
words, they reflect other sites, but are unlike them, and remain outside of them. The 
mirror, an early example provided by Foucault, is both a utopia and a heterotopia; the 
previous in the sense that the space it opens does not exist, is “a placeless place”95; the 
latter in the sense that the mirror itself is real and creates a counter-site in that it relates 
to (reflects) reality as much as contests and inverts it. Foucault thus describes the 
experience of the mirror: 
 
In the mirror, I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual 
space that opens up behind the surface; I am over there, there where I 
am not, a sort of shadow that gives my own visibility to myself, that 
enables me to see myself there where I am absent: such is the utopia 
of the mirror. But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does 
exist in reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on the position 
that I occupy. From the standpoint of the mirror I discover my absence 
from the place where I am since I see myself over there. Starting from 
this gaze that is, as it were, directed toward me, from the ground of 
this virtual space that is on the other side of the glass, I come back 
toward myself; I begin again to direct my eyes toward myself and to 
reconstitute myself there where I am. The mirror functions as a 
heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the 
moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, 
connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, 
since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point 
which is over there.96 
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Some passages in the quotations above have been emphasised because they emerge in 
Botting’s article as a basis for his reading of the concepts of utopia and heterotopia, and 
are then applied to account for what we should call, after the article, ‘the Gothic mirror’ 
– ‘Gothic’ standing for both a type of fiction and a general, abstract notion designating 
the medieval (or rather ‘feudal’) past as ‘constructed’ – almost literally – in the 
Enlightenment. The constructing, rewriting, inventing or fabricating of Gothic, again in 
the sense of both the past and fiction (but apart from that also e.g. architecture), by the 
Enlightenment becomes the basis on which Botting builds up his argument. 
Let us return to Foucault, though. Other examples of sites which remain in relation to 
real spaces but invert them and remain outside of them are, to name but a few: a mental 
hospital, a prison, a boarding house, an army’s post, a cemetery, a New World’s colony 
or a (n Oriental) garden, and finally, a boat, “a place without a place.”97 As Foucault 
presents them, they come to exemplify six principles by means of which the concept of 
heterotopia can be described: 1) heterotopias are present in all cultures of the world and 
take various forms, which we can classify into two categories, a) crisis heterotopias and 
b) heterotopias of deviation98; 2) the function of a heterotopia depends on a given 
culture and its needs; 3) heterotopias are spaces within which otherwise incompatible 
spaces can be brought together and juxtaposed (consider the cinema or the 
aforementioned Orient garden); 4) heterotopias are linked with heterochronies, “slices 
in time,” moments of “absolute break with […] traditional times”99; 5) heterotopias are 
both isolated and penetrable; and 6) they function in relation to the remaining space. 
This final principle means we may be dealing either with illusion heterotopias, ones 
which “[expose] every real space […] as still more illusory”100 (here Foucault gives an 
example of the brothel) or with compensation heterotopias, which strive to be perfect 
places, as opposed to our messy social reality. 
Of the aforementioned principles, I have emphasised the fourth one for a reason. “Of 
Other Spaces” begins with the following statement: “The great obsession of the 
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nineteenth century was, as we know, history: with its themes of development and of 
suspension, of crisis and cycle, themes of the ever-accumulating past, with its great 
preponderance of dead men and the menacing glaciation of the world. The nineteenth 
century found its essential mythological resources in the second principle of 
thermodynamics.”101 In this way, the nineteenth century is established as the age 
preoccupied with time. Our own times (or at least the mid-/second half of the twentieth 
century), are on the contrary established in the text as the times of space.102 Still, as it 
has been emphasised above, the counter-sites of heterotopias are related to moments of 
rupture in time. Hence, as Foucault notices, the highly heterotopic character of the 
cemetery – a place outside of the remaining space which constitutes itself in the light of 
the end of life. Foucault distinguishes between two types of relations between 
heterotopia and heterochrony: heterotopias infinitely accumulating time (museums, 
libraries) and those which are in themselves only temporal (seasonal fairgrounds or 
Polynesian vacation villages). This relation between time and space is emphasised here 
as, while speaking about the Gothic past in Gothic fiction, we are inevitably driven back 
towards the concern about time and history, though this time in the eighteenth century. 
To turn to Botting now, as we have already indicated, history in the incarnation of 
the Gothic past, or to be more precise the theme of its rewriting (re-constructing) in the 
eighteenth-century, constitutes the foundation of his article. As he amply states, “[t]he 
Enlightenment, which produced the maxims and models of modern culture, also 
invented the Gothic.” Botting stresses that it is thanks to the extensive rewriting of 
history that the Enlightenment, itself a re-invention of the classical period, can establish 
itself as ‘modern,’ different both from the classical period, which it, nevertheless, 
wishes to be a continuation of, and from the feudal past, from which it cuts itself off.103 
‘Gothic’ as a word emerges from this process of rewriting equipped with a wealth of 
meanings and significations, primarily negative, opposed to what is valued by the 
Enlightenment, both in a political and aesthetic sense.104 It is also strongly marked with 
fabrication – so when it comes to Walpole’s first ‘Gothic story,’ as when we speak of 
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his Strawberry Hill, or Macpherson’s Ossian.105 All this reconstruction – rewriting, 
fabrication, inventing – of history has its clearly defined function: “it articulates the 
long passage from the feudal orders of chivalry and religiously sanctioned sovereignty 
to the increasingly secularised and commercial political economy of liberalism.”106 
As Botting asserts, ‘Gothic’ – an abstract concept in itself, it should seem to us, a set 
of associations, a mould of perception and simultaneously something like a discursive 
formation – is thus proved to represent a type of ‘conceptual site.’ This site reflects the 
eighteenth century in that it represents the perceived vices of the past against which the 
present can elevate its virtues. What this site allows is, basically, the mechanism of 
negative definition – but here dressed in the metaphor of the mirror, and, above all, a 
utopic one for it provides an inverted analogy of the real society.107 Botting reads 
Foucault’s analysis of the utopic mirror as allowing self-definition (since it provides “a 
sort of shadow that gives my own visibility to myself”) and distancing (“in ‘the virtual 
space that opens up behind the surface’”),108 and this translates well onto the 
mechanism of negative definition: shadow of myself in the feudal mirror gives me my 
own Enlightened visibility, and is at the same time safely distanced for it appears in a 
space which is not – the past is gone.  
However, whereas utopia is originally understood as a “direct or inverted analogy,” 
in this Gothic utopic mirror, Foucault’s ‘or’ disappears. The conceptual site of the past 
is not only inverted. By peculiar and paradoxical means, it also becomes perfected, 
retaining a direct relation with the conception of the present by “an idealization of the 
elements of the past and the establishment of a continuity with the present” through 
creating ‘the myth of the Goths.’109 As follows from Botting’s article, whereas, in 
general neoclassical and bourgeois terms ‘Gothic’ has predominantly negative 
connotations (barbaric, disorderly, feudal, superstitious), when it comes to the 
establishment of what we could call national identity, it acquires positive resounding by 
the same means of re-construction of the historic Goths as liberal, rational and 
democratic; in this way, the continuity between the past and the present is restored 
against the corruption of the continent. Botting, quoting Miles, gives us an example of 
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Radcliffe in whose Gothic novels the ‘bad’ aristocracy is coded as ‘Oriental,’ whereas 
‘good’ aristocracy undergoes embourgeoisement.110  
But then, not much space is needed for Botting to show how the Burkean chivalric 
ideal is reversed by Mary Wollstonecraft’s “rationalist critique” and “thoroughly 
enlightened morality,” and how literary criticism (or its early version) of the times finds, 
in the light of the French Revolution, Gothic romances as potentially disturbing the 
social order – and hence, again, how Gothic acquires negative denotation.111 His 
discussion of the contemporary critical discourse (demanding fiction to teach virtue, but 
also by means of showing vice as a deterrent), as applied, inversely, on the one hand by 
Clara Reeve to justify romances, and on the other hand, by critics to condemn them, 
allows to introduce ambivalence as the inherent feature of the Gothic mirror. “Not only 
is it a utopic mirror that preserves an imagined and ideal continuity with the past, but it 
also serves as an inverted reflection marking a distinct break in the progress of 
history.”112 This ‘break,’ although Botting never uses Foucault’s term, emerges in his 
article as a powerful heterochrony. 
The presence of a heterochrony, visible actually since the very beginning of 
Botting’s argument about the Enlightenment constituting itself, is significant. It 
confirms what should have been expected since the moment of the application of the 
metaphor of the mirror to account for the concept of Gothic. Namely, the Gothic mirror 
is also a heterotopic one. Botting establishes this ‘version’ of the mirror on the basis of 
his consideration of how Gothic fiction distorts the mimetic and corrective mirror of the 
novel: “With romances and Gothic fiction, however, the social function of the mirror is 
distorted, its reflections exceeding the proper balance of identification and correction. 
The utopic mirror of perfected or inverted reflection is intermingled with a heterotopic 
form.”113 Distortion of proper literary function, lamented upon by the eighteenth-
century critics, thus turns the conceptual locus of ‘Gothic’ (non-existent and placeless 
since established as the past on the immediate level, and then also as a pure fabrication 
on a higher one) into an almost material place in the form of a book which, like a 
mirror, represents the real space but contests and inverts it at the same time. Gothic 
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fiction, no longer an abstract concept but a palpable literary creation, which ‘enacts’ the 
concept, becomes “an ‘effectively enacted utopia.’”114 
This is, however, not all. It has already been mentioned that Foucault distinguishes 
between two general types of heterotopia.115 Crisis heterotopias, as he asserts, are by 
our times practically extinct; thus hardly a heterotopia should escape being a deviation 
heterotopia, one which presupposes a deviant relation with the established norms. This 
feature of heterotopias should prove extremely attractive to the Gothic critic and indeed, 
Botting writes: 
 
The main features of Gothic fiction, in neo-classical terms, are 
heterotopias: the wild landscapes, the ruined castles and abbeys, the 
dark, dark labyrinths, the marvellous, supernatural events, distant 
times and customs are not only excluded from the Augustan social 
world but introduce the passions, desires and excitements it 
suppressed. The heterotopic mirror, moreover, exists in reality with 
palpable effects: ‘it exerts a sort of counteraction on the position that I 
occupy.’ The mirror of fiction, too, has a counter-Augustan effect. Not 
only does it transport readers into remote and unreal places, but it is 
read in a specific place in the present, thereby disturbing a sense of 
reality along with the aesthetic values supposed to sustain it. The 
heterotopic mirror ‘makes the place that I occupy at the moment when 
I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with all 
the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be 
perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is over 
there.’116 
 
 
Exclusion, counter-effect, disturbance – together with distortion – what could suit the 
Gothic better? But let us pay close attention to the way Botting establishes here the 
deviation of the Gothic with regard to the Augustan norm. Just like the mirror, the 
Gothic takes the reader into a space which is virtual, and thereby contests and inverts 
the experience of the real place of reading. What is more, the medieval, and often 
South-continental, we should add, setting and its elements are deviations with regard to 
the norm both in Enlightenment politics and aesthetics. 
Such a conceptualisation of the Gothic should hold, as it makes perfect sense. But 
then, there seem to be a few questions worth asking. In the first place, let us return to 
the question of ambivalence, introduced by Botting as an inherent feature of the Gothic 
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mirror. As he states, “[t]he Gothic mirror offers a heterogeneous and conflicting 
reflection of the present.”117 On the one hand, it inverts the past to despise feudalism 
while, on the other, it perfects elements of the past to establish continuity; on the one 
hand, it shows vice to promote virtue but on the other it does not discourage vice clearly 
enough. All this takes place in the utopic mirror – but should it not also take place in the 
heterotopic one? It does not seems so since Botting states: “Fiction itself, as much as the 
landscapes and cultures it represents, operates in the manner of a heterotopia: consumed 
in the eighteenth century, it nonetheless counteracted the dominance of neoclassical 
taste with an alternative and seductive vision of society, nature and art.”118 Thus, only 
what is counter-neoclassical, counter-Augustan, or counter-Enlightenment – counter-
dominant – is recognised as distinctive of heterotopia. However, paradoxically, what is 
pro-dominant, as follows from Foucault, could also be heterotopic. Let us consider his 
juxtaposition of illusion and compensation heterotopias – brothels and colonies. Of the 
latter, he gives the following definition:  
 
their role is to create a space that is other, another real space, as 
perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill 
constructed, and jumbled. This latter type would be the heterotopia, 
not of illusion, but of compensation, and I wonder if certain colonies 
have not functioned somewhat in this manner. In certain cases, they 
have played, on the level of the general organization of terrestrial 
space, the role of heterotopias. I am thinking, for example, of the first 
wave of colonization in the seventeenth century, of the Puritan 
societies that the English had founded in America and that were 
absolutely perfect other places. I am also thinking of those 
extraordinary Jesuit colonies that were founded in South America: 
marvelous, absolutely regulated colonies in which human perfection 
was effectively achieved.119 
 
 
As much as the Enlightened Britain strives to establish its own values and mores, as 
opposed to the superstitious times of aristocratic primogeniture, it also strives to 
establish, in a sense, a perfect society, a perfect space as opposed to what is jumbled and 
ill-constructed, and messy. The perfected reflection of the past which is to reinforce a 
perfected version of the present is also deviant with regard to the established rule – were 
it not, the present would not need perfection – and is also a marker of the heterotopic. 
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What is more, the mimetic mirror of the novel, referred to by Botting as the opposition 
of Gothic fiction’s heterotopic mirror, is, by definition, heterotopic as well. Let us 
consider Richardson’s Pamela – a most perfect(ed) staging of feminine virtue to be 
mimicked and internalised. And let us consider Fielding’s Shamela – a heterotopic 
mirror of the present which yearns for Pamelas. All fiction, as the above-quoted excerpt 
from Botting unintentionally suggests through its wording – “fiction itself” – if we treat 
it as having parallel effects to the mirror, is heterotopic. All fiction is read somewhere 
and sometime, relates to the space and time in which it is read (even if unconsciously), 
and takes the reader somewhere else where the rules will be – since the place only 
represents the real space – deviant. At some level, this rule should prove to apply even 
to the realist novel as defined by Stendhal – un miroir qui se promène sur une grande 
route. 
What we touch upon here is what was signalled at the end of the Chapter II, namely 
the way we understand subversion. Distortion, exclusion, inversion, contestation, 
counteraction, disruption, disturbance, confounding, blurring – all these concepts, used 
by Botting, can be linked with subversion, even if the noun itself never appears in the 
text. So does the adjective ‘deviant.’ But Foucault’s deviance, through the types of 
heterotopias he establishes – and the functions he ascribes to them – is a double-edged 
weapon, or tool. If it works in one direction, it works also in the other.  
Botting’s application of the concepts of utopia and heterotopia as defined by 
Foucault is indeed precious and illuminating for the Gothic. In a way, it enables us to 
bring together various historically conditioned discourses which shape the conceptual 
locus of ‘Gothic’ – the perception of the past and its use for the present purposes. In a 
longer run, such a vantage point, like Foucault’s heterotopia, which brings together 
otherwise juxtaposed spaces, resolves the problem of whether the Gothic was initially 
seen as detrimental or positive (even if the mirror shows a conflicting and 
heterogeneous reflection, we are confused only until we examine the particular details 
that are reflected, and their origin) for it was seen as both, within the same order of 
discourse, without any shade of paradox. This constitutes a well-prepared ground for 
further considerations of the issues of Gothic subversiveness and marginality. Apart 
from that, Botting’s considerations also bring our attention to the fact that the initial 
perception of the Gothic was to an enormous degree dependent on its political, social as 
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well as aesthetic context, one of extensive changes and reformulation in all the spheres 
of culture – of a powerful heterochrony, as we have already said at a point.120 
On the other hand, however, the above-discussed account is incomplete, for it does 
not seem to make a full usage of the tool provided by Foucault’s theory. And it seems 
that if we take into consideration the major vectors of the differentiation paradigm 
discussed in the previous chapter, it could hardly do so. Perhaps this is too bold a claim 
– but it seems that the traces of the rhetoric of subversiveness and counter-Augutanism, 
both established as the distinctive features of Gothic fiction, run along the lines of the 
text. Botting appears more than right in his consideration of the counter-Augustan effect 
of Gothic fiction when it comes to particular significations ascribed to the term ‘Gothic’ 
and given aspects of its functioning, but he evades noticing that ‘counter’ in 
Foucauldian sense is not quite an unambiguous word. The direction in which his 
considerations develop in the latter part of the article up to the conclusion also seems to 
be informed by a biased way of reasoning. 
This may be seen in the course of further analysis. What may appear to follow from 
Botting’s reading of Foucault – and to find confirmation in his analysis of Gothic – is 
the statement that “[t]he heterotopic mirror not only distorts the proper perception of the 
relation between present and past, but introduces a divergent reflection in which 
‘Gothic’ marks a discontinuity between political and aesthetic version of history.”121 Let 
us begin with the first part of this statement. What is interesting about it is the assumed 
distorted perception of how the past relates to the present, which is clearly presented as 
a heterotopic feature. To turn to Foucault, when it comes to the complex relation 
between heterotopia and heterochrony and its two incarnations, he states, with regard to 
spaces accumulating time, that they incarnate “the idea of accumulating everything, of 
establishing a sort of general archive, the will to enclose in one place all times, all 
epochs, all forms, all tastes, the idea of constituting a place of all times that is itself 
outside of time and inaccessible to its ravages, the project of organizing in this way a 
sort of perpetual and indefinite accumulation of time in an immobile place.”122 Then, 
turning to temporal spaces, he comments that they are “linked, on the contrary, to time 
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in its most fleeting, transitory, precarious aspect,”123 and while he considers the 
Polynesian villages, offering holiday that take a city dweller straight into the primitive 
past preserved in a simple hut, he sums up: “The rediscovery of Polynesian life 
abolishes time; yet the experience is just as much the rediscovery of time, it is as if the 
entire history of humanity reaching back to its origin were accessible in a sort of 
immediate knowledge.”124 And this is important. 
We could assume that it is difficult to imagine, after the lesson of postmodernism, or 
new historicism, that humanity is truly capable of “reaching back to its origin” to 
acquire an immediate knowledge of what it was like to live in a hut. Neither is it capable 
of accumulating, or preserving, time outside of time. On the other hand, even if 
Foucault states that “museums and libraries were the expression of an individual 
choice” in the seventeenth century, as opposed to modernity,125 knowing that this is said 
by Foucault, we can hardly say that nowadays the accumulation of time is objective. 
Discursively, it pretends to be. But then, any representation of the past which lays claim 
to objectivity is tinted by (political) discourse, its seemingly neutral and obvious givens. 
A museum aspires to abolish time – but under this cover it is simultaneously marked by 
the choices dictated by its own times. The experience of a Polynesian hut can also 
provide only a distorted (by the present) experience of the past. The same should refer 
to the relationship between the past and the present, and the same is manifested by 
fiction – in this case Gothic fiction – politically interested in presenting this relationship 
in a given way. 
The fact is, however, that although such conclusions can be drawn from Foucault’s 
oeuvre, he himself does not seem to put too much emphasis on them in this particular 
text. His interest is primarily in characterising a type of sites – heterotopias – which is, 
at a point, connected with pondering over the relationship between those sites and time; 
nonetheless, the question of the way in which heterotopias blur the perception of the 
past and its influences is not raised. On the other hand, raising such a question suits well 
the heterotopic mirror of the Gothic: blurring the relations by utilising given versions of 
history is exactly what it does, and for clearly specified reasons.  
The above part of the discussion of the quotation from Botting eventually shows no 
more than how a certain feature of heterotopia becomes added to, or emphasises aside, 
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Foucault’s major description. And we could say, quite justifiably. Nonetheless, we can 
observe how ‘heterotopic’ becomes somewhat strangely and instantly, without any 
foregoing warning or signs that this is to happen, substituted for the word ‘Gothic.’ The 
trigger may come so from reflections on Foucault’s notes and oeuvre, perhaps during 
the consideration of Gothic, as from considerations of the Gothic as heterotopic in the 
course of which the concept of heterotopia becomes re-characterised alongside what it 
was supposed to help to conceptualise.  
In such a case, a tool turns into an object, an object into a tool. What comes to one’s 
mind is Alexandra Warwick’s brief analysis of Julian Wolfreys’ passage from Victorian 
Gothic, which runs as follows: “we only read where the gothic has been, we only 
comprehend its effects in the places from which it has already retreated. We understand 
the gothic therefore as always already spectral through and through. All that is left in the 
Victorian text is the promise of the gothic, the disturbing trace, the haunting absence.126 
Warwick considers this passage as an example of the aforementioned ill-application of 
Derrida, ‘hauntology,’ a practice of searching for Gothic traces which ‘haunt’ texts. 
According to her, Wolfreys substitutes the word ‘gothic’ for the word ‘meaning’: “The 
problem here is that there is a rhetorical trick at work, a sleight of hand in which the 
word Gothic is first substituted for the word meaning, ‘we only read where meaning has 
been’ and then in the next sentence meaning becomes genre, if meaning is spectral then 
places from which it has departed become Gothic, and then back to meaning again, ‘all 
that is left is the promise of meaning.’ Gothic is then simultaneously that which haunts 
and that which is haunted, it is both meaning and text.”127 We could say that ‘meaning’ 
here is an incomparably broader term, and indeed, as Warwick notices, substituting 
Gothic for meaning makes it so ubiquitous that, according to her, it becomes 
meaningless.128 In the case of Botting, we have a reversed situation, namely a general 
term is substituted for a narrower one, but, peculiarly, the result is the same, and typical 
of the critical practice of elevating the Gothic: since heterotopia shares the major (in the 
text) characteristic of the Gothic, the Gothic itself seems somewhat grander (and its 
boundaries start overlapping with these of fiction in general). 
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Let us turn now to the remaining part of the quotation, according to which the 
heterotopic mirror “introduces a divergent reflection in which ‘Gothic’ marks a 
discontinuity between political and aesthetic version of history.” Again, even if we 
somehow relate this statement to Foucault’s theory, an analogous assumption is absent 
from “Of Other Spaces.” This means that, as above, we are dealing either with an 
extension of Foucault’s basic theory triggered by a reading of the concept of Gothic, or 
with an absorption and adaptation of his theory by the contemporary theory of the 
Gothic. What is of special interest to us here is the way in which this statement is 
developed further on in Botting’s article. What he means is basically that, in terms of 
aesthetic, the fascination with ‘Gothic culture’ results in a contestation of the neo-
classical taste which leads straight to Romanticism – and its rejection of Gothic fiction. 
Thus, from the political standpoint, Gothic is ‘inappropriate,’ a nuisance, a threat, while, 
from the aestheticpoint of view, it is related to Romanticism, but considered as an 
illegitimate relative. A skeleton in the closet, a black sheep of the family.  
Let us take a closer look at how this rhetoric is realised here. One more time we need 
to move from the level of Gothic fiction onto the level of Gothic as a broader concept 
related to the Gothic history – the Gothic revival. It is this revival, Botting notes after 
Lovejoy, that contributed to displacing beauty as the criterion for art and nature, and 
turning to the sublime instead. We read: “Romance is thoroughly entwined in the 
development of a non-classical aesthetic, involving a new sense of nature and, along 
with it, a positive notion of imagination and creative originality.”129 The Gothic 
romance (by which we mean that of the past, not the eighteenth-century one), on the one 
hand belongs to the debased social and political order, but on the other, in the works of 
Percy or Hurd, turns out to reveal Nature itself – free from neo-classical rules of 
composition and therefore unfit to be judged by them. This Nature is soon to become 
the domain of the Romantic poet, romance putting on new garments, acquiring new 
associations (imagination, creativity). In this process of change, Botting writes, “[i]n the 
heterotopic mirror of the past [...] a new, Gothic nature is discovered, a nature of 
sublimity and imagination that will be appropriated by romantic poets, while Gothic 
finds itself relegated to the popular and trashy realm of cheap, formulaic fiction.”130 
And this is telling. 
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What is pinpointed here by Botting is the moment of passage from the 
Enlightenment to Romanticism. In the new aesthetic order, the old (feudal) romance 
starts to change its signification as constructed by the eighteenth century, and the 
concept of ‘Gothic’ becomes re-constructed, partly under the name of ‘Nature,’ and 
partly as ‘Gothic’ trashy fiction of sensationalism, so popular at the end of the 
eighteenth-century. Again, we are dealing with a heterochrony, and ‘Gothic’ as a 
conceptual locus changes its function accordingly: to put it in Botting’s words, “it 
continues to have heterotopic effects” although now in relation to high culture.131 This 
makes sense. But then, we cannot fail to notice how certain elements of the rhetoric of 
Gothic criticism are brought about in this analysis. To be precise, ‘Gothic’ – the 
conceptual locus – is shown to be related to Romanticism, preparing the ground for its 
advent, and its literary incarnation, Gothic fiction, is then denied its role in those 
preparations and marginalised as trash. The verbs ‘appropriate,’ ‘relegate,’ and in the 
next line also ‘expel,’ all signify a negative process in which one of the parties involved 
is deprived of it property, position or rights, partly or entirely.  
What perhaps seems worth noticing in this context is the shifting of the term ‘Gothic’ 
in the article. First, ‘Gothic’ is a concept, the Gothic past, either rejected by the 
bourgeoisie or mythologized for the sake of the national spirit; next, Gothic fiction is a 
debased mode unfit for the reader; and then the interest in Gothic culture and the Gothic 
revival prepare the ground for the change of the neo-classical taste. ‘Gothic’ as a 
conceptual site is a larger concept that Gothic fiction – or the Gothic mode in poetry, 
prose and drama, and nowadays also cinema and video games, designated as ‘the 
Gothic’ – but finally, after its importance for aesthetic taste is stressed, it is reduced to 
fiction, popular literature. But if this is the case there nevertheless remains the question 
to what extent we may link Gothic fiction with ‘Gothic’ as a conceptual locus when it 
comes to preparing ground for Romanticism. Certainly – unquestionably – to some, but 
is it enough to state that Romantic poetry first appropriated what was ‘Gothic’s’ 
invention and then got rid of its literary predecessor? Or perhaps the two had drawn 
from the same source and then went separate ways? The matter seems to be slightly 
more complicated than it might appear. In fact, these questions are related to the status 
of the Gothic as a discriminated, marginalised entity elevated by revealing its effaced 
allegiances; questions to which we will return in the following chapters.  
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Furthermore, if the heterotopic mirror provides a divergent reflection in which 
‘Gothic’ is something different from a political point of view, and something different 
from the aesthetic one, then we should be able to show the way its political/social 
version develops. Yet, surprisingly, in the article, we limit ourselves to aesthetic 
considerations which confirm the already established conception of the Gothic. It is as if 
the political/social concept of ‘Gothic’ was not only separated from the aesthetic one 
but ceased to exist at a point, lost its political relevance; and the aesthetic quality 
‘Gothic’ involved changed its name while leaving the body of texts out. Conversely, we 
could say that perhaps the political concept remained the same – but then, this does not 
seem correct. 
Let us for a moment treat Foucault’s notes as if they were a historical resource. As it 
was already mentioned, according to Foucault, the nineteenth century is preoccupied 
with the second principle of thermodynamics: themes of development and entropy, 
progress and degeneration, cycles and crises; with time as much in its past incarnation 
as with the fear of the future, all culminating at the fin de siècle.132 Botting’s description 
somehow loses this political/social historical slant, turning to the aesthetic dimension in 
order to return to the theme of the past in a distinct way. Perhaps this is because the 
‘thermodynamic’ conception of time, marked politically and socially, is not adequate 
with regard to the eighteenth-century concept of the Gothic past and its function. But 
then should we exclude a body of nineteenth-century fiction considered as Gothic today 
from the Gothic domain as it seems to circulate around different issues? This is an 
interesting problem. 
Time in Botting’s article is predominantly history, and history as a Gothic theme 
becomes codified here as an everlasting play of past and present, in which the present 
tries to rewrite the past and the past keeps ‘haunting’ the present. Botting states: “Gothic 
remains ambivalent and heterotopic, reflecting the doubleness of the relationship 
between present and past. Indeed, Gothic continues to stand as a trope of the history of 
the present itself, a screen for the consumption and projection of the present onto a past 
at once distant and close by. The play of distance and proximity, rejection and return, 
telescopes history, both condensing the past into an object of idealised or negative 
speculation and unravelling and disarming the gaze of the present with its ambivalent 
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return.”133 In this description, the feudal past is constructed by the eighteenth century as 
much as “disarms the gaze” of it; early nineteenth-century England becomes the 
repressive Gothic past for the early twentieth century fiction; and the fin de siècle is the 
Gothic setting for the late twentieth-century film.134 This past is of course not ‘Gothic’ – 
but the same process seems to work in all of the cases, which ought to secure the 
continuity of the mode, whose proper place is pop: “Without the grandeur of a wild and 
natural past [...] Gothic finds itself as the mirror of a baser nature, a symptom of a 
voraciously consumeristic commercial culture in which pleasure, sensation and 
excitement come from the thrills of a darkly imagined counter-world, embracing the 
less avowable regions of psyche, family and society as well as the gloomy remoteness 
of past cultures and rugged landscapes.”135 And again, counter-world, less avowable 
regions of human sphere, a structure which unravels and disarms the present and its 
attempts to codify the past so that it does not ‘haunt’ – all these signal the unstated 
Gothic subversion lurking in between the lines. 
Finally, there is the issue of the application of the analytical tool, namely the 
Foucauldian concepts of heterotopia and the mirror. Let us have a look at the discussed 
quotation again. The first part, “[t]he heterotopic mirror not only distorts the proper 
perception of the relation between present and past,” seems a characterising statement 
about heterotopia, but it may be an extension of Foucualt’s theory as much as 
‘heterotopic’ in it may simply represent a “sleight of hand,” a substitution for ‘Gothic.’ 
The second part, “but introduces a divergent reflection in which ‘Gothic’ marks a 
discontinuity between political and aesthetic version of history,” is much more 
problematic. The question is what heterotopia stands for here. Are we still dealing with 
a heterotopic mirror in the form of the Gothic (book), or in the form of ‘Gothic’ the 
conceptual locus? Or rather with a different heterotopic mirror which reflects the 
conceptual locus of the ‘Gothic’ which is not a heterotopia itself? Or is the heterotopic 
mirror of Gothic fiction reflecting ‘Gothic’ which is itself a mirror? If not, there should 
be something yet else which would take up the mirror function. But this seems unclear. 
Later on in the article, in one of the passages quoted above, there appears “a heterotopic 
mirror of the past” in which we discover “a new, Gothic nature” – but since the mirror, 
which is a heterotopia, must be some sort of site, what sort of site should we imagine 
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the past to represent? Perhaps there is another conceptual locus at play. Or perhaps the 
logic of this statement does not flow from Foucault’s remarks but becomes filtrated 
through the givens of the contemporary Gothic criticism. 
The analysis carried out above by no means exploits the subject entirely. But then, 
the aim was not so much to provide a comprehensive account of the ways in which 
Foucault is used by the critics as it was to bring two things to our attention. Firstly, there 
is the fact that the voluminous oeuvre of Foucault proves at many various points at least 
potentially illuminating with regard to the Gothic. This is because Foucault’s theorising 
of the eighteenth-century cultural, social and political shift in the Western societies, 
such as those of France or Britain, not only constitutes an interesting context for the 
emergence of Gothic fiction, but also invites closer theoretical analysis of the 
phenomenon. If we feel that ‘the essence’ of the Gothic is difficult to capture, this is 
because the mode emerges out of these considerations as, indeed, a conflicting site: it 
witnesses and reflects a major cultural shift – and participates in it – and thus becomes a 
repository of conflicting discourses that are at play at a given moment. This is the 
reason why Gothic fiction departs in so many divergent, often contradictory directions, 
follows discrete agendas – and this is what a Foucauldian reading, grounded as it is in 
constant engagement with historical considerations of the very needed point in time, 
makes evident. 
But then, there is also the other thing, which in fact designates a problem area within 
Gothic criticism as much as it proves the differentiation paradigm to constitute a 
discursive formation as such. As we could see, in spite of its potential relevance, theory 
may still be read ‘through the Gothic’ – through the Gothic’s own discursively 
established theory. Accidentally perhaps, while it proves to some extent attractive for 
the Gothic critic but, at the same time, by no means central to the field of Gothic 
studies, Foucault’s poststructuralist thought illustrates this problem area well. While, in 
the above-discussed accounts, it becomes partially transplanted into the Gothic domain 
as illuminating, it is only utilised selectively and in accordance with pre-established 
criteria of relevance. As a result of, some of its implications and findings are in danger 
of getting lost somewhere between the lines, their visibility obscured by criticism’s own 
discourse. 
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Chapter V 
Gothic Definition(s): Shopping for the Gothic 
 
As we have pointed out, the differentiation paradigm is a highly functional paradigm 
for representing the Gothic and its criticism. The following chapter, dealing with the 
question of the definition of Gothic fiction, poses that the assumed indefinability of the 
Gothic is similarly functional in the critical discourse of contemporary Gothic studies. 
This is because it allows for the coexistence of the most varied definitions of the Gothic, 
simultaneously securing the field from the rise of a dominating and exclusive ‘grand 
narrative.’ It appears that the indefinable, ungraspable nature of the Gothic should find 
little confirmation in reality; this is because, one way or another, the Gothic is 
constantly being defined. Consequently, the chapter discusses some of the available 
definitions, offered to us by both the contemporary criticism and the criticism from the 
period recognised within the differentiation paradigm as that of disparagement. In the 
course of our analysis, we will attempt to trace the influences on the adopted 
methodological standpoint observable in them, and show that all of them, in fact, 
organise the Gothic according to their own discursive framework. This will allows us to 
undo the distinction between the late twentieth century and later criticism, on which the 
differentiation paradigm’s representation of the history of Gothic criticism is based. It 
will also allow us to show that the more Gothic critics strive to expand the domain of 
the Gothic, and prove further texts to belong to it, the more they ‘spectralise’ the 
possible boundaries of Gothic fiction. Finally, we will again see how presumptions 
about the Gothic as already conceptualised by criticism inform the reading of the Gothic 
by influencing the handling of the methodological tools. 
 
5.1. Against Grand Narratives 
 
It was stated in the previous chapter that situating Robert Miles’ Gothic Writing with 
regard to the chronology of what might be called the history of Gothic criticism 
produces valuable results. To give one significant example, Miles’ own ‘discourse’ (in 
its more immediate, non-Foucauldian sense) allows us to trace changes in the critical 
discourse on the Gothic. Miles asserts that the surge of criticism after Punter’s The 
Literature of Terror engages itself in remedying the deficiencies of the earlier, 
  177
simplistic, psychoanalytical and Marxist readings.1 Simultaneously, he himself takes yet 
one step further to avoid dehistoricizing his object of study. His premise is noticeably 
different from that of Suzanne Rintoul, mentioned in earlier chapters. Rintoul elaborates 
on the apparent lack of Gothic definition in works on the Gothic published more or less 
a decade after Gothic Writing was issued for the first time. When Miles speaks of 
defining the Gothic, he seems to be at a point of departure for (or at a peak of, 
depending how we view it) the process which resulted in consolidating the position 
Rintoul elaborates on. And this, indeed, provides us with a valuable perspective on the 
forming of the Gothic’s paradigmatic indefinability. 
Apart from that, Gothic Writing is valuable for yet another reason. It was published 
two years before Fred Botting’s influential Gothic, early enough to be mentioned in it.2 
We could thus expect the two works to convey a similar perspective on the state of 
research. The changes in the field of literary criticism, those enabling the rise of serious 
interest in the marginalised forms such as Gothic fiction, which Botting speaks of, take 
place in the very same decade which is mentioned in Miles’ own introduction. But the 
two critics apply two different rhetorics to reflect on the period. One of the advantages 
of Miles’ account is that it tends to name moderately what the differentiation paradigm 
inscribes within a grander rhetoric of prejudice, resistance and successful overthrowing 
of limits. While Botting focuses on ‘the enabling’ of serious study by unsettling old 
boundaries, Miles, in the closing chapter of his book, openly names the paradigm which 
has been the driving force for his own as much as other more or less recent studies: the 
rejection of grand narratives.3 By the way, this rejection is what we might see as 
explaining his insistence on the multiplicity of Gothic dialectics, in the introduction to 
Gothic Writing. Miles’ “making room for difference”4 corresponds directly to Botting’s 
“challenging the hierarchies of literary value.”5 While Botting’s hierarchies immediately 
call for power(/knowledge) relations, Miles’ moving away from simple histories, 
simplistic readings and quests for deep structures in favour of more adequate 
(considering the complexity of the Gothic) theoretically informed readings seems 
strangely almost un-Foucauldian. 
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 We could say that both critics are influenced by the contemporary discourse, and, 
arguably, we would be right. But what is significant here is the fact that Miles’ assertion 
of, and conformity with, the establishment consensus that grand narratives are to be 
avoided is to be seen as admitting the foundation of the differentiation paradigm’s 
unwillingness to define. Grand narratives limit and exclude, which is an observation 
that could be well read along Botting’s lines. For Miles himself, avoiding such 
narratives seems to be, in the first place, a matter of doing justice to the multiplicity of 
the Gothic: a multiplicity which must, as it should seem to us, stem from the fact that 
the Gothic writing is crossed by discourse. And while we could observe that he 
nevertheless finds no difficulty in devising a workable definition for the carnivalesque 
mode he envisions the Gothic to represent, we cannot easily assert that his definition has 
a fully totalising or exclusive effect, at least considering the methodological premises he 
adopts. This becomes immediately visible in his justification for, as he views it, 
important omissions of canonical Gothic texts in his study: “No single dialectic includes 
all Gothic writing, and no single genealogy: there are only supplementary readings.”6 
Such an assumption immediately undoes totality. With this statement, what is opened is 
an immediate possibility of other genealogies and other axiomatically historical 
discursive inflections to be traced, intertwined in the fabric of what we take to represent 
the Gothic. 
Rintoul, as it was stated above, departs from a different point. She no longer writes 
about avoiding grand narratives, or liberating oneself. Instead, she would rather seem to 
advocate guarding the Gothic against fixing its boundaries and limiting its liberty, 
which, in spite of her final call for a critical self-scrutiny that would fill in a significant 
gap in the field, is properly paradigmatic. This can be seen in her own approach, which 
is to favour no approach: “Clearly, studying the Gothic has no best approach. While this 
review has attempted to discuss some of the benefits and pitfalls of particular 
approaches, I am not prepared to suggest that either the survey method or focused study 
method of reading the genre ought to be considered superior to the other.”7 Although 
each of the texts she analyses does, as she states, define the Gothic, in one way or 
another, what seems to be the greatest achievement of the field is the equality of 
approaches. 
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Not surprisingly, indefinability, though risky at times and generally frustrating, is 
established in the review article as clearly valuable. Rintoul focuses on the assumption, 
based upon her observations, that Gothic critics compete to represent the genre (for she 
still views the Gothic as a genre, even if this might be considered somewhat striking), as 
“fragmented and disjoined,”8 enacting the very same process of dialogue which actually 
made Gothic fiction so versatile and difficult to pinpoint. This is a perfectly just 
observation, but for Rintoul the situation proves problematic only where there is an 
attempt, on the part of the critic, to use the indefinability of the Gothic as a cover for 
imposing some sort of undesirable limits. According to her, such is, to a significant 
extent, the case with The Cambridge Companion to Gothic Fiction, edited by Jerrold 
Hogle. Analysing that work, Rintoul comes to the conclusion that, in spite of its 
insistence on the instability of Gothic fiction’s boundaries, the collection paradoxically 
relies on the canon and chosen patterns of selection when it comes to Gothic texts and 
themes. This results e.g. in the exclusion of feminist and related readings from the scope 
of the book. As she states, “Hogle favours a canonical approach, and from this approach 
one can glean that certain ages and nations are afforded more legitimacy than others in 
terms of Gothic writing.”9 On the other hand, the more diffused the understanding of the 
Gothic on the side of the authors and editors, and the broader the spectrum of possible 
contexts and contents as presented to the students, the better. We could sum up that 
Rintoul’s perspective is a direct ‘product’ of the process consciously engaged in by 
Miles, and rhetorically elevated by Botting. 
There is little room devoted to the consideration of how the drive for indefinability 
could be situated historically in Rintoul’s article. The reader is, instead, reminded of the 
explanatory mantra, characteristic to the late twentieth-century criticism, that the Gothic 
itself emphasises the unsettling of boundaries, which Rintoul seems to take for granted. 
There is also a brief discussion of Miles himself, whom she quotes as “lamenting”10 the 
lack of attempts at grasping the multifarious dialectics shaping the Gothic. What is, 
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however, discussed at some length are the ways in which the critics benefit, and 
therefore themselves contribute to, the lack of Gothic definition. Rintoul finds less fault 
with the remaining books she analyses. They either succeed in rendering the sense of 
the multifariousness of the Gothic in their attempt at a general but simultaneously 
disjunctive representation of the field, or focus strictly on chosen works and themes, 
providing rich contexts as well as bringing to one’s attention texts and forms which fall 
outside the Gothic canon. Subversion is visibly favoured here (for the lack of the works’ 
pointing to it is lamented on a few occasions); inability to define the Gothic is seen as 
productive. Although each work defines the Gothic to some extent, none advocates 
itself as containing it thoroughly, which allows the advent of various modes of 
interpretation, and the diminishment of the chances for exclusion. 
Rintoul does finally raise the question about the critic’s role in defining the genre. 
But while this indeed signals an understanding of the critic as actively involved in 
shaping his/her object of study, the effect of carrying out such a role seems to be noticed 
only in the case when the emergence of a new grand narrative becomes possible. In 
other cases, it is only minor infringements of the secured multifariousness and 
instability of the Gothic, omissions of marginal or subversive themes and texts, that rise 
the author’s doubts. However, one must admit that such an egalitarian approach to the 
issue of definition does pose a serious problem, one that goes beyond the framework of 
the differentiation paradigm, and one which must manifest itself in the long run. 
Namely, if all the approaches are equal, at what point does one lose the hold of the 
widest possible perspective on the subject, for it changes into an incomprehensible 
assembly of discordant readings and themes? 
This might seem a rhetorical question, but what is actually at stake here is the 
perspective we adopt. Considering a doubt such as the one stated in the previous 
paragraph while bearing in mind Fish’s criterion of what is acceptable in academia with 
regard to interpretation, we may assume that a situation in which one ultimately loses 
the hold is impossible, at least for those versed in the contemporary Gothic studies. 
There is always some key to the accepted way of reading, some underlying assumption 
as to what is supposed to be ‘done.’ For this very reason, there must also be an order of 
equal readings, mutually exclusive though they may be, even if it is not what we might 
expect it to be – even if, as Foucault tells us, this order is not immediately visible in the 
field as such. It is here that the real problem resides. What is the order – the key to 
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‘understanding’ the Gothic – that we are looking for? And does it truly serve to 
illuminate Gothic fiction? 
Miles makes us alert to what underlies the supposed indefinability of the Gothic, 
shedding light on the moment from which the differentiation paradigm gains an 
impetus. Rintoul’s article may serve well to illuminate the contemporary understanding 
of what is to be ‘done’ in the field of Gothic criticism. Bearing this in mind, we shall 
nonetheless undertake to answer the call she voices for the scrutiny of the ways in 
which Gothic criticism defines its own field. In this way, we hope to trace some 
discursive inflections of critical accounts, and to be able to analyse the manner in which 
the contemporary approach to the definition of the Gothic turns out to be functional in 
the critical discourse.  
As Rintoul’s remarks make us aware, there is a wealth of available definitions of the 
Gothic. This should not come as a surprise – as she notices, if critical accounts do 
contribute to the definition either by indicating how the Gothic can be read, or simply 
by emphasising one chosen aspect of it, each and every critical text should tell us 
something (which is, in fact, a truism). Rintoul distinguishes between two structural 
camps which undertake to define the Gothic, one focusing on providing a general 
understanding of the genre, the other on chosen works and themes.11 All the four studies 
she discusses represent one of the camps. We, however, shall approach the issue from 
another angle by scrutinising studies which overtly undertake to define Gothic fiction. 
This will entail delving more deeply into the period of Gothic studies to which Gothic 
Writing belongs, the 1980s and 1990s, the period which seems to have established the 
indefinability of the Gothic in the course of trying to structure a definition that might 
describe it most accurately. As we shall attempt to show, this ‘defining of the 
indefinability’ already discloses the functional dimension of the ‘spectralising’ of the 
Gothic definition, the dimension which is then clearly visible in Rintoul as much as in 
other ‘late’ criticism. Failing to be captured by the allure of the Gothic metaphor, 
however, we shall theorise this functionality using Eugenia C. DeLamotte’s concept of 
the shopping-list definition. This results from the fact that surveying late twentieth-
century Gothic criticism – and much of its twenty-first century continuations as well – 
one has a hardly resistible impression that what it does with texts is ‘shopping for the 
Gothic’ in a manner truly similar to that of a certain mock-Gothic heroine, Cherubina. 
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5.2. The Borderline Undone: J. M. S. Tompkins and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
  
As Miles’ states, the drive towards avoiding the grand narratives is noticeable in the 
general practice of critics in the 1980s. We shall begin with an early case, mentioned by 
Miles as well, and labelled by him as working against the shallowness of mid-century 
psychological readings, namely Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s The Coherence of Gothic 
Conventions. At the same time, we will attempt to show that reading Sedgwick against 
an example of an early Gothic scholar undoes one aspect of the basic distinction at the 
foundation of the differentiation paradigm, that is its sharp separation from the earlier 
scholarship. J. M. S. Tompkins is chosen here deliberately instead of a representative of 
the mid-century generation of critics, such as Masao Miyoshi, whose premises 
Sedgwick wishes to undercut, as her study is a conveniently distanced one, both in time 
and as far as the perspective it adopts is concerned. If the differentiation paradigm 
maintains that the earlier criticism worked to limit the understanding of the Gothic and 
contain its cultural powers within a safely constrained confine, the following analysis is 
aimed at showing how both earlier and late twentieth-century critics construe the 
Gothic, working each from within their own adopted discourse. As a result, in each 
case, the Gothic can emerge as functional in relation to a wider critical paradigm. Seen 
in this light, the borderline studies enumerated by the differentiation paradigm as 
enabling the shape taken by the contemporary criticism in terms of an intellectual 
breakthrough – and progress – can be discussed as fulfilling their function in a 
discursive shift. 
Since Gothic fiction is so strongly associated with ‘the past,’ let us for a brief 
moment succumb to the temptation of the Gothic metaphor and begin with the past of 
the Gothic criticism. In The Popular Novel in England, 1770-1800, first published 1932, 
J. M. S. Tompkins does not seem to have any significant problems with defining ‘the 
Gothic romance,’ which she does by means of listing and then elaborating on what she 
considers to be the exemplary members of the genre. Her prime examples are Radcliffe 
and Lewis, conveniently juxtaposed to illustrate the differences between the English and 
the German vein in the romances of the late eighteenth century. Of these two, quite 
predictably, Radcliffe is favoured, which can be felt at least if we consider the room 
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offered for the consideration of her novels.12 Both authors are, however, seen as 
descendants of Walpole’s The Castle of Otranto – which, nonetheless, is discussed in a 
separate chapter under the heading of the historical novel. There are other names 
mentioned, either as representing the genre or in some way related to it – and among 
these, there appear e.g. Reeve, Smollet, Lee, Roche, Smith, Godwin and Drake, as one 
might expect. Also, there are listed and discussed the most pervasive themes, places and 
characters, and the list goes, more or less, as follows: castle, decay, convent, 
imprisonment, forbidden love, the Inquisition, conspiracies and secret societies, the 
fantastic and mystery, hermits and monks, the rebel, the supernatural (also explained), 
vengeful ghosts, witchcraft, as well as the palpable influence of the sentimental novel, 
scattered and reassembled families, parental tyranny, and the persecuted heroine. There 
are also listed some themes which, though making an appearance, do not fit as closely 
as the remaining ones the paradigm according to which Tompkins perceives the genre: 
these are gypsies and slavery, “on which no romantic light has yet fallen.”13 
As this final quotation makes clear, Tompkins reads the Gothic romance as the 
eighteenth-century embodiment of the “notion of the romantic.”14 While she relates the 
information on the contemporary status of Radcliffe in the field of literary studies, she 
point out that “[m]ore and more one sees in her the focus of all the romantic 
tendencies”15: Radcliffe is to be seen as “unashamedly romantic,”16 rather than didactic, 
“the first poetess of romantic fiction.”17 Accordingly, the themes discussed by her, 
putting the aforementioned exceptions aside, are all marked with the romantic spirit and 
its perception of the world. Decay is “part of every romantic spell,”18 the prison 
becomes symbolic, the style is emotional, tyranny and guilt, ghastly and intolerable in 
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themselves, become elevated by “the romantic mood” which reshapes them for its own 
purpose.19 
Apart from that, Tompkins also views the Gothic in terms of its obvious 
contemporaneousness as opposed to the archaisms of the feudal past. This emerges for 
instance when she considers the theme of the decaying castle as combining not only the 
image of tyranny and melancholy but also “a gentle thrill of complacency.”20 While she 
recognises this complacency not to be explicit in Gothic works as such, and “for 
obvious reasons,” she nonetheless views the Gothic representation of the feudal abode 
as partaking in the perception of the ruin of a castle as indicative of progress and 
stability when it comes to the government, civilisation, individual safety and property.21 
Similarly, she classifies the Gothic protagonists as “projections of eighteenth-century 
ideals,” and while she points to Gothic anachronisms, she nonetheless perceives them as 
resulting from the demands of taste preferring “modern elegance” to historical 
accuracy.22 
If we adopted a limited perspective on her representation of the Gothic, we could 
conclude that Tompkins represents an early twentieth-century version of Eugenia 
DeLamotte’s shopping-list approach towards the definition of the Gothic. That would, 
in fact, comply nicely with DeLamotte’s periodization of Gothic criticism as 
characterised by the shopping-list approach until the 1960s.23 DeLamotte describes the 
approach, based on listing conventions, as originating in the late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century Gothic parodies, which, as she sees it, for the first time grouped 
together a number of novels recognised as Gothic today. What is characteristic of the 
approach is its reliance on stock characters and themes, or “similarities,” which become 
embodied by a shopping list that the protagonist of Eaton Stannard Barret’s The 
Heroine, Cherubina, draws in order to properly equip a newly acquired Gothic ruin.24 
The list goes as follows: “‘painted glass enriched with armorial bearings,’ ‘pennons and 
flags stained with the best old blood;— Feudal if possible,’ ‘antique tapestry sufficient 
to furnish one entire wing,’ ‘an old lute, or lyre, or harp,’ ‘a bell for the portal,’ black 
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hangings and curtains, and a velvet pall.”25 As DeLamotte observes, while it enables 
critics to identify the Gothic in a text, the shopping-list approach passes over the 
implications hidden behind the use of Gothic traces.26 We could paraphrase this 
statement by saying that while the approach is useful when it comes to placing a Gothic 
label on a text or an author (the practice criticised severely by Warwick27), it does not 
provide one with the satisfactory explanation of a possible impact of this label on 
meaning.  
DeLamotte enumerates Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s study as one of the works which 
launched a new approach to the Gothic. She describes this approach as based on trying 
to determine “what fear, what longing, what faith, or what despair” was to be conveyed 
by the application of “the tired vocabulary of Gothicism.”28 In Sedgwick’s own chapter 
on the definition of the Gothic in The Coherence of Gothic Conventions (first published 
1980), we read: 
 
You know the important features of its mise en scene: an oppressive 
ruin, a wild landscape, a Catholic or feudal society […] the trembling 
sensitivity of the heroine and the impetuosity of her lover […] the 
tyrannical older man with the piercing glance who is going to 
imprison and try to rape or murder them […] the novel’s form: it is 
likely to be discontinuous and involuted, perhaps incorporating tales 
within tales, changes of narrators, […] found manuscripts or 
interpolated histories […] priesthood and monastic institutions; 
sleeplike and deathlike states; subterranean spaces and live burial; 
doubles; the discovery of obscured family ties; affinities between 
narrative and pictorial art; possibilities of incest; unnatural echoes or 
silences, unintelligible writings, and the unspeakable; garrulous 
retainers; the poisonous effect of guilt and shame; [etc].29 
 
 
The description of what Sedgwick ironically labels as the pervasive conventions and 
predictable contents30 of the Gothic seems nowadays so clichéd that one might wonder 
what is the purpose of quoting it yet again, especially that a similar list has already 
appeared in this chapter. However, as we shall see, the use of the list by Sedgwick is 
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both rhetorical and vital for her own representation of the Gothic. She does not resign 
from enumerating conventions, but rather does so providing them with the meaning 
DeLamotte found lacking in the accounts written up to the 1960s. However, quite 
paradoxically, if we put DeLamotte aside and return to Tompkins, refusing to treat her 
representation of the Gothic as a shopping list, we shall see that the two lists, one by 
Tompkins, the other one by Sedgwick, are both dis- and similar, if closely inspected. 
Above all, their dissimilarity need not be accounted for in terms of DeLamotte’s 
periodization, and this periodization is vividly undercut by their similarity. What is the 
most important thing is the fact that Tompkins’ list lacks some of the elements 
mentioned by Sedgwick. This seems trivial to mention, but not because, as Sedgwick 
seems to state in a somewhat ironic manner, the list of Gothic conventions she gives is a 
summary of the lists found in “every work on the Gothic novel.”31  
Alongside others, this marginal remark, added in a footnote, discloses the ‘novelty’ 
of the standpoint that Sedgwick takes. She clearly refutes the simplistic thinking of the 
Gothic as a predictable set of conventions, which soon becomes codified as represented 
best by Railo and Summers. And then, she also attempts to distance her own study from 
the perspective taken by the mid-century predecessors. This is done most effectively, so 
with regard to the dismissive attitude taken by the early criticism, as the mid-century 
depth psychology approach, both when it comes to the arguments she presents and the 
rhetoric she uses. An example of this rhetoric can be found in her introduction, where 
her thesis ‘sandwiches’ the considerations of the topic: she begins by evoking a 
commonplace statement that Gothic is not a useful critical category, and ends with 
reversing it completely as a conclusion to the observations she makes in between. But 
above all, this rhetoric may also be traced in the very quotation above. Seemingly, it 
does not differ that much from DeLamotte’s typical shopping list, but in fact it 
anticipates Sedgwick’s own definition of the Gothic, based on the two emphasised 
central themes – live burial and the unspeakable. It also can be seen as disclosing, to an 
extent, her vantage point and the basis for the analyses to come – the Freudian twist. 
The double, as the contemporary theory of Gothic fiction teaches us, is always a 
suspiciously biased notion. Moreover, if we consider the ‘conventions’ enumerated in 
the proximity of the emphasised ones, it turns out that what is placed between 
“priesthood and monastic institutions,” representing the Gothic’s anti-Catholicism, the 
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aesthetic considerations in the form of “pictorial art” and its influences on writing, and 
the simply humorous “garrulous retainers,” reminiscent of Shakespeare, are themes 
immensely attractive to the psychoanalysts. What is the case here is clearly an attempt 
at describing Gothic conventions from a ‘meaningful’ perspective. 
Sedgwick example of a shopping list is thus not a simple evocation of an old cliché 
to be done away with. It serves its own purpose within the rhetoric adopted early in the 
study. Gothic conventions may seem to be narrow, but their narrowness is mitigated by 
“the range of tone and focus,”32 as much as “intent”33 displayed by works which follow 
the formula. Above all, they allow Sedgwick to ask her working questions: “why are 
these conventions found together in the gothic novel? Why did it take so long for one 
and another of the conventions to become disentangled from the formula and available 
to other novelistic traditions?”34 But then, despite the fact that it is visibly different from 
Sedgwick’s, Tompkins list is also not a ‘simple’ list of conventions, similar to 
Cherubina’s list of Gothic items. 
If Sedgwick’s list includes what is of immediate interest to her, the same can be said 
of Tompkins.’ Tompkins’ list is not a mere list of ‘empty conventions,’ a formula 
limited to requisites and themes: in her definition of the Gothic romance, these become 
filled with romantic signification. Hers is also the definition of the Gothic as ‘modern’ 
in the sense that it is rooted ‘here and now’ in the late eighteenth-century immediate 
English context, not ‘back then,’ in the Middle Ages, superstition and folklore, as the 
German Gothic. She writes: “The German Ritterroman, however, is often susceptible of 
political meaning; not only is its anti-clericalism more virulent than the picturesque 
iniquities evolved by English authors, but it is strongly marked by idealism of the feudal 
past and the Holy Roman Empire.”35 The ‘politics’ of Schauerroman is here clearly 
seen as divergent from the politics of eighteenth-century more moderate romance, the 
‘German’ context is not the ‘English’ one.  
These two perspectives, of tracing the romantic mood and simultaneously 
pinpointing the modern inflections of the Gothic, do clash at a point. We may, for 
example, find it surprising that Tompkins praises Radcliffe’s novels simultaneously for 
not being didactic and for complying with the demands of probability and the 
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expectations of the critics, anxious about the misconduct of youthful readership.36 The 
failure to see the connection here must, at least partly, result from the overall romantic 
paradigm adopted as a means of elevating Radcliffe to literary prominence. The 
romantic mood, organised around passion has little room for the novel’s tedious 
teachings and equating the Gothic with the romantic automatically annuls novelistic 
inflections. Such a critical step, all in all, proves not that different from Punter’s 
attempts at validating the Gothic through the Romantic credentials. 
There is most probably more than meets the eye in Tompkins’ emphasis on two 
strands of the Gothic romance, insistence on the Gothic’s romantic nature and the ease 
with which she views the Gothic as introducing eighteenth-century ideal characters. Yet 
even going only as far as we have until now, we may say that she construes the Gothic 
according to her own critical framework, the extra-textual context she operates in. This, 
inescapably, results in emphasising certain aspects of the object of her study at the cost 
of others. Her Gothic is the romantic Gothic. We could say she owns it, and if we 
assume she represents the critical discourse of her own period, it may become clear to 
us how it structures its own objects of study. 
Considering one of the bedrocks of the differentiation paradigm, namely the 
oppressiveness of the former approaches, this should not come as striking. However, the 
fact that Tompkins construes her object of study according to a critical paradigm is 
paradoxically what makes her both different from and similar to Sedgwick. Sedgwick is 
enumerated by Botting, after Punter, as one of the key contributors to the todays’ Gothic 
studies. Botting introduces her in the following way: “Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s book 
on Gothic conventions discloses the textuality of the genre, the play of narrative 
surfaces and metaphors that undermine assumptions of depth and hidden meaning.”37 
Her approach, presented thus, is to be seen as markedly different from what proceeded 
it; as contesting the traditional notions and patterns. The opposition is, however, based 
on the recourse to one particular strand of criticism which directly triggers Sedgwick’s 
response. She is not that markedly different from the earlier criticism when it comes to 
the certainty with which she delimits the premises from which she approaches the 
Gothic. And, as long this can be seen as representative of anything, we can also notice 
that while she is dissatisfied with the assumption that ‘the original Gothic’ and 
Victorian novels can be linked only on the basis of “their shared impetus towards the 
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pole of passion and away from that of reason,”38 which is, be as it may, an awfully 
romantic impetus, she does not say it is a wrong basis, but only an insufficient one. 
Quite similarly to Tompkins, Sedgwick relies on thematic regularities filled with 
signification dictated by an external paradigm. This paradigm is a psychoanalytical one, 
for references to Feud abound in critical moments of her analysis and play a decisive 
role when it comes to forming conclusions. But then, it is also a clearly structuralist one, 
for she strives to draw a governing structure according to which the Gothic conventions 
work. The conventions she is interested in are related to themes, or metaphors, such as 
the unspeakable or live burial, which are both explicitly used in the novels and “acted 
out” by them on different levels.39 To give an example, the unspeakable is such a theme 
for it both belongs to the Gothic register and emerges at particular points of the plot 
(when a character cannot speak), or can be detected in the very structure of the narrative 
(which can prove fragmentary).40 These themes, or conventions, are seen as 
representing subjects particularly interesting to the writers, and as congruent with one 
another; congruent in the sense that they can “mean” or be “about the same thing” or 
“encompass the same content.”41 Sedgwick assumes it is necessary to be careful not to 
reduce the Gothic to ‘one centred’ type of content, which she tries to escape by shifting 
her focus from one possible centre to another, and pointing to the variety of connections 
between themes instead of substituting them with one all-encompassing theme. In doing 
so, she may be seen as trying to avoid the ‘grand narrative’ such as that of Tompkins’ 
romantic Gothic, which is a discursive and obviously biased product for it relies on the 
romantic as the key to understanding the Gothic. And, obviously, she is trying to 
undermine the prevailing dialectic of seeing the Gothic as arranged in accordance to a 
vertical axis of surface and depth psychological meaning; to open the possibility of 
meaning distributed over the Gothic material in a different manner. But simultaneously, 
the structures she adopts to change the limiting perception of the Gothic are in 
themselves limiting and appropriating. It is more than telling that she names the types of 
content she recognises as Gothic as the phenomenological, the psychoanalytic and the 
structural,42 which, even if we treat it as merely metaphorical, still comes disturbingly 
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close to what Tompkins does while she designates the Gothic content as almost always 
‘romantic.’ 
Sedgwick is well aware that the types of content she enumerates reflect three critical 
schools. She does not see it as a problem, though. She limits herself to modestly assert 
she hopes to achieve “a fairly careful eclecticism,” so that centeredness does not take 
over the possibility of “mere contiguity.”43 Yet we might oppose that there should not 
be that much difference between ‘structuring’ the object by three different discourses 
and merely one discourse: in each case, the object emerges from within the paradigm 
used to account for it. Each time, some properties are given to the object at the cost of 
some others. Logically, the more discourses we ‘apply’ to the object – or the more 
discourses offer their own version of the object – the more distorted picture we ought to 
be bound to get. 
If in the case of Tompkins one may be surprised by the way she passes over the 
possibility of didacticism in Radcliffe, in the case of Sedgwick one may be similarly 
struck, for example, by the way she handles the interpretation of Emily Brontë’s 
Wuthering Heights. Sedgwick proposes, though “not definitely,” to envision the novel 
as “a therapy, in the course of which Brontë extricates herself from the demand for a 
relationship of identity with her main character and becomes educated to the necessity 
for signs and representations.”44 Such a model, for her, explains the structure of the 
novel, granting it coherence on all levels. Here, psychoanalysis serves well the 
structuralist drive. But taking into consideration the way Sedgwick was introduced by 
Botting, and her own assumed orientation away from naïve psychologising,45 it seems 
somewhat striking that in order to ‘explain’ the book – and to explain it as ‘Gothic’ – all 
in all, in spite of the intricacy of her overall insight, she finally makes Brontë lay down 
on the couch, as if she could not resist saying something about the author’s psyche. This 
bizarrely remind us of Marie Bonaparte doing the same with Poe.  
They key issue in question here is identity as a theme of Wuthering Heights. This 
theme becomes connected with the consideration of the unspeakable and doubleness of 
language as typically Gothic themes. For example, Sedgwick notices that Catherine fails 
to recognise herself by her face (the sign), which is interpreted as one of the arguments 
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in favour of Cathrine’s “denial of doubleness”46 between language and herself, and her 
urge for directness and immediacy, the power of which language cannot grant her in 
spite of her wish. The way in which Catherine ‘wants’ her language to effect real 
power, over herself and others, or to express herself immediately and directly, is 
discussed at length. The consideration of Catherine’s assertion that she is Heathcliff, or 
that Heathcliff is more her then she herself is, is also given much attention, either as an 
example of the manner in which Catherine wills language to almost magically transform 
reality, or in terms of unresolved “psychoanalytic siblingship.”47 Sedgwick does notice 
that Catherine never has an occasion to say ‘I am Catherine,’ but this comes as a 
marginal remark, for she is much more interested in how Heathcliff and Catherine shift, 
and whether the former can be discussed as a fantasy of the previous (in terms of 
Catherine’s rejected doubleness, for Heathcliffe is both one with her and a dreadful 
other). What Sedgwick aims at is, first, to assert that Heathcliff, with all his 
indeterminacy, is “the novel’s fantasy about its own character,”48 and, finally, to arrive 
at her suggestion about the novel as a therapy for Brontë. Interestingly, she begins the 
chapter by quoting a passage from the book in which Catherine, the name, is juxtaposed 
with – respectively – Earnshaw, Heathcliff and Linton as possible surnames, but she is 
more interested in the consideration of the similarity between Lockwood’s ghost 
adventure at Wuthering Heights and the function of dreams in what we could perhaps 
feel free to call the Gothic structure, rather than in the identity theme suggested by the 
exchange of surnames as Catherine’s modifiers.49 
It is interesting how Sedgwick’s account oscillates around the possibility of 
Catherine being a spectral presence without noticing it. Catherine is, indeed, introduced 
for the first time as a ghost. In each and every case Sedgwick does not make the 
connection which almost forces itself on her reader: that Catherine’s problem with 
language stems from the fact that she cannot express herself for she is not, or is only 
spectral. Reading Sedgwick, going through the quotation she provides, one realises that 
Catherine’s identity is always ‘borrowed.’ Heathcliff, Earnshaw, Linton – all denote a 
different Catherine, and in each case, Catherine is defined by the surname. At the 
moment when the protagonist is left with herself, she perceives herself as a ghost, a 
haunting presence, the presence which has never been uttered or, at least, was not 
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listened to (as when Nelly Dean refuses to treat Catherine’s threats of starving herself 
seriously). What is more, her identity will remain unuttered, for Lockwood will not let 
her in, even at the cost of mutilating the ghost which bleeds, literally and brutally 
‘cutting if off’ from existence. 
Similarly as in the case of Tompkins, the question is why the critic does not make the 
connection. What is especially striking is the fact that this connection would combine 
well, at least potentially, with the remaining analysis, and might serve to establishes a 
somewhat sounder relationship between the author and her characters, one not 
necessarily based on investigating into Brontë’s own internal life. We might risk to 
answer that drawing the connection would demand introducing another centre of 
attention, or structure, into the analysis, and this structure has not been defined by 
Sedgwick as inherently Gothic. For Sedgwick, the novel is ultimately classified as 
Gothic precisely for what she recognises to be the Gothic conventions it internalises. 
One of them is the theme of the unspeakable realised at various levels: Catherine’s and 
Heatcliffe’s use of language, Heathcliffe’s indeterminacy, the novel’s puzzling structure 
of events and narrators. The other, related, is doubleness: the lack of unity between the 
substance and the sign, the protagonists’s state of being “massively blocked off from 
something to which it [i.e. the self] ought normally to have access,”50 and the 
terribleness of the moment of potential unification51 – of the ghost’s entering of the 
world of language – which is banned from the novel, never realised, contained yet 
always lurking ‘behind the window.’52 Interestingly, in the light of those assumptions, 
Sedgwick admits that the latter part of the novel, dedicated to Cathy, Linton and 
Hareton, is not that Gothic53 – and performs what might be seen as an act of explaining 
it away by building the Gothic interpretation of Wuthering Heights on the returning 
threat of the doubles (Catherine/Heathcliffe, Catherine/Emily). As a result, the Freudian 
twist (inviting the author to the coach) proves to be necessary to make a large portion of 
the text meaningful within the assigned structure, and stimulated by precisely the search 
for such a structure that would reflect the assumptions about the Gothic and fulfil itself 
on every level. Consequently, the analysis is bound to leave certain possible traits – or 
statements – out, finding them not that much valued as false, as simply inexistent. The 
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definition of the Gothic illustrated by Sedgwick’s reading of Wuthering Heights, in spite 
of the recourse to eclecticism, turns out to be discursive. 
We could sum up by stating that the paradigm adopted by Sedgwick forces itself on 
her reading of a Victorian novel, just as the romantic paradigm forces itself upon 
Tompkins’ Gothic romance. The attempts at applying depth psychology to the Gothic, 
and viewing the Gothic as a genre concentrated primarily on masculine protagonists and 
their internal struggles – the occupation of the mid-century critics – seen in the contexts 
of the analysis of both female critics, emerge as embodying only one more possible, 
more or less justifiable, but still limiting perspective on the Gothic. In all the cases, both 
on the side of what proceeded the contemporary Gothic criticism, and on the side of the 
border-case studies that the contemporary Gothic criticism wishes to embrace, the 
Gothic – the object – is structured by the dominant paradigm of the discourse – or set of 
discourses – which claims it. Thus, as the comparison of Tompkins and Sedgwick 
shows, the borderline which the differentiation paradigm draws to distinguish itself 
from earlier criticism can be undone, at least in one way. 
As it was mentioned earlier in this part of the chapter, Sedgwick’s account can serve 
as an example of turning away from ‘grand narratives’ which would ‘fix’ the Gothic. It 
aims at eclecticism, at showing how possible centres of attention within the Gothic 
interact and prove to be interconnected and coherent without naming the one which 
prevails and proves the core. At the same time, however, it ought to be noted that 
Sedgwick, as much as she works to liberate herself from the limits of the depth 
psychology approach, does not entirely preclude it; rather, she reinscribes it within her 
own spatial model – that of the self being cut off from what it should have a free access 
to – assimilating surface-depth axis but only as one possible way of reading the Gothic. 
As she puts it although her “model is not inconsistent with psychological interpretation, 
it is distinct and recognisable without it.”54 There is a particular reason for stressing this 
fact while discussing the ‘spectralisation’ of the Gothic definition. 
Traditionally, we would expect the Gothic to have this one defining, graspable 
quality which makes it what it is. But Sedgwick performs a movement which at the 
same time expands the field she is interested in – her definition, or structure, is more 
capacious for it contains both what was already recognised as Gothic and yet opens 
itself to more – and makes its defining qualities less tangible (or fleshy). This is for the 
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reason that although there are three types of content, or meaning, inherent in the Gothic, 
the attention each of them is given is to constantly shift, without any of them being 
singled out. This is the very kind of approach that we recognise, though in an advanced 
form, in Rintoul.  
And there is yet more to it. Just as Sedgwick speaks openly of the Gothic ‘content’ in 
terms of critical schools, each of which has a discursive potential to structure their 
objects, so she speaks openly of the aim of her re-spatialisation of the earlier 
understanding of the Gothic. As she states, by the way she redefines the Gothic 
conventions, she wishes to “make it easier for the reader of ‘respectable’ nineteenth-
century novels to write ‘Gothic’ in the margin next to certain especially interesting 
passages, and to make that notation with a sense of linking specific elements in the 
passage with specific elements in the constellation of Gothic conventions.”55 What we 
ought to recognise here is the drive, characteristic of the differentiation paradigm, to 
change the literary status of the Gothic. This time, however, the critic does not provide 
the Gothic with the Romantic credentials (although romantic passion is not denied its 
place in the Gothic constellation, it is not sufficient to make the Gothic a respectable 
context for nineteenth-century ‘serious’ prose), but as if turns to “respectable” Victorian 
novel for support. The conclusions drawn from the union are as follows: The Gothic is 
not simply the late-eighteenth century Radcliffean romance. It lasts well into the next 
century. This is, obviously, an attempt at once again validating the Gothic. And – the 
final thing to be stressed – it too serves to further ‘spectralise’ the Gothic definition by 
envisioning a structure which ‘works’ for a much broader body of fiction, but is 
simultaneously less ‘substantial.’ 
 
5.3. Going Shopping: The Decade after the Breakthrough 
 
While Sedgwick is interested in extending the scope of Gothic fiction so that it can 
include the Victorian novel, David Punter wishes to extend it so that it comprises the 
eighteenth-, nineteenth- and twentieth-century works. This obviously makes the domain 
he ventures into larger, and much more indiscriminate. The problem with Sedgwick’s 
structure is that it passes over what it cannot assimilate while emphasising the 
conventions that can be applied outside the so called First Wave Gothic. Punter’s theory 
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of the Gothic faces this problem in a macro scale. What is more, while Sedgwick’s 
discursive frame is strictly structural – her Gothic is a pattern of recurring formal 
features, carrying the particular meaning, estimated by recourse to e.g. Freud – Punter 
emphasises the Gothic as a reflection of the psychological state of the middle-class, 
immersed in Marxist history, which creates a much greater – and graver – potential for 
re-construction of the mode along the lines of two powerful twentieth-century 
discourses. Hence, discussing Punter after Sedgwick proves beneficial when it comes to 
illuminating how the Gothic definition is made less and less possible (and more and 
more a construct) while more and more new areas are included into the field of Gothic 
fiction, and theoretically-based tools applied. 
 This is, however, not the only reason for choosing to tackle Sedgwick first. There 
are two interesting points about Punter’s 1980s definition of the Gothic. One of them is, 
of course, the fact that Punter himself is not that eager to repeat it twenty years later, in 
his companion, but rather turns to pointing out the difficulties that the Gothic poses as a 
category. Perhaps this is self-explanatory. The 2000 edition of the Blackwell companion 
already represents a diversified collection of vantage points and perspectives presented 
in 24 chapters, and its succeeding edition of 2012, whose introduction is an almost 
identical copy of the 2000 one, adds further twelve. The other thing is that none of the 
two later and strictly feminist studies, by DeLamotte and Williams, which will be 
discussed in this chapter, lists Punter’s contribution as vital. At the same time, both 
undertake to define the Gothic by explicitly addressing the legacy left by earlier critics. 
DeLamotte’s example could be given immediately. According to her periodization of 
the Gothic criticism up to and after the 1960s, the approaches which initiate the 
beneficial changes are listed as follows:  
 
Works that ask such questions [i.e. questions about the meaning 
hidden behind Gothic conventions] have attempted, for example, to 
define a Gothic ‘monomyth’ and relate it to ‘dark Romanticism’ 
(Thompson); to explain ‘the coherence of Gothic conventions’ 
(Sedgwick) or the ‘deep structures’ of the genre (Levy); to trace, in 
later works, the development of its symbolic resources (Nelson); to 
place the Gothic in the context of women's psychology and social 
status (Doody, Fleenor, Gilbert and Gubar, Holland and Sherman, 
Kahane, Moers, Nichols, Ronald, Wolff); to trace a persistent Gothic 
tradition in England (Wilt), America (Fiedler, Ringe), or the 
twentieth-century South (Malin).56 
                                                           
56
 DeLamotte, Perils of the Night, p. 5. 
  196
Punter, as can be seen, is missing from the list; moreover, he is not named even once in 
the entire book, published 1990, although he appears in the bibliography. Both studies, 
however, utilise Sedgwick more or less directly, which reminds us that Gothic criticism 
is a divided field even if the differentiation paradigm strives to establish its unity – 
notably, by turning to indeterminacy as a golden mean. 
Yet Punter does attempt at defining – theorising – the Gothic, and his attempt 
discloses the same inflection towards discursivity as the thematic conventions discussed 
by Sedgwick. What is more, it is vital that his theory-based definition self-consciously 
aspires to the status of a theory too, and this theory has indeed become highly influential 
in the field. We shall begin our scrutiny of the decade of the 1980s with a consideration 
of this theory. Then, however, since, as we can see, Punter is not always represented as 
the Father-figure presiding over the field, we shall shift our focus to have a look at an 
attempt at the Gothic definition organised along a different axis, namely George 
Haggerty’s perspective on the Gothic form as a tale. The shift from the application of 
cultural theories to the consideration of form may appear somewhat out of place here. 
However, Haggerty’s considerations do not abstain from quoting e.g. Kristeva, and 
referring to his colleagues’ theory-based works. What is more, he asserts that his 
discussion of the Gothic form is meant to explain the immediacy with which 
psychological or political perspective is adopted for reading Gothic fiction. And finally, 
his proposed definition of the Gothic practically grants it indefinability, at least as far as 
thematic approaches are concerned. In the final section of this subchapter, we shall 
arrive at DeLamotte’s own vision of the Gothic at the dawn of the next decade. With 
DeLamotte, we shall return to the thematic approach to defining the Gothic, but this 
time, as a result, we shall see how the Gothic may be constructed from a feminist 
perspective. 
 
David Punter’s “Towards a theory of the Gothic” 
 
“Towards a theory of the Gothic,” Punter’s closing chapter, devoted to defining 
Gothic fiction, begins with a brief overview of the definitions made available by the 
1980s, but concentrates on what Punter calls the “heart” of Gothic fiction.57 Generally, 
he divides the defining criteria into two groups: the external and the internal ones. 
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Included into the first group are: the cultural/historical definition, which treats the 
Gothic as a response to eighteenth-century social and cultural context; the focus on 
narrative complexity; and the Gothic’s propensity to draw freely from various literary 
traditions and genres.58 All of these are found to be “subsidiary elements in the Gothic’s 
general opposition to realist aesthetics,” the criterion treated by Punter as the basis for 
“[defining] a unitary ‘Gothic tradition.’”59 As far as the second group is concerned, the 
heart of the Gothic is defined by three vital concepts, that is: paranoia, the barbaric and 
taboo. Paranoia is here linked to the reader’s experience of disturbed reality while 
reading a Gothic novel; the barbaric is connected with the fear of reaching the limits of 
civilization; and taboo with working on the borderline of the acceptable.60 
There are many points in this theory on the Gothic at which discursive inflections 
can be observed. However, from our perspective, it is the most beneficial to illuminate 
those at which Punter refers to the theme of history. We have chosen to treat the Gothic 
as always crossed by the contemporary discourses, to use Miles’ phrase; to be always 
rooted in and to reflect on the prevailing discourses of given times, and hence to be 
always contemporaneous in the most literal sense. Consequently, what proves 
immediately important to us is, first of all, Punter’s handling of the historical definition, 
and, second of all, the later part of his considerations, devoted to the internal group of 
criteria, whenever it deals with the historical aspect of the Gothic. This is for a simple 
reason. It seems that if we juxtapose Punter’s understanding of the historical dimension 
of the Gothic with our own, what should be consequently illuminated is the way in 
which this dimension is actively reworked by Punter’s discourse so that it suits the 
discourse’s overall governing assumptions. 
Initially, we could find it quite promising that Punter begins with a criterion that 
stresses the grounding of the Gothic in its immediate historical context. However, as 
soon as he discloses his understanding of this criterion, we notice that it is thoroughly 
distinct from the way we would understand the historical context. Like other external 
criteria, Punter acknowledges, the one of the historical-cultural relevance has been 
elaborated in reference to the First Wave Gothic and the eighteenth century. 
Nonetheless, he finds it relevant also with regard to later Gothic works.61 The 
consistency he traces lies, however, not in the way these works reflect on their own 
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historical-cultural contexts, even though that would be much in tune with his own 
premise that the vitality of a genre is a result of its engagement in the matters of social 
concern at a given time.62 Instead, Punter focuses on the ways in which later works 
evoke the eighteenth-century Gothic as such, through utilising its stylistic or satirical 
conventions, archaism, or emphases on certain types of architecture and setting, which 
he sees as the proof of “the continuity of Gothic’s central concerns.”63 These concerns, 
like Gothic conventions, are thus immediately identified as the common axis for more 
than a two-hundred-years-old body of fiction, and they are exemplified by Lytton’s 
nineteenth-century fiction, or more precisely its “insistence on portraying codes of 
behaviour and honour which are not grounded in the value-system of the bourgeoisie.”64 
Thus, the common axis for Gothic fiction is structured as that of the anti-bourgeois 
attitude. 
We observe that although Punter provides himself with the basis for establishing 
contemporaneousness as the major characteristic of the Gothic, he thoroughly fails to 
notice it. Quite on the contrary, it seems that the definition which limits the Gothic to its 
eighteenth-century incarnation is somewhat strangely extended by him so that is can 
work for the later Gothic as well (original formal features and stock devices reappear). 
It should not, of course, come as a surprise that later writers draw from the broad 
spectrum of the ‘original’ Gothic styles, settings, or generally conventions. Yet we 
could account for such a continuous recourse to the stock conventions throughout the 
extensive body of the Gothic in a number of different ways, probably depending on the 
author or the particular text in consideration, instead of by emphasising ‘the unity of 
concerns.’ That is one thing. 
Another thing is that, in Punter’s case, the eighteenth century itself is understood in a 
particular and distinct way, as a moment of change whose consequences are still felt, 
and it is this understanding that allows it to become the core thread for continuity.65 
However, Punter strangely contradicts himself at this point – on the one hand, he 
assumes that the Gothic persists since it always tries to tackle the concerns of the day; 
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on the other, he assumes these concerns have not changed for over two hundred years. 
All the more, these central concerns need not boil down to the anti-bourgeois attitude. 
In fact, there is much evidence to support the stance that they cannot. As we noticed 
earlier in this chapter while discussing Tompkins, whose account is also quoted by 
Chris Baldick and Robert Mighall as a decently historical one,66 the early Gothic can be 
easily discussed in terms of its inherent ‘modernity,’ instead of in terms of turning 
against the bourgeois reality. As a result, we could hypothesise that what Punter chooses 
to perform while discussing the historical definition of the Gothic in order to make it 
account for an extensive body of texts are two moves. One goes up a timescale – 
conventions reappear from the beginning of the mode to the present day. The other one 
goes down that scale – it departs from a present day assumption to account for a body of 
texts which may have little to do with that assumption’s immediate context. 
Our hypothesis immediately gains some justification if we remember our 
considerations of the assumption of the Gothic’s opposition towards realism, 
Enlightenment and Augustanism, carried out in the first chapter. It is useful to evoke 
these considerations now, for they illuminate how the axiom of the anti-Enlightenment 
attitude of the Gothic effectively serves to rework the mode’s representation. Above all, 
it is also this very axiom, the perceived alliance of Gothic fiction and Romanticism, to 
be held responsible for Punter’s conviction that the central concerns of the Gothic are 
continuous. As a matter of fact, all Gothic fiction is claimed to be anti-realist, according 
to his theory. We have already discussed how workable such an assumption is. Based 
on what Foucault would call a ruse, the assumption that the Gothic is Romantic 
becomes anachronistically projected on the texts of the past, as a result of which 
continuity can indeed be seen as traced back to the ‘original’ Gothic. It is another thing 
that this continuity is fake. 
Before we move on to confirm our hypothesis, we may notice that it proves to be 
somewhat striking, in the light of the above considerations, that only two pages later 
Punter speaks of “the ‘historical Gothic’”67 as illustrating the fear of the past. From our 
own perspective, this again should sound promising. His mentioning of this category of 
Gothic fiction is connected with the introduction of the concept of the barbaric as the 
‘internal’ feature of the mode. The example of the fear of the past is the fear of the 
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aristocratic world, epitomised in the figure of the vampire. Simultaneously, the barbaric 
emerges in nineteenth-century Gothic fiction, engaged in the question of the degeneracy 
of human species, and twentieth-century one, which turns out to be anxious about the 
shape of humanity in the future.68 As a result, the conclusion is drawn that the Gothic 
“brings us up against the boundaries of the civilised,” emphasising the relativeness of 
conventions, ethics and codes of behaviour.69 This could, again, position the Gothic as, 
nonetheless, contemporaneous.70 In that case, when it comes to early historical Gothic, 
the immediate context could be deciphered as a ‘modern’ one, reinforcing the 
eighteenth-century codes through depicting a potential feudal threat, rather than anti-
bourgeois. But then, Punter soon proves to view the question from a thoroughly 
different angle. 
The fear of the past, mentioned early in the chapter, is later on illuminated through 
Marxist-based considerations of the historical moment at which the Gothic emerges. 
Punter views this moment as connected with the Industrial Revolution, which he 
discusses in terms of the falling down of the old social structure and order, and the 
emergence of a new system. This system is immediately classified as unstable, and, 
furthermore, it is meant to influence the shape of Gothic literature by making it display 
an ambivalent attitude towards the bygone era of feudalism.71 The present middle-class 
fears, those connected with the instability of the new system, are here displaced and 
projected onto the ancient structures, which nonetheless retain some allure based on 
nostalgia for the lost order: 
 
The ‘borderland’ attitude of Gothic to the past is a compound of 
repulsion and attraction, fear of both the violence of the past and its 
power over the present, and at the same time longing for many of the 
qualities which that past possessed. In Gothic the middle class 
displaces the hidden violence of present social structures, conjures 
them up again as past, and falls promptly under their spell. […] The 
code of Gothic is thus not a simple one in which past is encoded in 
present and vice versa, but dialectical, past and present intertwined, 
each distorting each other with the sheer effort of coming to grips.72 
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As a result, the fear of the past is not simply the fear of feudalism as threatening the 
modern way of living, as it could be viewed, for example, if we consider Tompkin’s 
position on the ‘modernity’ of the Gothic. It becomes the projection of the fear of the 
present. In a peculiar way, the bourgeoisie fears itself.  
In this way, although the vantage point for Punter’s considerations is again 
‘historically’ promising, we remain on the level of the anti-bourgeois attitude, where the 
attitude is seen as inherent in the late eighteenth-century middle-class itself.73 It is as if 
Gothic fiction was a type of literature aimed at disclosing the very (Freudian) 
discontents of the order that the bourgeoisie themselves raised: the relative status of 
their own civilisation and its borders. And this is exactly what Punter says: “Gothic 
enacts psychological and social dilemmas: in doing so, it both confronts the bourgeoisie 
with its limitations and offers it modes of imaginary transcendence, which is after all the 
dialectical role of most art.”74 Yet as soon as one refuses to perceive the Gothic in terms 
of the messed-up bourgeois psyche, one may start to wonder whether Punter is indeed 
accurate in his application of Marx to the explanation of the emergence of Gothic 
fiction. Marxist-based reading of the Gothic is a recurring theme in Gothic studies. It is 
especially its construction of the middle class that proves attractive to the critics: from 
the Marxist-Freudian perspective, the Gothic is a bourgeois literature which continues 
because it constitutes a space in which the ‘other’ in the bourgeois can be projected on 
the outside and denied. Such an interpretation initially seems to hold, but then there are 
points at which Punter appears to overestimate the explanatory power of Marx – or, to 
use Eco’s terms, starts overinterpreting.  
The first of such points seems to be connected with the explicit gap that Marx sees 
between the bourgeoisie and proletariat. If Gothic fiction is a bourgeois literature, read, 
for afforded, mainly by the middle-class – and this is Punter’s argument meant to 
vindicate the Gothic as the literature of the educated – and if the middle-class thrives on 
capitalism, is it truly adequate to discuss the Gothic as “literature of alienation”75 using 
Marx’s notions of the alienation from the products of one’s labour, the natural world, 
one’s own humanity and, finally, oneself? Punter enumerates a number of texts which 
seem to confirm his train of thought; these are respectively: Frankenstein, The Island of 
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Doctor Moreau and Kafka’s “Metamorphosis”; Titus Groan; The Monk, Turn of the 
Screw and Invasion of the Body Snatchers; Peeping Tom, Repulsion and Cat People.76 
At the first sight, all of these could be seen as tackling the issue of alienation. But if one 
begins to think about it (and about the rule of economy, also as discussed by Eco) is, for 
example, the alienation from the product of one’s labour really meant to be the 
governing idea for Victor Frankenstein’s monster-making and monster-rejection? It is a 
fact that both Wollstonecraft and Godwin, the perhaps most immediate influences on 
Shelley, were radicals, but it does not seem historically correct to reduce them to 
prophesying Marx. Of course, Punter does not make such a connection – but neither 
does he make any other, except for the assumption that the Gothic reflects the troubled 
bourgeois psyche in need of a mode of transcendence. As it seems, this conflicted 
psyche must be bourgeois, or else the possible motives for its being conflicted could 
possibly be innumerable (and in the case of Mary Shelley, would have to include at 
least a multi-layered birth trauma77).  
It should seem that Marx is not that much occupied with the bourgeois psyche, torn 
between what it perpetuates and fears at the same time. Instead, he is focused strictly on 
the proletariat, the victims of the bourgeoisie’s cold reasoning and calculations. As to 
the bourgeoisie, in the Communist Manifesto we read: 
 
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to 
all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder 
the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors”, and 
has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked 
self-interest, than callous “cash payment”. It has drowned the most 
heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of 
philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It 
has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the 
numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, 
unconscionable freedom — Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, 
veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, 
shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.78 
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Taking into consideration different periodizations of the Industrial Revolution, one 
might pose the question whether early eighteenth-century Gothic fiction, for instance 
that of Walpole or Reeve, may indeed be seen as possible to be contextualised by the 
Industrial Revolution in the form discussed by Marx. Similarly, one could ask whether 
it makes much sense to discuss Ambrosio as alienated from his “‘species-being.’”79 
Perhaps it makes, but judging by the quotation above, were it not for the psychological 
assumption that the Gothic enacts conflicting drives of the bourgeois – the assumption 
that the Gothic is anti-middle-class at heart – such a contextualisation might just as well 
reveal early Gothic fiction to be far removed from representing a sphere offering 
symbolical transcendence. 
There seem to be two ways in which contemporary (new)historicists discuss class 
depiction in early Gothic novels. One of them is to assume that works of Walpole and 
Reeve depict a restoration of old aristocratic ties and rightful inheritance. According to 
James Watt, The Old English Baron, to give an example, redeems aristocracy for 
strictly patriotic reasons. Watt states: “Reeve accentuated the role of legitimacy and 
property in her plot, so as to purge Otranto of its frivolity and provide a reassuring 
moral and patriotic fable during a period of national crisis.”80 The other one is to, quite 
conversely, see the eighteenth-century ‘ideals’ as nonetheless promoted over the strictly 
feudal code of ownership and primogeniture. An illustration of this approach could be 
E.J. Clery’s reading of the very same work. Recounting the plot of The Old English 
Baron, Clery notices that soon after the duel between sir Phillip and Lord Lovel, “the 
knights and barons remove their armour and […] roll up their shirt sleeves” to settle the 
conditions – the ‘business’ – of Edmund taking over the estate, which he is a rightful 
heir to, from Baron Fitz-Owen, who has made an investment in both the estate and 
Edmunds upbringing for over twenty years.81 As she concludes, “[t]he assorted fifteenth 
century noblemen have the appetites and (idealised) instincts of eighteenth-century men 
of commerce.”82 Both of these readings, no matter which we find closer to the fact, 
undercut Punter’s psychoanalytical-Marxist perspective.  
What proves the weak point this time is the Freudian inflection of Punter’s theory. If 
Watt is right, then we have a confirmation of nostalgia for the past order as displayed by 
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the eighteenth-century text, but this nostalgia has less to do with resolving a conflict in 
the bourgeois psyche as it is evoked to be actively involved in shaping the perception of 
the nation. It is to be seen as strictly political, idealising the chosen elements of the past 
for the sake of constructing the present, and not escaping from it. On the other hand, if 
we choose to follow Clery, we will also find it difficult to perceive the Gothic as serving 
to resolve an internal psychological conflict. Instead, Gothic fiction will have to be seen 
as ostensibly pro-middle-class, and not in any way anti-bourgeois. Quite probably, 
Marxist criticism might have a lot to say about the Gothic text in question in both cases, 
as much as it might have plenty to say about later texts such as, to resort to the obvious, 
Dracula. However, without the psychoanalytical grounding, even if it would not reveal 
Gothic texts of various periods to be strikingly different, it would still produce quite 
different readings from those preferred by the contemporary Gothic criticism, which 
clearly takes the anti-bourgeois stance.83 
 At this point, one may seriously wonder whether it is not obvious that the common 
axis adopted by Punter precludes certain readings of particular Gothic texts, 
anachronistically imposing on them readings which confirm the continuity of concerns. 
The combined Freudian-Marxist perspective serves well Punter’s theory of the Gothic, 
for it does provide a unified framework in accordance to which the Gothic might be 
discussed, supposedly as a whole. But in this theory Freud and Marx are used to 
reinforce each other. Without one, the other soon diverges from the preferred course, 
taking the act of defining the Gothic to the extremes. 
Let us return to the initial pages of “Towards a theory” and the way they introduce 
the historical dimension of the Gothic, for this may allow us to better comprehend why 
Punter does not find it questionable that the bourgeoisie is meant to relish anti-
bourgeois fiction. The historical aspect of the Gothic emerges in yet another way there, 
namely through the discussion of the distorted perception of the past, characteristic of 
Gothic fiction. As Punter states, “the Gothic revivalists of the eighteenth century could 
not properly ‘see’ the areas of history which they were trying to revive,” yet not due to 
the fact that they failed in their attempts at ‘seeing,’ but because “the whole weight of 
the eighteenth-century synthesis lay against the possibility of perceiving the medieval 
world aright.”84 This is a third time when Punter seems to make a valuable observation, 
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one which could be very much in tune with Baldick and Mighall’s insistence on 
perceiving Gothic fiction as embodying “partisan and self-consciously Protestant 
approach to historical representation,” based on deliberate reconfiguration of the past as 
a foil for the present.85 However, quite predictably, he draws dissimilar conclusions. For 
him, the fact that Gothic fiction misrepresents history is a result of the mode’s complex 
relation to realism. The Gothic’s ‘unreal’ (which means improper, anachronistic) 
depiction of the past becomes connected with the fact that the mode enters into a debate 
with realists, utilising their insights but simultaneously focusing on symbolism and 
myth-making as the primary occupation of the writer.86  
Again, while Punter makes a thoroughly justified observation, he fails to notice the 
opportunities it gives. It does not seem to be the case that misrepresentation of history, 
resulting from the impossibility of seeing history properly, was a recurring “problem”87 
faced by the Gothic – definitely not the early one. Nonetheless, the drive towards 
assuming the anti-realist perspective as the governing principle of the mode has an 
immediate impact on the way the statement on the impossibility of ‘seeing properly’ is 
taken account of. Recognising the “Whiggish” agenda is not a proposition to be 
considered in the discourse assumed by Punter.88 In this discourse, the Gothic is striving 
to portray the world as not simply governed by cause-and-effect laws but rather, on 
many occasions, inexplicable, comprising “moments of terror and vision,”89 and hence, 
as more complete and ‘as it really is.’ 
Obviously, Gothic fiction is full of moments when reason is suspended and reverie 
takes the hold of both the protagonist and the reader. But again, there are different ways 
in which we could account for resorting to such a mechanism, and not all of them come 
down to the assumption that the Gothic writer wishes to show that realism is not the 
whole story. Yet in “Towards a theory,” such an assumption seems to be ‘the whole 
story.’ Punter’s account of the anti-realistic impulse of the Gothic finally ends up in 
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turning the Gothic into an entirely psychological domain: Gothic fiction becomes the 
embodiment of the state of “delirium […] the experience of being at the mercy of 
conflicting and unassimilable impressions,”90 inherent in one’s life. Realism, on the 
other hand, becomes a post facto reconstruction of “a single model,” one obliterating 
“the intensity and immediacy of life.”91 This psychological domain is then translated 
into a strictly psychoanalytical one as Punter evokes Freud to support the view that life 
consists of the acts of mythologizing, both of ourselves and the world we live in.92 
Through such a use of a psychological model of the Gothic, Punters is free to claim it as 
‘realistic’ as any realist novel.93 This, perhaps, ought to be seen as an attempt at 
dismissing realism as the empowered discourse. Yet, simultaneously, it could be 
considered as a case of using the empowered discourse to pursue the causes of a 
‘minority’: with its insistence on portraying human imagination as it is, the psycho-
Gothic may be well established – even though it is not overtly proclaimed so, for Punter 
does not do that – as having more right to the status of ‘being realist’ than realism itself. 
Be as it may, Punter again uplifts the Gothic from debasement, this time not by aligning 
it with Romanticism, but by psychologising it so that it proves truly ‘realistic.’ 
While Sedgwick proposes a structural framework of conventions to extend Gothic 
fiction into the Victorian period, and, consequently, passes over whatever falls beyond 
that framework, Punter abandons conventions for the sake of psychology and fixes the 
Gothic meaning as psychoanalytical. Even if he applies Marxism to historically 
contextualise the Gothic, such a contextualisation seems to hold for the whole body of 
Gothic texts only if we assume that the Gothic is an expression of the troubled 
bourgeois self. At the same time, such a contextualisation explains away a wealth of 
other available contexts. In Punter’s account, Gothic fiction, designating a vast body of 
diverse texts, indeed “becomes a process of cultural self-analysis, and the images which 
it throws up become the dream-figures of a troubled social group.94” But it can be little 
more than that. The continuity of concerns breaks down as soon as we refuse to perceive 
Gothic fiction as a psychological projection of the ego torn between its thirst for 
progress and reason, and its experience of the actual reality as irrational. If we remove 
from this theory the anti-bourgeois attitude – the heart of the Gothic proper and the 
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reason for its paranoia, barbarity and taboos – the intricate net of links between different 
texts up till the present day falls apart. If we refute the anti-realist attitude, we not only 
lose the common axis for the Gothic aesthetics, but also cannot strive to do the Gothic 
justice using the very discourse of realism against the (establishment criticism’s) power 
which relies on this discourse. Stepping outside of this basic framework is possible only 
if we do not strive to undermine any of its cornerstones. If we do so, the structure 
crumbles down, and all that is left for certain are Gothic conventions, the in-famous 
Cherubina’s shopping list. 
 
George Haggerty’s Gothic Fiction/Gothic Form 
 
Punter’s early approach to the definition/theory of the Gothic is, as can be clearly 
seen, more thematic than strictly formal. It is, however, not exactly the case that he 
devotes little space to the consideration of form. Punter begins his considerations with 
this area95 and through his analysis of the Gothic’s distorted perception of history, 
represented un-realistically, and its predilection for symbolism and myth-making, he 
arrives at the conclusion that Gothic fiction represents romance fiction, “no less ‘real’ 
than the realistic novel.”96 The mode’s97 formal eclecticism and, as Elisabeth Napier 
would have it, formal failure are later on explained in terms of psychoanalysis: human 
psyche is not unified, and hence, all the more unity is not a property of a Gothic text.98 
George Haggerty, who approaches the Gothic from a strictly formal angle in his Gothic 
Fiction/Gothic Form, 1989, takes a different stance. 
For Haggerty, the vantage point is the assumption that the Gothicist strives for 
formal innovation. Here, a crucial role is ascribed to Walpole as the founder of the 
genre, and the basic function of Gothic fiction becomes that of “[playing] out a formal 
drama.”99 This drama is explained in terms of the Gothic writer struggling to resolve the 
tension between the affective content of a work and formal limitations imposed on the 
novel, which ends in “a generic revolution.”100 According to Haggerty, Gothic fiction 
represents in the first place an affective form, which proposes a new perception and 
                                                           
95
 Punter, The Literature of Terror, p. 405. 
96
 Punter, The Literature of Terror, p. 408. 
97
 Actually, already Punter uses this notion with reference to the Gothic. Consider e.g. p. 406. 
98
 Punter, The Literature of Terror, p. 410. 
99
 George E. Haggerty, Gothic Fiction/Gothic Form (University Park and London: The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1989), p. 3. 
100
 Haggerty, Gothic Fiction/Gothic Form, p. 4. 
  208
representation of reality, different from that imposed by realism, and its initiator’s aim 
is to be seen as “to change the concept of reality itself.”101 In a certain way, this can be 
read as similar to Punter’s assumption that the Gothic strives to achieve a more 
complete representation of reality, one encompassing its irrational dimension. However, 
instead of ascribing the Gothic a ‘psychoanalytical’ dimension, Gothic Fiction/Gothic 
Form emphasises Gothic fiction as aimed at “giving private experience external 
manifestation,” simultaneously contextualising it through references to the eighteenth-
century trends in aesthetics and the growing interest in imagination.102 
Haggerty asserts that the fullest formal realisation of the Gothic’s concerns is the tale 
form. This is the form which, as he sees it, suits best the need of raising emotional 
response, or, as he puts it, “[heightens] the emotional intelligibility” of the Gothic. This 
‘emotional intelligibility,’ achieved in a form-specific way, is here seen to be the 
inherent and distinctive feature of the Gothic.103 The main “subject” of the Gothic is 
assumed to be “the paradox between private experience and public fact.”104 Gothic 
conventions, which Haggerty identifies with those listed by Sedgwick, are referred to as 
“[having] the power to objectify subjective states of feeling […] they were developed as 
metaphorical vehicles, but their tenors remain inexpressible,” as a result of which each 
reader may express them only ‘privately.’105 Hence, they are not accidental, and serve 
well the Gothic project. 
In this account, Gothic fiction is clearly defined as a form which is above all meant 
to trigger a particular type of emotion. There arises, however, a problem connected with 
such a definition. Quite predictably, the affective nature of the Gothic is described by 
Haggerty as serving indeterminacy. As he states, “Gothic fiction […] cannot have 
specific meaning […] it is central to the nature of Gothic fiction that differing 
interpretations of the material will seem equally valid.”106 Haggerty himself does not 
perceive this as a problem, though. Instead, he points out that some critics tend to 
confuse interpretation with generic analysis, while other – including Punter and Paulson 
– tend to present their interpretations as final, and concludes that versatility of 
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interpretations is inherent in the Gothic form itself.107 From the perspective we adopt, 
such an approach to the Gothic does, nonetheless, pose certain difficulties. 
What may not immediately emerge as problematic is the fact that, in Gothic 
Fiction/Gothic Form, the thematic approach to the Gothic is immediately established as 
secondary to the definition. Even though Haggerty assures he does not wish to dismiss 
the psychological and political readings of Gothic fiction, his approach still challenges 
the assumptions about the Gothic genre’s “nature” which stem from such readings.108 
This indeed gives the impression that his analysis goes ‘deeper,’ explaining why more 
‘superficial’ – devoted to interpretation – accounts are meant to make perfect sense even 
as they clearly contradict one another, but adding a necessary correction to their 
premises. Since the thematic approaches, those which assign the Gothic a particular 
meaning, have been so far shown as discourse-driven and passing over what they cannot 
assimilate within the discourse, Haggerty’s approach should be seen as beneficial. Still, 
there is something in it which makes it ‘final’ as well.  
Firstly, this can be seen on the rhetorical level of the critical text as such. Haggerty 
says, for instance, on Emily Brontë:  
 
the problems so widely noted in the Gothic novel are the result of a 
basic contradiction between novelistic structure and affective 
intention. Brontë was not only aware of such formal inconsistency in 
the Gothic novel, she seems to have structured her novel both to 
mirror these tensions and to demonstrate the formal means of their 
resolution. Even more effectively than Frankenstein, Wuthering 
Heights directly confronts the formal dilemma facing every Gothic 
novelist and works out with literary exactitude the means of resolving 
the conflict between Gothic intention and novel form.109 
 
 
Of course, one might agree that Brontë was aware of the tension between the realistic 
mode of representation and the internal, to some extent even ‘supernatural,’ life of her 
main protagonist, and that she even structured her novel in the above-mentioned manner 
– just as one may assume there is enough historical evidence that Mary Shelley, another 
of the authors Haggery discusses, was well-read in Gothic novels.110 Nevertheless, 
while reading Haggerty, we may have the impression that his own language – or 
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discourse – now and then shifts from analysis to interpretation. Was Brontë aware, or do 
we only choose to read her, or actually her authorial intention so, judging from the 
textual evidence that we are left with? Clearly, what transpires from such passages as 
the one quoted above is the assumption that the Gothic novel is a transitory form 
between realistic novel and the Gothic tale, better suited for the expression of the 
private experience; a transitory form which faced the inadequacy of the available modes 
of representation to the affective load of the text. Such a premise makes perfect sense, 
as far as we may agree that the appearance of Walpole’s first Gothic novel indeed 
shattered the newly established canons and opened possibilities which were soon to be 
utilised by later writers, and have been exploited by this day. What is, however, difficult 
to accept is the arising possibility of a critic making a non-qualified presumption that 
the Gothic text is first and foremost concerned with formal matters, and this alone 
validates all sorts of varying interpretations. 
Establishing the affective agenda as primary for the Gothic is a tricky move. For one 
thing, Haggerty’s consideration of, for example, the ways in which Mary Shelley’s 
‘monster’ is meant to be unnameable but at the same time invites all sorts of 
interpretations111 is convincing, and perhaps one could even accept the premise that 
Shelley’s primary aim was to scare her reader. Yet for another thing, there are novels 
deemed Gothic which are affective and, simultaneously, are visibly biased, 
philosophically or politically – take fiction by such radicals as Godwin and 
Wollstonecraft, for example – and their philosophical or political charge is impossible 
to be set aside, lest we wish to deliberately obscure it. At this point, it should be perhaps 
mentioned that Haggerty, similarly to Sedgwick, wants to extend the label ‘Gothic’ so 
that it may comprise later works,112 including the American ones, but his choice of 
material seems to be limited, in each case, to specific examples of texts and authors, 
labelled as Gothic already by 1989. Of the First Wave Gothic writers, he discusses at 
some length only Walpole. Hence, while his definition of the Gothic seems to be 
inclusive, it nonetheless remains exclusive. 
While the general methodological assumptions manifest themselves in the very 
language used in Gothic Fiction/Gothic Form, and then also in the choice of texts, an 
inclination towards finality may also be noticed on a much more general level. The fact 
that Ludwig Wittgenstein and Wolfgang Iser meet in the very first sentence of the book, 
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to be joined by Hans Robert Jauss somewhere around the middle of the introduction, is 
obviously telling. Yet Haggerty’s assumption that different interpretations will seem 
equally convincing for that is the nature of the Gothic form may be seen as encouraging 
misinterpretation at apparently no cost. The qualifying criterion that is missing here is 
again historical contextualisation, the recognition of the grounding of a Gothic work in 
its own contemporary discursive background. Haggerty sounds convincing as he states 
that “Gothic works only become fully intelligible when we understand the extent of 
their affective rationale,”113 but it must be remembered that the affective rationale is, at 
least in many cases, an important but not the only criterion of intelligibility. Ann 
Radcliffe is a mistress of the Gothic affective form, but not all existing interpretations of 
her novels seem equally valid, nor even invited, if we refer them to the range of 
discourses available to the authoress. Some may be even considered simply out of place. 
All in all, it seems unavoidable that a Gothic text should be structured so as to scare, 
thrill, perplex and enchant. Haggerty’s claim that Gothic fiction takes a direction 
towards the tale form rather than a purely novelistic one seems perfectly sound for this 
very reason. However, just as the Gothic does not have a monopoly on spectres, it also 
does not have a monopoly on the affective character. While we may fully agree that for 
example both Shelley and Brontë artfully work to trigger specific emotional responses 
in their readers, this seems an unsatisfactory reason to immediately classify their works 
as Gothic. Of course, to some extent, novels by both authoresses employ typically 
Gothic conventions, but then many texts do, and for different reasons. As a result, we 
may agree with Sedgwick that we are able to add the comment “Gothic” on their 
margins, next to specific passages, but this does not change the fact that it is 
simultaneously possible to consider both novels from other angles. To add a side-
remark, the issues – social, moral, etc. – raised in Frankenstein and Wuthering Heights, 
as Haggerty aptly shows, are various, and in each case may be accounted for by the 
writer’s immediate background rather than by a general thematic paradigm of Gothic 
fiction. 
We are left, then, with a field which again seems to be broad and welcoming, for it 
extends the scope of the Gothic. The rhetoric of this field may, however, explain away 
what might undercut its openness, quite discursively. Needless to say, this field is also 
too welcoming when it comes to interpretation, for it has a potential to excuse theory-
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driven dehistoricising and re-shaping, the premises of Haggerty’s approach having 
potentially the very same effect as the paradigmatic premise of the indefinability of the 
Gothic. 
From the perspective of a discourse which works towards functional indeterminacy, 
the stance that the Gothic formally encourages conflicting responses should be more 
than desired. However, what comes together with it, at least potentially, is a permission 
for a perverted version of Cherubina’s (already perverse) shopping for Gothic items. As 
we know, the mock-heroine does not find too much of ‘true’ Gothic stuff available for 
purchase. As a result, she has to do with substitutes, sometimes capable of giving way 
to only loose associations with ‘Gothickness.’114 Critics permitted to interpret in 
whatever way they wish, feeling excused by a too hastily assumed premise that the form 
itself grants them freedom, may be seen as performing a similar act: shopping for 
whatever meaning they could do with while pretending to be dealing with the ‘true’ 
Gothic, whatever it could be. 
 
Eugenia C. DeLamotte’s Perils of the Night 
 
While Punter provides the Gothic with a theory that allows to include into its field a 
wide array of texts, Haggerty’s Gothic fiction is a category seemingly unlimited, but in 
fact it imposes upon the texts labelled as Gothic quite specific limits. In Perils of the 
Night, 1990, Eugenia C. DeLamotte confronts the problem of limits as she tries to 
establish a non-final yet solidly texts-based thematic approach to the Gothic definition. 
Interestingly enough, she takes the feminist perspective, which allows her both to point 
out how the conception of the Gothic was re-constructed (almost discursively) by mid-
century criticism (the same criticism from which Sedgwick distances herself) and, 
simultaneously, to re-construct that conception anew.  
Having dismissed the early critical approach to definition, dealing with cataloguing 
conventions, DeLamotte delimits her own premises. She evokes Claudio Guillén’s 
distinction between myth and genre, where myth may be seen as a recurring theme (“an 
essential situation or significant structure derived from the [works] themselves”115), and 
genre as a kind of matrix of possibilities to be realized (“an invitation to the actual 
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writing of a work, on the basis of certain principles of composition”116), and brings 
about the notions of a first and a second circle, which utilize the original pattern, 
respectively, more thoroughly or only partially. To her, the recent (at that time) criticism 
of the Gothic is engaged in scrutinizing the myth, which results in an expansion of the 
field and may bring a potentially beneficial rethinking of the original generic pattern. At 
the same time, however, she notices that definitions devised on the basis of works 
which utilize the myth in a manner far distant from the original pattern may, in fact, 
have little reference to it.117 The political implications of such a departure loom just 
behind the corner. 
According to DeLamotte the “best described”118 original pattern of the Gothic genre 
may be established on the basis of Maurice Lévy’s Le Roman “gothique” anglais, 
1764—1824. As she states, Lévy’s discussion of Gothic works, written over the period 
of fifty years and sharing a given way of handling plot, setting, character and 
conventions, allows for ‘pinpointing,’ in a precise manner, the genre of the Gothic 
romance. Yet while neatly limiting “the innermost circle,”119 this particular original 
pattern turns out to be immediately exclusive as far as its insistence on architecture as 
the central Gothic feature is concerned. DeLamotte does find it problematic and 
immediately moves on to extend the scope of the Gothic myth beyond Lévy’s 
framework. 
This is an interesting move. What DeLamotte immediately does seems to be noticing 
how different authors take the invitation to write but adjust the original pattern to their 
own needs and possibilities.120 The example she gives is that of the American Gothic 
writers, Hawthorne and Brockden Brown, who exchange Gothic architecture for 
wilderness but retain other typically Gothic traits, utilizing them for their own ends. 
What is interesting here is the fact that the dialogic quality of the Gothic is 
automatically implied. One may think of James Watt’s assertion that different Gothic 
writers pursue different aims (including the political ones) and hence Gothic fiction is 
so versatile. Yet DeLamotte bases her approach on Guillén, and later Alastair Fowler, 
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precisely to put this versatility in order. In the first place, she manages to isolate the 
‘basis pattern’ for the Gothic not, as it was the case with Haggerty, by taking Walpole 
as a starting point, but by applying Fowler’s distinction between three phases of the 
development of a genre.121 From this perspective, the initial stage of the genre 
development ‘naturally’ entails versatility – as a result of “assembling the ‘genre 
complex’”122 – but ends in the emergence of the genre’s formal epitome, that is Ann 
Radcliffe. 
The fact that DeLamotte chooses Radcliffe as the “formal type”123 has a multiplied 
effect. In the first place, thanks to the methodological stance taken, the patter she 
proposes for the Gothic myth is established as almost an ‘objective’ fact. DeLamotte 
does observe that, when it comes to the ‘innermost circle’ of the Gothic romance proper, 
the links between particular authors and texts tend to be vague. Consequently, 
“generalizations about the genre are often tacitly rooted in the works of one particular 
author and not necessarily transferable to those of another.”124 Assuming that Radcliffe 
represents the formal type is thus her way out of the predicament: ‘the Great 
Enchantress’ presents the reader with the finely developed pattern to be utilized by 
subsequent writers in their own way, while the preceding – or simultaneous – works are 
located in the position of a point of departure. Sound as it may seem, however, such an 
explanation does have the other side to it. In a way, whatever wider discourse the works 
pre-dating the formal type are emerged in, their own ‘meaning’ behind Gothic 
conventions is automatically relegated into the domain of ‘the less relevant,’ not to say 
‘less significant.’ 
This becomes particularly visible as one realizes the discursive premise from which 
DeLamotte herself departs. One of the difficulties connected with defining the Gothic, 
as she notices, is the fact that there is a wealth of neglected and/or unavailable texts 
which also belong to the genre or myth yet are not taken into consideration by the 
critics, deciding on the canon.125 This is a perfectly justified observation, which 
DeLamotte links with the consideration of the distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
Gothic. One may immediately think of Punter arguing that the Gothic cannot be seen as 
popular literature due to, among other things, the fact that its representatives fulfil the 
                                                           
121
 DeLamotte, Perils of the Night, p. 10. 
122
 DeLamotte, Perils of the Night, p. 10. 
123
 DeLamotte, Perils of the Night, p. 10. 
124
 DeLamotte, Perils of the Night, p. 8. 
125
 DeLamotte, Perils of the Night, p. 8. 
  215
criteria of literariness, which he illustrates with Walpole, Radcliffe, Lewis and 
Shelley.126 One could imagine that a whole array of aspects of the genre may be 
neglected in this way, at least potentially. However, DeLamotte limits her 
considerations to one particular aspect, the women’s influence, taking a feminist 
viewpoint. 
Such a step, of course, may be seen as justified. Above all, it results from a reaction 
against what we could view as discursive re-construction of the Gothic from the male-
centred perspective. As DeLamotte notices, ‘high Gothic,’ for the mid-century male 
dominated criticism (apparently, the very same strand of criticism that Kate Ferguson 
Ellis writes about127), is based on a male canon, and ‘low Gothic’ becomes a notion 
which allows to relegate women’s prolific fiction to the margin.128 She also quotes 
Leslie Fiedler and Patrick Day to show how such a ‘transfiguration’ of the Gothic 
impacts on its reading by eradicating the need to consider women and their situation as 
central to Gothic fiction.129 As a result, the stance she takes on the shape of the concept 
of the Gothic is that “[i]t is necessary to insist on the centrality to the genre of Radcliffe 
in general and of The Mysteries of Udolpho in particular,” for otherwise “Radcliffe and 
her most famous work are easily relegated to the periphery of the genre she herself did 
most to define.”130 Obviously, we could agree with such a stance, but what poses certain 
problems is the question of ‘centrality.’ It is hardly debatable that Radcliffe exerted vast 
influence on various authors, both more and less known. Similarly, it is barely possible 
to deny that the Gothic was to a large extent written by women and that it encodes a 
particular version of women’s situation, whether explicitly or implicitly,131 and that this 
must not be overlooked. However, while DeLamotte delimits the pattern for the Gothic 
myth in such a way that it is still possible to utilise it in various ways, viewing the 
women’s question as central for the Gothic results in a ‘transfiguration’ similar, to some 
extent, to the one which takes place when the Gothic is considered from a 
predominantly male-centred perspective. 
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This is perhaps not that evident if we consider DeLamotte’s conception of the main 
axis for the Gothic myth. If Lévi insists on architecture, she manages to reconsider his 
stance so as to make the Gothic a much more open category. Gothic conventions are 
here viewed as constituting “a symbolic language congenial to the expression of […] a 
concern about the boundaries of the self.” 132 From this perspective, the Gothic castle (or 
abbey, or convent), the embodiment of mystery and the past (both individual, of 
characters, and shared, of characters and readers) stands for loss, including self-loss 
within a confined space.133 The atmosphere of the setting, in turn, takes on the quality of 
a depersonalised and diffused “nameless dread,” as if it the place itself stood for “the 
forces of violence,” which DeLamotte identifies as exercised by social institutions, 
represented by the place: “[t]he church, the courts, the Inquisition, and the family.”134 
Such a conception of the nature of fear, the major subject of the Gothic,135 as the fear of 
social institutions allows DeLamotte to extend Lévi’s architectural pattern so that it may 
encompass also the natural setting. Also, it does not preclude as non-Gothic a situation 
in which the setting recedes into the background, but the fear of violent, omnipresent 
power remains. The essential feature of the Gothic text becomes the anxiety about 
boundaries: a concern that the self will be, against its will, cut off from the world and 
the ordinary; locked in an alien milieu, physical or metaphorical; and invaded by the 
Other.136 Thus, both the American writers and, for instance, Maturin and Shelley can be 
seen as Gothic. What is more, translating the anxiety about boundaries into the 
Romantic anxiety about the distinction between “the me” and “the not-me” opens, as 
DeLamote postulates, a new way of approaching the relationship between the Gothic 
and Romanticism.137 
The (discursive, we should add) transfiguration of the Gothic carried out by 
DeLamotte becomes more visible if we consider how putting the women’s question in 
the centre of the Gothic results in limiting this welcoming openness. The limitations to 
the Gothic which result from the adopted premises here can be traced down if we 
consider two major assumptions that DeLamotte makes about the Gothic. On the one 
hand, the author does stress that the anxiety about boundaries as a theme is not limited 
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to women writers and that even women writers utilise it in different ways.138 This is a 
common-sense conclusion, which results from her theoretical premise about the 
distinction between genre and myth, myth’s circles and the stages of genre 
development: if the anxiety about boundaries is to be the pattern for the Gothic myth, it 
must be utilised by the male Gothic and it must be utilised variously. On the other hand, 
she argues that  
 
what becomes evident in the analyses of male and female Gothicists 
writing about both women and men and the boundaries of the self is 
that the problem of the boundaries of the self was a crucial issue for 
women in some special ways—ways that sometimes manifest 
themselves even in a woman’s portrayal of a male protagonist and that 
sometimes do not manifest themselves fully even in the most sensitive 
Gothic portrayals, by male writers, of that issue as it applies to 
women.139 
 
This is fully in accordance with her assumption that because Gothic fiction is occupied, 
on a more general level, with the boundary between the individual and the world, it 
lends itself to the expression of women’s psychological and social situation and proves 
especially attractive to both women writers and readers.140 Departing from such a 
premise, DeLamotte is able to extend – or actually reverse – Sedgwick’s spatial model 
of the Gothic in which a typically Gothic situation is that of one being cut off from what 
should normally be available to one, evoked earlier in this chapter. As she states, 
Segdwick’s natural connection between the self and what the self is blocked from is “a 
connection that women are not ordinarily able to make, because of the social forces and 
the psychological consequences of women’s experiences of those forces that define 
women’s relation to the world beyond them.”141 For DeLamotte, the typically Gothic 
situation is that in which a female protagonist is cut off from what is normally 
unavailable to her in a patriarchal society.142 
When it comes to the first assertion, the limits imposed are those on the dialogic 
possibilities of the Gothic text. This takes us back to our earlier observation that, by 
making Radcliffe the formal type, DeLamotte removes from the genre’s foreground 
writers such as Walpole and Reeve, with their specific concerns and the potential, both 
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literary and cultural, with which they endow the newly emergent literary form, whatever 
it is. Automatically, also the subsequent writers, of the secondary and tertiary phases,143 
are to be discussed primarily from the perspective of the ‘governing’ pattern. The 
specific concerns of the non-female texts, or female texts which do not contain the fully 
developed pattern, are here immediately codified as side-concerns, by-products, or 
realisations of the myth, not central to the definition of either myth or the genre. Thus, 
the possible recurring links between both female and male fictions other than those 
based on, originally, gender relations, which are the social factors impinging on the 
shape of DeLamotte’s pattern, are thus removed from the central discussion and located 
at the myth’s periphery. 
It is interesting to note that Reeve’s Old English Baron, to give one immediate 
example, could be seen as displaying similar, or even the same, traits of culturally 
imposed restrictions as later female Gothic novels. As E. J. Clery notes, Reeve’s 
correction of Walpole and the much restrained handling of supernatural are both signs 
of negotiation: in the era when women are expected to be subject to didacticism and 
paragons of virtue, and the discourse of the sublime, otherwise justifying the use of 
supernaturalism, is gendered and reserved for men in its pure form, female Gothicists 
are forced to apply specific techniques to avoid immediate castigation.144 Needless to 
say, the founder of the most successful technique, the supernatural explained is 
Radcliffe.145 However, when it comes to the question of the boundaries of the self, in 
the case of Reeve the issue must be more complicated. This should be expected even 
judging by the mere fact that DeLamotte does not consider her writings, content with 
the assertion that they, too, serve to assemble the genre’s proper complex.146 We may, 
of course, feel that reading Reeve from DeLamotte’s theoretical perspective is possible. 
Yet how to approach, in that case, the political implications of her patriotic novels (with 
a middle-class bias) from the perspective of theory which assumes that the Gothic 
allows women to voice their discontent with their contemporary social/family system is 
a more complicated matter. DeLamotte does recognise, time after time, that the female 
Gothic is caught up in the vicious circle of subscribing to the same social restrictions 
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that it finds dissatisfying,147 but in the case of Reeve there seems to be more at stake. 
This could be, among others, the ‘loyalist’ quality of her writing, of which we shall say 
more in the next chapter; the ability of the Gothic to support the emerging status quo as 
much as to attempt at shaping it, and not necessarily only when it comes to women’s 
situation. 
In Perils of the Night, the Gothic is constructed discursively from a number of 
angles, and this takes us to DeLamotte’s other assertion mentioned above. A precise 
excerpt from her text should prove useful at this point. She writes: “And because the 
dividing line between the world and the individual soul has had, from the inception of 
the Gothic craze, a special relevance to the psychology and social condition of women, 
this interpretation of the ‘deep structures’ of Gothicism provides a new explanation of 
the appeal the genre has always had for women readers and writers.”148 A fixed set of 
theoretical premises can be immediately identified here. First and foremost, what takes 
place at this very moment is, once again, making a connection between the Gothic and 
Romantic philosophy, or, in this particular case, their occupation with the boundary 
between the self and the world. Interestingly, this time, as a result, one could possibly 
see Romanticism as having a predecessor in women’s Gothic, which actually signals 
two loci traditionally encoded as ‘inferior.’ Willingly or not, this reminds one of the 
Romantic credentials; however, rather than to provide a pedigree for the Gothic and 
women writers, drawing such a new link between the Gothic and Romanticism may be 
seen as a call for a reconsideration of the very tenets of Romanticism.  
Another premise is, implicitly, that women constituted the major readership of 
Gothic fiction.149 This, as Clery makes it clear, is not that obvious; what is more, as she 
notices, feminist criticism up to her times had had little interest in disproving such a 
position.150 It is hardly possible to deny the cultural importance of the phenomenon of 
female Gothic readership and the critical response it generated.151 Nonetheless, the fact 
that the dominantly female readership of the Gothic is, to some extent, a discursive 
construct, with a well-defined socio-regulatory function assigned, as Clery 
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demonstrates,152 should complicate its use as a justification for the ‘central’ position of 
the women’s Gothic. That said, we return to the already raised question of the centrality 
of the inherently gender-based pattern to the Gothic as a genre/myth/mode. As Diane 
Long Hoeveler stresses, feminism itself is a diverse and diversified field,153 which may 
be perhaps illustrated by the fact that, in Gothic Feminism (1998), she denies the need to 
read female Gothic along its male counterpart, viewing the former as a distinct genre 
“designed to dramatize the horrors of English patriarchal life safely displaced onto a 
remote setting.”154 Although Hoevelers stance on the character of female Gothic is thus 
basically close to DeLamotte’s, and she too cites the common-place assumption of the 
female authorship and readership, this neatly undercuts the need to come up with a 
pattern that would be discernible in ‘all the (true) Gothic,’ whether genre or myth (or 
mode). Taking such a perspective does not diminish the force of Hoeveler’s argument; 
it also does not implicitly impose the domination of one theme. 
Tracing further discursive tenets which shape DeLamotte’s conception of the Gothic, 
one may, for instance, point out to a Freudian influence. Her reading of the female 
Gothic appears to be based on Freud’s assumption that only unhappy people fantasise. 
One might imagine that eighteenth-century women need not be (psycho)analysed to be 
read as potentially dissatisfied with their status. Still, they are read via this particular 
Freudian given for example by Hoeveler, who also admits to rely on Punter’s theory 
that the Gothic displays the bourgeoisie’s ambivalent attitude towards the lost order and 
the anxiety about the newly emerging one – their own.155 The same set of assertions lies 
at the foundation of DeLamotte’s own considerations. Both she and Hoeveler treat 
women’s Gothic as a version of wish fulfilment fantasy in which women envision a 
perfect happy ending.156 Next, the very same assumption which underlies Punter’s 
premise that the Gothic is a version of anxiety of the present projected on the past 
manifests itself in DeLamotte’s statement that “[t]he contemporaneity of the suffering 
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described in women’s Gothic, for example, is most often disguised by the portrayal of 
the institutions that oppress the Gothic heroine as outdated, foreign, or illegal […].”157 
The application of Freud, and the departure from the premise that the Gothic somehow 
turns against its own socio-political context, both connected irreversibly in much of 
Gothic theory, point to a discursive crux. 
What is at stake here is the unresolved, as it seems, question of whether the Gothic 
originally turned against the bourgeois order or participated in its formation. DeLamotte 
herself favours the psychoanalytically biased view, namely that it did both, creating a 
psychological tension, at times impossible to be resolved.158 What comes to the 
foreground is, however, dissatisfaction in every case, a type of negative submission 
resulting from the lack of possibilities of change: what women do by means of writing 
is “speaking the Gothic nightmare.”159 Consequently, we may say that female Gothic 
participates in the dominant bourgeois ideology, but due to the lack of alternative, and 
this only confirms the oppressiveness of the system.160  
With women’s fiction, especially in the vein of Radcliffe, the question of 
participation/rebellion attains a particular complexity. Assuming the perspective that the 
Gothic propagates the bourgeois culture against the feudal corruption uncritically when 
speaking about women’s fiction might direct our attention away from its important 
complexities, and ultimately dehistoricise it in another way. We must retain caution, 
though. There is every historical evidence to document the acuteness of women’s 
situation in the discussed period. However, much of what we make of it today appears 
to depend on the adopted critical perspective. One may notice, for example, that while 
DeLamotte’s position is ultimately a strongly anti-bourgeois one, the final 
representation of the Gothic heroine she proposes is that of a powerless woman, too 
constrained to rebel, even on a symbolic plane on which she unveils her discontent. Yet 
it seems that, in the case of other critical readings similarly interested in the women’s 
question, the less strictly anti-bourgeois the adopted perspective proves to be, the more 
power is admitted to the female protagonist. Of course, what we mean by power here is 
not the ultimate equality of the woman and the patriarch, or an actual, open rebellion. 
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Rather, it is a space in which the woman may act subversively from within the 
bourgeois culture, implementing mechanisms of negotiation in a narrative which may 
be read instructively. 
In this regard, the shortcoming of DeLamotte’s reading, or its discursive inflection, 
seems to be, unsurprisingly perhaps, its lack of a more concrete historical grounding. 
DeLamotte does notice that the Gothic heyday occurs during the period in which the 
place of women in society was under discussion, but immediately after mentioning 
Wollstonecraft as an example of a notable exception, she moves on to rely on the 
bourgeois feminine code as operating upon the emerging Gothic fictions.161 As a result, 
for a moment the woman’s status is shown as a status in formation, but the moment is 
brief and fleeting, and the bourgeois code is presented as having already influenced 
women Gothic writers and holding its stand. Thus, the writers are not represented as 
capable of negotiation, but become ultimately victimised themselves: their texts may, on 
a symbolic plane, display anger and suffering, but as a result of processes which have 
already taken shape and resulted in fixed social formulas the texts themselves abide by. 
In a particular way, such a representation of the historical momentum to Gothic fiction 
is an instance of discursive re-shaping, which we may demonstrate by means of a 
comparison. 
It does not take much for Hoeveler to speak from an already changed position, and 
for Clery it takes even less. The study of the latter is based on a research into the 
discursive context of the supernatural fiction, a research similar to the one we see as 
necessary to proper understanding of the phenomenon of the Gothic. The former relies 
on a peculiar blend of Freud and Foucault as a foundation for methodology, which 
enables her to approach the female Gothic in an irresistibly empowering way. The result 
is that whereas DeLamotte seems to see no point in distinguishing between the feudal 
and the bourgeois patriarchy, Hoeveler does notice the rift between them, and Clery is 
able to describe it in detail. In both cases, the consequence is the change in the 
perception of women’s situation as propagated in fiction. 
If DeLamotte’s Gothic expresses discontent on a symbolic level, Hoeveler’s is a 
functional critique of the woman as subject as constructed by public institutions and 
juridical systems of the bourgeoisie.162 This situates the Gothic craze in a similar 
                                                           
161
 DeLamotte, Perils of the Night, pp. 150-151. 
162
 Long Hoeveler, Gothic Feminism, p. xiii. Hoeveler does stress, however, that while the female Gothic 
gives the heroine covert power, its insistence on her maintaining, or at least pretending to maintain, the 
  223
historical setting as in DeLamotte, but simultaneously must result in a change of 
perspective: though “coded and veiled,”163 this critique does not ultimately shun its own 
insights due to the limits imposed externally. What is more, it is not only a critique. 
Hoeveler views the female Gothic as a discourse, characteristic of what she calls Gothic 
feminism, an ideology, which constituted the source of the ideology today termed 
‘victim feminism.’ As she would have it, Gothic feminism aimed at constructing and 
promoting “professional femininity,” a pose or a masquerade which grants, similarly to 
victim feminism, “female power through pretended and staged weakness.”164 Thus, it 
aimed not that much to change social order as to “allow […] female characters and by 
extension […] female readers a fictitious mastery over […] an oppressive social and 
political system;” to help women feminize and tame the masculine spaces that confined 
them, and thus adapt to the status newly assigned to them by the bourgeois culture.165  
The consideration of the discursive context has a direct impact on such a 
representation of the female Gothic. What is noteworthy, Hoeveler assumes Gothic 
fiction to become popular among women writers and readers for the very reason that it 
posits itself both within the bourgeois culture and at the same challenges it. This is, as 
she believes, the result of the ambivalence which women felt towards the shift of their 
social status as a result of the political and economic changes.166 Consequently, we may 
speak of participation and rebellion at the same time, but not in a straightforwardly 
negative terms, as was the case with DeLamotte. In Gothic Feminism, the female Gothic 
as a discourse is seen as participating, alongside sentimentality and Romanticism, “in 
the broad cultural project of Enlightenment ideology—that is, making the world a safe 
place for feminized men and masculinized women.”167 It is at this point that Hoeveler 
pays special attention to the distinction between the feudal, aristocratic codes and those 
of the new ruling class, the bourgeoisie. It is also at this point that she evokes Foucault 
in a crucial manner. In Foucault’s charting of the cultural shift taking place in the 
eighteenth century, the bourgeoisie move away from the symbolics of blood, which they 
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associate with the aristocracy, to their distinctly middle-class analysis of sexuality, 
which is to find its first expression in de Sade and early eugenics. For Hoeveler, 
significantly, the shift is also reflected in the female Gothic, which does away with the 
feudal patriarch simultaneously promulgating the professionalization of female 
sexuality.168 
Perhaps the best illustration of how taking such a stance allows Hoeveler for a re-
construction of the possibility for female agency is her interpretation of the Gothic hero 
and marriage endings of many Gothic novels. For DeLamotte, the hero – the final 
husband – is in a sense to be identified with the villain. As Radcliffe’s Emily is to be 
married to Valancourt, the supposedly good husband, she becomes entrapped in the 
displaced marriage with Montoni, the bad one. In DeLamotte’s reading, the second, 
displaced marriage can be seen as a manifestation of the threat inherent in the first one, 
an instance of a female “dream of fear” before marriage, or a sign of the Gothic author’s 
suspicion that the “domestic bliss is a lie.”169 Yet for Hoeveler, the very same hero is a 
feminised man, a ritually punished and wounded “sibling figure” purged from folly, 
who will not stroll too far from home and his wife.170 He bears the signs of a 
sentimental man, crying profusely and girlish, and his code of masculinity stands in the 
direct opposition to that of the patriarchal (feudal) tyrant.171 As Hoeveler aptly puts it, 
“juridical violence, paranoia, and injustice, figured as the ‘masculine,’ can be brought to 
heel, punished, and contained safely within the confines of the ultimate fantasy home—
the female-dominated companionate marriage.”172 Having outsmarted the patriarch (and 
getting rid of him by passively waiting for his own fatal step), the Gothic heroine, 
rewarded for her virtue and the persecution she underwent, settles in the bourgeois 
household without a need to fear a man.173 
Ironically, if we move one step further, we can say that, quite conversely, it is the 
man who could feel insecure. Hoeveler does notice, in here analysis of Radcliffe, that 
her novels pass a telling comment on the property and inheritance law.174 Also, she does 
mention the eighteenth-century understanding of the woman’s legal status with regard 
to her husband, quoting William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
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and notices that Gothic heroines usually manage to avoid it.175 Finally, while she posits, 
in tune with Punter, that the female Gothic displaces the contemporary anxieties on the 
past, she nonetheless takes the final stance that it is feudal patriarchy and family ties 
based on blood that get busted.176 Clery’s The Rise of Supernatural Fiction, published 
five years earlier, allows us to place those remarks in the proper context. What is more, 
following Clery we observe how a more historically oriented study may conclude with a 
suggestion that the female Gothic could have been actually envisioned as subversive.177 
Clery too quotes Blackstone, and her considerations highlight some significant facts 
about the eighteenth-century common law. Blackstone’s Commentaries illustrate how 
the property law – with arbitrary changes – is transplanted from the feudal setting into 
the bourgeois context, retaining coverture and justifying it with social (economic) 
benefit. As a result, the husband technically wields a total power over the wife, who, 
upon marriage, ‘dies’ in civil terms.178 Yet what Clery also notices is that, in the case of 
Radcliffe, it is persistently the heroines who inherit property, with the culmination of 
female legal heirs in The Mysteries of Udolpho. Contrary to the legal provisions, Emily 
inherits after two other women, and, upon marriage, she retains the control over her 
property through the charitable character of the union and the benevolence of 
Valancourt, which Clery sees as “the dispensation of economic power in the 
relationship.”179 As she signals, while the inheritance plot in the novel can be seen as 
nonetheless justified by the common law logic, the resolution may actually postulate a 
different matrimonial order.180 Also, in the novel, we may observe a clash between 
coverture and the law of equity – applied to property since the seventeenth-century to 
allow families in direct blood kinship to retain family property by passing it to the 
daughter, and then her descendants, and not to her husband, and, incidentally, creating a 
possibility for a woman’s financial independence.181 This leads Clery to the conclusion 
that “Radcliffe, by regularly endowing her female characters with inherited fortunes, 
foregrounds the ideological inconsistencies of the property laws relating to women of 
her time.”182 Such an observation is in tune with that of Hoeveler, but is substantiated 
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with the legal technicalities traceable in the historical context of the period and in the 
novels themselves.183 
Whereas coverture can be seen as an arbitrary turn to custom, equity may be 
perceived as an instance of ‘natural’ law. Yet, as Clery stresses, rather than as an overt 
social critique, Radcliffe’s handling of property laws may be seen as a powerful means 
of terrifying the female reader out of her wits. But this is not a simple means, nor a 
fancy terror. As she writes: 
 
this was the shape that terror took for the projected reader, middle 
class and female: the point at which fantasy and reality met and 
mingled. [Radcliffe’s] writings, at least at the height of suspense, 
encourage reflection on the illusory nature of the law’s ‘phantom-
objectivity,’ its interested, man-made nature, through a literal-minded 
representation of the law as haunted house. The metaphysical 
paraphernalia of an ‘objectivist’ system of justice is portrayed with 
objectivity in the terrifying phantasmagoria of Gothic fiction. ‘Justice’ 
is estranged from itself, retranslated into an unequal, repressive 
relation between people. Before the narrative reverts to a tidy 
denouement there is a moment of illumination in which the 
unthinkable is felt to be real.184 
 
 
The critical potential of Radcliffe’s novels is then explored more realistically and 
consciously in Wollstonecraft’s The Wrongs of Woman, which tries to pass a social 
comment through the Gothic medium (even though the medium is perhaps not entirely 
suited for turning critique into action).185 And with Wollstonecraft, the Gothic critique 
becomes radical. 
As Clery states, the potential critique, intertwined in the Gothic fabric, is 
symptomatic of the fact that women Gothicists in Radcliffe’s day do realise that 
romance may reveal the facts about their own situation, not at all that rosy.186 Such a 
statement is not surprising in the feminist strand of Gothic criticism. In this respect, all 
the three critics discussed in this section, DeLamotte, Hoeveler and Clery, share the 
common ground. Furthermore, Clery can be seen as close to Hoeveler, for example, 
since she assumes the Gothic heroine to be the inheritor of Richardsonian Pamela’s 
legacy, i.e. the inevitability of trading a woman’s own virtue and turning propriety into 
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profit.187 In a way, their overall perspectives can be seen as complementary: it is 
possible – or even desirable – to view the female Gothic as both reflecting on the 
contemporary legal discourses in “the libertarian language,”188 and propagating covert 
power through mastering adaptation. Though perhaps Clery’s female Gothic seems to 
be, at this particular point, less complacent about the bourgeois codes,189 it does not 
preclude Hoeveler’s stance, but adds to it, illuminating some of its intricacies. What is 
more, Clery’s analysis too heads towards envisioning the female Gothic as 
implementing particular codes of behaviour that modify the bourgeois discourse by 
participating in it (trading virtue) and, at least potentially, may open a space for a more 
radical discussion (playing with the women’s awareness of their financial and legal 
insecurity, Wollstonecraft’s attempt at social critique through the Gothic mode). 
Nonetheless, both these perspectives would not be possible within the discursive frame 
adopted by DeLamotte. 
The governing assumption for much of DeLamotte’s reading of the Gothic is the 
perceived victimisation of the Gothic heroine. As a victim, the heroine is doomed to 
self-destruction through submission – but she remains pure. Much is said in Perils of the 
Night of the way in which self-protection in the women’s Gothic is based on retaining a 
coherent version of the self, abiding by the decorum, which will sooner suffer self-
destruction than violate the imperative of purity. This mechanism is ultimately 
transferred on the women writers, too – just consider DeLamotte’s statement that 
Radcliffe and Roche are too indoctrinated to represent their angel-like heroines as 
spoiled by internal evil (which they, by the way, are also said to perceive as inherently 
‘male’).190 The woman cannot afford subversion even if her own writings glimpse at it – 
she has already been too victimised. Protecting the decorum is the very same 
mechanism which Hoeveler sees as an inherent flaw in the Gothic, its insistence on the 
professionally gendered heroine to at least successfully pretend she is the exemplar. But 
while Hoeveler admits the possibility that the heroine may pretend – the ability to turn 
tables becoming simultaneously the chance and the minimum requisite for negotiation – 
DeLamotte views the heroine as having internalised the exemplar to the point of not 
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being able to safe her-self. From here, there is just one step to the Freudian logic of the 
heroine-patient: she suffers from repression, and her repression results in hysteria, or 
schizophrenia, or paranoia, the consequences of the unresolved tension between the fear 
of anger and a need to voice it. But such a heroine, or a victim, is nonetheless pure, and 
hence, cannot be accused. 
One of the possible ‘accusations’ is that of the heroine pursuing her trouble. This is 
an argument connected, for example, with the perceived masochism of the damsel in 
distress: her desire to be victimised (sexually). DeLamotte refutes the critical readings 
based on such a foundation as containing “glaring inadequacies”: viewed from this 
perspective, the heroine cannot be seen as a victim of external forces and her struggle to 
free herself from confinement in the socially assigned homely space is swept out of 
sight.191 On the one hand, the critic seems to be right to do so, especially if we see her 
response as a response to a particular discourse which would find such a reading 
politically functional. On the other hand, as she insists that the heroine be a victim, she 
herself falls prey to the imposed decorum the heroine, in her reading, fears so much to 
infringe.192 Occupying the position of an innocent victim, too pure to cope with any sort 
of internal flaw, the Gothic heroine (or writer) will never be allowed any substantial 
active agency aimed at an actual critique or change. Similarly, she will never be allowed 
any positive participation in the discourse which incarcerates her. It is in this way that 
DeLamotte’s own discursive framework does not validate readings such as those by 
Hoeveler or Clery. 
If we consider the definition of the Gothic proposed by DeLamotte, we shall find out 
that it participates in a discursive re-shaping of the Gothic on many planes. The 
victimisation of the Gothic heroine is here perhaps only one illustration of what is 
signalled by Hoeveler as she states that by failing to see contradictions in the female 
Gothic, one may end up “[recasting] our novelistic foremothers in our own image.”193 
As in the case of the previous critics, the result is going shopping – constructing the 
Gothic in the image of what we believe it should be. 
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5.4. Decorating the Castle: The Spectralisation of the Gothic 
 
If the impetus behind the differentiation paradigm’s insistence on the Gothic 
indefinability is the fear of grand narratives, than we might find it somewhat surprising 
that the decade which the paradigm considers as its own beginning continues to produce 
narrations of the Gothic. Broad as they are, and sometimes vague too, all the three 
considered definitions are discursive narratives. And since, in their attempt to overthrow 
the domination of narratives which constructed the Gothic as limited in capacity and 
diminished in cultural/literary significance, they aim at the expansion of the field and 
the status of the general, they too end up being grand. We could call it Fish’s irony – 
while it seems that the Gothic criticism takes a new (opposite) direction (consider e.g. 
the mid-century male-oriented psychological readings which constitute the ‘negative’ 
basis for much of the feminist criticism), it actually recapitulates the same sort of 
processes. And these processes remind one of Rorty’s procedure of linking traits and 
clues in a way which is entirely subjective and external to the work, or Foucault’s 
assertion that there is nothing essential in an object as such, for the object is the sum of 
statements about it, possible in a given discourse. Even if we agree that all the three 
definitions create a vast space for interpretation, and leave certain areas to be white 
spots on the map, the general frameworks they devise confirm just that: discourses they 
utilise validate only a specific set of statements as true or false, and pass over a vast 
array of other statements as illogical or simply inexistent. In this particular regard, is 
there much difference between, say, a Freudian and a Romantic paradigm? 
The multiplicity of theoretical tools combined with an array of perspectives creates a 
whole range of possibilities for devising one’s own Gothic. With this in mind, we 
understand why Miles decides to speak of discrete Gothic genealogies. We also grasp 
why Hoeveler insists on seeing the female Gothic as a separate genre, not bothering too 
much to define the governing principle for the Gothic as such.194 Both are ways to limit 
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one’s field at the same time not limiting another one’s. If the considerations carried out 
in the previous section show anything, they show that focusing on one strand of 
consistencies, or one dialogic line, might actually illuminate the domain of Gothic 
fiction better than attempting to grasp it in its vague entirety. This is because the Gothic 
has always been a label, applied to various, though similar, sets of texts for various 
purposes. Similarly, the texts traditionally labelled as Gothic utilise ‘Gothickness’ 
variously. Thus, trying to view the Gothic ‘globally’ inescapably entails omissions, re-
workings and obliterations, no matter what the intention was.  
Bearing this in mind, we might think of a potential solution. Viewing the Gothic as a 
dialogic mode, within which we deal with a series of interconnected genealogies that 
use a similar code of conventions to elaborate on different (social, economic, gender, 
etc.) questions in a way determined by a given discourse, or an order of discourse, of a 
given period, seems to solve the problem of accounting for why a certain work ‘has a 
Gothic feel to it,’ without the immediate need to decide about its generic affiliation. Of 
course, this would not enable one to avoid constructing or reconstructing grand 
narratives. Still, it seems it would prove more illuminating with regard to a number of 
works traditionally grouped together as ‘Gothic’ if we focused on excavating their own 
grand narratives, rather than on rewriting those narratives anew. However, as Gothic 
criticism brings together multiple perspectives, interpretations and representations, 
insisting that there be no specific limits to the category it nonetheless wishes to treat as 
established (or institutionalised), such an approach is made impossible. And the 
assumed equality of approaches, especially if they tend to be mutually exclusive, results 
in the spectralisation of the Gothic. 
The problem with the dialogic approach, from the perspective of the differentiation 
paradigm, seems to be the fact that it would again undo the importance of the Gothic as 
a literary/critical category. We may imagine, for instance, a situation in which we would 
be dealing with a series of works – or texts – speaking of the women’s struggle, or the 
anxiety of boundaries, or the fragmentation of the self, through a particular coded 
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representation, but the mode (and, importantly, not genre) of that representation would 
be less important than what is behind it. Or it would be important only to the extent to 
which it would signal a distinct perspective. In a similar vein, we could speak of the 
development of emotive narrative strategies without necessarily limiting them to one 
literary genre, or the development of an aesthetic without tying it with some allegorical 
or symbolic meanings veiled by its gloomy landscapes. Conversely, we could be 
speaking of how these three dimensions interact and impact on one another as they 
meet, and that could be seen as ‘a Gothic moment’ – but that kind of interaction could 
not be ultimately fixed. The Gothic would always have a potential for an already 
changed meaning, an already new perspective, and an already new aspect of a theme. 
If that were the case, however, the differentiation paradigm would lose another of its 
founding tenets – the vindication of a marginalised category, a topic which will be 
expanded upon in the next chapter. A subtle signal that the existence of such a category 
is somehow necessary for the contemporary Gothic critic can be felt, for example, as 
one reads the following passage from Anne Williams’ Art of Darkness, of 1995: 
 
[T]hough there may be disagreement as to the absolute position of the 
line between the “obscene” and the “decent,” there is a general 
category of “obscenity.” Similarly, though one may have trouble 
drawing a precise line between “Gothic” and “not Gothic,” there 
undoubtedly is such a thing as Gothic. Just as Western culture has 
tended to assume that obscenity more or less equals the explicitly 
sexual, so Gothic more or less corresponds with eighteenth-century 
fantasies of the “dark ages.” This approach to either category has its 
limitations, however. It inadequately serves the feminist lawyer who 
wants to argue that violence against women is more damaging to the 
social fabric than representations of sexuality, or the literary critic 
who wants to talk about Faulkner as part of the Gothic tradition.195 
 
 
Certainly, the category of obscenity constructed in such a way might serve inadequately 
the feminist (or any) lawyer. But why would the lack of grounds to read Faulkner as 
Gothic serve inadequately a literary critic? Williams is right that there is more to the 
Gothic than “fantasies of ‘dark ages.’” Yet what is interesting in this passage is the 
statement of choice and intention. The literary critic wants to speak about Absalom, 
Absalom! as a member of the Gothic genre, be it a secondary or a tertiary 
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representative.196 But why? Is this meant to be an arbitrary decision, based on one’s 
intuitive perception that there is something Gothic about the work, and hence it might 
be somehow illuminating to tease it out? Or is this the matter of some rejected and 
muted truth that Faulkner was a Gothic writer? 
The comparison with the lawyer would suggest that reading Faulkner as Gothic is a 
matter of no minor importance. Faulkner is a recognised writer and one of the aims of 
Gothic criticism, as illustrated throughout this chapter, is to show that the Gothic is 
present within the canon, but remains unrecognised, for the institutionalised criticism 
has tended to repress it. It is assumed that Gothic fiction is popular trash, hence low in 
artistic qualities, hence even if we trace its influence on a major literary work, it cannot 
be of any substantial importance, not to mention the fact that the resemblance may be 
purely accidental, and so on. In a certain way, the Gothic thus becomes seen as 
constructed by earlier institutionalised critics as a negative label, a category of dismissal 
serving as a means of evading the consideration of meanings that would otherwise come 
to the surface. What is repressed in reality is, then, the meaning itself. As a result, 
reading Faulkner as Gothic could be a yet another attempt at the vindication of a genre 
and a reconsideration of the literary/cultural categories, on the one hand, while, on the 
other, it might be seen as a way to uncover an additional but significant layer of 
signification, not fully illuminated otherwise. In both cases, however, it is crucial that 
there is an established category such as the Gothic. 
But the question here is not even whether there is a Gothic moment in Faulkner or 
not. It may be there – just consider “The Rose for Emily,” a story of a decaying 
aristocratic monument engulfed by darkness and jealously guarding its secret. The 
question is, to what extent it actually impacts on the content. To establish such an 
impact, it may seem we would need to consider not only the textual layer, the traits we 
recognise as Gothic (and thus hurry to ascribe to them meaning by association) and their 
relationship with other significant traits (in Eco’s fashion), but also, and perhaps 
primarily, the context and the possibilities it might have both given and precluded. By 
failing to carry out such considerations, we risk discursive re-writing. Furthermore, if 
we ascribe the Gothic a fixed set of associations and, thus, meanings (themselves 
discursively generated), and we use it as a grid to generate the meaning of a text, then 
the discursive rewriting may only double. 
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The more, it should seem, Gothic criticism ought to avoid grand narratives. Yet the 
paradigmatic assertion of the indefinability of Gothic fiction, of its ‘spectrability,’ is a 
grand narrative in itself, in which the instability of the limits becomes a practical 
measure to grant the unlimited possibility of setting boundaries. All of the discussed 
definitions do. However, while their shortcomings are pointed to in the criticism which 
comes immediately after them, and then the criticism which follows the period of 
breakthrough, ‘individual’ ways of approaching the Gothic are rarely dismissed. On the 
contrary, they seem to be accumulated to protect the freedom of staking out one’s own 
area, especially an underprivileged one, and they are definitely available and used for 
further considerations of the Gothic. There is, certainly, a grander dimension to it, and it 
need not come down to the impossibility (or refusal) to choose the new dominating 
grand narrative. We may, for instance, recall Culler’s line of defence of 
overinterpretation: the most radical interpretations are often those capable of triggering 
the critical re-thinking of social/cultural constructs, of making issues surface. Very 
often, the contemporary Gothic criticism seems to embark on precisely such a project. 
Nonetheless, in doing so, it frequently illuminates its own times and milieu, while not 
necessarily telling us something illuminating with regard to the Gothic (or non-Gothic) 
text and its context. 
The final example of a Gothic definition to be discussed in this section may serve as 
an illustration of what we might metaphorically call ‘decorating’ the Gothic castle with 
the purchased items. The metaphor describes a situation in which the Gothic undergoes 
double rewriting. Its theory rests on the paradigmatic axioms and it expands from this 
basis, further reworking the Gothic as a category. However, at the same time, the critic 
adjusts the analytical tool to the already established ‘knowledge’ on the Gothic. As a 
result, the category undergoes as if double discursive re-shaping.  
Published the same years as Kilgour’s The Rise of the Gothic Novel, in a way, 
Williams’ Art of Darkness is already partly symptomatic of what Rintoul writes about 
the contemporary critical stance on the issue of the Gothic definition. Williams is 
careful about asserting the difficulty Gothic poses as a category, and highlighting the 
dangers that stem from attempts at defining it. At the same time, however, she begins to 
construct her own definition as quickly as she dismisses other critics for writing ‘Gothic 
stories,’ and her own perspective influences her analysis quite visibly. At times, she 
does voice the realisation that the Gothic is constructed by criticism rather than 
explained, but then she immediately changes the direction and engages in a yet another 
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re-construction. Above all, however, her study illustrates how the Gothic shifts from a 
literary category into a literary theory, from an object to be defined to a workable grid 
used to account for texts (and not necessarily only literary ones). If maintaining the 
limits blurred is one way in which the contemporary Gothic criticism acts to 
‘spectralise’ Gothic fiction, such a transformation of the Gothic into a category larger 
than that of the strictly literary/textual is another one deserving our immediate attention. 
Williams titles the part of her introduction devoted to outlining her own premises 
“On the Dangers of Defining the Gothic.” The stance presented here is, however, not 
yet that the Gothic is indefinable. This is what distinguishes Williams from critics such 
as Kilgour or Botting. If they proclaim that the Gothic is indefinable – openly, for the 
Gothic is so broad, or by implying that every attempt at knowing is a re-construction – 
Williams treats its complexity as a vantage point for her own definition. Her evoking of 
the difficulty the Gothic poses as a category is a rhetorical manoeuvre, to same extent. It 
is meant to stress that the Gothic is difficult to define not simply because it is so vast 
and so spectral, or because ‘there is no truth behind the veil,’ but because the critics fail 
to see deep enough in it, and, consequently, to approach it in the proper manner. This 
becomes immediately visible if we consider one of the opening statements of the 
section: “even referring to ‘the’ Gothic and choosing—or not—to capitalize the word 
opens some doors and assures that others will remain not only closed but invisible. A 
thoughtful analysis of ‘Gothic’ should challenge the kind of literary history that 
organizes, delineates, and defines: a literary history that also confines us within some 
inherited literary concepts, particularly ideas about genre, that can be as confusing as 
Udolpho’s amazing structures.”197 The first sentence of the quote could strike us as very 
close to our own observations: no matter how we delimit the Gothic, we shall always 
leave something out. But in a footnote which follows after the sentence, Williams 
immediately clarifies: “I have chosen to capitalize the word because I intend to 
demonstrate that Gothic denotes literary conventions organized around a specific 
structure.”198 Then, with the second sentence, her stance is further clarified. Certainly, it 
is difficult (if at all possible) to imagine a literary history which does not organize, 
delineate and define, and still remains a literary history, but ‘to organise,’ ‘to define’ 
and ‘to delineate’ are all verbs which have a special significance – and signification – 
here. What Williams seems to speak of are “inherited” notions and modes of analysis, 
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those which she appears to blame for the failure of previous critics in their attempts to 
reach an ‘appropriate’ definition of the Gothic. The fact that her version of literary 
history will also organise, define and delineate, by the way, is not necessarily realised 
by the reader at the same time.  
  In her attempt to clarify the “Gothic’s apparent chaos,”199 Williams uses George 
Lakoff’s conception of a category as a cognitive structure. This allows her to explain the 
central motif of the castle (and the reason why certain Gothic texts lack it but are still 
Gothic) in a more thorough manner than DeLamotte’s conception of the Gothic myth.200 
The basic move is to perceive Gothic fiction not as characterised by a particular shared 
essence, or family resemblances, but as a cognitive structure build up according to 
discernible principles, which has its central, basic members to which further members 
are linked through “chaining” and which may be affected by culture-specific “basic 
domains of experience.”201 While Williams asserts that Gothic fiction poses problems 
for critics who wish to approach it through classifying, for the reason that classification 
invariably entails lacks and inconsistencies,202 her own approach is meant to both allow 
one to grasp the Gothic in its entirety and prevent one from failing to consider its 
historical development. This development seems to be reflected both by the chains in 
the Gothic “complex,”203 and the fact that certain works produced before Horace 
Walpole (Williams uses the abbreviation “B.W.”) have been retrospectively viewed as 
Gothic, and many works up to this date, be they written or cinematographic, still have a 
discernible Gothic feel to them.204 
But for the insistence on the ‘centrality’ as a key concept to the Gothic definition, 
this approach would be quite similar to ours. Certainly, by moving beyond the theme, 
Williams wishes to distance herself from the search of ‘the essential Gothic feature.’ 
But the fact that the Gothic complex she proposes is meant to be structured around a 
‘central’ element nonetheless immobilises the structure, carving the possible paths of 
development in advance. 
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If “basic domains of experience” influence, or, indeed, organise the category, the 
Gothic is to be organised around the deeply rooted Western-cultural experience of the 
patriarchal family. For Williams, Gothic fictions notoriously represent otherness,205 set 
in motion already by Walpole as he labelled his Otranto “a Gothic story,” a story taking 
place in the ‘dark ages’ as opposed to the present, civilised times.206 She affiliates the 
otherness found in the Gothic with the categories of otherness she finds to be consistent 
in the Western culture and exemplified by the Aristotle’s ‘the line of evil,’ as opposed 
to ‘the line of good,’207 which she perceives as founded upon the binary opposition of 
‘male’ versus ‘female.’ As she links the Gothic with the line of evil and the female – 
“the most powerful and persistent “other” of Western culture208 – Williams discovers 
the secret principle for the Gothic, comparable, as she writes, to Freudian ‘latent 
content’ or linguistic ‘deep structure.’ The castle, a persistent Gothic element, is a 
setting most representative of a patriarchal family, patriarchy itself being the 
embodiment of the line of good, which becomes threatened, with its clear distinction 
between what is male and what female, by the Gothic’s ostensible others. This, as she 
views it, is the distinctive characteristic of Gothic fiction: “Gothic plots are family 
plots,” the family structure determines the plot.209  
If assertions about the Gothic theme, recurring throughout ‘all the Gothic’ texts, 
immobilise the category, so does the assertion that the Gothic is ‘latently’ structured 
around the rule of family. The basis for the structure may not be in the Gothic texts 
themselves – it may be outside of them – but it is still fixed, this time in Western 
culture’s perception of itself. There are many interesting points in this ‘poetics’ of the 
Gothic, as Williams terms it. There are, also, many questions to be simultaneously 
raised. 
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One of them is definitely that of the status of the Gothic. Is it to be seen as a 
threatening “other” as such? The question is thought-provoking due to the way in which 
Williams accounts for the two ancient lines of opposites. Under the label of the line of 
evil, she groups together the Gothic and Romantic aesthetics, and, unsurprisingly, the 
theory of the sublime, all three containing some of elements associated with the line. On 
the opposite side, she puts classicism and realism.210 This opposite side is then ascribed 
to patriarchy, and the statement that “Gothic narratives enabled their audiences to 
confront and explore, and simultaneously to deny, a theme that marks the birth of the 
Romantic (and modern) sensibility: that ‘the Law of the Father’ is a tyrannical 
paterfamilias and that we dwell in his ruins”211 presents Gothic fiction as capable of 
inviting and entertaining, though not necessarily wishing to implement, subversion. On 
the one hand, this is nothing new. But on the other, the simultaneous reconfiguration of 
Romanticism and the sublime as opposed to the patriarchal is curious.  
A similar question is that of whether we should, consequently, put an equation mark 
between the Gothic and the female. Could we add the Gothic as such to ‘the line of 
evil’? Like the previous one, this question, though it sounds like a cliché, imposes itself 
on us immediately as we think of the ways in which the first wave Gothic was 
dismissed by its contemporary critics. Once again, Clery could be particularly useful 
here. Her consideration of civic humanism as an Augustan, conservative discourse 
aimed against finance capitalism and consumerism212 sheds light on how Gothic fiction 
actually came to be debased for the drastic effect it allegedly had on women, and how it 
was itself codified as a representative of a new ‘feminine’ order of business. Among 
many things, Clery brings our attention to the fact that, as eighteenth-century critics 
rage about the Gothic peril to female readers and writers, they see more at stake than the 
woman’s virtue. The woman becomes less an object of concern than a rhetorical figure 
here, embodying an ages’ old link between the female and luxury.213 For civic 
humanism, the female is indeed a disturbing other: maintaining the feudal manner of 
thinking about wealth, what the discourse represents as feminine is commerce, an 
epitome of which becomes Gothic fiction. Hence, for the ‘aristocratic’ patriarchy, the 
Gothic could, in a way, belong to ‘the line of evil.’  
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But what Clery’s considerations make clear is yet another thing. For civic humanism, 
the female stands for “the excesses of economic self-interest;” but for bourgeois 
liberalism, it represents “virtues excluded from the sphere of commercial 
competition.”214While the female is the other for the conservative, landed paterfamilias, 
and serves as a veiled representation for his another ‘other,’ which is the middle-class 
capitalist, it is simultaneously the capitalist’s other as well. In the case of Williams’ 
account, however, the bourgeois seems to be replaced by the Romantic. Indeed, the 
study internalises the paradigmatic assumption of the link between the Gothic and 
Romanticism to the point of seeing them as almost one. Rebellion is, consequently, 
emphasised where one could see the influence of (middle-class) ‘conservatism.’ 
Furthermore, as the author relies heavily on psychoanalysis, patriarchy seems to be 
brought down to a single denominator: The Law of the Father. Hence, the shift from the 
aristocratic order to the middle-class one is removed from sight.  
This is related, in a way, to the question of history in the study. Early in her 
considerations, Williams complains that approaching the Gothic through classifying it 
into subcategories is unsatisfactory for, among other reasons, in this way the issue of the 
historical development of the genre is not addressed.215 However, she dismisses history 
as insufficient to explain the Gothic thoroughly later on in her study.216 From our 
perspective, this is felt perhaps most acutely as she contends that the surge of texts 
concentrating on the family plot in the late eighteenth century must have had something 
to do with historical changes in the family structure at that time, but immediately shuns 
socio-economic considerations in favour of analysing psychological effects of the 
changes.217 As a result, she limits herself to the well-known assertion that since the 
Gothic proliferates at a certain period in history, it must reflect contemporary anxieties 
projected on a remote setting. In this case, the difference is that she grounds this 
assertion in Mark Turner’s consideration of ‘family’ as a basic conceptual metaphor and 
takes the stance that our experience is regulated by family notions.218 
The turn towards psychology and away from history results, at a crucial point, in 
Williams’ peculiar way of reading Foucault. Speaking of family structure changes in the 
eighteenth as well as in the nineteenth century, one may easily think of Foucault’s 
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volume one of The History of Sexuality, and she indeed evokes the source as useful. 
What is to be of particular interest with regard to the Gothic seen as organised around 
the family plot are Foucault’s notions of two kinds of deployment: of alliance and of 
sexuality. The birth of the deployment of sexuality coincides, in Foucault’s 
periodization, with the birth of modernity. It is also strictly connected with the 
bourgeoisie and marks a distinction between the middle class and the old aristocracy. 
Foucault’s states: “sexuality is originally, historically bourgeois;”219 the bourgeoisie 
“converted the blue blood of the nobles into a sound organism and a healthy 
sexuality.”220 Thus, the deployment of alliance is occupied with preserving fixed 
statuses and family relations to ensure a particular way of the circulation of wealth, and 
is based upon stable rules of what is to be permitted and forbidden. By contrast, the 
deployment of sexuality is not concerned with preserving statuses, but constantly 
expands its area of power and control through shaping bodies. It is “concerned with the 
sensations of the body, the quality of pleasures, and the nature of impressions,” and the 
producing and consuming body is one of the relays through which it connects with the 
economy.221 The two, are however, not simply juxtaposed, but seem to be inescapably 
interconnected. 
The connection is an intricate one, and refers to the way in which the deployment of 
sexuality utilises and incorporates the older system. It is constructed “around and on the 
basis of the deployment of alliance,”222 and incorporates alliance’s basic family axes of 
husband and wife, and parents and children relations. Thus, the family as a basic social 
cell becomes the place where sexuality is first and foremost incited, instead of thwarted, 
but at the same time, it remains a unit governed by law inherent in alliance. Hence, for 
instance, the insistence on the prohibition of incest, which – due to the highly 
sexualized character of the family – is seen as inherent in the family (being its “dreadful 
secret”223) and, simultaneously, becomes the object of the strictest ban. As Foucault 
notices, in this way, the law characteristic of alliance is retained within the dimension of 
sexuality, whose proliferating techniques of power are thus brought under jurisdiction, 
and pleasure enters alliance.224 
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It is this interconnection of sexuality and alliance in the family cell that attracts 
Williams’ attention. The obvious reason is of course Foucault’s placing of the family at 
the centre of the new system of power, which manifests itself most visibly from the 
eighteenth century on. However, Williams indeed concentrates exclusively on the 
psychological effects of the emergence of a new deployment. Interestingly, as she 
evades the need to take account of the affiliation of sexuality with the bourgeoisie, she 
identifies alliance with neoclassicism, patriarchy, The Law of the Father and the line of 
good. Simultaneously, she views sexuality as underlying the Romantic revolt against the 
other system, and hence belonging to the line of evil. In her view, sexuality “[favours] 
the private perspective of the individual, sentient being.”225 Since both operate within 
the family, one imposing the strict rule of the Father, the other underscoring the status 
quo and transgressing the rules inherent in alliance, the result is a psychological tension: 
“a situation in which the demands of family, property, social order, and tradition 
conflict with the new idea that the desires of the private self should constitute the 
fundamental basis of private behavior, and even of institutional order.”226 As she moves 
on, she describes the family which combines the two deployments as “a structure 
ordered according to the hierarchical principles designed, among other things, to name 
and control the female [which] must also nurture sexual beings, who know and act 
according to their own desires.”227 As can be seen in the quotations, she views sexuality 
as capable of ensuring, in a sense, a greater freedom and, thus, constituting a threat to 
patriarchy, but, simultaneously, as still controlled by the patriarchal family structure. 
This is a paradoxical situation, in a sense recognized by Foucault as well (though we 
could argue that Foucault takes a slightly different perspective on the dimension of 
sexuality’s threat).228 As a result, the Gothic is defined “as a narrative built over a 
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cultural fault line—the point of conjunction between the discourses of alliance and 
sexuality, in Foucault’s sense of those terms.”229 Through this narrative, the self – 
which is frequently the ‘female other’ – finds a means to express the conflict inherent in 
the clash of inner desires with the external rules.  
On the one hand, such a reading of Foucault is plausible. The patriarchy, formerly 
inherent in feudal relations, is maintained and adapted to the needs of the bourgeoisie. 
Hence, to remind ourselves, the new jurisdiction maintains the law of coverture. 
Sexuality is seen here as capable of functioning on its own terms, indeed, as Foucault 
notes, traversing the laws which the conjunction with alliance imposes on it. 
Unchecked, the technologies of power generated alongside the rise of sexuality begin to 
counteract the very notion of law – but, consequently, they also need to be “recoded” in 
its forms.230 We could see this, in a sense, also as a situation arising as a result of the 
discursive shift: the givens of the newly empowered discourse are not necessarily 
different from the givens of its predecessor. But, on the other hand, Williams devotes no 
space to the consideration of sexuality’s class implications and function. Instead, she 
focuses on the deployment of sexuality as a trigger to the Romantic revolt. The 
consequence is atemporality assumed where it should seem we are discussing 
historically conditioned shifts: patriarchy and sexuality are distilled from the context of 
their functionality. Williams seems to perceive patriarchy as univocal and 
‘unchangeable,’ released sexuality being its overt ‘other’ and opposite, which erases a 
number of subtleties, and she further simplifies the notion by organizing it around the 
eternal Name of the Father. 
The un-changeability of patriarchy emerges as Williams rewrites Aristotelian lines of 
good and evil and places the deployment of alliance at the end of the former, putting the 
deployment of sexuality at the end of the latter.231 This would not be possible but for the 
turn away from socio-economic considerations and towards psychology. While alliance 
is characteristic of aristocracy, and sexuality of the bourgeoisie, both aristocracy and the 
bourgeoisie are inherently structured around patriarchy. And even if Foucault supposes 
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that the deployment of sexuality might replace that of alliance in the future,232 he 
nonetheless views it as incorporating the older system and tied to the system so that it 
may appear to be naturally grounded in law. By the way, the crucial role in the process 
of consolidating sexuality with alliance is ascribed by him to psychoanalysis.233 The 
conflict between the demands of the two, manifesting itself in the family, is, 
inescapably, reconciled first by medicine, than by law and naturalised. 
The emphasis on sexuality (the female, the other, the Romantic) as subverting and 
capable of functioning outside of alliance (the patriarchal, the neoclassical) and the 
elision of its socio-economic implications have their price. True, they give the Gothic a 
reason to be, and not a minor one, but central to the cultural development of the Western 
world from the eighteenth century to the present. Simultaneously, however, they 
preclude certain paths of reading a Gothic text favouring particular others. On a higher 
level, such an approach sexualises the Gothic permanently, following the assertion of 
psychoanalysis that family relations are permeated with desire. Thus, it again 
reorganises the boundaries instead of releasing one from the need to draw the line, for it 
immediately sweeps aside various themes and inscribed discourses that are 
characteristic of the Gothic, but not necessarily explicable through the psychological 
results of the internal clash between alliance and sexuality. On a lower level, every 
Gothic stock device – the typically Gothic spectre, to give an example – becomes a 
signal of a threat to patriarchy by definition. To reverse Williams’ assertion, it is not 
that certain themes and characters become ‘Gothic’ as they start to be used as 
threatening the patriarchal family.234 As we assume that the patriarchal family and the 
fissure in The Law of the Father lie at the heart of the Gothic, whatever scares in the 
book, has to somehow scare the patriarch. 
The concern about both bringing the Gothic down to sexuality and representing the 
Gothic ‘other’ as always subverting the status quo is voiced in Baldick and Mighall. As 
they state, in much of the twentieth-century criticism, especially devoted to late 
nineteenth-century Gothic fiction, one may find declarations of a historicist-like 
attitude. This attitude, however, becomes unmasked as superficial as soon as we realise 
that the analysis focuses on the psychological dimension and relies on the a priori 
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assumption of the anxious bourgeoisie.235 We may state that the same refers to the case 
of Williams. In fact, her assertion that a stock Gothic ‘other’ becomes a stock Gothic 
‘other’ the very moment it is established in fiction as threatening the patriarchal family, 
which we have just reversed above, is an apt illustration of Baldick and Mighall’s 
position that contemporary critics often depart from an “unproven” vantage point that 
“this ‘oppressive’ culture [i.e. the bourgeois culture] was terrified by its ideological 
‘Others’; and thus if the Gothic features the Other in demonic form, these demonic 
forms must reflect society’s fears about the Other.”236 Williams’ one-page-long 
discussion of the vampire as exemplifying the process of becoming ‘Gothic’ also could 
serve as an example in their discussion of the critical re-writing of Count Dracula. 
For Baldick and Mighall, Gothic fiction concentrates on two types of anachronisms. 
One of them refers to a situation in which ‘modernity’ is misplaced in ‘antiquity’; the 
other, to a situation in which ‘antiquity’ invades ‘modernity.’237 Dracula exemplifies the 
latter case. However, as Williams does not distinguish between ‘antiquity’ and 
‘modernity’ embodied in patriarchy, but rather views patriarchy as constant, for her 
Dracula automatically exemplifies the line of evil and the other, “a specifically sexual 
threat that could undermine Western culture itself.”238 Thus, he is also automatically 
linked with the female, and confirmation is found in the immediate associations he 
rises: “blood, darkness, death, and monstrous, unspeakable, unsanctified 
reproduction.”239 Notably, we should not assume that his sexuality or these traits make 
him a part of the Aristotelian ‘evil line.’ Since patriarchy is atemporal and, in such a 
form, occupies the line of good – and in the novel it is represented by the bourgeois 
Crew of Light – Dracula, being an adversary, must be on the other side. The remaining 
conclusions are inescapable if we wish to hold to the idea of two lines as embodying 
the, again, atemporal categories of otherness in the Western culture, and we insist on the 
binary pair of ‘male/female’ as the basis on which other categories rest. 
This is an only superficial sorting out of the Count’s affiliation. What is explained 
away is the fact that Dracula is alliance, just as he is Father, or a paterfamilias, and his 
blood is the blue blood of the nobles. His sexuality is thus not a healthy bourgeois 
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sexuality; from the perspective of Foucault’s periodization, it is not sexuality at all. It 
could rather represents what Foucault calls “the combined figures of an alliance gone 
bad and an abnormal sexuality.”240 What else is Lucy the vampire, sucking infants’ 
blood, than an extreme incarnation of “the mother beset by murderous obsessions”241? 
Or to put it better still, Dracula’s sexuality could embody the typically middle-class 
representation of the aristocrat as lustful, immoral, and dedicated to gratifying carnal 
desires, thus spoiling the body. In both cases, however, the trick is that he is not in line 
with the female. As an aristocrat, he is not the ‘other’ of patriarchy as such, but an 
exemplary of the long beaten ancient regime as seen through the bourgeois eyes. 
Drawing an analogy with Clery, we might assume that the clash over women, taking 
place in the novel, is an element conditioned by the bourgeois discourse in which the 
woman is an exemplar. If that is the case, the fight is actually about much more than 
family relations (this issue is actually quite interesting and we shall return to it shortly).  
Thus, we may realise that there is a fault in Williams’ line of reasoning at this point. 
IF it were not for the psychological perspective, her reading of Dracula would be self-
contradictory. Moving on, we may also observe, by the way, how the point from which 
she departs actually allows her to choose between available interpretations suggested by 
the psychoanalytical line of reasoning. If, as she states, Stoker accidentally foretold in 
Dracula Freud’s story of patricide from Totem and Taboo (1912), then her own reading 
of the great vampire as “the terrible father figure” who nonetheless “represents the 
female”242 could be re-read were it not for the immediate assertion that patriarchy has 
one single denominator (men in the novel) and all that is against it must be aligned with 
the female. Strangely enough, if we insist on Stoker’s unconscious ability to foresee 
Freud, we may also see Dracula as the specter of the father arising from the grave to 
regain the power over women and punish the murderous sons. Again, in such a reading, 
there are two statuses quo in conflict, and the whole order built around The Law of the 
Father is in danger. But from both perspectives, of the guilty sons and the Father-
specter, women belong to men; they pass from hands to hands, or are all in the hands of 
one man. 
Another thing is that, indeed, what is regarded, in a discourse centred on men’s 
hegemony, as undesirable will quite probably be represented in ‘feminine’ terms. This 
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is exactly the case of civic humanism discussed by Clery. It may be, thus, the case, that 
‘evil’ in Dracula is shown as linked with the governing discursive representation of 
femininity.243 However, this does not mean that the vampire will immediately have the 
same status as the female, even if both are ‘others.’ There is, in Williams’s analyses, 
something which makes one think of a problem with metaphor; something which at 
times makes us notice she resembles Clery in her considerations, but only on the 
surface. Following Clery, we see that much in culture around the Gothic boom was 
discussed in terms of women, their chastity and their proper place. Consequently, much 
should also be represented through familial metaphors. But metaphors are metaphors 
because they point to something beyond their immediate signification (which, of course, 
is not to say that their immediate signification is without significance). In her use of the 
family metaphor, Williams seems to look in the opposite direction – as if, since our 
experience can be told in the familial metaphors, this meant that the family is indeed 
what our experience is about. This is a Freudian point of view, of course, and, for 
instance, Baldick and Mighall show how it imposes itself on her interpretation when she 
is dealing with the typically Gothic representation of Catholicism.244 
The patriarchal family is established in Art of Darkness as one fixed, atemporal 
coordinate. The other one, as should have perhaps become clear by now, is the 
organisation of ‘others’ in the Western culture, to which Williams constantly returns. 
The way in which those become established as constant and unchangeable is 
exemplified by the sorting out of the Burkean sublime. As Clery notices, the sublime’s 
opposite is the beautiful, and the contemporary critics point out that both are gendered, 
as male and female respectively.245 The same is referred to by Williams, who states that 
“[Burke’s] association of the sublime with the masculine and the beautiful with the 
feminine is virtually explicit.”246 Simultaneously, she nonetheless emphasises that the 
sublime can be seen as incorporating several of the qualities that belong to the line of 
evil. Thus, it is as if it were evoked by the culturally female. Consequently, Williams 
asserts that “‘the sublime’ is […] a ‘sublimation’ of the culturally female.”247 What is to 
confirm this assertion is the observation that the subject perceiving the sublime is placed 
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in the culturally female position. As a result, the sublime is established as “smuggling 
into the Symbolic […] the repressed maternal.”248 Sound as it may seem, this reasoning 
rests, however, on the assumption of the unchangeability of the binary pairs with regard 
to the governing male/female opposites. Additionally, as we may notice, Williams 
mentions in passing that such an understanding of the sublime undoes the need for 
establishing the difference between the Gothic and the Romantic varieties.249 
Williams’ theory of the Gothic visibly rests on many of the typically paradigmatic 
tenets. The affinity of the Gothic and Romanticism, the anxious ‘bourgeois’ (though 
here not named by class), Gothic fiction’s atavistic attitude towards its own present – or 
at least its expression of the tension resulting from the inculcation of conflicting modes 
of desire – these are all the givens of a theory of the Gothic as developed by the 
differentiation paradigm. All of these givens are notably underlain by a conjunction of 
the need to vindicate the Gothic and psychoanalytical methodology. Additionally, and 
perhaps more importantly, we may observe that these givens are here no longer to be 
seen as determining the rising action, climax and resolution of the act of interpretation, 
in a way. The notions of patriarchy and the Aristotelian lines, here seen as fixed, may be 
perceived by us as not necessarily illuminating the Gothic, and hence referred to, but 
rather as chosen for they seem to confirm and reinforce the already established truths of 
the Gothic theory. They also allow for its further elaboration in the formerly assumed 
direction. Williams’ insistence on remaining in the realm of psychology as more 
appropriate than a recourse to history may be seen in the same light. Shunning history in 
favour of psychology shuts down the possibilities to divert from the pre-established 
direction of analysis; it secures both interpretation, and the theory itself. As a result, we 
may observe that while the contemporary criticism re-works the Gothic using various 
discourses, its own discourse expands incorporating an additional grid: the concept of 
the theory of the Gothic. This theory emerges at the point of convergence between 
various discourses, but in time gains an impetus to function independently. 
This independence may be sensed in Williams’ application of psychoanalysis. On the 
one hand, she draws heavily on Freud, Kristeva and Lacan when their assertions come 
in hand. On the other hand, she makes it clear that psychoanalysis is itself a child of its 
own times. At times, as in the chapter “Male Gothic: Si(g)ns of the Father,” she 
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observes that psychoanalysis is occupied primarily with the masculine, and hence 
patriarchal, point of view (especially when it comes to gaze as a means of establishing 
one’s identity).250 Elsewhere, she views it from a poststructuralist perspective to 
highlight its own organisation around the concept of the other, interestingly, inherent in 
“the post-Enlightenment culture.”251 Yet elsewhere, we may find statements such as the 
one that “Freud […] may serve to represent the most advanced views of the late 
nineteenth century.”252Thus, psychoanalysis functions in the study as a tool for analysis 
and, at the same time, as an illustration of the ongoing processes, so to speak. What is 
most interesting, however, is the fact that Williams sees it as itself a narrative which has 
something in common with the Gothic. 
Williams is not the first to notice the similarity. In the first chapter, we already 
evoked Miles as pointing to it. However, in Williams’ understanding of the affinity 
between the Gothic and psychoanalysis, the latter is embedded in the former entirely. 
This exemplifies, to some extent, the stance typically taken by psychoanalytic criticism 
with regard to the matter. The stance could be illustrated with Michelle A. Massé’s 
position. For Massé, both the Gothic and psychoanalysis follow a historical 
development, and are socio-culturally conditioned but, most importantly, they have a 
common source in “cultural unease.”253 We could say that this statement both reflects 
the hermeneutic circle of psychoanalytical reading, and betrays the emergence of the 
Gothic as theory and a mode of interpretation as such. First, you need to identify the 
cultural unease, anxiety, irrationality, etc. as the Gothic fabric with the help of 
psychoanalysis. Then, you are able to see the Gothic and psychoanalysis as cognate, not 
as one, or related to each other as are a case study and the method of analysis, but as 
related (the object is constructed, together with its materiality). Thus, Massé assumes 
that psychoanalysis is not an objective mode of interpretation which unlocks the Gothic, 
but still illuminates it, and the more so if we assume that the Gothic influenced 
psychoanalysis254 (the object is interwoven in the net of ‘natural’ evolution). Williams’ 
reading is one caught up in the vicious circle of hermeneutics comprising both turns of 
the circle – constructing the Gothic as grounded in the same internal conflict as 
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psychoanalysis, and then using it to explain psychoanalysis and simultaneously confirm 
it. 
It is suggestive that, throughout the study, Williams both utilises the teachings of 
psychoanalysis and simultaneously shows it to be defective. This illustrates just well 
enough how a discourse works. However, Williams is particularly interesting in this 
respect. In her final chapter, she asserts that psychoanalysis is a limited model for an 
illuminating analysis, a grid which produces unsatisfactory results, especially from the 
feminist perspective.255 Yet this is meant only to strengthen the relationship between it 
and Gothic fiction. The limited capability of psychoanalysis for illuminating the Gothic 
is to result from the fact that psychoanalysis is Freud’s own version of a Gothic 
narrative. She states: “perhaps we have it backward. Instead of using Freud to read 
Gothic, we should use Gothic to read Freud.”256 This is not, however, the same claim as 
the one made by neohistoricist critics, such as Miles or Mighall, who would then 
venture to examine the historical (and discursive) context of both. Williams treats her 
statement literally, dedicating a number of pages to showing how the Gothic undoes the 
boundary between literary and nonliterary, how Freud utilises its conventions and how 
his narrative (a grand narrative, we should add) may be seen as incorporating both Male 
and Female Gothic plots as defined by her. In the end, she reaches the conclusion that 
“the similarities between the Freudian model of the psyche and the conventions of 
Gothic fiction are best understood as parallel expressions of an Enlightenment frame of 
mind, which is both the last phase of patriarchy and the first of something else not yet 
articulated.”257 From the historicist perspective, such a statement could be perfectly 
sound. Yet in this case, it is spectralising in effect.  
The spectralisation results from the fact that the Gothic is, nonetheless, constructed 
as an object according to psychoanalytical tenets. In spite of the effort to address 
historical shifts and rifts, and the adopted feminist perspective – which could be 
particularly promising for the historical illumination of the category258 – psychology 
still imposes itself on the definition. Thus, the Gothic is not only a sum of a particular 
set of true and false statements, a set which is exclusive as much as it expands beyond 
the previously established area of a literary category in both directions of the past and 
the future, incorporating a new range of texts institutionally established as ‘high art.’ It 
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becomes its own spectre. Williams’ reading of Freud ‘via’ her construction of the 
Gothic proves this spectre to be perfectly able of what spectres typically do – haunting. 
Her Gothic is indeed a theory: aspiring to the institution, equipped with its own poetics, 
and enforcing its own way of reading. Thereby, the discourse explains away yet more 
efficiently what it cannot assimilate or account for. 
Focusing on socio-economic context, the very one Williams dismisses as less 
relevant, could clarify many points in her argument. It could, also, bring to the light 
many discursive rifts and gaps. Yet the assumed equality of approaches, discussed at the 
beginning of this part of the dissertation, assumes a different criterion for verification: 
the indefinability, the multiplicity of contexts and subtexts, the blurring of boundaries, 
emphasised in Rintoul’s review. And this is striking. It is as if indefinability, which 
results from approaching the Gothic from positions which in fact predetermine its shape 
– indeed, from shopping for the Gothic and decorating the castle with whatever suits the 
critics – was taken to be the sign of whether one defines the Gothic ‘correctly’ or not. If 
we consider the possible definitions that have been discussed here, we will not find it 
surprising that it is so difficult to grasp the Gothic, for it has been rewritten so many 
times, that it is compelled to constitute an astounding palimpsest of voices and 
perspectives, a true discursive mixture. Consequently, it ought to be as far as possible 
from a ‘grand narrative.’ However, the equality of approaches results in inclusiveness 
which allows for the most varied coexistence, and further mixing, of the defining 
structures. Accidentally, or unnoticeably, it also allows us to pass over the fact that the 
in-definition of the Gothic has its own, internal order. 
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Chapter VI 
Gothic Fiction of the Eighteenth Century 
and the Narrative of Marginalisation 
 
In Chapter V we have analysed one feature of Gothic fiction which is often 
emphasised in the contemporary conceptions of the mode, namely, the mode’s 
indefinability. The following chapter deals with the assumption of the Gothic’s 
marginalisation, which is often shown to originate in the eighteenth-century virulent 
criticism of the popular novels/romances. As the differentiation paradigm poses, 
contemporary Gothic criticism liberates the Gothic from the literary margin. At the 
same time, however, the value of Gothic fiction is established, according to a 
psychoanalytical logic, on the basis of its ‘waste’ status – its representing what culture 
abjects in the process of identity formation. Establishing the cultural significance of 
Gothic fiction in such a way, paradoxically, results in fixing it on the margin in the 
sense that the critics conceptualise the mode as inherently marginal by ‘nature.’ On the 
contrary, we attempt at showing that the Gothic is not a mode that used to be marginal 
in the eighteenth century due to its assumed abjected status or oppositional stance 
towards the status quo and social order. This is because the Gothic utilises as much as 
participates in a number of contemporary discourses, socio-cultural, political and (what 
is often overlooked) economic. In this way, it takes part (perhaps marginal indeed, but 
still representative of the general changes taking place in the eighteenth century) in the 
constitution of the bourgeois order through positive production in the period following a 
major socio-political and, indeed, cultural shift. This makes the mode a particularly 
eighteenth-century and middle-class literary phenomenon.1 
 
6.1. Historical Refashioning: Liberation of the Margin 
 
If we were to adopt the perspective of the differentiation paradigm, we ought to 
assume the long-lasting marginalisation of the Gothic to be significant first and 
foremost for its ‘injustice.’ On a certain level, we may concur with this. If we recognise 
the Gothic to emerge at a time of socio-cultural shift, and we assume it somehow 
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embodies this shift, then dismissing it as a literary curiosity, unworthy of ‘serious’ 
studies and scholars, should seem to be harmful. Logically, we should take it for granted 
that, owing to its immersion in the shifting discourses of its contemporary times, Gothic 
fiction may tell us a lot about at least the history of literary categories and their 
connection with economy or politics.  
Nietzsche would probably agree with the maxim “History is written by the victors.” 
So would Foucault, and so shall we. It is hardly questionable that the Gothic as a 
concept had not enjoyed a widely recognised position in the literary histories until late 
twentieth-century gave it some recognition. It had to take a change in the critical 
approach to literature for Gothic studies to flourish. However, as the discipline enjoys 
its institutionalised status, an inquiry into how it sorts out the past in which it was itself 
‘marginal’ may take us in two directions. 
One of them is the question of the extent to which the negligence of the Gothic 
impoverished our understanding of the processes which shaped the modern concepts of 
literature. And, of course, we may consider the ‘impoverishment’ as functional in the 
‘grand old’ critical discourse. If it ascribed the Gothic a minor position, we should 
expect this was a position in a wider hierarchy, organised so that a specific equilibrium 
could be maintained, and a particular representation of literary history upheld. The other 
direction, in which we are now about to turn, is related to the question of how the 
contemporary criticism, stressing its own difference, rewrites history for its own aims.  
As we have seen in the first chapter, in the history written by the contemporary 
criticism, often, even if not always, the notion of marginalisation plays a crucial role. 
Interestingly, if it does not, the account is often less interested in drawing a clear and 
divisive line between the past and present scholarship. On the other hand, if it does, 
differentiation is usually emphasised. What this indicates is that marginality and 
marginalisation represent notions which play a significant discursive part; they are 
concepts with an assigned, well-defined function within the discourse of the 
contemporary Gothic criticism. If we remember the first chapter, we may observe that 
in the paradigmatic histories the contemporary Gothic criticism has not solely moved 
the Gothic closer to the centre of the institutionalised critical inquiry after a time of 
negligence. Once we recall Williams’ Gothic myths of the black sheep or the skeleton in 
the closet, or Kilgour’s metaphor of the New Criticism’s shackles, we shall remember 
that Gothic criticism is represented as having liberated the mode. Of course, this means 
that the Gothic had to be previously ‘constrained,’ ‘limited’ so that it conformed to its 
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ascribed place in the literary hierarchy. By representing its own history in such a 
manner, the contemporary Gothic criticism in a way inscribes its practice into a wider 
cultural project of contesting the ‘grand’ discourses of ‘truth’ as oppressing discourses.2 
Participation in the wave of liberation, both of the Gothic and the critic, is visible, or 
at least traceable, not only in more general accounts which tend to comment on the 
necessary changes in the critical discourse (think of e.g. Botting’s introduction to the 
New Critical Idiom’s Gothic). There is, for instance, a detectable sense of personal as 
much as social liberation from constraints in Nina Auerbach’s introduction to Our 
Vampires, Ourselves (1995). Here, we begin with the critic’s recounting of her own 
teenage interest in the 1930s horror movies as a way of fending off the identity of a 
popular girl in the 1950s, “a destiny of girdles, spike heels, and approval,” and finish 
with her recollecting how her paper was dismissed at a Women’s Studies symposium 
for it was about horror and undeath, both allegedly incompatible with the ‘real’ threats 
for women.3 Thus, we may see her personal account as an illustration of the Gothic (in 
this case, vampire) critic’s journey for recognition. And we may assume the journey has 
been successful. Auerbach states she is “writing in part to reclaim [vampires] for a 
female tradition, one that has not always known its allies,”4 and this is clearly seen as a 
beneficial advancement. 
Much of the contemporary criticism seems to set itself a similar goal. The question 
remains, however, whether the reclaiming is a ‘true,’ or historically justified one, or 
whether the critics (in general, not necessarily Auerbach herself), all in all, consciously 
or not, tend to slip into carrying out the practice of congratulating themselves on their 
personal, (post)modern liberation by rewriting the Gothic. The practice, described in 
precisely those harsh terms, is discussed by Chris Baldick and Robert Mighall as 
characterising much of the contemporary critical studies. Congratulating oneself upon 
one’s personal liberation from “the dungeons of Victorian sexual repression or social 
hierarchy,”5 as the passage goes, designates a biased reading of the Gothic which is 
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informed by the critic’s own contemporary discourses, and not on a consideration of the 
text’s historical context. What results is a rewriting of the Gothic, its recodification 
according to a code alien to the mode’s own background. As the authors suggest, the 
practice takes place due to the fact that “the cultural politics of modern critical debate 
grant to vindicators of the marginalised or repressed a special licence to evade questions 
of artistic merit.”6 Yet, we could notice that the case is not restricted to the question of 
artistic merit as such. The postmodern critical debate in general places much emphasis 
on the scrutiny of the margin and its vindication. 
If the marginalisation of the Gothic had a starting point, this point was the mode’s 
very birth, followed by an outcry of the eighteenth-century critics. Of course, Gothic 
novels did not vanish from bookshelves in consequence, and neither did criticism 
immediately fall silent about them. Quite on the contrary, the process of marginalising 
the mode should appear to be a gradual one. In the following chapter, we shall have a 
look at a brief history of Gothic criticism, represented by two texts, one written by Fred 
Botting as a preface for a collective volume, the other co-authored by Botting and Dale 
Townshed, which oscillate around the concept of the Gothic margin and its formation, 
and put a particular emphasis on differentiation.  
Our starting point will be doubts raised by Baldick and Mighall’s counter-history 
with regard to the common representation of Gothic fiction. A major difference between 
their perception of the Gothic and the one proposed by the above-mentioned authors is 
the mode’s attitude towards its own historical socio-cultural background. We may see 
that Baldick and Mighal strive to base their accounts on historicist scrutiny, just as 
Botting and Townshend. However, while the former pair of critics stresses the overall 
‘compliance,’ or ‘conservatism’ of the Gothic with regard to its own discursive 
background (and it is worth stressing that, in a certain way, both words in inverted 
commas seem to be inappropriate if we apply those critics’ perspective), the latter one is 
obliged, by the adopted viewpoint, to focus rather on what makes the Gothic stand in 
the opposition to that background. To remind ourselves, for Baldick and Mighall the 
Gothic is primarily a type of bourgeois fiction, characterised by its specific use of 
topography and history, Protestant rejection and satirising of Catholic superstition and 
abuse, and frequent anachronisms which serve to confirm its modernity and illustrate its 
embracing of the prevalent middle-class Protestant/Whig values.7 By contrast, Botting 
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and Townshend, especially in the general introduction to Gothic, propose a reversed 
understanding of the mode’s engagement with the contemporary discourses, focusing 
primarily on the rejection of Gothic fiction by the contemporary and subsequent critics, 
and the possible reasons for it. In consequence, we are presented with two apparently 
incompatible versions of the very same literary phenomenon: one stressing the Gothic’s 
belonging to the discursive order of the times, the other emphasising the outrage it 
provoked by its alleged breaches of that order as a reason for resulting marginalisation. 
The incompatibility arises from the fact that each of those versions approaches the 
Gothic from a different premise: one attempts to look at content, and the other at 
reception. In the course of analysis, we shall see how the latter version has been 
structured around the assumptions characteristic of the contemporary critical discourse 
on the Gothic, making use of its theory-established tenets and, consequently, passing 
over the possible historical discursive inflections of the mode. 
 
6.2. The Functionality of the Margin 
 
As it has been mentioned above, marginality appears to be a functional notion in the 
paradigmatic history of Gothic criticism. Clearly, it enables us to draw a line between 
the contemporary and older scholarship on the one hand, and adds extra value to the 
scrutiny of Gothic fiction on the other. At the same time, however, it also creates a 
space for a re-working of the conception of the Gothic which goes beyond assigning 
Gothic fiction the status of a worthy object of study.  
One way of illustrating how ascribing the marginal status to the Gothic entails its 
reconceptualization is, as one might suspect, by turning to psychoanalytical Gothic 
theory. We might say that Gothic fiction was first successfully vindicated as culturally 
significant by psychoanalysis at the beginning of the twentieth century. Michelle A. 
Massé (trying to vindicate psychoanalysis as an appropriate tool for the scrutiny of the 
Gothic at the dawn of the twenty-first century) points to the special significance that 
‘popular’ modes have for psychoanalytical scrutiny and thus the understanding of our 
own psyche in general. She writes: 
 
Freud […] identified writers of what we would now call ‘popular 
culture’ texts as providing particularly fruitful objects for 
psychoanalytic investigation, because it is ‘the less pretentious authors 
of novels, romances, and short stories, who nevertheless have the 
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widest and most eager circle of readers of both sexes.’ In such texts, 
the ‘secondary elaboration’ through which we reshape primal material 
seemed less densely wrought, the wishful, forbidden desires more 
clearly evident. The enthusiasm of readers for such genres further 
underscores their power, a power often nervously depreciated by 
relegating them to the realm of ‘low’ culture.8 
 
 
We may notice that such a representation of the Gothic runs counter to the attempts at 
vindicating the mode on account of its poetic and Romantic affiliations. Nonetheless, it 
is seen here as enough to grant Gothic fiction a recognisable socio-cultural status. 
Unelaborated, popular texts offer a more fruitful investigation into both the writer’s and 
the reading audience’s psychological states, or, in more general terms, the culturally 
hidden – repressed – content. Thus, on the one hand, we have Gothic fiction as 
‘popular,’ which means here less elaborated in a positive sense. On the other hand, we 
have the Gothic as something powerful, and thus feared – as a consequence of which it 
becomes marginalised as low culture. We may see in these assertions the basis for some 
of the strongest paradigmatic axioms: the Gothic as a carrier of unspeakable desires, as 
powerful for culturally subversive by nature, as feared by the institutionalised 
mainstream. What makes the Gothic attractive and valuable here is precisely the fact 
that it allows the repressed to surface – acting like the “rubbish bins” of culture, which 
hoard what the culture throws off9 – and since it does, it is necessarily marginalised, 
cast out, or abjected. Marginalisation is here as much a result as a symptom and 
confirmation of the (dangerous) psychological load carried by the Gothic text.  
At the same time, however, as Baldick and Mighall would point out, the value of the 
Gothic is established at the expense of reconceptualising the mode in purely 
psychological terms. There seems to be little space left for the consideration of what 
other reasons might contribute to the marginalisation of the mode. Similarly, there is 
hardly any place left for the consideration of how the Gothic participated in the culture 
which spawned it. Or, to put it differently, both the question of other, say socio-political 
reasons, and that of participation in the status quo, if tackled from this perspective, must 
be subordinated to the conception of the Gothic as carrying the power of the repressed, 
and hence, at least to some extent, feared due to the danger it poses to the coherently 
formed social subject. There is virtually no possible option for establishing the Gothic 
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as above all ‘positively’ middle-class and embracing the middle-class values, and hence 
reinforcing identity, personal, social or national, rather than pointing to rifts within it. 
We could paraphrase what has just been said in Foucauldian terms. If we adopt the 
psychoanalytical perspective, repression automatically becomes the focus. This is 
demanded by the overall discursive framework. Yet power operates upon the subject not 
simply through repression, but also by positive mechanisms. For instance, as Foucault 
states, “‘Sexuality’ is far more of a positive product of power than power was ever 
repression of sexuality.”10 In volume one of The History of Sexuality, we read:  
 
In any case, the hypothesis of a power of repression exerted by our 
society on sex for economic reasons appears to me quite inadequate 
[…] We are dealing not nearly so much with a negative mechanism of 
exclusion as with the operation of a subtle network of discourses, 
special knowledges, pleasures, and powers. At issue is not a 
movement bent on pushing rude sex back into some obscure and 
inaccessible region, but on the contrary, a process that spreads it over 
the surface of things and bodies, arouses it, draws it out and bids it 
speak, implants it in reality and enjoins it to tell the truth […].11 
 
 
Hence, Foucault’s method of focusing on the positive mechanisms of power: “rather 
than assuming a generally acknowledged repression, and an ignorance measured against 
what we are supposed to know, we must begin with these positive mechanisms, insofar 
as they produce knowledge, multiply discourse, induce pleasure, and generate power; 
we must investigate the conditions of their emergence and operation, and try to discover 
how the related facts of interdiction or concealment are distributed with respect to 
them.”12 If, instead, we concentrate exclusively on repression, such positive 
mechanisms remain unnoticed. 
This is not to say that we may unproblematically use ‘Gothic fiction’ as a substitute 
for ‘sexuality,’ and then apply Foucault to our discussion. Not all of the above will be 
immediately applicable to the Gothic; a mere rewriting of the passage, using ‘the 
Gothic’ instead of ‘sexuality,’ would probably not take us far, at least not much further 
than the similar practice of rewriting Derrida, mentioned earlier in this dissertation. 
What we may, however, find immediately useful is the emphasis Foucault puts on the 
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positive operation of power. Surely, concentrating on repression will automatically set 
aside any possible ‘positive mechanism’ that we might otherwise trace while dealing 
with the Gothic. 
The positive mechanisms, if there were any, would have to link with the assumption 
that the Gothic is a middle-class form. If it indeed represents such a form, then it must 
fall within the field of practices used to “produce knowledge, multiply discourses, 
induce pleasure, and generate power.” In the least, it ought to situate itself within the 
already established area of knowledge and order of discourses, and promote them 
somehow. Interestingly, this should not preclude critical outrage, as we shall attempt at 
demonstrating. It may, however, undermine the value of the Gothic as established by 
the repression-centred criticism, and, from a more general perspective, allow us to 
reconceptualise the notion of the Gothic’s marginality, at least to a certain degree. 
To turn now to our own case studies, let us consider the first of the two above-
mentioned sources, Botting’s preface to the English Association’s Essays and Studies 
2001 volume The Gothic. The preface is interesting primarily for its general tone of 
self-scrutiny. Botting evokes the paradigmatic history, pretty much similar to the one he 
himself presented in his New Critical Idiom’s Gothic, to ultimately cast it into doubt by 
the end of the text. The history of Gothic criticism he offers us illustrates well the 
functionality of the notion of marginality in the differentiation paradigm discourse. 
What needs to be stressed, however, is the fact that the account as such appears to 
distance itself from the typical theoretical analysis, as if in direct response to Baldick 
and Mighall’s criticism of the state of affairs in the field of Gothic studies.13 The tension 
revealed in the meantime points to the discursive framework of Gothic criticism and its 
lasting influence on the critics and their standpoint. We could propose that, as a 
consequence, the history evoked by the text invites and might embrace the notion of 
positive power mechanisms, but, while still working under the discursive givens of 
Gothic criticism, it can do so only partially.  
The influence of the paradigmatic discursive assertions can be observed while 
Botting discusses the cultural status – and value – of Gothic fiction. Having mentioned 
the long lasting critical neglect and denial, Botting pinpoints precisely the qualities 
which make the mode worthy of serious attention, and these are its ‘bad’ qualities: 
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No one has ever claimed that gothic texts offer examples of the best 
that has been thought and said in the world. More often the contrary. 
Indeed, it is as explorations of mysterious supernatural energies, 
immense natural forces, and deep, dark human fears and desires that 
gothic texts apparently found their appeal. Emerging at a time when 
enlightenment reason, science and empiricism were in the ascendancy, 
the attraction of Gothic darkness, passion, superstition or violence 
came from prohibitions and taboos, and was not the positive 
expression of hidden natural instincts and wishes: the newly dominant 
order produced, policed and maintained its antitheses, opposites 
enabling the distinction and discrimination of its own values and 
anxieties.14 
 
 
Consequently, marginality becomes the key to the usefulness of Gothic fiction. The 
today’s critics engaged in the study of the Gothic become cultural rubbish-diggers, their 
role almost as subversive as the Gothic negative material. They are not “[guardians] of 
taste and morality,” but rather “[analysts] of the currents and consistencies of specific 
cultural self-representations,” of “the negative represented by and in Gothic texts,” and 
examine culture by bringing to our attention the fact that what it excludes is as telling as 
what it wishes to embrace15 Clearly, being the opposite, the antithesis of order, and 
representing tabooed passions, is what makes the Gothic a precious artefact today. Its 
cultural status, in turn, may be seen as confirmed by the anxiety about its negative effect 
upon the readers with which it was initially welcomed, and the mode’s overall 
marginalisation.16 
Quite predictably, the description which grounds the value of the Gothic in its 
marginality, not to say liminality, is immediately followed by the recollection of the 
cutting-off moment in criticism. Botting speaks of the transvaluation of Gothic fiction in 
both writing and criticism in the second half of the twentieth century, “a curious 
dynamic” which made the Gothic a central affair.17 Yet he also highlights that it is the 
modern Gothic fiction and criticism that chime with the imperative to love one’s own 
monster, and that, at the end of the twentieth century, both the Gothic and criticism are 
affected with the drive towards liberation, be it social, political, or cultural.18 With these 
remarks, the preface turns towards self-critique and the final call for self-scrutiny and 
reconsideration. 
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Consequently, what becomes particularly interesting in this account is the visible 
‘instability’ of the ground on which the critic seems to be standing. There is a clear 
realisation that a reconsideration of the field’s givens is required, but at the same time 
the critic’s background, from which he continues to write, is put into doubt. To give an 
example, we can see that, on the one hand, the account dismisses ‘depth psychology’ 
and stresses the tendency of psychoanalysis to misperceive its own applicability with 
regard to the Gothic. We might notice that this could represent simply a discarding of 
the older, more naïve application of Freud, characteristic of criticism until the 1970s. At 
the same time, however, the preface names psychoanalysis explicitly only as it 
discusses the dangers of theory to critical reading. In tune with Mighall and as if 
referring to Miles, Botting states, for example, that “[p]refiguring Freud as much as 
Gothic writing does […] there is a case to be made for reversing the direction of 
influence so that psychoanalysis becomes an effect of 150 years of monster making.”19 
Still, on the other hand, it is difficult not to associate the idiom through which the 
validity of the Gothic is established with psychoanalysis, and not to notice a parallel 
between the cultural status of the Gothic thus construed and its status as presented by 
Massé. As in Massé’s article, here, the Gothic is not uplifted thanks to its Romantic 
affiliation, but on the grounds of its being the rejected, or repressed, of a socio-cultural 
order; “waste,”20 which nonetheless has the power of giving a full picture of the very 
order, the order’s own preferred and propagated image, and the repression through 
which this image could be achieved.21 
This illustrates the tension which arises as the critics strive to reassess their own 
field, the clash between the consciousness of misreading22 and the depth to which the 
givens of Gothic theory have become rooted in the field. Simultaneously, what we may 
notice is the influence of the once established theoretical framework as preventing a 
reformulation of the theory from another angle: a reformulation based not on repression, 
but on the positive mechanism of power. If we return to the passage in which the Gothic 
is presented as primarily valuable for its endorsement of the negative material rejected 
by the dominant order, we may observe how this takes place. 
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For all its psychoanalytical idiom, the passage curiously invites a more history-
oriented study of socio-political circumstances. Especially while considering the 
statement that the Gothic did not use to be a positive expression of natural desires for 
‘the newly dominant order produced, policed and maintained its antitheses, opposites 
enabling the distinction and discrimination of its own values and anxieties,’ we may 
have an impression that Freud somehow meets Foucault. What this statement refers to 
is, clearly, the assertion that the Gothic was a necessary cornerstone for the ‘dominant 
order’s,’ or culture’s, negative definition. In the history of Gothic criticism as described 
here, this negative definition is construed primarily through a psychoanalytically-related 
model of identity formation through some sort of repression or abjection.23 Hence, the 
critic becomes a rubbish digger. However, the negative definition may also be seen as a 
positive mechanism (and, up to a point, it is seen so here as well, a fact to which we 
shall return shortly). In a sense, it generates both the given cultural order and – quite 
discursively – its opposites, not so much by repressing them, but by delineating them 
carefully, giving them concrete shape and substance. Interestingly, the very terms used 
in the passage to describe the ‘handling’ of opposites by the dominant order – 
producing, policing and maintaining – point towards such an understanding of the 
negative definition process. They are, however, interpreted in accordance with the 
already established discursive framework: the dominant order is repressive, prohibits 
certain desires, and guards taboos. 
To define, then, the Gothic as “the worst that has been thought and said”24 is to 
depart from a pre-formed assumption, which may be at least partly traced back to 
psychoanalytical criticism. What is more, clearly, the negative qualities of the mode are 
seen as the warrant that the mode is worth studying. Yet, in this way, the marginality of 
the Gothic, the basis for its today’s ‘glamorous’ status, proves to be a paradoxical 
construct if we consider the drive towards differentiation from the earlier, negligent or 
repressive, criticism. That is because to treat Gothic fiction as ‘waste,’ is actually to 
adopt, and adapt, the perspective of criticism which once shared the discourse with the 
dominant order that construed the Gothic as “demonstrably unacceptable.”25 If we recall 
Massé’s statement above, rejection is a symptom of repression. Consequently, 
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differentiation proves to be superficial; it is actually sameness which allows to valorise 
the status of Gothic fiction. Moreover, if we remember how the Gothic used to be 
vindicated through its Romantic affinities in the 1980s, especially by Punter, we may 
notice that vindicating it on the basis of its ‘antithetical’ function in the process of 
negative definition similarly entails working from within the same discourse that would 
codify it as debasing and debased. It is debasement which becomes, curiously, the basis 
for uplifting. 
We may illustrate the above statement more fully if we now turn to the other case 
study, the general introduction to four-volume collection Gothic (2004) of Critical 
Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies series, co-authored by Botting and 
Townshend. Again, we are dealing here with a history of Gothic criticism, and one 
which strongly emphasises critical differentiation. Near the end of it, at the crucial point 
of turning to today’s critical attitude, we read: “Eschewing the literary assumptions, 
hierarchies and values which position Gothic as inferior, criticism examines the cultural 
role it plays in terms of different contemporary perspectives, perspectives that examine 
how the idea of human is constituted historically and ideologically, how it shapes 
notions of individuality within changing cultural and class contexts, and how it 
participates in the exclusion of a variety of figures from dominant cultural discourses.”26 
But for the emphasis put on exclusion in the latter part of the quotation, we might find 
what the authors say quite promising. Yet this history is a history of the Gothic margin 
from the eighteenth century to the present in the paradigmatic terms. It concentrates 
mainly on how, for most of the time, criticism worked to establish the Gothic as a basis 
for negative definition, and then operated on the so established ground, strengthening 
the common negative perception of the category. The very fact that the authors write the 
history of Gothic criticism from such a perspective as a way to introduce the reader to 
an extensive selection of critical texts – the mainstream of critical inquiry in the Gothic, 
one should presume – cannot be seen otherwise than as telling. The stress on exclusion 
rather than positive production of figures – women, sexuality, aristocrats, criminals, etc. 
– in conjunction with Foucault evoked in the very same paragraph,27 points directly to 
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the operation of the conventional tenets of the Gothic theory. From this perspective, in 
spite of its call for historicising the Gothic,28 the introduction largely restates the 
assumptions of the critical history presented by Botting in the preface to The Gothic, but 
does so not in a similar self-critical manner. 
The negative value of the mode, be it purely a matter of discursive representation, is 
here represented as the basis for the mode’s early marginalisation. The Gothic emerges 
as a part of a wider (and older) current of popular romances. Thus, the lexicon of 
reasons for assuming the ‘waste’ status of Gothic fiction in the eighteenth-century 
critical responses, provided by Botting and Townshend, is long. And we may easily 
predict it is going to be so by glancing at the first paragraph of the text. Immediately, 
‘Gothic’ is presented as a word of “critical abuse”, denoting fiction under attack for 
“[refusing] neoclassical realistic and didactic aesthetic rules […] endangering not only 
aesthetic values, but moral and social values as well.”29 The critical attacks entail 
accusations of offending decency, disregarding social and familial rules, teaching 
readers irrationality, inciting passion, propagating mischief and painting a false, over-
sentimental image of love, all of which, as the authors emphasise, are seen as having 
grave (and much feared) social consequences.30 Among those, the authors distinguish 
the destabilisation of parental, and especially the father’s authority, which is seen as a 
symptom of the fear about the stability of entire social order, law and morality included. 
Furthermore, linking them with the fear of social change effected by the French 
Revolution, the authors also emphasise the anxiety about the women’s reading and 
writing, and the merging of the question of female sexuality with other contemporary 
anxieties. Finally, when it comes to aesthetics, the Gothic is reported to have been 
attacked on the basis of its disrespect for neoclassical rules of composition, uncivilised 
deformity (also moral), amounting to monstrosity, and its unnaturalness. It also used to 
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be scoffed at for its generic impurity, being neither purely a romance form, nor a 
novelistic one.31 Perceptibly, if we recall Botting’s preface discussed above, the early 
rejection of the mode for precisely these reasons – whether the negative reviews 
disclose authentic fears or only use Gothic fiction as an excuse to complain about wider 
phenomena – is what makes the Gothic a fertile ground for a socio-cultural research. 
The contemporary critics neither subscribe to the views of early reviewers nor strive to 
debunk them, but treat them in themselves as evidence of the process of cultural 
formation.  
In this way, the original institutionalised critical discourse does not undergo so much 
a scrutiny as it is embraced and theorised for the benefit of the present-day critical 
discourse. This results in the sameness of the discourses, at least partial. While the 
criticism of the turn of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century 
represents the Gothic – discursively – to pursue its own goals (let socio-cultural identity 
formation at the time of a major cultural breakthrough be one of them), the 
contemporary critics take over this early discourse on the Gothic and treat it as an object 
of and, simultaneously, justification for study. Thus, what is, however, in danger of 
being passed over, is the way in which the Gothic itself actively and productively 
engages in the contemporary discourses and the positive processes of, among other 
things, identity formation. The present-day discourse is focused primarily on the 
negative, the rejected, the repressed. 
This becomes even more visible if we consider the question of negative definition. 
As we have already stated, the negative definition – or, in Botting and Townshend’s 
words, “a process of recoil and negative reaction,”32 – may, or even should be, seen as a 
kind of positive operation of power. To a certain extent, this also follows from both the 
preface and the general introduction. As Botting states on the eighteenth-century 
criticism, it used to treat the Gothic as an example of an undesirable form of writing to 
teach the readers how to choose what to read.33 Similarly, together with Townshend, he 
observes that, in precisely such a way, the Gothic played its role in the shaping of both 
modern criticism and the novel.34 This, in turn, may be seen as a positive process, a 
mechanism which both construes the object – the Gothic – establishes the set of true and 
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false statements about it, and shapes and fixes its perception. Thus, discourse is 
multiplied, knowledge produced, power generated. 
Interestingly, however, this particular representation – or rather a set of functional 
representations – becomes fixed in the perception of the present-day criticism. It is 
desirable to scrutinise the early, deterring discourse to discover what might be hidden 
behind it. However, as the present-day critics assume that the popularity of the Gothic, 
irrespective of the critics’ bashing, came from the allure of the prohibited and the 
tabooed, they oblige themselves to take their predecessors’ word – or representation of 
Gothic fiction – for granted.  
It should seem that if criticism wishes to distance itself from the previously held 
positions, it should distance itself from the assumption of the marginality of the Gothic. 
Or, at least, it should reconsider that marginality, treating as suspect the formulations 
based on the representation of the Gothic as a repressed antithesis of order. If we were 
to do that, we would need to take a clue from the possibilities offered by the assumption 
that the dominant order produces, polices and maintains its opposites. Also, we would 
need to take into consideration the possibility that the Gothic is a field in which positive 
mechanisms of power do operate through participation in discourses and the pedagogy 
of knowledge. As we have already mentioned, this does not necessarily preclude 
negative reviews, but, in fact, may illuminate them to a degree. 
 
6.3. The Gothic’s Discursive Background: A Reconstruction 
 
One clue as to the ways in which the Gothic may actually be popular thanks to its 
participation in the recognised discourses of its time may be taken directly from 
Botting’s preface. As was already quoted above, the Gothic found its particular relish in 
the supernatural and “the immense natural forces.” Of course, such a formulation 
immediately calls for an association with Romanticism, and may be easily juxtaposed 
with the Enlightenment ideal of fiction. However, we may notice that Gothic fictions 
were first produced in the discursive context more complex than simply favouring the 
Enlightenment ideals of utility, reasonability and naturalness. We should perhaps 
immediately think of the discourse of the sublime, but turning to Emma Clery’s careful 
delineation of the gradual process of the supernatural becoming acceptable should put 
us in a broader picture. 
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In Spectres of Shakespeare, in which he analyses Shakespeare’s influence on the 
early Gothic, Jacek Mydla emphasises the fact that the supernatural was far from being 
entirely rejected in the Age of Reason. As he observes, “[i]n the second half of the 
eighteenth century, scenes of supernatural terror received ample coverage in paintings, 
prints, and personal accounts by spectators — all reflecting the fascination with ghost-
seeing and the power of the supernatural to transfix popular imagination.”35 And, as 
Clery states, with regard to the eighteenth-century attitude towards ‘ghost-seeing,’ 
“different ways of seeing the supernatural were as much the product of specific 
discursive fields as of personal opinion.”36 Her considerations of the links between the 
supernatural fiction and the developing consumer society illuminate the Gothic as 
acceptable primarily in the nascent economic discourse. This discourse of the 
marketplace and consumerism is to be seen as counteracted by the Augustan discourse 
of civic humanism, a ‘landed’ discourse opposing the new economy based on luxury 
and consumption, irrational and unpredictable as they are by nature. As Clery states, 
civic humanism sets the terms for the negative reception of the fictional representations 
of the supernatural in the early eighteenth-century: “[t]he resistance to representations 
of the marvellous, with their illusory, irrational appeal, coincides with anxiety over the 
escalation of ‘unreal needs.”37 It is unreal needs – irrational appeal, and the useless 
pleasure one finds in the marvellous, seen as parallel to and representative of 
consumerism – that raise doubts here.  
In a similar way, though with stress placed on the rejection of credulity, the 
supernatural is approached in what we could perhaps call the discourse of “the real 
supernatural.” This type of the supernatural, according to Clery, is characteristic of the 
way of ghost-seeing based on the question of truth. In the latter half of the seventeenth 
century, as Clery recounts, the apparition narrative, a projected antidote to the spread of 
atheism and scepticism, is meant to serve a didactic function of convincing disbelievers 
through transparent scientific description and testing: a faithful (even boring) record of 
circumstances and a (frequently painstakingly) careful scrutiny of facts. Yet publishing 
apparition narratives inescapably entails the risk of inciting appeal. Narratives are in 
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danger of being read merely for the pleasure of emotionally indulging oneself in a 
thrilling story, which testifies to one’s credulity, and hence, a regressive drive, 
deserving to be scorned. This risk, as Clery remarks, turns out to be in itself more 
threatening to the authors than the accusations of spreading credulity by the narratives 
themselves, yet as such is not necessarily at odds with the publishers’ policy.38 
As we can see, the (political) discourse of landed wealth and stable social order on 
the one hand, and the scientific/religious discourse on the other are both sensitive to the 
popular demand which validates and revalorizes what they wish to discard. And this is 
not surprising, for already the mid-century market willingly embraces “the spectacular 
supernatural,” that is the supernatural construed originally from the sceptical 
perspective as an object of mockery and yet, simultaneously, entertainment. Such is the 
case of e.g. the Cock Lane ghost, which upon its alleged appearance in 1762, quickly 
becomes not only a subject of farce, but also a stock-device in a number of strategies 
used for attracting readers and theatre audiences.39 Seen from this angle, the 
supernatural becomes a spectacle and a commodity, to which both the ‘credulous’ mob 
and the ‘learned’ elite may respond with enthusiasm equal to that raised by a theatrical 
performance, the pleasure not being tainted by the accusation of superstitiousness. Yet, 
notably, while the spectacular supernatural becomes divorced from the question of truth, 
it ultimately takes its potential from the continuing fascination, the thrilling moment of 
“a mental state of suspension in doubt.”40  
A parallel process takes place in the aesthetic discourse. As early as with Dryden, 
and later on with Addison, the supernatural becomes suggestive of taking on an 
aesthetic function. Clery states: “[t]he effect [the tragic ghost] produces is pleasurable in 
so far as the object is known to be fictitious and enjoyed as part of the dramatic artifice, 
but terrible in that, simultaneously, disbelief is suspended far enough for the passions to 
operate as if the object were a reality. […] Valorisation of the supernatural as a source 
of aesthetic pleasure, the awakening of a sensibility detached, not only from truth, but 
also from probability is the sign of an autonomous sphere of art in the process of 
formation.”41 The process is visible in the way in which Garrick validates and valorises 
the supernatural for the aesthetic effect through naturalistic acting in Drury Lane’s 
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staging of Shakespeare’s plays.42 On stage, the matter of supernatural is not that much a 
matter of representation, as a matter of how the actor represents the reaction to the 
supernatural occurrence.43 What is more, the prohibition to evoke emotional states in the 
receivers, operating in written accounts, is undone. The viewer experiences the effects 
of ghost-seeing through private identification with the actor; however, simultaneously, 
the technique of triggering emotional responses remains fully explicable in terms of the 
body knowledge, “a taxonomy of passions.”44 Objectified and divorced from the 
question of belief in the ghost, the emotional response is perceived not as a sign of 
credulity, but as a mark of sensitivity to a technique of stimulating particular states in 
the viewer; the supernatural becomes a sublime object, triggering “delightful terror.”45 
Both the spectacular supernatural and the aesthetic supernatural function as plausible 
representations of the marvellous, and point to the areas of acceptability within (and 
generated by) the generally ‘prohibitive’ discourse. As Clery observes on Garrick, the 
taste for supernatural he raised in his audience did pave, even if only to a certain extent, 
the way for the supernatural fiction to emerge.46 Thus, we might see the Gothic as 
predated by ‘permitted’ representations and, consequently, we might suspect its 
emergence actually depended to some degree on the general prevailing discursive order. 
This should prove especially valid if we pay attention to Clery’s emphasis on the overall 
compliance of both types of the supernatural with the realist/Enlightenment limits.47 As 
Clery comments on William Collins’s ode to fear, the poet, attracted by the 
Enlightenment dispensation for representing the marvellous, “is divided between the 
desire to exploit the supernatural for aesthetic effect, and a guilty consciousness of the 
enlightenment prohibition against any such usage.”48 This might sound as repression or 
nostalgic longing; however, the fact is that the ‘allowed’ representations of the ghost are 
themselves products, not antitheses, of the dominant discursive order. This is because, 
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on the one hand, they do not infringe the overall discursive framework, and, on the 
other hand, they emerge as a response to this framework (both the sarcastic laughter 
triggered by a supposed ghost and Garrick’s move away from pantomime49 are 
conditioned by it). The Gothic, then, as one mode of representing the supernatural, does 
not emerge as a sudden rupture in the system. The grounds for it are prepared within the 
predominant discursive framework. 
A further clue how the predominant discursive paradigm might itself generate 
possibilities, in a yet broader sense, for the emergence of Gothic fiction comes from the 
history of literary criticism. Gary Day’s Literary Criticism shall prove a particularly 
useful source at this point. We may see a parallel between Clery and Day in the fact that 
both emphasise commerce as a decisive factor in the development of literature and the 
shaping of critical response. Yet while Clery focuses, necessarily, on the popular novel, 
supernaturalism, and the ways in criticism responded negatively to the supernatural 
fiction due to its being an epitome of the consumerist revolution, Day puts us in the 
picture with regard to the positive (in the sense of a positive production mechanism) 
impact of the market discourse on criticism as such. It is this impact that, as we shall 
attempt to show, opens perhaps not yet a way, but a fracture in the structure of literary 
production and reception that will enable the Gothic to emerge. 
Simultaneously, of course, it must be said that the impact of commerce on criticism 
has been known for long. And while the importance of the market factor is easily found 
to be stressed in the histories of the eighteenth-century criticism, what we may find 
emphasised in those histories is not only the critical reaction against the expansion of 
publishing, but also the growing influence of commerce on critical concepts themselves. 
It seems enough to browse Douglas Lane Patey’s introductory chapter to the volume 
four of The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism. Patey stresses that the second half 
of the eighteenth century is when the critical scrutiny undergoes sharpening, which is 
connected with the expansion of publishing and the growing need for distinction 
between high and low literature.50 At the same time, however, he describes the first half 
as influenced by the new conception of civil society as built upon commerce, 
represented, among others, in the writings of Addison and Steel.51 What Day makes 
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particularly clear is the fact that criticism in the eighteenth century was preconditioned 
by market discourse to a large extent. And, since it is the market which, as we shall see, 
validates the Gothic – just as much as it quickly absorbs the supernatural turned into a 
spectacle – this appears to be a significant coincidence. 
One of the important facts about the eighteenth-century criticism is the fact that, as 
Day puts it, the modern literary era begins with a shift towards imagination.52 This shift 
is later on discussed as one way of grounding literary value in the face of the spread and 
growing commodification of reading and writing, which began in the late seventeenth 
century. The other ways, as Day lists them, are neoclassicism, taste and scholarship.53 
The sole question of the need for grounding literary value is significant here, yet before 
we move on, it is crucial that we establish on what grounds the relationship between the 
Gothic, criticism and commerce becomes explained away through the contemporary 
critical practice. 
Evoking imagination, within the field of the present-day Gothic criticism, 
inescapably calls for some sort of association with the Gothic. At this point, we may 
immediately think of the rise of imagination as the path which led to the rise of 
Romanticism. If we were to validate the Gothic by its Romantic allegiances (the artistic 
dimension), then we might view it as following, or even sticking out, this very same 
path. With all the attention they pay to the participation of Gothic fiction in cultural 
formation through the process of the negative definition, this is a manner of validation 
that Botting and Townshend finally hint at in their general introduction: 
 
Elements of romantic and Gothic aesthetic find themselves absorbed 
by the movement belatedly distinguished as Romanticism: darkness 
and mystery provide the conditions for solitary and introspective 
reflection, allowing inspiration to attain spiritual and visionary 
heights; wild nature offers suitably sublime scenes for emotional and 
imaginative creation. Although there may be, in the scenes, mood and 
effect of works that can be grouped together as a counter-Augustan 
aesthetic attitude, a common ancestry linking Romanticism and 
Gothicism, all traces of filiation are denied by the time the former is 
defining itself […]. Perhaps the proximity is too great. Certainly, it is 
too disturbing, and must be held at bay with strong critical 
denunciations.54 
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Perhaps the Gothic is not absorbed entirely. Yet we could say that, just as ‘appropriate’ 
representations of ghosts pave the way for the supernatural to break free, Gothic 
aesthetics prepares the ground for the Romantic vision.  
Still, there is more at stake in the passage. We ought to pay attention to the final two 
sentences, and then bear in mind that the authors are quick to evoke how Gothic fiction 
is discarded by the First Generation Romantic poets. Wordsworth rejects the writer’s 
pandering to “a craving for extraordinary incident” shown by the masses accumulated in 
the cities,55 and Coleridge denies the frequenters of circulating libraries the status of true 
readers on account of the debilitating outcome of the activity they perform.56 
Consequently, as Botting and Townshend state, “[t]he diseased and corrupting 
mechanisms of Gothic novel writing and reading are placed at the furthest possible 
remove from Romantic vision.”57 Thus, as described here, the Romantic distancing of 
the Gothic might be called a discursive activity: sorting out one’s own distinct 
representation/identity by adjusting the general reference framework to one’s needs, and 
explaining away “disturbing” similarities.  
And this is, of course, much in tune with the validation of the Gothic on the ground 
of its being the ‘abjected,’ ‘othered’ cultural material. Simultaneously, it is interesting 
that Botting and Townshend remain practically silent about the market factor which 
could be seen to transpire from Wordsworth and Coleridge’s grand literary project of 
uplifting literature from the debasing status of pandering to popular cravings.58 No 
matter how we look at it, as long as we do not limit it to the ‘canonical’ names listed by 
Punter, the Gothic is a mass-market form, entailing a mechanistic reproduction of 
schematic texts, sometimes amounting to what we might call recycling today, and 
calling for a comparison with the mechanistic division of labour.59 Yet, while Botting 
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and Townshend speak of the Romantic division between high art and popular/low 
forms, they again speak in terms of discursive ‘explaining away’ in the name of 
negative definition, rather than bring up such factors. They state: “With neoclassical and 
Romantic critics allied against it, Gothic fiction is firmly located in the lower realms 
and situated on the margins of a properly literary history and production.”60 While we 
may find it unquestionable that the eighteenth century witnesses a new demarcation of 
literary production, what is conveyed by means of rhetoric here is the assumed 
artificiality (and we should add discursiveness) of the process; its grounding not in the 
quality of texts, but in the functionality of the demarcation lines for the overall 
Romanticist project. Similarly, as Botting and Townshend discuss Gothic fiction being 
rejected for its departure from the rules of composition, they are more willing to explain 
it with discursiveness, the neoclassical supremacy, expected moral function of literature 
or widely assumed inferiority of feudal themes, rather than to delve into the question of 
the conditions of actual production of the majority of popular novels at the time.61 It is 
as if we had a direct confirmation of Baldick and Mighall’s assertion that vindicating 
the margin suspends the obligation to consider artistic merit. 
Of course, one could respond that in the face of the Gothic serving as a negative 
‘other’ in the process of identity formation, the question of artistic merit recedes into the 
background. What counts is the load of the repressed or rejected of a culture that 
unravels as we scrutinise the Gothic text. All in all, it is not the literariness of Gothic 
fiction that is at stake here, but cultural representation – both within and of the Gothic. 
The ‘waste’ status justifies critical interest. Yet, in a certain way, these two areas cannot 
be considered separately, especially if we structure the negative image of the mode on 
the basis of historic material. While the representations construed in the reviews are 
undeniably conditioned by various discourses of the times in which they were produced 
– let us treat civic humanism as an example – the question of the impact of popular 
publishing on the value of a work, and, on a larger scale, on social stability, be literary 
value grounded in one way or another, nonetheless remains their inherent element. Still, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
upheaval, impossible to be prevented by critical correction due to the sheer amount of published items. 
James Watt, Contesting the Gothic (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 80-
82. A more complete overview of the development of the circulating library is provided by Clery, who 
stresses that the libraries which opened in the first half of the eighteenth-century emphasised the moral 
credentials of the work aspiring for inclusion. It was due to its success among the readers that the library 
begun to rise suspicion among the critics, which, by 1780s, made it the epitome of cheap, debasing 
fiction. Clery, The Rise of Supernatural Fiction, p. 88. 
60
 Botting and Townshend, “General Introduction,” p. 12. Emphasis mine.  
61
 Botting and Townshend, “General Introduction,” pp. 3-5. 
  272
the question of the commodification of literature, the reign of ‘popular tastes’ on the 
shelves of the circulating library, somehow escapes one’s attention while going through 
Botting and Townshend’s text. And even if it did not, it might be seen to be declared as 
unimportant by the overall discourse construing the Gothic as, indeed, culture’s much 
revealing ‘waste.’  
In this way, we begin to see that we may be dealing with a double discursive 
formation: both on the side of the ‘old’ and on the side of the ‘new’ critics. It is one 
thing that Botting and Townshend do not delve into the relationship between the Gothic, 
criticism and commerce, the poor quality of masses of popular novels and the 
conditions of their production. And it is another that the criticism of Gothic fiction – its 
actual marginalisation – is consequently positioned exclusively between the neo-
classicist/realist/Enlightenment aesthetic/moral critical stance and the Romanticism’s 
falsification of its own roots. Early criticism of the Gothic construed in this way 
becomes a matter of aesthetics in an assumed connection with the moral question. 
Consequently, the emphasis is put on “base motives and desires” the Gothic connotes,62 
but these raise ‘psychoanalytical’ connotations63 rather than evoke any associations with 
the production of low quality writing. The Gothic is the worst of what has been ever 
written but somehow only because it comprises culture’s rejected regions of the self, 
and incarnates culture’s opposite. 
 The social dimension, which is intricately connected with the moral one, is thus 
explained solely in terms of ‘negative’ identity formation. Little opportunity is left for 
the ‘positive’ one. Whiggism appears as if on the margin, its negative codification of 
romance form serving only to confirm the rejection of the contemporary romances. And 
national spirit, as reflected by the Gothic revival, is mentioned as, in fact, the only 
‘legitimate’ eighteenth-century discourse in which Gothicism, thought as it seems 
somewhat indirectly, might find some support.64 The class in question ought to be the 
middle class and hence the Gothic must be the ‘waste’ of that class. As a result, 
although much is said about the social threat the Gothic poses, the literary 
considerations become in fact separated from the economic background which might 
illuminate them. What is more, the present-day critical discourse, again, follows 
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trustingly the eighteenth-century condemning critics, whose accounts originally 
represent ‘the hobgoblin romance’ as a source of social threat. 
Why would the Gothic pose a social threat exactly? As Clery shows, with regard to 
the critics who bash female reading and writing, the representation of the Gothic as 
endangering the rightful social status of women readers and, by extension, the society, 
may be explained by the operation of civic humanism. What should be stressed is the 
fact that civic humanism, in turn, is a discourse harkening back to the past, fearing the 
consumer future. Hence the social threat, posed by popular fiction and too readily 
available luxury. In Botting and Townshend’s history of the marginalisation of the 
Gothic, with regard to the women’s question, the only given context is French 
Revolution and the resulting fear of social change.65 Of course, such a context may be 
rightly chosen – but it is not an exclusive one. Thus, as the authors point to the fusion of 
the romance form, revolutionary politics and female sexuality in critical responses,66 
they may be seen as delimiting a field for further inquiry, and not necessarily providing 
a self-evident example of representing the Gothic as socially devastating.  
It appears necessary to ask the question to what extent the early critical responses to 
the Gothic are directly representative of a culture. In the words of Clery, “the hurry to 
use the condemnations of novel-reading as evidence of one thesis or the other has 
prevented them from being read in anything but a roughly descriptive or referential way. 
Their high rhetoric makes them extremely quotable, yet at the same time their 
repetitiveness has encouraged the illusion that they are ‘already read,’ self-
explanatory.”67 Such a reading, however, may easily result in falsification, as any 
theoretical re-working. 
To return to Day, his considerations of the different ways in which the 
Enlightenment criticism strives to ground the literary value allow us to reconsider that 
kind of ‘self-explanatory’ reading of criticism. Yet even before we proceed to his exact 
account, we might begin by briefly locating the critical moment at which the Gothic 
receives harsh welcoming. Botting and Townshend treat the Gothic as receiving 
criticism on a pair with a surge of popular romances, whose negative reception prepares 
the ground for the same sort of reaction towards Gothic fiction. Thus, they launch their 
review of the critical reaction with, among others, Oliver Goldsmith’s negative account 
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of romances from 1760.68 For Patey, in turn, Goldsmith, as well as Johnson, mark a 
moment of transition in the overall eighteenth-century critical practice, from a more 
‘democratic’ and dialogic perception of the critic’s role to the sharpening of critical 
categories, which we have already mentioned above. To quote his exact words this time, 
“under such pressures as an explosion of new publication and a consequent sharpening 
of distinctions between ‘high’ and ‘low’ literature, the qualifications of the critic again 
become stringently exclusive in something like the old manner: the critic must once 
again be either scholar or member of a new quasi-aristocracy of ‘fine taste.’”69 In the 
context of our considerations, this is a significant observation, above all for the stress 
put on the market factor and the resulting need to emphasize the artistic value. 
While Goldsmith is perhaps not that fond of the scholar-function, believing it to be 
characterized by pedantry detrimental to good taste, he views the critic as a qualified 
teacher whom “the vulgar” are to follow.70 The excerpt from a letter from Public Ledger 
quoted by Botting and Townshend directs our attention towards the exemplary role of 
writing and its influence on “the youth of either sex,”71 yet the quality of writing is also 
Goldsmith’s concern. He perceives the decline of taste to stem from the expansion of 
authorship as a profession, available to many, and governed by the laws of the market.72 
He says: 
 
The author, when unpatronized by the Great, has naturally recourse to 
the bookseller. There cannot be, perhaps, imagined a combination 
more prejudicial to taste than this. It is the interest of the one to allow 
as little time for writing, and of the other to write as much as possible; 
[…]. In these circumstances, the author bids adieu to fame, writes for 
bread […]. A long habitude of writing for bread, […] turns the 
ambition of every author, at last, into avarice […] he despairs of 
applause, and turns to profit […]. He finds that money procures all 
those advantages […] which he vainly expected from fame. Thus the 
man who under the protection of the Great, might have done honour to 
human nature, when only patronized by the bookseller, becomes a 
thing little superior to the fellow who works at the press.73 
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Yet, as observed by Patey, the expansion of writing is the result of the previous opening 
of the domain of taste to a wider public.74 What is particularly interesting from our 
perspective here is the fact that, as he stresses, this very opening is partly enabled by 
criticism itself. 
Patey provides us with a general explanation by illuminating the transition from John 
Dennis’s conception of the critic to that of Addison, Steele and Pope at the beginning of 
the century. Notably, we could see this transition as one between two distinct socio-
political discourses. Both Dennis and Addison define the critic’s role and status in 
reference to the status of a gentleman, possessed both of inborn qualities and thorough 
education, who leads the state. Yet their perception of the gentleman’s status and role, 
as much as that of the state, is substantially different. For Dennis, whose social ideas 
Patey recognises as somewhat old-fashioned and more of the 1690s,75 the critic, a 
“gentleman of taste,” is a “polite man of taste [who] must ‘have his mind free from all 
avocations of Business, and from all real vexatious Passions’”; a member of aristocracy 
who received proper learning and enjoys enough leisure to cultivate art.76 He is also a 
person of cultural authority, qualified to guide others, himself being one of the few who 
possess the fine taste.77 Thus, “the realm of taste is […] no republic but an aristocracy, a 
hierarchy ruled ideally by the taste of its monarch.”78 Addison and Steel, on the other 
hand, envision the critic as “a polite companion”: not a censor, but a friend who engages 
into a conversation with those of his breeding and hence ‘teaches’ by bringing to 
attention what his fellow companions, by their breeding, should already know.79 Thus, 
their vision of critics, as Patey notes, exemplifies the turn against the absolutist state.80 
Of course, such a more ‘democratic’ approach in criticism does not amount to the 
opening of the realm of polite taste. As Patey makes it clear, neither women, nor lower 
classes are seen as possessed of any considerable taste.81 Nonetheless, while commerce 
is the source of the decay of taste for Goldsmith, in a certain sense as it is to Dennis, for 
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Addison, the critic is a member of civil society based on it.82 And this opens a way for 
the extension of the reading public. By the time of Goldsmith, Patey observes, 
“Addisons great educational scheme has succeeded only too well: there has emerged a 
large and diverse reading public […], which has in turn helped to generate too many 
writers […] that is, of the wrong social alignments (lacking polite taste).”83 And, as the 
scheme succeeded, its success may be seen as signifying the shift in perception, rooted 
precisely in the middle-class order of discourse, which prepared the ground for the 
emergence of the Gothic. 
Day proves particularly useful at this point. Above all, he illuminates the 
interrelationship between commerce and the criticism of the first half of the eighteenth-
century. In the first place, he draws our attention to the ways in which imagination and 
figurative language are juxtaposed with ‘commercial’ plainness and clarity of style after 
the Civil War, the trend which continues into the beginning of the eighteenth century.84 
Similarly to Patey, Day emphasises the reconceptualization of commerce. Its 
revalorisation, as one might say, results from the post-war distrust of the figurative 
language, the language of the court and religious sects,85 and a drive towards social 
stability. To a nation troubled by the internal and external conflicts of the seventeenth 
century, “[a] language based on calculation and measurement seemed to yield 
knowledge of the world and its workings. Tropes stood in the way of truth. Literary 
imitation endorses the values of business and enlightenment because, in principle at 
least, it portrays natural phenomena that the merchant wants to exploit and the scientist 
to understand. More importantly, it reveals the harmony at the heart of nature. […] The 
imagination could offer no such comforts.”86 It is then the comfort of plainness and 
clarity that makes commerce attractive to the critics.  
Furthermore, and more importantly, by having power over language, commerce is 
also able to condition thought.87 Thus, the parallels observable between art and 
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commerce88 testify to a market mentality of the eighteenth-century English. What 
emerges together with such a mentality is a new conception of the human as “a costed 
commodity” and “an economic unit.” It is thank to it that commerce is believed, at the 
beginning of the eighteenth-century (as it is evident in the writing of e.g. Addison) to be 
capable of unifying a divided society: “in general, there was a move from a conflict 
model of society, based on religious passions, to a cooperative view of society, based on 
commercial interest.”89 When it comes to criticism, this may be perhaps particularly 
visible in it becoming itself associated, as seen in Addison, with an act of consumption 
of goods.90 Yet, as follows from Day, the very same move towards commerce which 
emphasizes commerce’s many benefits results in the market attitude which will make 
criticism’s traditional function of correction seem redundant. Also, it will contribute to 
the emergence of a class of writers whose work will be dedicated exclusively to earning 
money. Since commerce defines the human as a machine, and machines are repetitive, 
and since imitation in art may be seen as corresponding to this mechanistic conception 
of the human, the justification for the ethical, or corrective, dimension of criticism may 
seem to be lost.91  
What is to be observed, and stressed, at this point, is a sort of clash, a conflict of 
interests which sparks between the market mentality and the critical discourse. While 
the critics are clearly far from resigning from their function of improvement of men and 
manners, commerce, to whose language and social benefits they turn in the times of 
crisis, and which manifests itself to a degree in their own attitudes to literature, 
simultaneously undoes their ‘moral’ authority. What appears is a rift which, as we shall 
see soon, makes the emergence of the Gothic possible and perfectly justifiable as a 
thoroughly eighteenth-century, and central, affair.  
As we may see, the discourse of criticism is underpinned by the social/political 
discourse and this makes it resort to commerce. What we must, simultaneously, bear in 
mind is that imagination, like the supernatural, is politically suspicious for the 
Augustans. Both are notions connected with the Gothic ‘romance,’ and the romance 
flights of fancy are all too readily juxtaposed, in the mid-century and later, with the 
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novel’s aim to imitate nature. Hence, what Day provides us with may be seen as 
shedding light on the discursive exclusion of the future Gothic as a ‘low form’ on the 
one hand, but, on the other, it also attests to the rooting of the economic discourse, 
which will embrace low forms just as it will embrace the supernatural, in wider culture. 
From the perspective of a historian of criticism such as Day, the low forms of art are 
low basically for they are connected with the mechanistic operation of the market and 
market demand. With the decline of patronage, opening of culture, and increase of 
publishing outside of the learned elites, earlier notions of literature are undone, and 
criticism turns to the discrimination of ‘bad’ writing from high-quality works.92 This, by 
extension, is connected with the fear of the lack of sheer possibility to control what is 
being read and how it is read.93 And this fear, in turn, is underpinned with much more 
general anxieties, inherent in the period of multi-layered change already taking place. At 
that point, criticism and commerce part; however, the market mentality is still rooted in 
society.  
What is passed over in critical histories which leave out the connections between the 
Gothic and the increasing commercialisation of literature is precisely this fact. It may 
seem that evoking ‘poor’ quality of the surge of Gothic novels at the dusk of the 
eighteenth-century, as much as evoking ‘poor’ quality of popular fiction, to whose 
stream the Gothic belongs, does not primarily concern a theoretically-oriented account 
of the socio-cultural status of the mode. Firstly, poor literary quality is not relevant to a 
cultural analysis which rests on the assumption of the ‘waste’ status, not more than to a 
point to which it confirms that status. And secondly, the considerations of the quality of 
the Gothic material seem to belong to a different critical discourse, the one of the past 
from which the present-day critics wish to distance themselves. Yet if Gothic fiction 
poses any kind of threat to social order, for the eighteenth-century critics this threat 
manifests itself primarily in the fiction’s commercial character, associated primarily 
with the poor quality of writing, be it actual or projected. It is the Gothic’s commercial 
character, its sensitivity to market demand, and hence the modes being an epitome of 
wider social processes taking place that primarily make it threatening. 
Yet this, contrary to what might be thought, actually casts doubt on the assumption 
that the Gothic – the genre or the mode – is an abject, or other, or any kind of an actual 
underground or unconscious ‘waste.’ It definitely represents the abject of the culture as 
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projected, or represented, by the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century critics in their 
commentaries, immersed in various discourses. And it may just as well carry out the 
process of abjection in its own representations of the threats faced by the projected 
eighteenth-century protagonists. Yet a wider socio-cultural acceptance for the Gothic as 
a critically condemned form, as for Grub Street writers – as well as its emergence – is 
granted by the society’s well rooted market mentality. The eighteenth-century middle-
class English demand their basest needs to be pandered to, while the market is 
necessarily sensitive to those demands. And it is this that makes the Gothic a central and 
inherently eighteenth-century, not marginal or antithetical, phenomenon. Gothic fiction 
may be ‘firmly located in the lower realms and situated on the margins of properly 
literary history and production’ by the predominant critical discourses, but not exactly 
because it, as such, carries a social threat reminding one of what has to be repressed to 
form a coherent social self. On the contrary, it represents a part of the ‘fearful’ 
consumer self which is already there. 
What perfectly confirms such an observation is Clery’s analysis of both Walpole’s 
prefaces to The Castle of Otranto and the novel itself. Clery states: “The founding work 
of the Gothic genre did not appear out of the blue, the harbinger of a Romantic revolt 
against the repressive rationalism of the Enlightenment. […] the event of The Castle of 
Otranto, its critical reception, its address to the public in the prefaces, its very newness, 
was determined by a complex of values and assumptions already in place.”94 And this, 
in turn, puts Walpole in an interesting position with regard to the question of the 
Gothic’s lineage. We may remember that the conception of Otranto as the first Gothic 
novel is deemed to be a myth by some. Watt scrutinises the novel and its prefaces in 
detail to show that Otranto cannot be seen as an obvious founder, just as its second 
preface cannot be seen as a Gothic manifesto, without a significant dose of 
qualification, for its status is clearly singular.95 Clery, in her turn, observes that Walpole 
had to wait long for a successor that the market would respond to. In fact, such a 
successor appeared only more than a decade later, in the form of Reeve’s The Old 
English Baron. The observation she makes about the lack of the publishing market’s 
substantial interest in texts utilising the supernatural after Otranto and its many 
versions’ success is interesting. According to her, Otranto did not spark the demand for 
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followers, apparently due to its “reputation […] as a one-off novelty or caprice.”96 This 
is important, for it signals the singular status of Walpole’s text. What is more, though 
this will become obvious only as we discuss Reeve in the further part of the chapter, it 
also signals that there had to take place a change in the discursive codification of Gothic 
fiction for the Gothic to surge and flood the circulating libraries, one which would 
actually confirm even more visibly the Gothic’s grounding in the Enlightenment 
culture.  
Still, if we depart from the perspective assumed above, namely that it was the market 
discourse which also contributed to the emergence of the Gothic, legitimising it in its 
own field, we shall see that Walpole did pave the way for the later re-codified ‘Gothic 
story.’ If we assume that the Gothic is a dialogic form, a mode in whose case particular 
texts remain in constant dialogue but not necessarily form a unified axis of progress, or 
stake out a stable field, we may find Otranto palpably distinct on the one hand, but 
paradoxically Gothic on the other. Especially from the perspective of the mode’s market 
conditioning, as well as its rooting in the discursive context of its own times, Otranto is 
an exemplary Gothic text. 
There are two areas of discursive rooting, as we might call it, that emerge from 
Clery’s discussion of the novel. One of them refers to the question of compliance with 
the contemporary critical tenets, the other one to the more general question of social 
change in the eighteenth-century. Criticism becomes the target of Walpole’s two 
prefaces, the first of which, as Clery carefully observes, meets on many levels the 
requirements of the critics. This preface, provided by an alleged translator, William 
Marshall, in Clery’s view, is written so that it complies with ‘the horizon of 
expectations’ defined by exemplary historicism.97 Said to be written down by an Italian 
monk of the period of reformation, Onuphrio Muralto, the story, taking place in the 
feudal times, relies on unrealistic depictions, superstition and unbalanced 
sensationalism, but as such it proves in accordance with the eighteenth-century 
representation of the medieval culture, and is entirely acceptable as an exemplary 
historic relict. Its incredibility, in other words, may serve to reinforce the contrastive 
representation of the sober, enlightened and Protestant eighteenth-century English.98 As 
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Clery observes, it was at the cost of such a codification of the past that the eighteenth-
century readers were allowed to enjoy the supernatural, and, as a result, it was such a 
codification that made some writers resort to forgery as a means to make the marvellous 
enjoyable, Macpherson’s ‘Ossian’s poems’ being an example.99  
Similarly to ‘Ossian,’ Otranto is a forgery, and its initial preface reveals an acute 
consciousness of the requirements for the eighteenth-century fiction. Its second preface, 
in turn, proves the first one to be a satire on these requirements.100 In Clery’s words, 
“[t]he second preface […] alters the meaning of the first by suggesting that the spurious 
antiquarian account of the work’s origins in the late gothic era is a disguised account of 
its true origins in the present.”101 What follows from such an interpretation is that, 
producing his story in the times of the Enlightenment and progress, the metaphorical 
spread of letters and rejection of superstition, the modern author, like the monk (whose 
surname is Walpole translated into Italian), subverts the progressive present by using its 
greatest invention, the press, to spread superstition and backwardness – or rather, to 
breed a much feared demand for “unregulated, hedonistic, irrational consumption of 
print,” unguided by moderation, utility and reason.102 In a sense, by anticipating the 
critical reaction to his ‘modern romance’ as unacceptable in the era of reason, Walpole 
pinpoints the underlying fear of an uncontrolled production and consumption cycle. 
While poetic forgeries such as ‘Ossian’ tend to serve as a means for indirect critique of 
the Enlightenment and the growth of commerce,103 Walpole’s prefaces subvert the 
common eighteenth-century representation of the market and commerce as necessarily 
controlled and guided by virtue and reason.104 
The subversion, however, is hardly anti-bourgeois. On the contrary, it points to a 
crucially bourgeois grounding of the text in its immediate historical context, in the 
apparent contradiction inherent in commerce. Clery points to this as she compares the 
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tone of Walpole’s prefaces with the scandal aroused by Mandeville’s The Fable of the 
Bees.105 Also, she states that the prefaces “raise the spectre of a thoroughgoing 
transformation in the relation between literary fiction and society, not in order to 
analyse or resolve the questions or difficulties involved in such a change [but] to wave it 
like a red rag in the face of the opposition.”106 The concerns they address are clearly 
concerns inherent in the eighteenth century and characteristic of the widespread changes 
taking place at that time. They appear to be linked with a negotiation of identity, but the 
contradiction is not simply repressed in the process; in fact, it is not repressed at all, to 
which fact testify the continuing critical outrage and alarm. Commerce, breaking free 
from the supervision of eligible authorities, may be lamented upon, but cannot be 
repressed, for commercialism is already inscribed in the identity. It is this fact that may 
just as well transpire from Watt’s assertion, stated as if on the margin, that Walpole’s 
first, authenticating preface was officially received as true by some critics in spite of the 
fact that they may have just as well suspected it was a hoax.107 And, as Clery observes, 
even as the forgery was disclosed, “the public continued to buy and read and, in private, 
literary friends and acquaintances felt free to express their approval.”108 Thus, the 
reaction of criticism, with its bashing and rejecting, was one thing, and the general 
reception was another. 
If we now remember Day, we may see a direct operation of the economic discourse, 
or the market mentality, here. In the case of Walpole, fiction dedicated exclusively to 
demand satisfaction is validated without a notice paid to the moral, or corrective, 
function of criticism, or the so projected function of literature. As Clery notices, both 
prefaces manifest the position of “economic amoralism”109 taken by the author. As a 
result, what supplants the instructive function of literature are: the freedom of novelty 
and imagination in creating a new literary form that would be primarily attractive to the 
public on the one hand, and the freedom of appealing to ‘kitchen taste,’ disrespectfully 
of the critical dictates, if only this will grant a novel its success on the other hand.110 
And these will clearly decide upon the success of the surge of Gothic fiction by the end 
of the eighteenth-century.  
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The prefaces to Otranto manifest the market mentality in operation. First of all, this 
takes place through their elaborating on the fearful – or, in other words, highly 
problematic, from the perspective of criticism’s traditional function of correction – 
relationship between commerce and literature. Second of all, it can be observed in 
Walpole’s open evocation of the legitimising power of market demand. Turning to 
Otranto as such, the novel, in turn, manifests its inherent grounding in eighteenth-
century socio-cultural background due to its tackling of the paradoxes and 
inconsistencies inherent in the period of social change. As Clery observes, Otranto may 
be read as an “[allegory] of an imperfect, irrational social structure.”111 This is not an 
immediate reading, and certainly it does not appear in the eighteenth-century 
commentaries. Yet, according to Clery, due to the complexity of the contemporary 
discourses of progress and rationality, it was impossible for the eighteenth-century 
criticism to read the novel in this way, for such a reading would undercut the very 
premises (dictated by exemplary historicism) which defined the critic’s own point of 
departure.112 
Just as in the case of the prefaces, what lies at the heart of Otranto is a contradiction 
inherent in the period. The prefaces articulate, we might say, either the conditioning of 
the critical discourse by civic humanism, of which Clery speaks, or the departure of 
criticism from the discourse of commerce of which we have spoken earlier, effected by 
the market’s disregard of the traditional moral and corrective function of the novel (in 
which it undercuts the need for moralising criticism). The novel (or the modern 
romance), in turn, points to the anachronistic persistence of the laws sanctioning 
patrimonial inheritance of land privileging aristocracy in the era of bourgeoisie’s 
increasing power. In Clery’s words, “[by] the second half of the eighteenth century, 
debate over the divinely appointed succession of kings was effectively dead, whereas 
patrilineal inheritance of land and title continued to be a live issue. Indeed, it could be 
said that the moment when the providential doctrine of kingship was revoked, in 1688, 
was the point at which aristocratic ownership of land became sacralised in its place.”113 
Along this historical legal background, Clery analyses Walpole’s own situation with 
regard to the source of his income and the constant criticism he underwent 
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consequently, and finds his reaction supporting her line of interpretation.114 She notices 
that the supernatural in Otranto operates in the manner of blind justice, a patrimonial 
law from whose strictures there is no escape, even though they may seem illogical and 
unjust. The pieces of Alfonso’s magnified statue crush both familial ties and the will of 
those upon whom the prophecy operates, regardless of whether these are the 
descendants of a usurper, or the rightful heir.115 They are, as if, anachronistic 
reminiscences of the previous order, forcing themselves upon the lives of future 
generations. 
This is an incredibly useful observation from our perspective. As may be seen from 
the quotation above, patrilineal inheritance of land in the eighteenth century is an 
anachronistic but still operating remnant of the feudal order and absolutist state. Civic 
humanism’s representation of landed estate as a stable warranty of one’s support, in 
contrast to luxurious and unstable commerce, is obviously meant to serve the opponents 
of the market economy.116 Patrilineal inheritance, is, hence, anti-bourgeois. If we, then, 
read Walpole as criticising, or simply satirising the situation, we may see his 
perspective as evoking the competing discourse, that of bourgeois capitalism. As Clery 
notices, the latter discourse opposes primogeniture, viewing it as threatening its own 
basic values, “human self-determination and the bonds of familial affection,” family 
seen as based on contract, not kinship of blood.117 Thus, she concludes: “The 
supernatural in The Castle of Otranto figures an equivalent contradiction between the 
traditional claims of landed property and the new claims of the private family; a conflict 
between two versions of economic ‘personality.’”118 
Regardless of Walpole’s own comments on the origin of Otranto, his ‘modern 
romance’ seems hardly an apolitical distraction. Certainly, it can be said to be grounded 
in the eighteenth-century bourgeois discourses, and to function in a way which is closer 
to the positive operation of power (the rising middle-class power). In any case, what it 
appears to oppose is the previous order, whose overall rejection is also inscribed in the 
Enlightenment project. One may think of what Watt reminds us, namely the fact that 
Walpole did comment heavily upon the contemporary political affairs, even though he 
was “a private critic,” and he did “frequently [adopt] a principled, old Whig, 
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oppositional stance.”119 What springs to one’s mind here is the recollection that 
discourses are themselves not exactly coherent, not autonomous structures, framed by 
clear-cut boundaries, but have their inflections and gaps, fractures and illogicalities 
dictated by external factors, often related to the question of who wields the power in 
support of which discourse is used. While perceiving Otranto as an anti-Enlightenment 
work, one in a sense treats them as if they were autonomous. Yet, as the novel seems to 
reject the neoclassical dictates, the rules of exemplary historicism, and the requirements 
of rationality, it is, simultaneously, still deeply rooted in the socio-political discourses of 
the times, and not at all strange to its immediate readers. As Clery states, “[i]t was 
addressed to a specific crisis in the experience of its eighteenth-century audience, a 
fantasy of the dissociation and homicidal confrontation of self and social forms […].”120 
We may, of course, simultaneously concur with Watt that much of Walpole’s political 
commentary may exemplify his quite pretentious self-fashioning rather than true 
interest. 121 Still, we cannot reject his work’s rooting in its discursive background. This 
is because Otranto is indeed rooted in it, and not oppositional with regard to the 
bourgeois-oriented discourses of the times. 
 It is possible to list other ways in which Gothic fiction turns out to be rooted in the 
eighteenth-century discourses and thus representative of the age and its crises, rather 
than marginal or oppositional with regard to it. We could turn to the examples of how 
eighteenth-century writers consciously worked to inscribe their works into the dominant 
discursive paradigm. Such examples readily spring to one’s mind, and have been often 
evoked by the contemporary critics. Yet another way would be turning to discrepancies 
rather than conformities, to the ‘loopholes’ in the very critical paradigm, so unstable in 
the eighteenth-century, in order to show that these loopholes and discrepancies also 
contributed to the emergence of the Gothic. One of such ‘loopholes’ is, as we have seen, 
the early critics’ engagement with the discourse of commerce, which helped us to 
pinpoint this very discourse’s impact on the widespread acceptance of popular fictions. 
However, further ones can be traced even in what should seem to preclude the rise of 
Gothic fiction, namely neoclassicism and the discourse of taste.  
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Day, again, will prove useful at this point. His historical account, in the first place, 
allows us to trace the gaps in the overall neoclassical framework as adapted to the 
English needs, and, consequently, to contextualise Walpole’s own justification for the 
‘invention’ of his ‘hybrid’ genre from yet another perspective. In his second preface, 
Walpole presents Shakespeare as his model and refers to Voltaire’s contemporary 
criticism on the playwright, all in all trying to turn Voltaire’s general thoughts on 
comedy complimented by the elements of tragedy to his own benefit.122 In this, Clery 
traces a continuity with the changing critical attitude towards the national bard, 
triggered by Voltaire’s attacks: with the shift from the consideration of his breaches of 
classical rules to the emphasis on him embodying the genuinely English national spirit, 
as opposed to French-ness.123 Next, she points to Elizabeth Montagu’s attempt to 
validate the supernatural in Shakespeare’s plays on the very same basis.124 Similar 
conclusions are offered by Mydla. As he states, Montagu’s position “[testifies] to the 
rise of bardolatry.”125 Walpole, in turn, utilises the traits “identified with Britishness and 
worshipped in the figure of Shakespeare.”126 In the eighteenth century, Shakespeare, 
indeed, is not simply cherished as an artist; he becomes an embodiment of national 
identity, “a spokesman of an enlightened social and political order and a champion of 
civil liberties.”127 And this opens a potent fissure in the neoclassical order for the early 
Gothicist to make use of. 
Mydla describes this fissure more precisely. As he observes, the vindication of 
Shakespeare was based on an appeal to “the affective conception of drama”128 as 
opposed to the rule-based one. Both conceptions can be traced back to Aristotle, but the 
former postulates that pity and terror, and hence the reception of the play, outweigh in 
importance the rules of decorum.129 And, as Mydla notices “the early Gothic was 
greatly indebted to the affective notion of tragedy, mainly as a consequence of 
Walpole’s attempt to base his Otranto on this tragic pattern.”130 This makes two things 
immediately visible. First, as Mydla shows, both Walpole and Radcliffe participated in 
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the national ‘worship’ of Shakespeare and utilised him for the needs of their own 
fictions to a considerable degree,131 which could not pass as unnoticed by the 
contemporary audience. Second, when the Gothic emerged, the ‘affective’ conception 
of fiction as a tool for aesthetic ‘vindication’ was already in place, even before the 
Aikins wrote about the pleasures of terror. In a sense, then, the vindication of 
Shakespeare also paved the way for the Gothic. 
In both cases, of Montagu and of Walpole, the attempt to use Shakespeare to justify 
the supernatural is met with rejection and condemnation on account of the resistance to 
reducing the appreciation of drama to mere uncritical pleasure.132 The rule of the utility 
of fiction (behind which, we might say, there lurks the fear of commercialisation), it 
seems, operates here more strongly than the nationalist discourse. However, be as it 
may, Walpole’s reference to Shakespeare as his model displays another level on which 
Otranto as a whole can be seen as grounded in its immediate discursive background. If 
we now follow Day, we may see again that whereas Walpole and Montagu move 
perhaps several steps too far in their attempts to justify the supernatural through the 
notion of nationhood, they are not at all exceptional when it comes to the general critical 
paradigm of the time. 
As Day makes it clear, transplanted on the English soil from France and the rest of 
the Continent, neoclassicism was not embraced entirely. In his own words, “[t]he native 
tradition made it difficult to adopt the principles of neoclassicism completely. 
Consequently, the English relation to neoclassicism was one of dialogue.”133 The 
immediate example he gives is that of Dryden, who would respond to the accusations 
aimed at Shakespeare’s plays by justifying: the lack of unities, meant to imitate nature, 
by the actual unnaturalness in which they may result; the typically English introduction 
of underplots with the pleasure one gains from their making the main plot less obvious; 
the mixing of tragedy and comedy with the fact they are complimentary; and the 
violence on stage with the national temperament. The last of the typically English 
breaches of the classical rules of drama, by the way, Day associates with an implicit 
attempt at representing the English as warlike and manly in contrast to the French, the 
relations with whom were tense at that time.134 Interestingly, one of the arguments 
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Dryden uses is that the French themselves no longer follow Aristotle as closely as they 
used to.135 We may observe that Walpole himself utilises a parallel argument with 
regard to Voltaire. 
Further examples reveal further paradoxes, and, we could perhaps say, prove English 
neoclassicism to be a qualified measure for asserting literary value. Dennis points to the 
fact that Aristotelian rules of tragedy may be adopted partially, depending on their 
relevancy to the play’s immediate context. And while neoclassicism may be seen as 
having some affinity with science thanks to its underlying assumption that particular 
means trigger particular emotional responses, Addison and later Johnson dismiss the 
possibility of discerning all the exact and constant triggers, in a scientific manner, that 
might account for the whole pleasure derived from a work. Thus, Day demonstrates, 
one of the central tenets of neoclassicism is undermined.136 And, while the possibility of 
a partial implementation of neoclassicism is one thing, Day moves on to indicate 
inconsistencies and paradoxes in the ways neoclassicism actually becomes 
implemented.137 
One of the interesting things Day mentions is that before the implementation of 
neoclassicism, the English had hardly any drama tradition of following strictly the 
classical models.138 In a way, then the very introduction of neoclassicism might be seen 
as a discursive breach of continuity, for, as it follows from Day’s account, it was clearly 
functional. For one thing, neoclassicism laid stress on clarity and this quality, like in the 
case of the clarity of the language of commerce, made it an alternative to figurative 
language. For another, it promised to renew literature after its assumed fall, resulting 
from the fact that its domain was taken over by the market.139 Yet, perhaps most 
importantly, it could have been seen as reinforcing political stability and social order, 
through the emphasis it put on imitating nature as a constant, ideal order of things, in a 
country which had suffered along with the change of political and social system. As 
Day notices, neoclassicism emphasised the universal – and unifying – qualities of 
mankind.140 At the same time, the traditional instructive function of literature could be 
embedded within its fundamental element, the imitation of nature.141 
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However, if we see the drive towards social stability as a reason for adapting 
neoclassicism to the needs of the English, we should also view this very drive as a cause 
of neoclassicism’s failure. Just as criticism cannot embrace the commercial discourse 
for commerce underscores the need for critical supervision, so, at a certain point, there 
proves to be a rift between neoclassical emphasis on the proper hierarchies being 
respected and the post-Civil War suspiciousness towards the previous socio-political 
order.142 While the critics seem to conflate nature and culture in their accounts of what 
should be imitated, Day observes, the universal and unifying power of neoclassical 
nature is brought down to “the local.”143 It is the novel, rather than classical epic, poetry 
and drama that will take over of the function of representing a society “where the 
distinctions between ranks are no longer clearly demarcated.”144 
It is frequently assumed that the Gothic in the eighteenth-century was a reaction 
against neo-classical limitations which came well before Romanticism. However, a 
careful analysis of the conditions on which neoclassicism was introduced in Britain 
casts doubts on the overall oppositional status of the Gothic. The above is not meant to 
serve as a confirmation that the gaps and rifts in the English adaptation of neoclassicism 
make it too weak to become a perspective from which early Gothic, such as Walpole’s, 
could be attacked; far from that. But if we look closely at Otranto, and especially at its 
two prefaces, we shall see that Walpole is utilising various aspects of the contemporary 
debates – and inconsistencies – to promote his own text. Firstly, he makes use of the 
ongoing question of Shakespeare, inscribing his own discourse into the general critical 
one. Next, he adopts similar means to justify his own cause to those adopted by major 
critics, such as Dryden. We may also pay attention to that fact that, as Day observes, 
neoclassicism’s power is weakened by the fact that the development of science divorces 
literature from its traditional function of conveying the truth – just as much as its 
rhetorical function is taken away by turning it into a commodity.145  If the reaction is a 
further search for the basis to ground literary value in the mid-century, and the possible 
basis is found in imagination, then we are also not surprised by Walpole’s appealing to 
the notion of imagination being cramped by the modern novel.146 And we are even less 
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surprised, taking into consideration Clery’s stance that Walpole embraces economic 
amoralism, if we consider the fact that imagination emphasises the poet’s vision instead 
of rules, but, in this way, it also draws one’s attention away from moral questions.147 On 
account of all these ways of inscribing his justification for a new blend of romance into 
the available critical discursive frame, Walpole proves less to be ‘in opposition’ to 
neoclassicism, than he attests to the complex structure of the eighteenth-century critical 
discourse. This structure, in turn, is too heterogeneous to allow for drawing a clear line 
between what is ‘conformist’ and what is ‘oppositional’ or ‘antagonistic.’ It is this 
heterogeneity, in fact, that Otranto represents and draws attention to.  
If we now turn to the discourse of taste, we may say that, in a way, it appeared to be 
better suited to the needs of the rising middle-class in Britain than neoclassicism. For 
one thing, as Day observes, taste “combines the value the aristocracy place on birth with 
the value the middle class place on achievement.”148 It allows for establishing an elite 
social group, and thus serves to reassure social distinctions, yet on a different level that 
between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. Simultaneously, it remains in tune with the 
middle-class discourse, for it does not fix taste as a constant quality, but represents it as 
open (at least to some extent) to polishing and improving.149 At the same time, however, 
taste also works towards diminishing the importance of the corrective function of 
poetry. As it shifts attention from the traditional concerns of criticism to the question of 
individual experience of a piece of art, it puts a greater stress of pleasure as a matter of 
“self-cultivation” rather than ethical improvement, and hence emphasises the 
consideration of the text’s ‘beauties’ rather than moral qualities.150 All in all, as Day 
states, “[t]he focus on the sublime and the beautiful suggests that the conception of 
literature is now more aesthetic than ethical.”151 
As a result, taste becomes potentially relative.152 There are, of course, attempts at 
balancing the relativity of taste with reason and the reintroduction of ethical standards, 
but these are, as Day points out, not entirely successful.153 Also, as he points out,  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
better cut out for the needs of the times and the general socio-political paradigm. Day, Literary Criticism, 
p. 177. 
147
 See Day, Literary Criticism, p. 168. 
148
 Day, Literary Criticism, p. 180. 
149
 Day, Literary Criticism, p. 180. 
150
 Day, Literary Criticism, p. 180. 
151
 Day, Literary Criticism, p. 190. 
152
 See Day, Literary Criticism, pp. 186-187. 
153
 Day, Literary Criticism, pp. 187-188. 
  291
[m]ost discussion of taste in this period is dedicated to minimizing its 
socially disruptive effects. The idea that taste differs from person to 
person threatens the unity of the polity because it signifies what 
separates them, not what they have in common. This, in fact, is the 
tension between civic and commercial humanism. The former focuses 
on the citizen’s duty in promoting virtue and valour to maintain the 
integrity of the State while the latter focuses on the cultivation of 
manners and pleasures. The struggle to establish taste either on an idea 
of human nature – ‘a child born with an aversion to its mother’s milk 
is a wonder’ – or on the premise that ‘there are certain qualities in 
objects which are fitted by nature to produce [feelings of beauty]’ is 
the struggle to find a balance between the individualism of 
commercial humanism and the community of civic humanism.154 
 
 
This is interesting, primarily for it once again directs our attention to the clash of two 
discourses, one affirming the past, the other affirming the future, both having an impact 
on critical categories. Yet more importantly, as the above shows, what we may spot in 
the case of the discourse of taste is another fracture, or a gap, in the general discursive 
order, that might have facilitated, in a longer run, the Gothic’s emergence. In a peculiar 
sense, in his final statement from the second preface to Otranto on the novel, saying that 
“[s]uch as it is, the public have honoured it sufficiently, whatever rank their suffrages 
allot to it,”155 what Walpole appeals to is precisely the ‘liberty’ of individualised taste. 
Having considered all the above, we may assert that the Gothic is embedded within 
the eighteenth-century – and Enlightenment – discourses and overall historical situation 
to a large extent. Otranto with its prefaces constitutes an apt example here. Even if we 
treat Walpole’s satirical text as oppositional in a sense, its oppositional stance will 
nevertheless remain deeply rooted in, and reflecting, the general unstable, and often 
paradoxical, situation in a period following a major socio-political shift, in which the 
interaction between discourse and power is highly complex. What is more, the fact that 
Walpole alludes, or at least seems to allude, to the major contemporary debates in the 
field of criticism, and the prevailing discourses on the literary value, makes us alert to 
the fact that the Gothic did not emerge from a vacuum. On the contrary, it was the 
contemporary critical discourse itself which ‘offered’ the Gothic rifts and fractures to 
claim validation, successfully or not, but above all, to emerge and root itself in a fertile 
soil. 
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Still, Gothic fiction cannot be seen as a mere by-product of the dominant trends. This 
is because it also participated in those discourses in more self-conscious and 
conforming ways, often internalising their paradigmatic schemes. Let us now to turn to 
the examples of the ways in which early Gothicists attempted at inscribing their new 
domain into the dominant discursive order. As we noticed some time ago, both the 
spectacular supernatural and consumerism taking over the publishing realm prepare the 
ground for Gothic fiction, though, we might say, on different planes. These planes do 
converge, for both are dependent on consumption and demand. Actually, let us remind 
ourselves, the spectacular supernatural, the supernatural which becomes entertainment, 
is but one incarnation of market mentality, which reconfigures a ghost as a commodity, 
a novelty which boosts sales. Yet while the publishing market, based on demand, has a 
potential to dissociate itself from critical discourse and the conditions it lays for 
validation, Garrick’s supernatural is found to abide by the dictates of critical demands, 
and thus, to be discursively validated.  
Following the assumption that the Gothic has to undergo a similar discursive 
validation to emerge in its full-blown form, Clery lists a number of ways in which such 
a validation is attempted by the end of the eighteenth-century. Of these, the most 
immediate one is embedding a theory of the supernatural as causing the feeling of 
pleasurable terror within Edmund Burke’s conception of the sublime. Here, Clery cites 
the Aikins as, initially, offering an explanation of the pleasure derived from the 
contemporary discourse of historicism as a regressive drive in humans, explainable 
through primitivism.156 However, as she observes, the authors of the essay “On the 
Pleasure Derived from Objects of Terror,” are quick to follow Burke in their departure 
from primitivism towards a psychological explanation of the thirst for a sublime 
experience: “The taste for horrors arises from the resistance of the mind to the torpor 
induced by humdrum reality.”157 As Clery observes, Burke, on his side, similarly begins 
by validating imagination and figurative language through primitivism, and then offers 
them as antidotes to the diminishment of the powers of mind caused by living in a 
commercial society, the powers of mind being stimulated best by means of terror, as he 
assumes.158 In a parallel manner, the Aikins propose a tale of terror as a remedy to the 
contemporary sentimental novel, having a debilitating effect upon the faculties of the 
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reader by not being able to trigger the faculties.159 In this way, we might sum up, 
imagination is being juxtaposed with imitation. Yet interestingly, the latter is not only a 
matter of improvement through fictional example; it is also inherent, if we look at it 
from another angle, in the debilitating production process and the cycle of production 
and consumption. Day, in turn, points to the juxtaposition of imagination with imitation 
associated with the division of labour as a way of validating imagination in the mid-
eighteenth century, and of grounding literary value in it. He also emphasizes how this 
inescapably links imagination with commerce, and thus, discloses a form of market 
mentality at work, too.160 
Approaching the question of terror from the perspective which parallels Burke allows 
the Aikins to justify the use of supernatural without a recourse to didacticism. As Clery 
notices, in this field, granted to the novel, a tale of terror seemed not to be able to hold a 
stand.161 Yet as the critic also sums up, such a route to acknowledgement fails to grant 
success as well, for the tale of terror, evoking powerful emotions, cannot dissociate 
itself thoroughly from the production and consumption cycle which, as we might 
observe following Day, and Burke, imagination is meant to be a cure for. A tale of 
artificial terror is in itself an embodiment of surplus luxury, supplanted according to the 
demand, and creating an artificial need in the readers.162 It is this propensity of the 
Gothic that will become the basis for its rejection by Romanticism. 
According to Clery, it is Clara Reeve who manages to put the tale of terror, quite 
literally, into use, more than a decade after the singular success of Otranto. Usefulness, 
in turn, is her key to The Old English Baron’s relative success. Contrary to the Aikins, 
Reeve turns to the discourse of fictional example, the usefulness of the novel in the vein 
of Richardson and Johnson, and defines the relationship between her text and Walpole’s 
one as that of correction.163 Thereby, she subordinates her own writing to the dominant 
discourse, as did Garrick with his acting. The Reevian ghost, as Clery observes, is 
turned back from an absurd spectacle into a ‘truthful’ entity, in the sense that it has to be 
represented realistically enough not to damage the general realism of the whole text. To 
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achieve this end, its appearance is reduced to minimum, but apart from that it is also 
made to seem “commonplace.”164 It is this turning of the ghost, scarce as it is, into an 
almost commonplace phenomenon that Clery views as Reeve’s crucial reworking of the 
fictional example principle. Instilling morality becomes the justification for a 
reasonably reduced form of the supernatural.165 The novel, though dressed in a “fancy-
dress with the spice of the paranormal,” remains a version of Pamela: it oscillates 
around the details of conduct, creating an optimistic bourgeois vision; it is “an 
illustrative conduct-book for the proper correlation of wealth and virtue.”166 The 
supernatural is thus once again made acceptable according to the dictates of the 
dominant critical discourse. At the same time, the remaining content of the novel 
conforms with the mainstream. 
The above-mentioned characteristics of The Old English Baron are seen by Clery as 
enabling the further publishing expansion of Gothic fiction. Firstly, the ‘useful’ content 
of the “modern romance” allows to change its status, previously limited to that of a 
novelty, or curiosity.167 Secondly, the authoress’ effort to meet critical expectations 
discloses her “business sense,” an ability to compromise for the sake of critical 
recognition and respectability, and sensitivity to the problem of the publishing market 
seen as representing the cycle of production and consumption.168 Yet, as Clery notices, 
while Reeve’s novel succeeds, what it stirs is the worry that a too-commonplace ghost – 
a ghost not turned into a clear spectacle – may be also too-truthful, and serving the 
spread of superstition.169 Simultaneously, the novel fails to meet the criterion of 
sublimity170 – and in this, that is the lack of the ability to trigger high emotional states 
able to expand the mind, we might see another cause for the rejection of the Gothic by 
the First Wave Romantics.171 All in all, as Clery remarks, it is only with Radcliffe that 
the problems triggered by the representation of the supernatural in writing are 
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overcome.172 And, significantly, they are overcome through a further compromise and 
subordination to the dominant discursive frame. 
To stay with Reeve yet for a while before we move on, as we speak of her and the 
validation of Gothic fiction by means of addressing the contemporary discourses, we 
may also evoke Watt’s notion of ‘the Loyalist Gothic.’ Clery points out to the subtle 
manner in which Reeve both internalises the fictional example and modifies it for the 
benefit of the supernatural in the didactic realm. Watt, also acknowledging Reeve’s 
insistence on the usefulness of romance, provides us with an account of other ways in 
which The Old English Baron proves to be rooted in the eighteenth-century prevailing 
discourses, and, just as Otranto, can be seen as mirroring the crises inherent in the age 
of change. 
What he is primarily interested in is Reeve’s interest in the question of nationalism. 
While Clery views The Old English Baron as a stage in the representation of the 
supernatural in modern fiction, Watt points to the text’s indebtedness to newly emerged 
historical romance.173 As such, The Old English Baron may be seen as embodying a 
stage in the shifting status of the Gothic past as a resource for the formulation of 
national identity. We have observed in the first chapter that it is a seeming paradox that 
the Middle Ages are rejected as barbaric, superstitious and uncultured, yet 
simultaneously praised as embodying the true national heritage and spirit. This seeming 
paradox turns out to be hardly a paradox if we consider it from the perspective of the 
eighteenth-century socio-political prerogatives. On the one hand, we have the 
Enlightenment and rationalism, which preclude superstition, sensationalism and the 
supernatural, and exemplary historicism which defines its own age as that of progress 
through a negative comparison with the past. However, on the other hand, we also have 
the anti-aristocratic and anti-absolutist drive, which paradoxically, but not surprisingly, 
results in reaching for the Gothic example to substantiate its own claims. And, we also 
have persisting conservative (anachronistic, in a sense, we might say if we look at it 
from the perspective of the progressive bourgeoisie) sympathies which result in exactly 
the same thing. 
What we are dealing with here is what Mark Madoff, in 1979, termed ‘the useful 
myth of Gothic ancestry.’ In Madoff’s words, this ancestry “was a product of fantasy 
invented to serve specific political and emotional purposes. [It] offered a way of 
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revising the features of the past in order to satisfy the imaginative needs of the 
present.”174 We could exchange the word ‘myth’ for representation, and following 
Madoff, see how it shifted according to the current needs of who was using it. He gives, 
for instance, an account of how Whig politicians would simultaneously resort to the 
representation of Goths as “noble, vigorous, physically hardy, intellectually and morally 
superior to the Romans [and] particularly famous for prizing their liberty” to advocate 
the freedom of the Parliament set against the monarch’s power already in the 
seventeenth century, and shift to the representation of Gothicism as an anachronism to 
criticise the Tories.175 In a sense, we maysee here how a certain discourse is being 
adopted to the given needs of power. 
A similar usage of the representation of the Gothic past emerges from Watt’s 
account. First, in the early eighteenth century, when a patriotic stance was associates 
with the opposition, referring to ancient ancestry was a way of emphasising the 
possibility of an alternative political authority.176 Then, by the end of it, Gothic 
constitution was assimilated by the conservative circles to emphasise the continuity 
between the past and the present, the latter finding its justification in the previous.177 
We may remember Clery’s discussion of the eighteenth-century law, evoked in the 
context of Radcliffe’s subtle subversive revisions of patrilineal inheritance evoked in 
the previous chapter, or even the discussion of Walpole above. In both cases, the 
eighteenth-century law harbours feudal provisions, anachronistic from the perspective 
of the growing needs of the middle-class. As Watt makes it clear, it is a positive 
representation of the past that conservatives, such as Blackstone, would embrace in 
order to justify such anachronisms.178 He is cautious when it comes to assuming clear-
cut divisions with regard to particular texts and their ideological conditioning. However, 
he generally distinguishes between two ways of representing the Gothic past in the 
period starting with the late 1770s, on which befell American and then French 
Revolution: radical and democratic, evoking the heritage of “a Saxon democratic 
tradition,” or militarist, focusing on “military victory” and continuity of the state.179 Of 
these two, the latter manifests itself more visibly in the conservative circles of the 
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1790s, and can be seen in conjunction with the fear of revolution and anti-Jacobin 
sentiments.180 
Reeve’s The Old English Baron, according to Watt, represents a stage in the 
development of what he terms the Loyalist Gothic. The romance, as he views it, is 
situated in the period of “[reimagining] national identity.”181 Hence, on the one hand, 
Watt acknowledges what is more vividly stressed in both Clery and Madoff, namely the 
fact that The Old English Baron presents characters and sentiments with which the 
eighteenth-century readers may easily identify.182 Yet, on the other, he also emphasises 
Reeve’s overall positive representation of medieval class relations and inheritance law 
as testifying to her attempt at representing aristocracy “possessed of merit” and, hence, 
“redeemable.”183 Tracing what we may call a genealogy of texts that begins with 
Walpole’s Otranto and the possibilities his ‘Gothic story’ offers, and then continues, in 
the form proposed by Reeve, into the 1790s and the beginning of the nineteenth-
century, he speaks of a group of novels which rarely feature in the canon of Gothic 
fiction, but disclose a strong affinity when it comes to their political stance on 
nationalism and the recourse to the loyalist discourse.184 According to him, the Loyalist 
Gothic is characterised by its setting the action “in a predominantly English medieval 
setting, and [depicting] the conflict between patriotism and a variant of misguided 
ambition in a period of chivalric manners, all the time underlining the lessons that such 
a conflict presented for readers in the 1790s.”185 The final example he gives is 
Radcliffe’s Gaston de Blondeville.  
What we have just discussed are two distinct ways of validating the Gothic by an 
appeal to discourse in power, one by aesthetic means, the other by socio-political ones. 
While Clery points to the ways in which such a validation takes place through a 
revalorisation of the supernatural element, Watt’s analyses suggest a more general 
process of the Gothic becoming acceptable by means of its adopting a loyalist agenda. If 
we consider the above, we may say that these two ways depart in two opposite 
directions. Yet what they have in common, and what will ultimately grant the 
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Radcliffean romances’ success, is their conscious use of the critical, aesthetic, or 
political discourse to support their own cause.  
This calls for an analysis from the strict perspective of discourse. We may remember 
Foucault speak of discourses as capable of “[circulation] without changing their form 
from one strategy to another, opposing strategy:”186 of discourse not being 
homonymous with power that it happens to produce, transmit and reinforce.187 Hence, 
we could say that, in the above cases of the Aikins and Reeve – and Walpole as well – 
what operates is Foucault’s rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourse. In both cases of 
the theory of delightful terror and the attempt to endorse the Gothic tale with a useful 
and patriotic aim, the discourse which supports power (itself changeable as it may be) is 
used to validate the Gothic object as ‘true’ within that discourse, and, in this way, to 
turn it into an acceptable one – not without trying to adapt the supernatural, or generally 
the Gothic, in the long run, to the discursive framework in use.  
Of course, in both cases, because of the ‘nature’ of the order of discourse the 
Gothicist faces and attempts to operate within, validation produces a discordance, or a 
clash, with the dominant paradigm at a certain point. This discordance is, however, not 
that much a matter of the final impossibility to accommodate the supernatural, the terror 
tale, the Gothic within the discourse in power. As we have already observed in the 
previous chapter, Radcliffe succeeds in meeting the Enlightenment paradigm with her 
device of the explained supernatural and, at the same time, manages to achieve a certain 
dose of subversion without a substantial condemnation. And that is because her Gothic 
is bourgeois – not antagonistic, but representative of a shared, wider socio-cultural 
context. 
 
6.4. The Marginalised, the Marginal 
 
There is a number of points that need to be made to conclude the considerations 
carried out in this chapter. We have begun our discussion of the ways in which Gothic 
fiction is grounded in its contemporary discursive background with an assumption that 
such a discussion should enable us to confirm that the Gothic serves the positive 
production of power. The above analysis of Reeve is a clear confirmation that it does. 
By stating this, we repeat what was earlier stated by Watt – there exists a traceable 
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genealogical line of the Loyalist Gothic. But Reeve is not an exception to the general 
rule. Diane Long Hoeveler’s Gothic Feminism, evoked on various occasions in the 
previous chapter, shows that we may speak of the positive operation of power with 
regard to a whole range of Gothic fictions written by women. And a major example is 
Radcliffe, the romantic poetess contrasted by Tompkins, as indigenously English, with 
the German imports and the school of horror influenced by them. Speaking of the 
school of horror, Watt traces another genealogical line, including Lewis and the above-
mentioned German literature, which accounts for the Gothic texts disclosing openly 
subversive drives as standing out from the overall attitude of the majority of English 
Gothicists contemporary with, say, Reeve and then Radcliffe.188 He also points out that 
we need to observe how the utilisation of the socio-political discourse changed in texts 
written consciously from the liberal and radical standpoints.189 
To return to Radcliffe, an outstanding illustration of the manner in which her Gothic 
romances embodied the bourgeois ideal is delivered by Botting and Townshend 
themselves, in the introduction to the second volume of Gothic. As they state, she 
“embourgeoisifies the genre, moderating the passions and vices of its commercial 
context with the virtues of prudence, patience, duty and chastity. Her heroines learn the 
lessons of excess, eventually, and reap the rewards.”190 Consequently, Radcliffe 
manages to conform to the critic’s demands: her heroines embody readers who initially 
give in to passion but then avoid doom by turning to reason and virtue, and, what is 
made clear to the reader, thus exemplify clearly what is to be followed and what 
avoided.191 In that, her romances prove to be corrective – productive, we should say – 
and participate in the overall critical project of “the encoding […] of an ideal reader.”192 
As a result, it seems by all means justified to see her as internalising the dominant 
system that produces knowledge, multiplies discourses, induces pleasure, and solidifies 
power. 
Yet, interestingly enough, Botting and Townshend would rather see Radcliffe as an 
exception, a particularly sensitive middle-class representative who would know how to 
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satisfy such critics as T. J. Matthias.193 Overall, as they view it, the Gothic would invite 
indignation owing to the fear that it might turn readers into passionate monsters.194 Yet, 
again, what we must notice while following their account is that, firstly, they rely on the 
eighteenth-century critics, and secondly, in spite of all the references they make to 
Foucault, that the assumption of the Gothic representing (in a double way) the 
repressed, the ‘waste,’ seems to continue to underpin the stance they take. As they state, 
for instance, rephrasing Edward Barry’s response to ‘depraving’ fiction, “[o]nce 
awakened by a work of fiction, the reader’s monstrous desires would know no limits on 
the path towards destruction.”195 It is hard to resist the impression that desires in the 
above sentence, triggered by passions portrayed by a romance, must be the repressed 
ones. While the present-day critics paraphrase an eighteenth-century critic, 
psychoanalysis lurks from behind the idiom they use. 
However, as we have seen, it is difficult to ascribe to the Gothic the status of the 
repressed if we consider the general discursive context of its appearance. For one thing, 
all the bashing and castigating that takes place in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century critical responses and reviews resembles the multiplied discourses that would 
codify sex on a whole range of levels, producing a positive body of knowledge about it 
rather than falling silent over it. For another, the Gothic, in a sense, may hardly be seen 
as repressed. By the end of the century it proliferates on the shelves of the circulating 
library. In fact, what illustrates well the degree to which the attempts at silencing it fail 
is an insignificant, though humorous, interjection made in the middle of his otherwise 
critical and satirical text, “The Terrorist System of Novel-Writing,” by the oft quoted 
‘Jacobin Novelist.’ As the anonymous contributor to the Monthly Magazine states, it has 
“fallen to [his] lot to peruse many of these wonderful publications, previously to [his] 
daughters reading them (who, by the bye, would read them whether [he] pleased or not) 
[…].”196 Interestingly, Botting and Townshend mention the very same author and 
passage in their general introduction while they discuss the threat posed by the Gothic 
to the traditional paternalistic family. As they state, he “insisted that fathers rigorously 
scrutinise and police the reading matter of their daughters. At the same time [he] tacitly 
acknowledges that these fictions would continue to be read irrespective of a father’s 
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approval.”197 The critics do not comment on the final statement, leaving it as if for the 
readers to judge what its implications may be. But it seems that this brief interdiction, 
no matter whether it was meant to be comical, as we might see it today, or an expression 
of lament, collapses the critical integrity of the text, otherwise tackling serious issues 
such as the impact of the French Revolution on the English spectators. He author indeed 
scrutinises his daughters’ reading – but his supervision is utterly ineffective. Perhaps the 
Gothic should be ‘repressed,’ together with the revolutionary terror it is permeated with. 
But, all in all, what can the critic do but complain? 
If there seems to be something repressed about the Gothic, it is its commercial 
affiliation. And, paradoxically, it is repressed both in the eighteenth-century reviews and 
in the twentieth-century accounts of the marginalisation of the Gothic such as Botting 
and Townshend’s. The eighteenth-century critics fear luxury and market demand as 
much as they use the woman as an exemplar. And this is not surprising if we take into 
consideration Clery’s discussion of how the contemporary criticism is influenced by 
civic humanism. It is also not surprising if we recall how the discourse of commerce, 
production, consumption and profit undoes the need for rhetorical criticism, which is 
the traditional form of criticism. Thus, when Botting and Townshend state that Gothic 
fiction “[comes] out in favour of the romantic desires of the younger generation,”198 
they mean that the contemporary critics respond with a fear of the loosening of parental 
authority, but they could just as well state that Gothic fiction comes out in favour of 
market demand. And how can one control such a demand if it is being satisfied before 
one even has a chance to object? In a sense, what the eighteenth-century critics do by 
fighting off the Gothic and popular fiction in general is defending the province of letters 
in the face of the changing conditions of artistic creation. In a sense, they are trying to 
fend off the inevitable.  
In this sense, it is then difficult to see the Gothic as an incarnation of the repressed. 
Gothic fiction emerges together with the commercialisation of the republic of letters and 
the recognition of the power of market demand. And these lie at the foot of the 
economic identity of the eighteenth-century English middle class. There is, of course, an 
ongoing clash between the old and the new, civic humanism and bourgeois liberalism, 
the surviving remnants of the feudal law and the growing need of the bourgeoisie, the 
market and the traditional role of criticism, transplanted into a new background. And 
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there are shifts of power, as well as shifts of discourses, depending on the historical 
situation. The eighteenth-century middle-class identity is thus formed in a process of 
negotiation, in a riven, unstable manner; shaped by external factors which contribute to 
incongruent elements being assimilated at the same time. Hence, the critical outcry at 
the Gothic. 
And hence, also, the difficulty with asserting that the Gothic is not entangled in the 
mechanisms of the positive production of power. Gothic fiction seems to be a part of the 
process of negotiation. If we look at it from the perspective of the growing 
commercialisation of the English society, it is entangled in the positive production of 
power, because it becomes a means of boosting sales, and Walpole’s prefaces can be 
seen as promoting the liberty of the market. If we look at the rifts and gaps in the very 
critical discourses of the times, the Gothic also reflects and responds, to a degree, to the 
ongoing debates. And if we look at the ways in which the mode is consciously and 
deliberately made to assimilate the empowered discourses, we may see it again serves 
the positive production of power, for a large part of it embraces and incorporates the 
elements of the eighteenth-century middle-class identity. Of course, to some extent, the 
Gothic may also convey subversive content, as in the case of Radcliffe’s treatment of 
inheritance law, or radicals’ use of the mode for highlighting political issues, but this 
does not mean it is an abject, or ‘waste.’ The very complicated status of the eighteenth-
century social identity casts doubt on viewing it so. 
All in all, criticism does much more than only complain. It fixes the categories of 
high and low art and redirects our attention towards the former category, and away from 
the scrutiny of Gothic fiction as representing, directly or implicitly, the eighteenth-
century socio-political shifts. And this is a discursive manoeuvre, for it serves a new 
agenda, first suiting the Romantic, and then the modernist critics. With shifting interest, 
the Gothic and the question of the reader depraved by Gothic fiction is left behind. At 
this point we might agree with Botting and Townshend that the discursive shift of 
attention is first enacted by the Romantics. Yet then, we should also think of what Patey 
stresses, namely that Romanticism itself produces a certain, discursively functional 
representation of the Enlightenment, and that this representation has to be qualified and 
re-examined if we are to understand the peculiarities of the eighteenth-century 
context.199 
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Simultaneously, what should be re-examined is the marginalisation of the Gothic in 
the eighteenth-century. While it appears that the Enlightenment subjects are “rational, 
ordered, moral and prudent,”200 superimpose morality and aesthetics, and follow the 
rules of neoclassicism,201 if we delve into their discursive background, we may see that 
they also turn from neoclassicism to imagination and the sublime, from the unity of the 
polity to personal experience of a work of art, and complicate the matter of the 
moralising and utilitarian function of criticism in the discourse of taste; that they 
represent history according to the needs of the day, and occupy both conservative and 
liberal, or even radical, positions. And above all, that they are dealing with the 
strengthening of the economic power. The Gothic does not seems to abide by the 
general rules for the favoured manner of literary production, for it may be easily 
associated both with the unreasonability of the ancient social order on the one hand, and 
the feared commercialisation of life inherent in the newly developing one, on the other. 
Still, it is representative of the period and its upheavals, and cannot be easily seen as 
oppositional with regard to a stable socio-cultural identity, and thus threatening, without 
a proper qualification.  
The Gothic represented as a social threat is, undoubtedly, appealing to the late 
twentieth-century critics. The eighteenth-century critical attack on the popular novel, the 
Grub-street writers devoid of taste and learning, then its ‘silencing’ by the Romantics, 
and the disdain with which it is treated well into the twentieth-century, seem to attest 
undisputedly to its marginalisation. Yet, as it seems, in the nowadays’ critical accounts, 
apparent marginalisation quickly turns into inherent marginality, a ‘natural’ penchant 
for occupying the liminal spaces. While it does open some paths for subversion, the 
Gothic is, nonetheless, not that liminal as it might seem. And perhaps it truly deserves 
to be studied for exactly this reason: for its own rooting in and reflecting a major period 
of cultural change. 
We have pointed out, in the previous chapters, that both the differentiation paradigm 
and the indefinability of the Gothic are discursively functional concepts. While the 
differentiation paradigm allows the critics to represent their own field in a way which 
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unifies it in spite of the fact that it is highly versified, the Gothic’s indefinability secures 
the lack of a grand narrative of the Gothic, but at the same time ensures that multiple 
narratives of the Gothic may be uttered. And, while the differentiation from the earlier 
Gothic criticism obliterates the fact the history of Gothic criticism is also construed by 
institutionalised criticism in accordance with its own agenda, the indefinability of the 
Gothic contributes to the spectralising of the mode, and allows to shift the mode’s 
boundaries in the way favoured by the critic. As we have seen in this chapter, the 
marginalisation of the Gothic is a function of the critical discourse, too. It allows to 
ground the value of the Gothic in its marginal status, its alleged opposition to culture. At 
the same time, it results in obliterating the Gothic’s grounding in its own contemporary 
context. In a certain way, then, it serves to confirm the already established conception of 
the Gothic as subversive, anti-bourgeois, and repressed. As a result, we can see that 
theory is not only projected on the Gothic. Once projected, it becomes inscribed into a 
conception of the mode and returns to haunt the future attempts at illuminating it.
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Conclusion:  
Subversion, Compliance,  
and the Critical Conception of the fin de siècle Gothic 
 
Robert Miles’ assumption that the Gothic represents no single dialectic, but can be 
accounted for by tracing various dialectics and genealogies should seem incredibly 
promising from our perspective. If we accept that the Gothic is a mode, not a genre, and 
that it is, as Miles observes, a mode of texts which remain in constant dialogue, and are 
always conditioned by their own discursive background, then no other way of 
accounting for its body should appear equally productive. In a given sense, the 
differentiation paradigm also traces such a genealogy of Gothic texts. Yet, what it 
assumes to be the mode’s common dialectics is, to a considerable extent, subversion and 
psychological depth. And this, paradoxically, allows for unifying a tremendously 
diverse literary phenomenon at the expense of its historical discursive inflections. 
We have attempted to show that Gothic criticism is prone to re-construct the Gothic 
according it its own adopted discursive framework. Such a reconstruction, more or less 
extensive, is bound to take place whenever the critic relies on cultural theories to the 
point of internalising their prerogatives as givens for the Gothic, and fails to back them 
up with a considerable dose of historical research. In fact, once restructured according 
to the tenets of, above all, psychoanalysis and the assumption of the Gothic’s anti-
Enlightenment attitude, the conception of the Gothic becomes a workable theory. Its 
influences, as we have seen, may be traced in a number of critical accounts. In those 
accounts, what turns out to be appropriated is both the material to be interpreted and the 
methodological tools used for interpretation. 
Yet, as we also attempted to show, the Gothic is neither entirely about psychological 
states, nor about subversion. At least, not in the sense that it represents the fearful 
‘other,’ the object of abjection and the cultural ‘waste’ itself. The marginalisation of the 
Gothic, indeed, is conditioned by the political and social factors; however, this does not 
mean that the Gothic itself is marginal, in the sense of being oppositional, with regard to 
the political and cultural mainstream. It may tell us about subversions and then expel 
them, in accordance with its own discursive frame, and then it may highlight 
psychological states, but to account for those we would need to delve into contemporary 
philosophical discourses instead of immediately applying psychoanalysis. Similarly, if 
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we wish to trace what the Gothic, as a culture’s artefact, can tell us about, for example, 
changing class relations, we need to consult its immediate political and social discursive 
background before we evoke Marx. As a result, while it appears that devising a meta-
definition for the Gothic is indeed impossible, for each such definition, as we have 
shown, leads to the reworking of the Gothic at the expense of its diversity, the change of 
dialectics underlying the way we try to account for it seems to be inevitable if the 
Gothic is to be properly illuminated.  
Based on our considerations, it turns out that a promising dialectic for considering 
the Gothic is its ‘contemporaneousness,’ the feature emphasised by the new historicist 
studies. For, indeed, the Gothic is always contemporary. It is for this reason that it 
disturbs civic humanism so much, with its internalised luxurious status of a commodity 
and its sensitivity to market demand. Or, that it appears to be so anachronistic. It is also 
for this reason that it turns out to be loyalist and cherishing the military past, or radical 
and advocating a social change. All of this is conditioned by its being immersed in its 
own historical moment, in the complexity and interrelationships between various 
discourses that are applied both by power and by opposition. Once we admit that, we 
are able to account for its apparent paradoxicality and the penchant for shape-shifting it 
appears to disclose. At the same time, we also complicate its study considerably, for we 
draw attention to the fact that the Gothic terrain is far from smooth. On the contrary, it 
can be quite unpredictable and tricky, and in the least degree in the manner that we 
could identify with. 
The problem here springs from the fact that what the critics do is always construct 
their object. We could observe how the eighteenth-century critics construed the 
distinction between proper and improper occupation of literature – and we could trace in 
their accounts the indication that these tended to collapse as soon as literature proceeded 
from the site of a critical essay, or review, to the hands of readers. The basis for the 
success of the Gothic was the fact that it was read, in the first place. We could also 
observe how the contemporary critics reconstruct what has already been constructed, 
by, for instance, adapting the representation of the Gothic as devised by the critics from 
the past in order to reinforce the cultural status of their own activity. What must be 
remembered is that we do not have an immediate access to Gothic fiction as it was 
perceived at the times of, for example, its rise. What is more, we perceive those times as 
such through subsequent representations. This is, as we have noted following the 
historians of criticism, the case with the Enlightenment. Only as we are able to 
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understand the age which gave birth to the Gothic, are we able to begin to understand 
the Gothic itself. 
One might have the impression that much of what has been stated above could find 
confirmation in regard to eighteenth-century Gothic fiction, but could prove somewhat 
less applicable to the nineteenth-century one. We have discussed, of course, the 
instances of re-shaping the conception of the Gothic so that it may encompass the 
respectable, canonical Victorian novel – the instances of critics constructing the Gothic 
yet again. Still, not that much has been said about the fin de siècle revival of the Gothic. 
And, speaking of the psychological depth and subversion in the Gothic, it seems that the 
fin de siècle Gothic fiction can hardly testify to any other dialectic that that of the 
trembling bourgeois psyche.1 
For instance, we could notice that whoever has read Christopher Craft’s essay “‘Kiss 
me with those red lips’: Gender and inversion in Bram Stocker’s Dracula,” could think, 
at least for a moment, that the Gothic is indeed a transgressive genre. Craft observes that 
whatever subversive sexual desires are initially invited in the novel, and then 
entertained for a while, they are forcibly expelled at its end. And we could assume that 
since the fin de siècle monster is universally expelled at the end of the Gothic text, we 
are dealing with compliance with the status quo. On this basis, we could reject the 
Gothic’s anti-bourgeois drive again. However, compliance with the status quo does not 
always amount to affirmation and positive power production; in fact, one may comply 
but, at the same time, remain sceptical, or dissatisfied, and tacitly aim at subversion. 
And, as Craft states, “[w]ithin its extended middle, the Gothic novel entertains its 
resident demon—is, indeed, entertained by it—and the monster, now ascendant in its 
strength, seems for a time potent to invert the ‘natural’ order and overwhelm the 
comforting closure of the text.”2 Hence, compliance does not preclude the fact that what 
the text has entertained in between is a purely subversive drive. In fact, as Craft finishes 
his essay, he stresses that even as Dracula is annihilated, little Quincey Harker, the 
legitimate result of a heterosexual union between Jonathan and Mina, remains a child 
curiously suggesting an offspring of the homoerotic union of the crew of light.3  
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Still, if we consider the question of the way in which the conception of the fin de 
siècle Gothic is formed by the critics nowadays, we may see that what triggers the 
process of forming this conception is exactly what we have been discussing so far. 
Namely, what triggers the process is discursive assertions about the text made 
beforehand and later on confirmed by the projection of the adopted theoretical 
framework. For instance, Craft’s statement that the Gothic demon seems capable of 
inverting the natural order, natural in inverted commas, discloses his postmodern 
perspective. The order which is disturbed by the vampire is ‘natural’ according to a 
certain grand narrative, but this may be noticed only by the present-day critic. As 
Baldick and Mighall observe, Craft’s reading of Dracula “is wholly dependent upon the 
a priori assumptions that vampirism is sexually subversive and that the ‘conventional’ 
Victorian patriarchs are the villains of the piece.”4 Such a reading is enabled only if we 
project the contemporary discursive framework on the text of the past. 
What could serve us as another example is, again, an introduction by Fred Botting 
and Dale Townshend, this time to the third volume of the Gothic series they edit. The 
text tellingly begins by presenting Bram Stoker’s Dracula and Sigmund Freud’s 
psychoanalysis as dominating the critical discussion of the nineteenth-century Gothic 
fiction. As the authors state, “[a]t once constructing and being constructed by their 
cultural and historical conditions, both confirm critical expectations regarding Victorian 
repression and the return of the repressed sexuality.”5 This is a very promising 
statement, as it seems to almost immediately point our attention to the critical projection 
of pre-formed assumptions and expectations on the Gothic text. Accidentally (or maybe 
not), Botting and Townshend acknowledge what Foucault tells us about our own 
perception of the Victorian prudes, namely, that we expect them to repress sexuality as 
this forms the basis for our own perception of ourselves as liberated. However, the 
above having been stated, the authors immediately return to confusing Freud and the 
Gothic, postulating the internalisation of the former by the latter. 
This becomes immediately visible as Botting and Townshend discuss the 
characteristic features of the nineteenth-century Gothic. The very first one they mention 
is the uncanny as theorised by Freud. Immediately, what becomes associated with the 
Gothic is the repressed. As the authors state, “[t]he relation between psychoanalysis and 
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Gothic fiction lies in the manner in which both disclose what ought to have remained 
concealed. Indeed, a Freudian topography inscribes itself neatly over Gothic writing 
[…]: beneath the surface of the conscious mind is a cesspool of seething appetites; in 
the closets of well-kept homes, scandals and secrets lurk.”6 The eighteenth-century 
ghost, expelled by Enlightenment reason in Radcliffe’s romances, as Botting and 
Townshend point out, becomes internalised in the psyche and turns into a 
“psychological aberration and pathology.”7 Thus, the vampire, having risen to its 
prominence and strength by the end of the century, “signifies an otherness beyond, 
beneath and disturbingly central to the cultural, familial and sexual limits it both defines 
and transgresses. […] coming from distant and almost oriental lands to cross the 
thresholds of English homes by invitation only, Dracula […] evokes the strangeness at 
the heart of bourgeois family life, setting loose the barely supressed impulses within 
them and thereby corrupting fragile mores and norms.”8 Showing a peculiar interest in 
women entertaining the breach of social decorum, he endangers bourgeois patriarchal 
society, but he also turns out to be the double of those who dare to exterminate him. 
And the extermination itself resembles the establishment of society through the act of 
patricide similar to that described by Freud in Totem and Taboo; the uncanny, as 
Botting and Townshend write, “returns only to be expelled.”9 
Evoking Totem and Taboo has a strange effect on the account. What immediately 
follows the act of patricide in Freud’s text, the act itself being fundamental to the 
establishment of society as we have known it ever since, is the (re)establishment of the 
totem by the sons, giving in to remorse.10 Botting and Townshend do observe that in the 
figure of the vampire, “culture and the law paradoxically discover both their limits and 
their ends.”11 But we could also notice that a reference to Totem and Taboo subtly 
subverts the overall representation of the vampire that the two critics give, as it also 
points out to a peculiar glorification of the returning uncanny instead of only its re-
enacted expulsion. Yet the critics do not follow this thread, limiting themselves to 
stating that the killing of Dracula is “coeval with Freud’s account of patricide and 
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primal violence.”12 In this way, they seem as if to turn from discussing the Gothic in 
psychoanalytical idiom to stressing the simultaneous emergence of psychoanalysis and 
the Gothic vampire. And, very soon, they turn away from the subversive potential of 
Dracula to the way his figure plays a productive function: “In disturbing the boundaries 
and securities of bourgeois modernity, […] the vampire does not serve as a harbinger of 
liberation […]. In serving metaphorically as the point of condensation for many 
Victorian fears, [it] plays a crucial role in the discursive production of sexuality during 
the nineteenth century.”13 What follows is a brief account of Foucault’s dealing with the 
repressive hypothesis, and the conclusion that, by elaborating on the vampire’s 
subversive perversity, the present-day criticism itself reaffirms the repressive 
hypothesis, proliferating the discourse it tries to liberate itself from.14 
This makes Botting and Townshend’s account an incredibly interesting one. As we 
may see, the critics do make use of Foucault’s remarks, pointing to the way in which 
criticism, trying to pursue its own, postmodern agenda of liberation, falls prey to the 
repressive hypothesis. But, on the other hand, as they reaffirm the positive character of 
the Victorian Gothic, Dracula’s taking part in the positive production of power, they do 
not preclude its affinity with psychoanalysis. On the one hand, this is because they 
report on the prevailing trends. And these trends, we must observe, do confirm what we 
have stated above, namely, that in the case of the fin de siècle Gothic, the critical 
conception of Gothic fiction remains informed by the discursive framework of the 
adopted methodology, psychoanalysis, to a large extent. However, on the other hand, 
they also give no alternative. The nineteenth-century Gothic of their account remains a 
‘psychoanalytical’ one, characterised by its doubles, uncanniness and the return of the 
repressed. As a result, we could ask ourselves the question: Why should the vampire 
stand primarily, as it seems to stand in the account, for sexuality? Perhaps it does. But if 
the critics limit the positive power of the vampire to that of encoding proper sexuality in 
a psychoanalytical vein, it is quite probable that they consider the text from the limited 
position of one discourse, simultaneously passing over other possible positive roles that 
the vampire might play. 
What Botting and Townshend’s account seems to lack in, perhaps for the sound 
reason of reporting on the prevalent trends, or perhaps due to an overreliance on the 
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Gothic theory as already established, is proper historical contextualisation. Such a 
contextualisation, carried out for instance in Miles’ The Great Enchantress, or 
Mighall’s The Geography of Victorian Gothic Fiction, both already mentioned in the 
course of this dissertation, could show the Gothic and psychoanalysis to stem, perhaps, 
from the same source, or even the same discursive order. However, at the same time, it 
would allow us to keep them separate, as they should be kept. What is more, a 
discursive contextualisation would allow us to pay attention to numerous other 
discourses that might be, perhaps, found manifesting themselves in the Gothic of the fin 
de siècle.  
Such an attention, a very close one, is paid to the discursive background of the fin de 
siècle, for instance, in Kelly Hurley’s The Gothic Body: Sexuality, materialism and 
degeneration at the fin de siècle. In the case of Hurley, as in the case of much of the 
contemporary Gothic criticism, what we may notice is the departure from premises that 
we have already discussed as deserving reconsideration. Hurley not only draws from 
Kristeva to theorise the concept of the abhuman.15 She also draws from Jackson to 
indicate that the discourse of the fantastic is an oppositional discourse.16 Yet, what she 
aims at in her study is “to specify the Gothic’s relationship (both contestatory and 
highly imbricated) to dominant ideologies of human identity found within the 
nineteenth century.”17 This is an interesting perspective, for while it assumes that 
Gothic might have played a role in the contestation and fragmentation of the above-
mentioned discourses, it also aims at contextualising it with regard to the positive 
processes in which it took part. It does emphasise the former above the latter, though, 
for, as Hurley states, “[t]he Gothic seemed at times to reinforce normative sexuality by 
representing such behaviors as aggressive femininity and homosexuality as monstrous 
and abhorrent [but] even within this register (a fundamentally anxious one), the Gothic 
                                                           
15
 Kelly Hurley, The Gothic Body: Sexuality, materialism and degeneration at the fin de siècle 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 4. However, it must be noted that Hurley 
simultaneously points to the ways in which Kristeva’s Powers of Horror could be historicised “itself by 
placing it on a continuum with other anguished responses to the particular brand of materialism that arose 
in the nineteenth century.” As she observes, “Kristeva’s revisionist psychoanalytical model of the subject 
(liminally human, fragmented, Thing-like, convulsed with symptoms) could not have been conceived 
without benefit of fin-de-siecle models of the abhuman subject drawn from both pre- or proto-Freudian 
psychology and a constellation of evolutionist discourse (p. 11). 
16
 Hurley, The Gothic Body, p. 7. Also, as Baldick and Mighall observe, her analysis rests on the 
assumption that the Gothic negotiates cultural anxieties, which they find to be “tautological.” Baldick and 
Mighall, “Gothic Criticism,” p. 221. 
17
 Hurley, The Gothic Body, p. 7. Emphasis mine. 
  312
served to multiply, and thus destabilize, the meanings of sexuality.”18 As a result, it both 
draws our attention towards the necessary contextualisation of the Gothic, and could 
itself constitute an interesting object of study with regard to the influences of the 
contemporary cultural theories on the conception of the Gothic. 
The aim which we set for this dissertation in the very beginning was to show that 
theory-oriented Gothic criticism actively re-works the Gothic. As we have seen, this 
indeed takes place through the process of object formation as described by Foucault. 
Whenever the Gothic is approached through a cultural theory, and the approach is not 
qualified by the consideration of the mode’s discursive background, its conception is 
constructed according to the discursive framework from within which the critic works. 
We could see this to take place on numerous occasions. Cultural theories, be they 
psychoanalysis, (which indeed can be identified to influence the structuring of the basic 
axioms of many contemporary representations of the Gothic mode), Marxism or 
feminism, do tend to re-conceptualise the texts of the past according to their own 
internal logic, as a result of which subversion is seen as the mode’s inherent feature. As 
a result, they pass over what they often cannot account for – the Gothic’s own 
discursive background. Or, they account for it, but appropriating it to their own 
reference framework, posing the statements that can be perceived as true, and discarding 
those which need to be perceived as false for the framework to make sense. In addition, 
the assumption of the mode’s anti-Enlightenment and anti-bourgeois attitude (which 
originates in the affiliation of the Gothic and Romanticism) is often incorporated within 
the conceptions of the Gothic structured through the lens of theory, for it indeed appears 
to be very useful from its perspective. As a result, those conceptions often turn out to be 
indeed structured around a ruse, a methodological blunder. And then, those conceptions 
often form the basis for yet further readings, and yet further conceptions, in the process 
of what appears to be a double discursive appropriation. The result is a re-shaping of the 
Gothic which, indeed, obscures our understanding of the mode instead of illuminating 
it. 
We cannot deny that the contemporary conceptions of the Gothic have been, and to a 
large extent, shaped by theory. And, above all, we cannot deny the fact that theory has 
often not only projected its tenets on the Gothic, but also contributed to the mode’s 
discursive re-construction. Acknowledging this appears to be our critical obligation. 
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Like and old parchment, the Gothic is then still partly a lost text, an obscured 
manuscript – and partly a text to be still uncovered. And perhaps that is why we may 
expect it to remain highly intriguing, and inviting exploration, for a yet long time. 
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Summary 
 
Niniejsza rozprawa poświęcona jest zagadnieniu wpływu teorii kulturowych na 
współczesne koncepcje literatury grozy. W rezultacie, bezpośrednim przedmiotem 
analizy są w niej teksty krytyczne. W tekstach tych badaniom podlegają możliwe 
wpływy teorii kulturowych na konceptualizacje zarówno poszczególnych tekstów grozy 
jak i literatury gotyckiej jako takiej. Perspektywa badawcza, przyjęta w niniejszej 
rozprawie, jest zatem bliska perspektywie nowego historyzmu. Opiera się ona w 
znacznej mierze na teorii dyskursu Michela Foucaulta oraz na jego koncepcji 
przedmiotu jako dyskursywnego konstruktu. Z tej perspektywy, krytyka literatury grozy 
funkcjonuje w obrębie dyskursu, czy też sama reprezentuje dyskurs, w wyniku czego 
aktywnie konstruuje własny przedmiot badań.  
Z przyjętego w rozprawie punktu widzenia, koncepcja literatury grozy postrzegana 
jest jako konstrukt powstały w procesie przekształcania i dopasowywania do 
określonych ram dyskursywnych. Aby uwidocznić ten proces, niniejsza praca 
przyjmuje, iż groza charakteryzuje się nade wszystko swą ‘współczesnością’: tym, że 
jest niezmiennie zanurzona w swym własnych kontekście historycznych, właściwym 
dla danej epoki i znanym zarówno autorowi, jak i bezpośredniemu odbiorcy. Co więcej, 
na kontekst ten składają się nie tyle dane wydarzenia historyczne, co współczesne 
tekstom grozy dyskursy – społeczne, polityczne, ekonomiczne i kulturowe. Wydaje się, 
że tylko poprzez uwzględnienie wpływu owych dyskursów na tekst grozy i jego odbiór, 
tekst taki może zostać odpowiednio skontekstualizowany i opisany.  
Przez teorie kulturowe rozumie się tu szereg szerszych perspektyw społeczno-
kulturowych do których od lat siedemdziesiątych dwudziestego wieku odwoływali się 
w swych analizach krytycy grozy. Najważniejszymi z nich wydają się psychoanaliza, 
Marksizm i feminizm i to im rozprawa poświęca najwięcej uwagi. Są to bowiem teorie, 
które wedle współczesnych przedstawień historii krytyki literatury grozy, pomogły 
ustanowić współczesny społeczno-kulturowy status literatury gotyckiej. 
Decyzja o skupieniu się na analizie tekstów krytycznych, nie literackich, jest 
wynikiem refleksji nad paradoksalnym, jak mogłoby się wydawać, statusem, jakim w 
dzisiejszych czasach cieszy się literatura grozy. Stanowi ona przedmiot rozległych 
badań od około półwiecza, umożliwiając badaczom wgląd zarówno w tło historyczno-
literackie poszczególnych tekstów, jak i w ogólną historię współczesnej kultury 
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zachodu. Jednakże, bardzo trudno jest odpowiedzieć choćby na tak proste pytanie, jak 
„Czym jest literatura gotycka?” Wydaje się, że mimo lat badań, jesteśmy coraz dalsi od 
udzielenia takich odpowiedzi. Fakt ten kieruje naszą uwagę na rolę krytyki literackiej w 
kształtowaniu postrzegania tekstu literackiego. Wydaje się, że koniecznym jest 
postawienie następującego pytania: dlaczego współcześni badacze grozy ukazują tą 
literaturę jako niedefiniowalną, wysoce zróżnicowaną i hybrydyczną, w stopniu 
uniemożliwiającym jej pełne uchwycenie i opisanie, pomimo całych lat owocnych 
badań?  
Niniejsza rozprawa przyjmuje jako swój punkt wyjścia założenie, że wyżej 
wspomniane teorie kulturowe, używane niejednokrotnie jako narzędzia analizy tekstu, 
dążą do odkrycia ponadczasowej prawdy, jednocześnie same będąc ‘bytami’ 
historycznymi. W wyniku tego, oparcie się na nich bez jednoczesnego uwzględnienia 
dyskursywnego tła danego tekstu prowadzi do przetworzenia i niejako ‘napisania’ 
owego tekstu na nowo, zgodnie z przyjętą perspektywą. Dzieje się tak, ponieważ krytyk 
literacki, w trakcie analizy, skupia się na tych elementach tekstu, na które wrażliwa jest 
dana teoria, pomijając te, których ramy dyskursywne, właściwe dla tej teorii, nie są w 
stanie objaśnić. Rezultatem jest przetworzenie tekstu grozy według ramy dyskursywnej 
współczesnej badaczowi, ale obcej dla samego tekstu. 
Niniejsze rozprawa, jednocześnie, sama oparta jest na teorii. Jej celem nie jest jednak 
odrzucenie teorii jako narzędzia badawczego. Zamiast tego, rozprawa przyjmuje 
stanowisko, że analiza teoretyczna musi być koniecznie poparta analizą historyczną. W 
ten sposób, możliwe jest uniknięcie projekcji założeń właściwych danej teorii na dany 
tekst. Dlatego też analizy prowadzone w trakcie rozprawy, siłą rzeczy, podparte są 
rozważaniami na temat dyskursów, które mogły mieć wpływ zarówno na powstanie jak 
i odbiór danych tekstów literackich w przeszłości. 
W rozprawie szczególny nacisk kładziony jest na rozważenie kwestii 
subwersywności literatury gotyckiej. Podczas gdy współczesna krytyka grozy ukazuje 
ową literaturę jako niemożliwą do pełnego zdefiniowania, mimo wszystko podkreśla 
subwersywność i transgresywność jako jej nieodłączne cechy charakterystyczne, czy 
wręcz ‘gatunkowe.’ Te, z kolei, znajdują odzwierciedlenie, z jednej strony, w założeniu 
niedefiniowalności literatury grozy (groza z natury podważa obowiązujące normy i 
przekracza granice gatunkowe), a z drugiej strony, w założeniu marginalizacji grozy 
(przy czym, fakt, że literatura grozy podlegała marginalizacji uznawany jest za dowód 
na jej ‘gatunkowe’ zaangażowanie w kontestację porządku społeczno-kulturowego, a 
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sama marginalizacja, za przejaw ‘wyparcia’). Jak się jednak okazuje, literatura gotycka 
jest nie tyle niemożliwa do zdefiniowania, co założenie niedefiniowalności okazuje się 
funkcjonalne w obrębie współczesnego dyskursu krytycznego. Pozwala ono bowiem na 
dowolne definiowanie badanego zjawiska, bez ryzyka powstania ogólnie przyjętej 
definicji, będącej swego rodzaju ograniczającą i zinstytucjonalizowaną ‘wielką 
narracją,’ z punktu widzenia której możliwe byłoby automatyczne wykluczenie 
konkretnych koncepcji jako ‘niewłaściwych.’ Co więcej, wydaje się, że niesłuszne jest 
uznanie charakteru grozy za opozycyjny, czy kontestacyjny na podstawie faktu, że była 
ona marginalizowana w dyskursach krytycznych przeszłości. Jak pokazuje niniejsza 
rozprawa, ani niedefiniowalność, ani postawa anty-oświeceniowa nie są cechami 
charakterystycznymi literatury grozy. Pozwalają, jednakże, współczesnym badaczom na 
konstruowanie zjawiska literackiej grozy w taki sposób, by potwierdzało ono ich 
własny punkt widzenia, czy mogło posłużyć realizacji ich własnych celów. 
Rozdział pierwszy rozprawy poświęcony jest analizie współczesnych przedstawień 
historii badań nad literaturą grozy. Takie przedstawienia bardzo często powielają 
pewien schemat, w którym podstawą dla określenia współczesnego statusu badacza jest 
stanowcze odcięcie się od perspektyw wcześniejszych pokoleń badaczy, dominujących 
przed rokiem 1980, a przyjęcie perspektywy charakteryzującej się ugruntowaniem 
analizy w dostępnych teoriach kulturowych. Jak ukazują współczesne historie badań 
nad grozą, to zmiana, raczej niż ewolucja, leży u podstaw współczesnego statusu 
zarówno literatury grozy jak i jej krytyki. Nakreślenie spójnego obrazu współczesnej 
dziedziny badań nad literaturą grozy – dziedziny ogromnie zróżnicowanej – jest z kolei 
możliwe poprzez przyjęcie założenia, że badania te wskazują na subwersywny charakter 
zjawiska, któremu są poświęcone. 
Rozdział drugi poświęcony jest, z kolei, ukazaniu kontr-historii, które świadczą o 
dużej samoświadomości współczesnej krytyki grozy. Szereg tekstów krytycznych, 
przytaczanych w tym rozdziale, wskazuje na fakt, że sami badacze, zwłaszcza ci 
analizujący literaturę grozy z punktu widzenia nowego historyzmu, stają się coraz to 
bardziej świadomi procesu przetwarzania, jakiemu podlega literatura gotycka w trakcie 
analizy z punktu widzenia teorii w przypadku, gdy nie ma miejsca odwołanie się do 
kontekstu historycznego danego tekstu. Szczególnie problematyczna okazuje się być 
pod tym względem psychoanaliza. Dostrzegany jest również fakt, że współczesne 
koncepcje grozy niejednokrotnie służą poparciu kontestacyjnych postaw samych 
badaczy.  
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Rozdział trzeci poświęcony jest metodologii badawczej niniejszej rozprawy. 
Metodologia ta opiera przede wszystkim na rozważaniach Michela Foucaulta nad 
dyskursem, które umożliwiają postrzegania krytyki literackiej jako swoistego dyskursu, 
w obrębie którego ma miejsce konstruowanie przedmiotu padań. Rozdział rozważa też 
przyjęte w rozprawie rozumienie ‘znaczenia’ tekstu jako ugruntowanego w tle 
dyskursywnym danej epoki, oraz rozważa współczesne ukazania historii badań nad 
grozą, oparte na odgrodzeniu się od wcześniejszych perspektyw, w świetle rozważań 
Stanleya Fisha nad zasadami jakie rządzą naszym postrzeganiem danej interpretacji jako 
właściwej. Rozdział proponuje też wytłumaczenie dla faktu, że krytyka literatury grozy 
wciąż zdaje się często dążyć do ‘odkrycia’ jednoznacznych prawd o swym przedmiocie 
badań. 
Rozdział czwarty omawia sposoby, w jakie sama myśl Foucaulta jest współcześnie 
wykorzystywana przez krytykę literacką w rozważaniach nad grozą. Z jednej strony, 
przytoczony zostaje przykład Roberta Milesa, który w swym studium „Gothic Writing, 
1750-1820. A Genealogy” odwołuje się do genealogii Foucaulta jako wyjątkowo 
skutecznej metody badawczej w przypadku literatury grozy i ukazuje w jaki sposób 
przyjęte w niniejszej rozprawie stanowisko metodologiczne zbliża się do i różni od tego 
przyjętego przez Milesa. Z drugiej strony, analizie podlegają przykłady tekstów 
krytycznych, w których myśl Foucaulta sama ulega przetworzeniu przez pryzmat 
przyjętej koncepcji literatury grozy. W wyniku tego, zamiast prowadzić do ukazania 
nowych faktów i związków, służy potwierdzeniu wcześniej obranego stanowiska. 
W końcu, rozdziały piaty i szósty poświęcone są, kolejno, analizie koncepcji 
niedefiniowalności i marginalizacji literatury grozy. Rozdział piąty analizuje szereg 
tekstów krytycznych, począwszy od studium J.M.S. Tompkins z pierwszej połowy 
dwudziestego wieku, a kończąc na studium Anne Williams z ostatniej dekady tego 
samego stulecia. W wyniku analiz, okazuje się, iż nie ma zasadniczej różnicy pomiędzy 
wczesną a współczesną krytyką grozy, ponieważ, bez względu na przyjęta perspektywę 
metodologiczną, obie konstruują literaturę grozy w odniesieniu do własnych ram 
dyskursywnych, tym samym ograniczając swój punkt widzenia do założeń właściwych 
tejże ramie. Co więcej, podczas gdy współcześni badacze starają się nie dopuścić do 
powstania ‘wielkiej narracji,’ która zdominowałaby ich dziedzinę badań, podjęte przez 
nich starania mające na celu ukazanie, że groza nie ogranicza się do zjawiska 
marginalnego i przelotnego, przyczyniają się do rozproszenia granic tego zjawiska i 
umożliwiają weryfikację istniejących koncepcji literatury gotyckiej. 
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Rozdział szósty, z kolei, ukazuje w jaki sposób marginalizacja grozy, mająca swój 
początek w osiemnastym wieku i negatywnej recepcji krytycznej wczesnych powieści 
gotyckich, uznawana jest przez współczesnych badaczy za oznakę i potwierdzenie 
subwersywności gatunku. Z tego punktu widzenia, literatura grozy zagraża porządkowi 
oświeceniowemu pod względem społecznym, moralnym i estetycznym, co czyni ja 
niezwykle bliską współczesnym badaczom i cenną dla badań nad formowaniem się 
tożsamości społeczno-kulturowej klasy średniej. Jednakże, rozdział ma na celu ukazać, 
że literatura grozy nie jest z założenia anty-oświeceniowa, ani nie kontestuje porządku 
społecznego narzuconego przez klasę średnią. Wręcz przeciwnie, wczesna powieść 
gotycka wpisuje się w tło dyskursywne swej epoki, odzwierciedlając zachodzące w niej 
przemiany społeczne, kulturowe, polityczne, a zwłaszcza ekonomiczne. Jako taka, 
okazuje się ona być zjawiskiem reprezentatywnym dla osiemnastowiecznej kultury 
brytyjskiej i często ucieleśniającym wartości klasy średniej, a nie otwarcie 
antagonistycznym. 
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